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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. Introduction
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research to conduct a thorough, independent study of the workers' disability
prevention and compensation system in Victoria. The methodology of this study is derived
from a decade-long series of over 20 studies published in the United States by the Workers
Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) of Cambridge, Massachusetts. The overall series is
designed to assist public policy makers and other interested participants in making informed
comparisons across jurisdictions. For that reason, the studies of individual systems use a
common outline and, to the extent possible, address the same basic issues of workers'
compensation system structure and function.
The Upjohn Institute, in partnership with the Workers' Compensation Board of British
Columbia, Canada, expanded the methodology over the past 5 years to encompass the
Canadian workers' compensation environment, and also broadened it to include issues of
funding, health care, rehabilitation, and occupational safety and health. Now we have adapted
this model to accommodate the unique features of the Victoria, Australia, workers'
compensation system. This report focuses the model for the first time outside North America
and also broadens the scope over any single previous study.
The research and analysis team included six workers' compensation experts; one
Australian, two Canadians, and three from the United States. The authors drew on their
experience with numerous similar studies and brought a collective total of well over 100 years
of experience with workers' compensation and prevention issues to this task. During the winter
of 1996, we conducted over 300 interviews with some 260 individuals who had substantial
experience hi and around the Victorian workers' compensation and occupational safety and
health systems.
The goal is to describe the operation of the system in such a way that the intelligent
Xlll

layperson can understand what it does and how it operates. We also endeavour to provide some
comparative perspective with other jurisdictions where that is relevant or necessary. The
descriptive material is for the Victorian system as it existed in July 1996, but historical data are
generally presented for the period 1985-86 to 1995-96. Because of the extensive changes in
structure in 1992, this study offers an opportunity to review the operation of a workers'
compensation system under two distinct regimes, as well as across varied economic and
political climates. In the final chapter we also provide our perspective on areas that might need
additional attention.
n. Structure
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) was created by the Accident Compensation
(WorkCover) Act of 1992, which completely restructured the workers' compensation system in
Victoria. The functions of the Authority are very comprehensive, ranging from administering
the WorkCover Authority Fund and licensing and regulating authorised insurers to fostering a
co-operative consultative relationship between management and labour in relation to the health,
safety, and welfare of persons at work.
The Act also establishes the WorkCover Authority Fund. It receives premium income,
investment income, penalties, and other income and is responsible for payment of
compensation and other payments, such as the costs of the Health and Safety Division (and the
predecessor Health and Safety Organisation), the costs of administration of the VWA, the costs
of the Medical Panels, and the costs of the County Court, Magistrates' Court, and the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal arising from the operation of the Act.
The WorkCover Authority Fund operates as a re-insurer bearing the full underwriting
risk of the scheme. The day-to-day collection of premiums and payment of compensation
benefits under the Act are conducted by "authorised insurers." The Authority has the power to
appoint and terminate such agents. In July 1996, there were 14 authorised insurers operating in
Victoria. Their performance is monitored and regulated by the Scheme Regulation Division of
the VWA.
The Health and Safety Division (HSD) is responsible for administering health and
xiv

safety legislation in Victoria, primarily the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, the
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994. HSD undertakes
activities aimed at improving health and safety in workplaces, strives to improve health and
safety in the agricultural and farming sector, and facilitates public safety. A significant focus of
HSD is regulating the transport, handling, and storage of dangerous goods and hazardous
substances, including the notification and registration of premises and the licensing of drivers
carrying dangerous goods.
The VWA has a comprehensive communications strategy which is designed to acquire
and convey information to all major stakeholders. The stated purposes of this strategy are to
create and maintain stakeholder support; minimise the frequency, severity and cost of
workplace injuries; increase the rate at which injured employees return to work and improve
their maintenance at work; and encourage quality service by insurers and providers. The
VWA's Corporate Affairs Division has run a series of high-profile advertising campaigns
aimed at establishing a sustained culture of safety within Victorian workplaces. The campaigns
are grounded in comprehensive research and market testing. Their effectiveness is tested by
market awareness surveys and changes in the number of recorded claims. Market awareness
recently was found to be 80 percent, and a continued decrease in claims reported is attributed
partly to the communication effort.
HI. Insurance Regulation
The underlying philosophy of the WorkCover scheme is important to understanding its
regulatory institutions and evaluating their performance. The premise is that the state needs to
bear the underwriting risk and closely manage the provision of workers' compensation
insurance to ensure that coverage is readily available to all employers at the lowest possible
cost while serving the overall social goals of the system. The shortcomings of the private
system before 1985 are a legacy that helps to explain the perspective that the government needs
to take a close hand in guiding the system. At the same time, the serious problems encountered
with the public WorkCare system from 1985 through 1992 and the government's stated desire

xv

to return more autonomy to the private sector have resulted in the current mixed public-private
WorkCover system.
In addition to administering the WorkCover scheme, the VWA performs some of the
functions that might otherwise be performed by private insurers. These functions include
bearing risk through reinsurance, pricing, funding claims, reserve analysis, investment
management, and compilation and analysis of claims data. Insurers perform essentially all of
the client service functions that would be performed in a traditional private insurance market
environment. These functions include marketing, sales, underwriting, premium collection, loss
prevention, claims adjustment and payments, litigation, case management, setting reserves, and
data analysis and statistical reporting.
The VWA confronts a significant "principal-agent" problem in inducing authorised
insurers to promote scheme objectives. In some respects, the VWA and insurers operate as
partners in working together to provide workers' compensation insurance to employers and
their workers. In other respects, the VWA acts like a traditional regulator in ensuring that
insurers' actions comply with scheme requirements and serve the goals of the scheme. This
gives rise to some regulatory issues for the VWA that are not present with pure private or pure
government workers' compensation insurance systems.
The challenge for the VWA is to implement a cost-effective set of conduct and
performance measures, regulations, agreements, standards, penalties, and rewards that will
induce insurers and employers to maximise scheme objectives. The VWA's primary tools to
influence insurer behaviour are (1) the licence agreement; (2) audits; (3) licence actions and
penalties; and (4) the Best Practice Incentive (BPI) scheme. With the exception of BPI, these
mechanisms are more oriented towards conduct than outcomes.
The authority sets aside a certain amount of funds in a service fee pool which is
allocated to insurers according to their market share for each quarter. For the 1995/96 financial
year, the VWA allocated $72.3 million in service fees. The market share formula credits an
insurer $115 for every policy it writes, plus 5.3 percent of the premiums derived from the
policies. This effectively sets an average payment which each insurer receives for servicing a
given policy or portfolio of policies.
xvi

The Best Practice Incentive scheme sets performance standards and provides financial
rewards to insurers for meeting these standards and/or improving their performance. For 199596 the measures were (1) the cost of claims as a percentage of industry premiums; (2)
premiums collected as a percentage of the premiums to be collected; (3) the percentage of
reported claims referred to conciliation; and (4) claims duration. Insurers receive points for
meeting or exceeding performance benchmarks set by the VWA in monitored areas and
financial rewards are paid according to the number of points an insurer receives. For the
1995/96 financial year, the total BPI pool was $6 million although payments were reportedly
less.
Employers are required to carry workers' compensation coverage, which they can
purchase through an authorised insurer, or they can receive approval from the VWA to selfinsure. Employers must take responsibility for compliance with statutory requirements, employ
safety measures to reduce losses, and assist in returning injured employees to work. Producers,
i.e., agents and brokers, serve as intermediaries between some employers and insurers and
facilitate insurance transactions. Vendors of risk management, health care, and rehabilitation
services function and compete much as they do in other systems.
The VWA determines the price or rate charged for workers' compensation insurance.
This effectively eliminates direct price competition as a determinant of market performance.
The rate to be charged is promulgated by the VWA in a "premiums order" every year.
Victoria's pricing formula has been characterised as the purest experience rating system
utilised in Australia. It uses an unweighted three-year average that balances sensitivity to
changing experience against stability. The experience component is weighted by employer size
(payroll), so that small employers' rates are based less on their own experience and more on
the industry and class experience. With the exception of a $50 minimum premium, there are no
size- or risk-related adjustments such as policy or loss constants, premium discounts, or
schedule rating.
The overall cost of the WorkCover scheme is a principal concern of most stakeholders.
Even workers and non-insurance providers have a stake in this, as rising costs will increase
pressure to lower benefits and services. To the extent that costs can be minimised by effective
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loss prevention and return-to-work strategies, more resources are available to pay benefits and
provide additional services to injured workers.
The decrease in the published rate from 2.4 percent of payroll in 1987 to 1.80 percent
in 1997 combined with the elimination of a massive unfunded liability is a remarkable
accomplishment; the latter is the lowest rate among Australian states. Over the period 19941996, the average annual ratio of claims payments to premiums was 81.1 percent. This ratio
suggests a relatively efficient level of performance that is commensurate with the experience in
competitive workers' compensation insurance markets hi North America.
Several factors have contributed to this improvement. One is system reforms under
WorkCover supported by the public communication strategy mentioned earlier. Another is
refinement of the pricing formula and experience rating system to increase employers'
incentives to reduce losses. A third factor is VWA and insurer efforts to encourage loss
prevention and improve case management. Public dissatisfaction with the abuses under
WorkCare and the change in the culture pervading workers' compensation insurance have also
helped to discourage "rorting" of the system.
IV. Weekly Benefits
A worker is entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act if there is
an injury arising out of or in the course of employment and if the worker's employment was a
significant contributing factor. A worker's dependents are entitled to compensation if an injury
arising out of or in the course of employment was a significant contributing factor in, results
in, or materially contributes to the death of the worker.
There is a requirement that notice of injury be given to the employer. A claim for
compensation for weekly benefits must be served as soon as practicable, for death benefits
within 2 years after the date of death, and for medical and like services within 6 months after
the date of the service. A claim for weekly benefits must be accompanied by a certificate
issued by a medical practitioner.
In a claim for weekly payments, the employer must accept or reject the claim within 10
days of its receipt. The employer must forward to the insurer any claim for benefits for death,
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maims, or for medical and like services within 10 days of receipt of the claim. Claims for
weekly benefits need to be forwarded to the insurer where either the employer rejects the claim
or the claim is likely to exceed the employer's responsibility of $416 in 1996-97 (indexed
annually).
An employer's decision to accept or reject a claim does not prejudice the insurer's
decision as to liability. The insurer has 28 days from the date of receipt of the claim to accept
or reject the claim and to give the worker written notice of the decision. If no written notice is
given within that time, the claim is deemed to be accepted. Reasons for a decision to reject the
claim must be given.
An injured worker entitled to weekly compensation under WorkCover will receive a
benefit that is tied to his/her pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). The PIAWE is the
worker's average weekly earnings for the previous 12 months, if employed continuously by
that employer. It is calculated at the worker's ordinary time rate of pay for the worker's
normal number of hours per week. Allowances such as overtime payments, shift differentials,
hazard duty allowances or dirt money are not included in considering the injured worker's
PIAWE. All weekly benefit payments are treated as ordinary taxable income.
Weekly benefits are paid according to three distinct phases, i.e., the first 26 weeks of
incapacity, after 26 weeks of incapacity, and after 104 weeks in which a weekly benefit has
been paid or is payable to the worker. During the first 26 weeks of incapacity, the worker is
entitled to the lesser of 95 percent of his/her PIAWE or the weekly maximum benefit ($664 per
week as of 1 July 1996). Cash benefits for the first 10 days of incapacity are the responsibility
of the employer, not of the insurer, and are referred to as the "employer excess." Though
employers may select a "buy-out" option that will insure them for the first 10 days of benefits,
few employers choose to purchase it. It is the practice in many industries for employers to
"top-up" the benefit to 100 percent of pre-injury earnings, at least for the first 26 weeks. If the
worker is partially incapacitated, the worker is entitled either to the difference between $664
and the worker's earnings, or to the difference between 95 percent of the PIAWE and
earnings, whichever is lesser.
The most significant feature of Victoria's benefit scheme, and unique in Australia (or
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elsewhere so far as we know), is an adjustment of the benefit at 26 weeks according to whether
or not the worker has a "serious injury." Workers with a "serious injury" qualify for a weekly
benefit of 90 percent of PIAWE, subject to the weekly maximum. Workers with a partial
disability that is not deemed "serious" receive only 60 percent of PIAWE. Workers who are
deemed "totally incapacitated" qualify for a weekly benefit of 70 percent of PIAWE. This
means that a judgment needs to be made at this stage regarding the degree of the worker's
impairment. This provision is designed to foster a significant incentive to return to work for
those who might be able to do so after 26 weeks, without placing that pressure on persons with
more significant impairments.
The "serious injury" threshold for purposes of the 26-week rate adjustment is an
impairment that is rated at 30 percent or more by the standard of the American Medical
Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (2nd edition). The presence
of a "serious injury" is also a necessary condition for a worker to have access to the common
law remedy. The 1992 law also provided that weekly benefits would be terminated after 104
weeks of incapacity, unless either of two situations existed at that point. Weekly benefits would
not be terminated at 104 weeks if the worker was either "seriously injured" or totally and
permanently incapacitated. Thus, only workers with 30 percent impairment or greater receive
benefits beyond 2 years.
Since enactment of the 1992 legislation, aggregate payments for weekly benefits have
fallen sharply. First, the number of new claims for benefits declined significantly in the period
after 1 December 1992 to less than half the previous level by 1995-96. Second, the number of
long-term recipients has been reduced by 40 percent, a major goal of the 1992 change.
Additionally, WorkCover has been able to shorten the average length of time that persons stay
on weekly benefits. Weekly benefit payments constituted 36 percent of claim costs in 1995-96
totalling $259 million.
The success in curbing long-term claims (claims with over 260 days of compensation) is
quite remarkable. Long-term claims were developing at a rate of 5,000-6,000 per year in the
decade before WorkCover's enactment. By 1993-94, the rate had fallen below 2,000 per year,
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and it has continued to drop since. In December 1992, there were 16,600 long-term claims
open in Victoria. By 30 June 1996, the number of open long-term claims was 9,997.
V. Maims
The Table of Maims lists 46 impairments ranging in severity from quadriplegia or the
total loss of two limbs or both eyes, to the loss of a joint of a lesser toe. The maximum benefit
payable for a maim, as of 1 July 1996 is $102,460. For each impairment, a percentage or
range of percentages is listed. For example, the total loss of the right arm is listed as 80
percent. Thus, a worker who lost the right arm would be entitled to a lump sum benefit of
$81,968 (0.8 x $102,460). If the worker lost a fraction of the arm, that fraction, applied to
$81,968 would be the maims benefit paid as a lump sum. This would be in addition to any
weekly benefits that the worker received, and the worker also might seek further compensation
under common law.
In Victoria, no-fault pain and suffering benefits were expressly included in the 1992
legislation. Benefits under this section are available only to workers with injuries listed in the
Table of Maims. In keeping with several significant features of the WorkCover law, a benefit
for pain and suffering is available only to workers whose maun has been a significant one. As
of 1 July 1996, the threshold for access to a benefit for pain and suffering is a maims award of
$11,000 or higher. Thus, a worker with a non-back impairment rated at below 11 percent, or
an 18 percent back impairment (yielding less than an 11 percent whole person rating) is not
entitled to an award.
Lump sum maims benefits have grown substantially over time. One simple measure of
this is the changing value of total maims payments per year from $5.2 million in 1986-87 to
$104.1 million hi 1995-96. In recent years, a significant portion of the increase has been
associated with benefits for pain and suffering. However, it is also due simply to the growth in
maims payment claims. Maims payments constituted 14 percent of claim payments in 1995-96.
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VI. Medical and Like Benefits
Workers in Victoria who sustain a work injury have free choice of their medical
provider. The injured worker is entitled to have the reasonable costs of medical and like
services paid fully. Medical services are defined in the law and include the attendance,
examination or treatment of any kind of medical practitioner, or a (registered) dentist,
optometrist, physiotherapist, chiropractor, osteopath or chiropodist. In addition, medicines,
appliances, and prostheses are covered, as are other services that are not defined but are
available if they have been requested by a medical practitioner. For a worker who receives
compensation only for medical and like services (i.e., no weekly benefits), benefits cease 52
weeks after the date of injury.
There was rapid growth hi medical and like services costs from 1986-87 to 1992-93,
with much of the growth occurring early in that period. In the past 3 years, under WorkCover,
health care costs have fallen substantially. Much of the decline is associated with the reduction
in claims for compensation that occurred in the wake of the 1992 legislation. Some of the
decline reflects the increased employer deductible for medical and like services, which has
been increased annually since 1986 through indexation. As of 1 July 1996, it stood at $416.
Though aggregate expenditures paid for medical and like services have declined, they have not
declined as rapidly as claims have. Medical and rehabilitation costs constituted 18 percent of
system claim costs in 1995-96.
VII. Dispute Resolution
The agency does not adjudicate disputes. Instead, the WorkCover Authority seeks to
minimise the incidence of disputes and, when they arise, to have them settled rapidly by the
parties with a minimum of transaction costs. Where that does not succeed, as must occur on
occasion, the dispute is resolved in the courts.
To assist the parties and achieve their goals, the VWA depends heavily on a system of
Medical Panels, in order to bring to bear some objectivity and professional expertise on
disputes arising over medical matters. A quasi-independent Conciliation Service is empowered
to assist the parties in finding common ground. Disputes that are not resolved at that stage, and
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those emanating from common law actions enter the court process. A small number of disputes
over some specialized issues can be resolved, if not at the Conciliation Service, at the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The purpose of the Conciliation Service is to help the parties resolve their disputes,
thereby eliminating the need to litigate the matter at court. It functions by involving workers,
employers, and insurers hi an informal and non-adversarial process that aims to lead to a
mutually acceptable agreement.
Most requests for conciliation are initiated by workers who have been advised by the
insurer of a decision that is regarded as adverse to them. However, any party to a dispute, i.e.,
the insurer, the employer, the worker, or the Authority, may refer a matter to conciliation. A
party has 60 days from notice by the insurer of its decision to lodge a request for conciliation.
When a "Request for Conciliation" form is submitted, a referral certificate is issued within 7
days, putting all parties on notice. On occasion, this will be sufficient to cause the disputing
parties to agree to settle, particularly where such cases may involve not a dispute so much as
the need for clarification or a better explanation of a decision. After the initial 7 days have
passed, a date is set for a conciliation conference.
The Conciliation Conference will bring together the insurer, the worker, and frequently
the employer. The worker and the employer are entitled to be accompanied by a friend or
relative or some other person to assist them at the conference. Union representatives, for
example, often serve as an assistant for the worker. Significantly, neither a worker nor an
employer is entitled to be accompanied by a solicitor. If a party wishes to have their solicitor
present, approval must be given by both the contending party and the Conciliation Officer.
Such requests can and have been granted, particularly where it seems clear that the opportunity
to reach a settlement is greater where the worker has ready access to counsel.
If a solicitor does join the worker at a Conciliation Conference, his/her fee cannot be
paid by the contending party. Since costs are not allowed as part of the conciliation process,
either the worker must pay the solicitor or the solicitor must offer to serve without pay. Some
solicitors say that they charge no fee for conciliation work where the client is a member of
certain labour unions.
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The Conciliation Conference may enable the parties to move to an agreement. In some
cases, the agreement is shaped at the conference. In other instances, negotiations between the
parties may occur after the conference has occurred, possibly prior to a scheduled subsequent
conference. If the dispute involves a medical question, the Conciliation Officer may refer it to
a Medical Panel.
It is quite remarkable that this agency operates with virtually no backlog and that it can
generally accommodate the rigorous requirement that applications be conferenced within 28
days of their receipt. In its first 2 years, between 80 and 85 percent of its cases (excluding
applications where conciliation did not proceed or there was no jurisdiction) were resolved,
dropping to 65 percent in 1994-95 and 67 percent in 1995-96. This is an impressive
performance.
Medical Panels are independent of the VWA, though their budget flows from it. The
primary responsibility of a medical panel is to give its opinion on any medical question. The
definition of "medical question" consists of 9 items identified in the statute. A Conciliation
Officer, the County Court, the VWA, or an authorised insurer or self-insurer may require a
worker seeking or receiving compensation to submit themselves for examination by a Medical
Panel. If the worker unreasonably refuses to meet the Panel and answer its questions, to supply
relevant documents to the Panel, or to submit to a medical examination by a member of the
Panel, the worker may lose the right to payments or have them suspended.
The Panel can consist of one to three members. Each Panel member examines the
patient, usually separately. After examination of the claimant and an evaluation of any relevant
material supplied, each Panel member prepares a preliminary report. These reports are
exchanged, and based upon subsequent communication between or among the panelists, a
consensus is reached, which serves as the basis for the Panel's findings.
The opinion of the Medical Panel is binding on the insurer. Once the Panel's certificate
is issued, the insurer must make an offer within 14 days that is consistent with (or better than)
the Panel's findings. However, the Panel's opinion is not binding on the claimant. If the
dispute remains, i.e., the insurer's offer is not acceptable to the claimant, the Conciliation
Service may become involved.
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One goal of the Medical Panels has been to expedite the resolution of disputes. The
statute provides some tight time lines for this process. A Medical Panel must form its opinion,
in the form of a certificate, within 21 days after the referral is made. Further, the Panel has
7 days after forming its opinion to provide it to the relevant persons. This has proven to be
infeasible, and sizable delays exist in the process. In 1995-96, the median delay had grown to
160 days. There are several reasons for this, but a key has been that the system has been vastly
overburdened since 1994 by a requirement (introduced in 1994) that maims disputes be
referred to a Medical Panel before proceeding to court.
In 1996, the Act was amended to refer claims for maims to the Conciliation Service
rather than Medical Panels. Though the Conciliation Officer may refer disputes over "medical
questions " to a Medical Panel and the opinion of the Panel is binding on the parties,
detennining the extent of disability under Section 98 or of pain and suffering under Section
98A are not "medical questions." Also, the courts have not been completely supportive
regarding the binding nature of the findings on the parties.
VIII. Common Law
Though access to the common law on behalf of employees against their employers is
absolutely barred in many jurisdictions, the Australian experience is more of a continuum;
such actions are barred completely in South Australia and the Northern Territory; with limited
access or benefits hi Victoria, the Commonwealth (Comcare, SeaCare), New South Wales, and
Western Australia; and unlimited access or benefits in Queensland, Tasmania, and the
Australian Capitol Territory.
Access to common law was generally narrowed by the WorkCover legislation, though
elements of the law did broaden some parts of it. The law was enlarged to give workers access
to common law for damages to their loss of earning capacity. However, damages can be
awarded against an employer in such cases only where they exceed $32,860; a cap on such
damages is set at $739,690 for 1996-97. Common law damages for pain and suffering also are
not to be awarded if damages are assessed at less than $32,860. The ceiling on common law
awards for pain and suffering is $333,420 as of 1 July 1996.
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The most significant change with WorkCover was the requirement that the injury be
found to be a "serious injury" in order for the worker to have access to damages under
common law. A huge inflow of claims for damages in late 1992 and early 1993 primarily were
from those who believed that they would not be found to have a serious injury, thereby
becoming ineligible for common law recovery for injuries after the effective date of
WorkCover. Of course, the question of "serious injury" simply deals with the issue of access,
and not with the need to prove negligence, the amount of damages, or the need to prove that
the employment was a "substantial contributing factor."
With WorkCover, the expectation was that the number of common law cases would
drop off precipitously. Although a substantial reduction has occurred over what would have
been the expected volume in the absence of the 1992 legislation, workers' solicitors have
learned how to widen access to the common law. This, in combination with certain judicial
determinations, has meant that common law still represents an important component of work
injury compensation in Victoria. Common law damage payments and associated legal costs
constituted about 19 percent of claim costs in 1995-96.
IX. Courts
With only a few exceptions, the Courts (Magistrates' and County) of Victoria are
empowered to determine any matter or question under the Workers' Compensation Act 1958 or
the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (as amended). The Magistrates' Court cannot hear death
claims, and it is limited to matters and directions concerning sums not to exceed $40,000 or
104 weeks of weekly benefits. Except for claims for death benefits, proceedings must not
commence in Magistrates' or County Courts unless the matter has been referred to conciliation
and either 28 days have expired since the date of referral or a Conciliation Officer has issued a
certificate indicating that all action in respect of conciliation has been taken.
A party to proceedings before the County Court may appeal a decision to the Court of
Appeal/Supreme Court on a question of law. That party has 21 days from the date of the
determination to serve notice of their intent to appeal. The appeal application must be lodged
within 6 months of either the determination being appealed or the leave obtained to appeal by
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the Supreme Court. The County Court's determination is not stayed by the filing of a notice of
an intent to appeal or the lodging of the appeal. However, if a County Court's determination to
pay compensation benefits (other than weekly benefits) is appealed, it will allow payment to be
postponed, depending upon the progress of and the outcome of the appeal.
In proceedings regarding maims and pain and suffering, where the judgment for
payment of compensation by the Court is equal to or less that the final offer made by the
insurer, the Court must order that the worker pay the insurer's costs, and it must not order that
the insurer pay the worker's costs. Where the insurer's final offer is less than the amount
ordered by the Court, the County Court must order that the insurer pay the worker's costs.
X. Occupational Rehabilitation
Physical, psychological, and occupational rehabilitation are provided for within the
legislation; hi the Victorian context "occupational rehabilitation" refers to specific, defined
services within the general rubric of rehabilitation. The current status of occupational
rehabilitation services in Victoria also must be read in light of the evolution from its
predecessor, the WorkCare organisation. Many of the features, processes, and outcomes are a
direct response to the perceived shortcomings of earlier systems.
Return to work with the accident employer is the over-riding goal, and this message is
reflected hi legislation, publications, and policies. As a regulator rather than a provider of
rehabilitation services, the VWA's imperative is to set standards of service, monitor
compliance, and ensure equitable outcomes. As the manager of the central fund, the scheme
must also pay for the services (through the insurers), maintain adequate reserves for current
and future rehabilitation costs, and monitor both utilisation and outcomes.
Financial benefits for workers engaged in rehabilitation activities are identical to the
benefits prescribed for all workers under the Act. Benefits continue for a period of up to 1
year, while engaged in authorised occupational rehabilitation activities. The cooperation of the
worker is mandated by the Act, which requires a worker to make every "reasonable effort" to
return to work a in suitable employment" and to participate in occupational rehabilitation
service or a return-to-work plan. "Suitable employment" is defined as work for which the
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worker is suited having regard to the nature of the worker's incapacity and pre-injury
employment, age, education, skills, work experience, place of residence, medical condition,
return-to-work plan, and occupational rehabilitation services being provided. The definition
specifically adds "whether or not that work is available."
One of the most notable aspects of the system is the high level of responsibility that the
scheme places on employers. Where the Disability Management movement internationally and
the Total Injury Management concept defined by the Heads of Workers Compensation
Authorities' National Consistency Programme (HWCA, 1996) encourage return-to-work and
occupational rehabilitation, the legislation and policies of the VWA mandate these as employer
responsibilities. The insurer's role is supportive and facilitative to the employer's
responsibility. With few exceptions, employers are required to make all initial payments for
medical and like costs, including rehabilitation costs. These expenditures count towards the
employer's "deductible" of $416 in 1996-97.
By 20 calendar days following an injury, an employer must prepare a return-to-work
plan and nominate a return-to-work coordinator. Within a 90-day period after that, an
employer must establish a written occupational rehabilitation plan in consultation with the
worker. It includes a statement of the employer's return-to-work policy, the name of the
return-to-work coordinator, and at least one provider of occupational rehabilitation services.
The plan must include an estimated return-to-work date, an offer of suitable employment, and
the steps to be taken to facilitate the worker's return, including any occupational rehabilitation
services that are reasonably necessary to assist the worker in returning to and remaining at
work.
Workers are entitled to return to work within 12 months with the accident employer in
suitable employment. The employer, however, can be relieved of this responsibility if it can
satisfy the Authority that it is "not possible for the employer to provide suitable employment."
Failure to re-employ a worker may result in penalties of up to $25,000.
In Victoria, there is also a significant number of workers whose injury is profound,
resulting in total permanent impairment. Many of these cases have been inherited from
previous incarnations of the workers' compensation system in Victoria. In many cases, the
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employer is no longer active. The direction, management, and administration of the worker's
ongoing needs is a shared responsibility between the authorised insurer and the VWA. Either
may contract for occupational rehabilitation or other rehabilitation services for these workers.
Cases that have needs beyond the defined occupational rehabilitation services may be
referred to community-based programmes and services, some of which are funded by the
VWA. These agencies may offer support and services to the injured worker, family members,
and others who may be affected by the injury but who are beyond the scope of the Act.
The overall "return to work rate" (RTW) for the VWA is reported at 86 percent for
1995-96 a figure that compares well with other jurisdictions (including South Australia and
New South Wales) and is a startling improvement over the 54 percent RTW rate reported
under the WorkCare system in 1992. The quality of these RTW rates are also relatively high,
with same employer/same duties placement at 66 percent.
XI. Prevention
The Health and Safety Division of the VWA (HSD), formerly the independent Health
and Safety Organization, derives its authority from several pieces of legislation, including the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994, Dangerous
Goods Act 1985, and Road Transport (Dangerous Goods) Act 1994, Collectively, these acts
impose duties on employers, manufacturers and suppliers of plant and chemicals, and
occupiers of premises to achieve and maintain general health and safety standards. The acts
provide a broad framework for the imposition of specific regulatory controls.
The participation of workers in decisions concerning their own health and safety at
work is central to the strategy for prevention. This is achieved through the election of health
and safety representatives (HSRs) and the establishment of health and safety committees in
individual workplaces. Through negotiation between employers and their workers, designated
work groups (DWGs) may be established in workplaces from which health and safety
representatives are elected by the workers. The Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
provides such representatives the right to inspect any part of the workplace at which members
of the relevant DWG work, receive relevant information, and be consulted on proposed
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changes to the workplace that may affect health and safety. HSRs may even issue a provisional
improvement notice to the employer if they believe that the Act or regulations are being
contravened. This requires the employer to rectify the breach within a specified time frame.
The employer has the right of appeal to an HSD inspector.
The Act also provides for HSRs to be involved in the resolution of health and safety
issues in the workplace. It envisages employers and workers agreeing on procedures for the
resolution of issues; if there are no agreed procedures, the OHS (Issue Resolution) Regulations
1989 provide a procedure. Where there is an immediate threat to the health and safety of any
person, the HSR may stop the work following consultation with the employer's representative.
Health and safety committees may also be established at the request of the HSR. The
composition, role, and function of these committees is flexible in the Act, which sets out only
minimum requirements. It is for the parties in the workplace to agree on what is most
appropriate for their circumstances.
The law provides for penalties for contravention of the Act or regulations. These
penalties are currently set at a maximum of $40,000 for bodies corporate and $10,000 for
individuals. For certain serious breaches the maximum is set at $250,000 for bodies corporate
and $50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 5 years for individuals. Additional summary
penalties may be imposed for repeat offenders. There is also a provision for infringement
notices (on-the-spot fines), but regulations to give effect to this provision have not been
promulgated.
A separate Dangerous Goods Act covers the special nature of risks arising from
dangerous goods (e.g., explosives, flammable materials, and corrosive substances). It applies
generally both to workplace and non-workplace situations. The Equipment (Public Safety) Act
mirrors the provisions of the OHS Act in relation to prescribed equipment operated in nonworkplace situations. It places duties on proprietors, manufacturers, designers, importers,
suppliers, and persons in charge of prescribed equipment.
The VWA's decisions about the suitability of health and safety issues for regulation are
primarily guided by decisions taken by the National Occupational Health and Safety
Commission (NOHSC). NOHSC develops National Standards which are then implemented by
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the various jurisdictions in the way that is most appropriate within their own legislative
frameworks.
WorkCover inspectors have the power to visit any place in Victoria covered by the
health and safety Acts. The legislation provides inspectors with broad and far-reaching powers.
They have the right of entry, without the need for a search warrant, to workplaces and to sites
where there is high-risk equipment or dangerous goods. They can exercise this right at all
reasonable times, both day and night. It is a violation for anyone to refuse access to an
inspector, or to obstruct, hinder, or oppose an inspector. In conducting a visit, an inspector can
be assisted by other people, including technical or scientific experts, interpreters, or police
officers.
The VWA has an extensive database which it uses to target its prevention activities.
HSD uses the data to develop a list of the top 20 injury-producing industries each year, to
assist in targeting both high-risk industries and specific high-incidence injuries within these.
The Division recognises that this system is not capable of providing targeting data by
enterprise or workplace, however. To correct this shortcoming, a new system called SATS
(Site Assessment Targeting System) has been developed to record inspector assessments of a
workplace's risk elements (hygiene, plant, manual handling, dangerous goods, location), health
and safety management system, compliance performance, and risk control measures. The
objective is to develop a profile or scorecard for each site and to use this as a guide to target
future interventions.
HSD provides a full range of services including inspection, investigation, information,
advisory, licensing, and training. They are resourced with 304 people, of which 170 are field
inspectors and 15 are information officers. These 185 positions deliver the front-line service.
In the period March 1995 through February 1996, inspections totalled 46,141.
XE. Attention Points
These attention points are identified as such because they represent special strengths of
the system or because they warrant, at least in our opinion, additional attention by those who
seek to improve the system. We hope that the issues we identify for attention here will resonate
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with decision makers in Victoria. However, we purposely do not prescribe cures for problems
identified; we believe this is the responsibility of the stakeholders in the system.
For purposes of exposition, we have grouped our observations into the broad categories
of (1) general issues; (2) insurer regulation issues; (3) compensation issues; (4) rehabilitation
issues; and (5) prevention issues. Within each of these categories, the attention points are
numbered for convenient reference. However, the points are not presented in priority order.

General (G)
We begin with a set of observations that relate to the general approach and the
accomplishments of the VWA over the period from late 1992 to the present.
G-l. Amazing Transformation
In just a few short years, the VWA has transformed a workers' compensation system
characterised by a "compo" philosophy, uncontrolled claims incidence, excessive durations of
disability, and runaway costs to one that appears to be sustaining a level of performance that
would have been unimaginable 5 years ago. The leadership of the VWA and the Ministry
deserve much of the credit for this turnaround. Their vision and consistency of purpose have
been remarkable.
G-2. Historical Opportunity
While much has been accomplished, this is not the time for the VWA to rest on its
laurels. The merger of the former Health and Safety Organisation and the VWA in 1996
creates a historical opportunity for a thorough and careful rethinking of system parameters.
Bringing the mission and operations of HSD into the VWA will prove challenging, but if it can
be done with the kind of creative thinking that has characterised the past 5 years, it can move
the entire organisation to new heights of achievement.
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G-3. Cultural Change through Media
We are not aware of any other workers' compensation system in the world that has used
media more aggressively or more effectively than has the VWA. Their use of the power of the
media to effect a reversal in the "compo" culture that characterised Victoria's workers'
compensation system previously is unprecedented, and a valuable model for other systems
around the world.
G-4. Stakeholder Input
Our interviews revealed that labour and management, as well as other stakeholders,
have perceived a problem over consultation with the VWA and policy makers. We believe the
system hi Victoria has matured sufficiently that further improvements will depend upon
participation and ownership by stakeholders. Thus, it seems that it is time to move to a more
open, consultative policy development process.
Insurer Regulation (I)
There are a number of issues which emerged from our review of the insurer regulation
procedures at the VWA. It is difficult to forecast how future policy changes may impact the
role of the VWA, given the uncertainties about possible changes in regulatory policies and
mechanisms and the possibility of further privatisation of the provision of insurance services.
We have tried to formulate attention points that address these uncertainties, as well as the
eventual operational issues that will emerge from the political decisions about the relative roles
of the insurers and the VWA.
1-1. Improvements in Scheme Performance
The success of the WorkCover scheme is partly attributable to more sophisticated
regulatory mechanisms, as well as the development of insurers' capabilities. But Victoria may
be approaching the limits of what can be achieved from the current principle-agent framework.
In looking towards the future, policy makers will need to carefully assess the potential further
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gains from this arrangement against those offered by alternative models, including those that
return greater responsibility and choice to the private sector.

1-2. Role and Expectations for Authorised Insurers
A certain degree of ambiguity is inherent in a system where the government and
insurers share responsibility for providing workers' compensation insurance. However, this
ambiguity has been exacerbated by communication problems, political uncertainty about the
future role of insurers, and economic incentives that are sometimes inconsistent with the
expressed goals of the system. It would be very helpful if these uncertainties could be resolved
and all insurers understood the shape of the future in Victoria's workers' compensation market.

1-3. Relations Between the VWA and Insurers
We believe the relationship between the VWA and insurers is more adversarial than is
appropriate for their shared responsibilities. The development of institutional practices that
would facilitate better communication and joint problem resolution could improve VWAinsurer relations and contribute significantly to improved scheme performance.

1-4. Economic Incentives
The combination of experience rating and competition among insurers for employers'
business is intended to encourage insurers to provide high-quality service, and to work with
employers to contain costs. However, it is not clear that the incentives contained in VWA's
pricing, remuneration, and regulatory schemes always encourage the return-to-work goal. The
management of long-term claims and severely injured workers also will continue to be a
problem without incentives specifically focused to address these objectives.
1-5. Insurer Quality of Service and Performance
VWA statistics indicate significant variation among insurers in several important
service measures. If better service performance (considering an insurer's specific risk and
claim portfolio) can be adequately compensated, insurers would have a greater incentive to
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pursue the performance goals of the system. We would urge the adoption of a continuous
improvement model for all insurers, in addition to the implicit bench marking and relatively
crude financial incentives currently underlying the regulatory regime.
1-6. Insurer Audits
Fully engaging insurers in a collective evaluation of the programme could help to ease
their concerns and further support partnering with VWA. Of course, the VWA and insurers
also need to be willing to pay to recruit and retain better qualified auditors, and to commit to
longer-term contracts which would support additional capacity development by vendors of
auditing services.
1-7. Pricing and System Costs
We fear that the promotion of a low workers' compensation insurance rate increases the
pressure on the government to sacrifice other objectives to maintain that rate. Efforts to keep
rates low should not be allowed to mask trends with respect to system costs or other emerging
problems, which might delay recognition and implementation of remedial measures. While the
goal of maintaining a low premium rate is laudable, it needs to be balanced against other
scheme goals and the costs which may be externalised to employers, workers, or others in the
community.
1-8. Scheme Information
Insurers' ability to compete and provide high-quality service is heavily dependent on
their access to information. It is not clear to us that a summary database would provide
sufficient detail to enable insurers to supplement their own data to develop a proper rate
structure, nor allow the VWA sufficient insight into insurer performance to support their
regulatory functions. The opportunities for "database synergy" with HSD should also not be
overlooked. The potential contribution of analysing claims information jointly with
occupational health and safety information would seem to argue for retaining an establishment
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level database under VWA control. Thus, we urge the VWA to carefully consider the strategic
and tactical implications of the regulatory database proposals.
1-9. Consumer Information
Buyers need reliable, user-friendly information on the performance dimensions within
which insurers compete. Lack of access to this information in the past has probably contributed
to the inertia in employers' movement to better performing insurers. The VWA's plan to
publicize insurer performance data should help to address this deficiency and, thereby, enhance
competition and scheme performance.
I-10. Self-Insurance and Self-Administration
It is reasonable to consider ways to enhance employers' incentives to contain costs by
allowing them to bear greater risk and/or be more actively involved in managing their claims.
Of course there must be safeguards to ensure that only economically-viable employers are
allowed to self-insure and to avoid unfunded obligations for the scheme. The expansion of selfinsurance will also exacerbate the "missing data" problem. Self-insured employer's
experiences should be part of the system database for analytical and comparative purposes.
1-11. Coordination of Federal and State Regulatory Responsibilities
If changes are made that would permit authorised insurers to bear more risk, the VWA
and the ISC will need to reconcile their respective oversight functions to ensure that solvency
issues would not slip between jurisdictions and place the VWA or policyholders at risk.
1-12. Other Issues With Respect to Privatisation
The prospects for privatisation initiatives are uncertain, but the VWA will likely
implement several measures to improve economic incentives and increase insurers'
responsibilities even if full privatisation is not achieved. Uncertainty about the future may be
the most significant challenge facing insurers. Resolving this issue and developing a shared
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vision of the future structure of the scheme among all the stakeholders would facilitate better
planning, investment, and other changes necessary to achieve scheme goals.
Compensation Issues (C)
We take the basic structure of compensation as "given"; that is, we assume that the
political leaders in Victoria have structured the benefits to accord with current Australian
realities. However, there are still a multitude of issues which arise, and we have a number of
observations in the area of compensation.
C-l. WorkCover Goals Have Been Met
The legislation that created this new scheme sought to remedy certain perceived
problems. Among the objectives were to reduce the number of claims for compensation, to
shorten the average period of time for which workers would collect weekly benefits and,
especially, to decrease the number of long-term beneficiaries. The WorkCover system has
accomplished each of these goals.
C-2. The Erosion of the "Serious Injury" Threshold
The potential expansion of the concept of serious injury is a considerable threat to the
current cost levels of the system. Leaving this decision in the hands of the court system also
may not be the most effective way of dealing with the social equity and efficiency issues
involved.
C-3. Consistency and Comprehensiveness of the Table of Maims
There are a number of inconsistencies in the treatment of maims in Victoria. There are
also some surprising omissions from the Table of Maims. Combined with an update to a later
edition of the AMA Guides, it would be appropriate to reexamine the equity aspects of the
current benefit structure for maims.
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C-4. Terminating Weekly Benefits
Terminating weekly benefits is a difficult problem for most workers' compensation
systems because of the difficulty of balancing the needs of workers and employers. The
Conciliation Service in Victoria has managed to arrange and conduct conferences very
promptly, thereby minimising the difficulties that either side might have to endure from the
termination process. The significance of maintaining this access should not be minimised.
C-5. The Injured Workers' Wage Level May Need Consideration
A feature of Victoria's law is that the calculation of the weekly benefit takes no account
of an employee's pay for overtime, shift differential, hazard duty allowance or dirt money. For
workers that are accustomed to such payments, their true wage replacement rate is lower than
that of a fellow employee who does not regularly receive such earnings. It seems difficult to
justify this disparate treatment.
C-6. Payments for Maims Have Been Growing
The WorkCover law has been able to reduce the availability of lump sum payments.
However, it has not been able entirely to eliminate lump sum settlements. Other jurisdictions
have found that where the practice of lump sum settlements has existed, it becomes a familiar
and convenient tool for the parties to use, and is extremely difficult to eradicate. Clearly these
issues need to be reexamined in the current, successful workers' compensation environment.
C-7. Problems in the Setting of Reasonable Medical and Like Fees
Negotiations over fee schedules have been contentious. The process of rationalizing and
negotiating these fees needs attention. All parties will benefit if these changes materialized as
part of a carefully considered package, with extensive public consultation, rather than
emerging on a piecemeal ad-hoc basis.
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C-8. The Medical Panels Have Been Overburdened
The medical panel scheme has been well designed and could be a highly useful source
of dispute resolution. However, the extraordinary bulge in the workload of panels because of
their use in maims disputes has exacted a severe price. It would seem more appropriate to
confine the Medical Panels to areas where their expertise could really make a difference.
Rehabilitation Issues (R)
Occupational rehabilitation in Victoria has a narrower and more constrained focus than
in some other jurisdictions. This results in large part from the perceived excesses under the
WorkCare regime from 1985-92. Accepting this reality, we find there are also a number of
issues hi the occupational rehabilitation area that need scrutiny.
R-l. Focus on Return to Work
The VWA's success in changing expectations of both workers and employers towards
early return to work is remarkable. The VWA has been highly effective in getting this key
message across in its policies, its media campaigns, and in its dealings with stakeholders. They
have achieved a return-to-work focus second to none.
R-2. Rehabilitation as an Employer Responsibility
In many ways, the policies of the VWA have operationalised the ideals of the disability
management movement. Employers in Victoria generally accept that they are responsible for
returning workers to their employment. However, the size of an enterprise will inherently limit
its flexibility to accommodate workers with disabilities. Additional assistance will be needed if
smaller employers are to attain the return-to-work goal as well.
R-3. Return-to-work Coordinator
This innovation has been successful with large employers where the investment is
justified. But the lack of a sufficiently skilled RTW coordinator can adversely affect
rehabilitation outcomes either through delay in recovery or through an inappropriate early
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return to work. Wherever there is an infrequent need for such specialised skills, as with small
employers, it may be more effective to encourage access to a rehabilitation professional.
R-4. Hard Costs and Soft Benefits
From the firm perspective, "hard cost" expenditures on RTW coordinator training or
other occupational rehabilitation activities are real and immediate. The "soft benefit" of
savings in terms of reduced injury severity and lower human suffering are distant and abstract
benefits that do not easily translate to the bottom line. The VWA has taken the first step in
overcoming this problem by returning to the injured worker limited rights of self-referral to
occupational rehabilitation assistance. This area needs additional work if the VWA is to
achieve the disability management ideal.

R-5. Case Management for the Severely Disabled
For the long-term severely disabled workers, improvements in independence,
avocational rehabilitation, and quality of life issues are important and continuing needs. Many
such workers face mobility challenges and systemic barriers to achieving their highest
potential. Case management techniques offer the greatest opportunity to serve this client group
effectively. Existing social and community health centres may also provide an effective
delivery mechanism for some of these services.

R-6. Measured Outcomes and Research
In many cases, rehabilitation success must be measured hi increments far removed from
the ultimate return-to-work goal. The record of the VWA in funding research on rehabilitation
demonstrates a long-term commitment to improving measurement and outcomes. However, the
VWA still has a unique unexploited opportunity to utilise its rich source of data and other
resources to contribute to both prevention and rehabilitation goals.
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R-7. Rehabilitation Provider Issues
The VWA has a vested interest in fostering the professional development of the medical
and rehabilitation community. The hybrid public-private system that exists in Victoria poses
particular policy and monitoring problems in medical and occupational rehabilitation. The
practice of service-provider substitution was widely reported. The vertical integration of some
insurance carriers with wholly-owned rehabilitation subsidiaries and the ownership of
rehabilitation facilities by medical practitioners may also represent emerging problems.
Prevention (P)
Many of these attention points are targeted towards improving the utilisation of Health
and Safety Division (HSD) resources, dealing particularly with the efficiency and effectiveness
of providing field services. The logic is that the organisation must be able to demonstrate
maximum effect from the existing resource and strategies before it can be determined whether
the resource level is appropriate.
P-l. Potential Synergies
We commend the HSD on its programmes, several of which represent cutting-edge
strategies in this field. The management of the division is visionary, energetic, highly
educated, experienced, and firmly committed to the challenge of reducing workplace injury and
disease in Victoria. The merger of HSD with VWA provides a historical opportunity for the
division to develop new synergies within the organisation and leverage the resource potential.
P-2. Management Structure
The Divisional management count is over 40, or about 10 percent of the total staff. Any
future reorganisation should seek to reduce the number of managers and re-deploy resources at
the field inspection or service delivery level.
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P-3. Human Resource Skill Adjustments
The division needs to evaluate whether each individual inspector's skills match a
performance-based regulatory approach that promotes the use of best practices and a systems
approach to managing safety. Retraining or replacement may be necessary to effect a change in
service delivery that matches the requirements of the legislation.
P-4. Resource Allocation
The Division might benefit from reevaluating the need for the significant resources
invested in the development of the various procedure manuals. The volume and detail of these
appear excessive and incompatible with a performance-based regulatory approach.
P-5. Community Collaboration
The Development Taskforce has an opportunity to drive significant and durable
improvement in the prevention of injury and disease in both the workplace and communities.
Victoria is developing a wealth of private and public resources that can be enlisted to assist
with the prevention mission on a cost-effective basis.
P-6. Service Quality Assurance
Service quality needs to be monitored regularly through surveys of employer and
worker communities. It is particularly important in a regulatory environment that customers
feel free to give their unfettered opinion. Thus, a random, anonymous survey conducted by an
independent entity is the most reliable way of gathering information on service quality.
P-7. Specialist Skill Deployment
We believe that more specialist skills are needed in the field. HSD should consider the
field deployment of hygienists as inspectors, and as vacancies arise in the field increase the
number of hygienists. HSD should also find ways to enhance and deploy ergonomic consulting
resources, so that they can be more effective in delivery of monitoring and assessment services
in the field.
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P-8. Inspector Support
Each inspector needs a dedicated vehicle. This could provide up to a 64 percent
increase in field active time over current practice An added bonus will be the ability of
inspectors to carry brochures, pamphlets, posters, and other information they now advise
employers to obtain by calling the information officers. Each inspector might also be provided
with a laptop computer and portable printer. When combined with a dedicated vehicle and
cellular phone, the inspector essentially has a fully mobile office. This makes the inspector
contact with workplaces more effective and significantly extends the inspector resource in the
field.
P-9. Other Resource Allocation Issues
In the dangerous goods arena VWA may want to consider moving ahead with policy
revisions to achieve performance-based regulation on its own, with a view to regularise with
the national model when it becomes available. VWA should also review the significant
resource deployed in prosecutions, particularly in light of the generally held view in the
community that the deterrent effect is minimal.
P-10. Information Sources
A toll free OHS information call centre could be developed which would provide timely
advice and answers to questions from the public. The division would also benefit from
developing a series of industry specific, user-friendly guides to the regulations and codes that
are written in plain language and offer practical solutions specifically aimed at small business.
Conclusion

The VWA with its new responsibilities for occupational safety and health has
outstanding potential to exploit the synergies between prevention, compensation, and
rehabilitation. Further, the well-established VWA communication resource has the
demonstrated capability to bring this vital message to the general public. As champion of both
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prevention and rehabilitation, the VWA now directs the two programmes with the largest
potential to leverage financial and human cost savings in workers' disability. We look forward
to seeing how the VWA responds to this challenge over the next several years.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivation
Improving the effectiveness of workers' compensation programmes is an urgent theme
in legislative debates across the entire developed world, and developing countries are becoming
increasingly concerned as well. Workers in every country with a compensation programme for
workers disabled by their employment are concerned that benefits be adequate, prompt and
delivered hi an equitable manner. Increasingly, employers also are paying attention to these
programmes, especially as international competitiveness issues have driven them to examine
every source of cost variation across jurisdictions. Thus, employers are concerned that
workers' compensation systems are affordable. In addition, hi some states of Australia, the
past decade has seen workers' compensation insurance go through a wrenching series of
changes from private dominance to public monopoly to the current compromise between
privatisation and public insurance. These issues have concerned policy makers and
stakeholders in Victoria, as elsewhere, and the search for the "holy grail" of equitable and
economical methods of managing this universal social problem continues.
The statutory changes in Victoria hi the last decade constitute a grand policy experiment
that should enlighten and inform other countries of the world about the effectiveness of
different workers' compensation strategies. Victoria operated a privately underwritten system
(up to 1985), a public monopoly system (from 1985 to 1992), and a mixed model (since 1992)
in organising the administrative and insurance requirements for compensating workers disabled
in the course of their employment.
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research (Upjohn Institute) to conduct a thorough, independent study of the
workers' disability prevention, compensation and rehabilitation system in Victoria. The
Authority had the vision and the courage to open itself to scrutiny from the outside, in the
expectation that such an examination would lead to policy improvements in Victoria. Our hope
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is that this examination also has policy implications for other jurisdictions, in Australia and
elsewhere.
The methodology of this study is derived from a decade-long series of such studies
published in the United States by the Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) of
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Such studies have been completed by WCRI on some 18 U.S.
states to date. 1 In addition, the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) of British Columbia
initiated a series of closely related studies of the British Columbia, Canada system in 1991.
Separate studies were completed on the compensation and claims administration system,
including vocational rehabilitation and dispute resolution (1991), the occupational safety and
health system (1992), the assessment and premium setting system (1992) and the medical and
physical rehabilitation system (1993).2 Further, some of these studies have been repeated after
5 years in order to provide a "second look" at the progress made in British Columbia. 3
The overall series was designed to assist public policy makers and other interested
participants in making informed comparisons across jurisdictions. For that reason, the studies
of individual systems use a common outline, and to the extent possible, address the same basic
issues of workers' compensation system structure and function. We have adapted this model to
accommodate the unique features of the Victorian workers' compensation system. Thus, this
report focuses the model for the first time outside North America and also broadens the scope
significantly over any single previous study.
We pay special attention to the unique regulatory regime hi Victoria where private
insurers perform claims administration and policy administration duties under the supervision

'Connecticut (1987), Texas (1989, 1995), Washington (1989), Michigan (1990), Maine (1990),
Minnesota (1991), Pennsylvania (1991), Georgia (1992), New York (1992), Wisconsin (1992), California (1992),
Missouri (1993), North Carolina (1993), New Jersey (1994), Virginia (1994), Oregon (1995), Colorado (1996),
and Illinois (1996).
2Hunt, Earth and Leahy (1991), Rest and Ashford (1992), Hunt (1992), Fulton and Atkinson (1993).
3See Hunt, Earth and Leahy (1996) and Rest and Ashford (1997), for the second round of studies in
British Columbia.
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of the VWA as public regulator. In addition to regulating private insurers, in a way that would
be familiar to U.S. readers, although a good deal more invasive, the VWA operates a
public reinsurance fund, bearing all the insurance underwriting risk of the scheme, while the
private insurers bear no underwriting risk. Essentially, the private insurers operate as sales and
servicing agents of the VWA, who actually carries the risk. This method of insurance
organisation is unique in the world, to the best of our knowledge.
We also focus on the prevention of worker injuries and illnesses through inclusion of
the former Health and Safety Organisation (HSO), now the Health and Safety Division (HSD)
of the VWA, hi our study. This was somewhat difficult, since the merger of the two formerly
independent organisations was occurring hi the whiter of 1996, just as we were observing
them.
Because of the wide variety of institutional arrangements in Victoria in the past decade,
we also include outlines of the policy history of workers' compensation (Chapter 2),
rehabilitation (Chapter 7), and prevention (Chapter 8) efforts in the state. These histories will
be particularly useful to non-Victorian readers, who may need the broader perspective that they
can provide for understanding the Victorian story and, perhaps, to applying the lessons in their
own jurisdictions.
This study originated because of the interest of Andrew Lindberg, Chief Executive
Officer of the VWA. Andrew's determination to improve the workers' compensation system in
Victoria has led him around the world in search of "best practice." He saw the potential gain
from an independent evaluation of VWA operations, one that would measure Victorian
performance against an international standard. He requested that the Upjohn Institute assemble
an international team of experts to perform this study of the Victorian system, using the basic
format established in North America, but adapting it to the Australian environment as
necessary.
This volume represents our response to that challenge. Our research and analysis team
included six workers' compensation experts; one Australian, two Canadians, and three from
the United States. The authors drew on their experience with numerous similar studies,
including eight such studies in five North American jurisdictions which were authored by one
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or another member of the team, about a dozen other U.S. studies where one or more of the
authors served as technical reviewer or in some other consultative capacity, and scores of
research efforts in the general field of disability prevention and compensation. The six authors
brought a collective total of well over 100 years experience with workers' compensation and
prevention issues to this task.
The report summarizes the insights the six authors gained over a six-month study
period, including eight separate visits to Victoria of at least two weeks each by the North
American authors. The VWA supported our efforts by arranging most of our interviews and by
supplying requested documentation and data. In addition, they helped to focus the efforts of the
team through suggesting interview targets and unexplored avenues of which we were not
aware. They also respected our independence by resisting the temptation to "look over our
shoulders" as we conducted the study. We are indebted to all the informed observers and
participants in the Victorian scheme for sharing their observations and confidential judgments
with us. They enabled us to multiply our efforts severalfold, by incorporating the "redigested"
thoughts of local experts. We sincerely hope our efforts are worthy of their contributions.
The Scope of the Study
The objective of this volume is to describe, with supporting evidence, how the workers'
compensation system in Victoria actually functions, and to do so in a way which maximises the
comparability with the previous studies in North America. The intent is to provide an
accessible description of the major features of the Victorian system. Our goal is to describe the
operation of the system in such a way that the intelligent layperson can understand what it does
and how it does it. We also endeavour to provide some comparative perspective with other
jurisdictions, where that is relevant or necessary.
This study addresses nine core issues in the Victorian workers' compensation system:
What is the history of the present scheme?
How is the system organised and administered?
How is the insurance function structured and regulated?
What benefits are paid to injured workers?
What dispute resolution procedures are used, and to what effect?
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How are vocational rehabilitation services provided?
How is prevention achieved?
What are the actual costs of administration, benefits, claims processing, and
appeal?
What aspects of the system deserve further attention?
These questions are addressed for the Victorian system as it existed in July 1996, but
historical data are generally presented for the period 1985-86 to 1995-96. Because of the
extensive changes in structure in 1992, this study offers a unique opportunity to review the
operation of a workers' compensation system under two distinct regimes, as well as over
varied economic and political circumstances. Because of the desire to facilitate comparisons
across regimes, some analyses will use explicit comparisons between the 1986-1992 WorkCare
and 1993-96 WorkCover periods.
Research Approach
We conducted this study using a 4-step approach. The elements are (1) an examination
of the relevant legislative Acts and the policies, regulations and guidelines developed for their
implementation, (2) data gathering and analysis, (3) interviews with individuals knowledgeable
about the system and its operation, and (4) reconciliation of the observations we have made
about the system with the viewpoints of others.
The Act and Its Implementation
We began the study with an examination of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 and amendments thereto. Because of the broad
mandate of the Health and Safety Division of the VWA, it was also necessary to review the
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, the Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994, and related legislation.
We also had access to various policy manuals and training materials including the VWA
Claims Manual, OHSA Manual, OHSA Operations Manual, HSO Branch Manuals, HSO
Orientation Workbook, HSD Regulations, and Codes of Practice. We benefited greatly from
the work that has been done by the Boston Consulting Group for the VWA over the past
several years. They clearly marked out the trail of what has been accomplished in Victoria.
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We also reviewed the Australian Industry Commission studies of Workers'
Compensation (1994) and Occupational Health and Safety (1995). The very interesting and
thorough reports of the Australian Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities (HWCA)
provided invaluable context for our predominantly North American team. We reviewed VWA
and predecessor Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) Annual Reports from 1985-86
through 1994-95, as well as other published and unpublished literature on the Victorian
workers' compensation programme. The bulk of these were provided by VWA staff, but a
great deal was also provided to us by the individuals we interviewed during the course of the
project. We are deeply indebted to all of these sources.
Data Collection
The VWA provided us with the data we requested covering the past 10 years of system
performance. These data are designed to provide a clear perspective on the present status of the
system, but also to assist with an understanding of the antecedents of today's system; in other
words, to provide some historical perspective. However, gathering consistent and comparable
data for the last decade in Victoria proved to be significantly more difficult than anticipated.
Because of the dramatic changes in system structure and performance, and organisational
changes, many time series are not available on a truly consistent basis. The report gathers the
data that are available, but less reliance should be placed on the numbers in this study than in
others the authors have been involved with. The workers' compensation system in Victoria has
been a rapidly evolving one. Most of these data are displayed in Appendix Table A-l.
Interviews
The interviews were designed to probe beyond the statutory language and policy
manuals, to discover how the statutes actually are implemented in practice and how
stakeholders experience the system. We conducted over 300 interviews with some 260 separate
individuals who had substantial experience in and around the Victorian workers' compensation
system. They represent a wide variety of interests: from managers and staff of private
insurance companies to the VWA regulators they report to, from medical practitioners and
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physiotherapists to private workers' compensation consultants, from HSD inspectors and
information officers to community-based worker advocacy groups, from VWA conciliators to
solicitors representing injured workers in common law proceedings, from occupational
rehabilitation practitioners to the consulting actuaries for the VWA, as well as virtually the
entire management of the VWA.
Labour stakeholders interviewed included representatives of the Australian Workers'
Union, the Telecommunications Workers, the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers,
the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union, the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union,
the Transport Workers Union, the Construction, Forestry and Mining Union, The National
Union of Workers, the Health Services Union, the Australian Education Union, the
Independent Education Union, the State Public Services Federation/Community and Public
Sector Union, the Finance Sector Union and the Victorian Trades Hall Council (the peak
Federation) of trade unions. We also met with representatives of Community Skill Share, the
Maroondah Social and Community Health Centre, the Italian Community Assistance
Organisation and members of the Australian Nursing Federation Injured Nurses Support
Group.
Employer stakeholders interviewed included representatives of the Australian Chamber
of Manufactures, the Victorian Employers' Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI), the
Metal Trades Industry Association, and the Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association. In
addition, we spoke with a number of individual employers, including Coles-Myer, Thiess
Contractors, Qantas, Greer Industries, Royal Children's Hospital, Amcor, DuPont, University
of Melbourne, Mayne Nickless, Holeproof, Unilever, Shell, ICI, Nippondenso, National
Australia Bank, Philip Morris, Kemcor, and Transfield Tunnelling. We also met with the
Northern Employers Forum and the Southeast WorkCover User Group in Victoria.
We talked with administrators of two other state workers' compensation schemes in
Australia, three federal agencies, and six other State of Victoria agencies. All the individuals
we interviewed are listed in Appendix Table A-2. Of course, none of them are responsible for
our conclusions, no matter how much influence they may have had on our opinions.
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Reconciliation
Finally, we submitted the descriptions and analysis that resulted from this process to
many of the people we interviewed, the people who know the system best. The Draft Final
Report was circulated to about 50 persons for their review and comment in June of 1997. Their
cooperation made the study possible in the first instance, as they freely and openly shared their
perspectives with us. Their willingness to assist further by checking our interpretations was
invaluable to completion of the study. The authors, however, remain responsible for any errors
of fact or interpretation.
One limitation of the research approach is that we did not have the opportunity to
survey or to interview a large number of individual injured workers. Since injured workers are
the major beneficiaries of the workers' compensation system, that could be a serious
shortcoming. However, our extensive contacts with organised labour and worker advocacy
groups served the same purpose, with obvious gains in efficiency. In addition, the VWA is
already collecting feedback from external stakeholder communities, and we were allowed to
share this information. Thus, this report relies on the representatives of organised labour,
injured-worker advocacy groups, the formal client surveys sponsored by the VWA, the staff of
the VWA and its authorised insurers, and our own instincts to represent the views of injured
workers in Victoria.
Organisation of the Report
The report follows the list of basic questions given above. This chapter concludes with
a brief overview of Victoria's industrial environment. Chapter 2 presents the recent history of
the scheme, including an analysis of the perceived failures of WorkCare between 1985 and
1992, which shaped the new WorkCover scheme so decisively. The third chapter provides an
overview of workers' compensation governance and organisation in Victoria; it describes the
structure and function of the VWA and other organisations that play a significant role in the
workers' compensation system. It also contains a brief overview of the claims process,
including the rate at which claims flow through the entire workers' compensation system.
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The fourth chapter contains a description and analysis of the unique workers'
compensation insurance scheme in Victoria. It employs a principal/agent model and uses
techniques of analysis from industrial organisation economics to explore the structure and
performance of the scheme. Chapter 5 describes the extensive array of benefits available to
workers' compensation claimants in Victoria. Chapter 6 reviews the dispute resolution
mechanisms in Victoria, including Conciliation Services, Medical Panels, the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal, and the courts. The seventh chapter is concerned with the occupational
rehabilitation function in Victoria, including the historical antecedents of the current system.
Chapter 8 examines the structure and operation of the Health and Safety Division of the
VWA as it pursues its critical mission of preventing injuries and illnesses. A brief history of
health and safety regulation in Victoria helps to illuminate the important determinants of these
policies and approaches. Finally, Chapter 9 presents the study's Attention Points, the
professional judgments of the authors about those areas that might need additional examination
by policy makers, in Victoria and elsewhere. Attention Points were formulated after the Draft
Final Report had been reviewed by interviewees, i.e., those who were capable of correcting
our interpretation of the facts.
Victoria's Industrial and Employment Profile
For the benefit of readers outside of Australia, this section gives a very brief
description of Victoria's industrial makeup and employment profile. This is important
background to understanding some of the policy issues which will follow.
Victoria is the second largest state in Australia in terms of population, with about 4.5
million residents, or 25 percent of the Australian total. Victoria's employed workforce consists
of just over 2.0 million persons working in approximately 221,000 enterprises. The average
unemployment rate during 1995-96 was about 8.4 percent. Small employers (under $800,000
payroll) represent 88 percent of the enterprises but employ only 26 percent of the workforce.
On the other hand, large enterprises (over $800,000 payroll) represent just 12 percent of the
total but they employ 74 percent of the workforce.
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Both the enterprises and the employees are heavily concentrated in the urban areas of
the state. Greater Melbourne contains 81 percent of the workforce and 71 percent of the
enterprises. Regional cities account for about 6 percent of the enterprises and the workforce.
The remaining 13 percent of the workforce is employed in the 23 percent of the enterprises that
are located in the rural areas of the State.
Table 1.1 shows the industrial distribution of employment and enterprises in Victoria.
Manufacturing is the largest sector at 17 percent of employment and 9 percent of enterprises.
Retail trade has nearly 15 percent of employment and 17 percent of establishments. The third
largest sector is Property and Business Services, at 10 percent of employment and 13 percent
of establishments. Other moderately large sectors include Construction, at about 6 percent of
employment and 11 percent of establishments, Wholesale Trade, at about 6 percent of
employment and 8 percent of establishments, Education, at about 6 percent of both
employment and establishments, and Health and Community Service, with 9 percent of
employment and 8 percent of establishments.
Approximately 33 percent of all workers in Victoria are unionised. The system of
industrial relations is founded on an "Award" from either the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission or the state Industrial Relations Commission. Formerly, these were basically
industry agreements over the terms and conditions of employment. With deregulation of
industrial relations in Australia, they have become more a statement of the basic recognition of
the union and its areas of authority, including dispute resolution procedures, etc. Built upon
the Award is the "Enterprise Agreement," which is a collectively bargained agreement for a
specific term between the union and the employer. It adds to and amends the basic terms of the
award to accommodate the requirements of the individual enterprise. The Enterprise
Agreement also sets out the collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment.
Australia is being swept by the "privatisation" movement. In everything from
telecommunications to prisons, the trend is toward the private sector initiative and away from
government production. The Liberal Party has been riding this movement and using it against
the Australian Labour Party in the political realm. This has been successful in several states
and ultimately, in 1996, at the national level. As will be discussed below, this wave has
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notably included the state of Victoria, where the Liberal coalition won political dominance in
November 1992. Changing the "inflexibility" of Australian industrial relations based upon the
award system has been very much a part of this change.4 One of the first actions the LiberalNational Coalition took in Victoria was to "reform" the workers' compensation system. Thus,
the issues discussed in this report are at the core of the intense political competition over
"privatisation" in Australia during the past several years.
With this background in place, let us proceed to review the current workers'
compensation system in Victoria and how it operates. As indicated earlier, we begin with an
overview of the history of workers' compensation in Victoria.

Note: All uses of "$" and "dollars" in this report refer to Australian dollars, unless
specifically stated otherwise.

4John Mathews. 1994. Catching the Wave: Workplace Reform in Australia, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
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Table 1.1 Industrial Distribution of Victoria Workforce and Enterprises, 1995
Workforce %

Enterprises %

Agriculture, Forestry

4.7

7.4

Fishing & Mining

0.2

0.2

17.2

9.2

Utilities

0.8

0.3

Construction

6.6

10.6

Wholesale Trade

6.4

8.4

14.7

16.8

Hotels, Cafes, Restaurants

4.4

n/a

Transport

4.7

5.0

Communication

2.5

0.1

Finance

3.8

5.3

Property, Business Services

10.0

13.3

Government Administration

3.4

0.3

Education

6.4

5.8

Health & Community
Service

8.8

8.0

Recreation

2.0

3.4

Personal & Other Services

3.5

6.0

Industry Sectors

Manufacturing

f

Retail Trade

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
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Chapter 2 BACKGROUND TO THE VICTORIAN WORKCOVER SYSTEM
Introduction
The history of social systems always affect their current structure and performance,
sometimes in obvious and sometimes in subtle ways. This is most particularly true of workers'
compensation systems, which are the oldest government-organised social insurance systems in
many countries around the world, dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Our
review of the structure and performance of the workers' compensation system in Victoria
would not be complete without an explanation of its historical antecedents.
The current WorkCover system, dating from December 1992, is both an heir to the
predecessor WorkCare system and a reaction to it. WorkCare, dating from September 1985, in
turn was the product of the perceived inadequacies of the earlier private workers'
compensation insurance system. As such, this chapter can be regarded as an exercise in
contextualising the historical, political, and environmental background of the present workers'
compensation system in Victoria.
In this report, such contextual material will be presented in three different sections,
corresponding to the three broad missions of workers' compensation systems; prevention,
compensation, and rehabilitation. In the present chapter, the history of compensation will be
laid out in considerable detail. Chapter 7 uses the recent history of occupational rehabilitation
in Victoria to explain the policy environment in which occupational rehabilitation is practiced
today. Chapter 8 contains a brief history of the origins of injury and illness prevention
legislation in Victoria. In each instance, the historical material helps to illuminate the "policy
setting" which shapes current practice. We expect this material will be particularly useful to
non-Australian readers, for whom this information is much less familiar.
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Australian Workers' Compensation in Context
Australia is a nation of 18 million people occupying an island continent. In terms of
workers' compensation arrangements, it shares with the United States and Canada the
distinction of having the major occupational disabilities programme operating at the state rather
than the national level. As a result there are ten distinct workers' compensation systems in
effect, one for each of the six states and two territories plus two federal schemes (one for
public employment at the federal level and the other for the merchant marine engaged in
interstate and overseas trade and commerce). This compares with the 12 provincial and
territory systems plus 2 federal schemes in Canada, and the 50 state systems plus that for the
District of Columbia and four federal schemes in the United States.
While there are substantial similarities between the Australian workers' compensation
arrangements and those operative in the United States and Canada, there are also salient
differences. For instance, whereas workers' compensation has long constituted the exclusive
remedy in North America, until relatively recently all Australian schemes allowed unfettered
access to the common law action for negligence for workplace injuries and illness. In the past
several years this has changed, with some jurisdictions abrogating the common law remedy
entirely and others subjecting it to threshold entitlement criteria and/or caps upon settlements
and awards.
Similarly, all the Australian schemes operate upon wage loss principles for the
calculation of loss of earnings entitlement, although there are significant variants between them
in respect to duration of such entitlement and the capacity for it to be capitalised hi the form of
lump sum redemption payments. However, unlike the United States, scheduled disability
principles have not taken hold hi respect of payment of wage loss, although such principles do
operate in relation to lump sum impairment payments under what is variously called the "Table
of Maims" or "Table of Injuries." Many of the similarities and differences between Australia
and North America lie in the historical origins of the Australian workers' compensation
schemes.
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Historical Origins
Like so much of the early legislation of the Australian states, workers' compensation
statutes were based very much on the handiwork of the English legislature. The first Australian
workers' compensation statute, the South Australian Act of 1900, was essentially a copy of the
original English measure, the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 (Imp). Victoria was the last
Australian state to enact workers' compensation legislation, and this measure, the Workers'
Compensation Act 1914, again largely replicated the consolidating English Act of 1906 with
the addition of the "Table of Maims." This latter feature was derived from the 1908 New
Zealand statute and was reputedly the brainchild of the New Zealand judge and jurist Sir John
Salmond.
Over time, the various schemes have evolved in separate directions, such that now the
Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities (HWCA), a body comprising the chief
executives of the ten Australian schemes, is involved in a process of trying to achieve greater
national consistency. 1 However, until the mid 1980s, workers' compensation in Australia was,
overall, characterised by a surprising degree of structural uniformity. Where changes occurred
(such as the adoption of the disjunctive "or" in place of the conjunctive "and" in the primary
entitlement provision of an injury "arising out of and in the course of employment;" or the
extension of coverage to injuries sustained while travelling between a worker's place of
residence and place of employment, so-called journey injuries), such changes tended to be
picked up relatively quickly by most if not all jurisdictions in a process of legislative
uosmosis."
In terms of financing arrangements, the schemes adopted the English system of private
insurer underwriting with the ability of enterprises to contract out as self-insurers according to
certain criteria. Unlike the English system, the requirement to insure was generally made
mandatory and most jurisdictions, often at the time of enacting their workers' compensation
legislation, also created a state-owned insurer which competed in the market with private

'Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities, Promoting Excellence: National Consistency in Australian
Workers' Compensation: Final and Interim Reports to Labour Ministers' Council, May 1997.
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insurers. The state-owned insurer also tended to have the functional role of an insurer of last
resort and thus served a role which in the United States is most often performed by the residual
market. In United States terms, the typical Australian scheme was a three-way system of
private insurers, a competitive state insurer, and self-insurance option for certain employers.
The significant exception was the state of Queensland which, in 1916, under the radical TJ.
Ryan Government, moved to oust private insurers from workers' compensation and established
a monopoly state scheme, with no provision for self-insurance.
The Queensland experience was the nearest that Australia came to the debates on
alternative approaches to workers' compensation which characterised the Progressive era in the
United States. There were no organisations hi Australia such as the American Association for
Labor Legislation, the National Civic Federation and the National Association of
Manufacturers in the United States making a critical evaluation of various reform options.2 Nor
was there a figure such as Sir William Meredith, the Chief Justice of Ontario, whose
investigations and reports to the Ontario legislature laid the basis for the distinctive workers'
compensation arrangements adopted by the Canadian provinces and territories from 1914. The
nearest Australian analogue did not occur until 1970, with the trailblazing report on
rehabilitation by the then chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission of New South
Wales, Judge A.T. Conybeare QC.
Stability and Change
Change tended to be somewhat slow and piecemeal. In Victoria, the 1914 legislation
operated without amendment until 1922 and then remained unchanged until 1928.3 These
changes were often directed to refining and widening the qualifications and restrictions on
coverage inherited from the English model; for instance, the income threshold on coverage

2See Robert Asher, Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 1880-1935. University of Minnesota,
Ph.D., 1971, Ch. VI.
3Orwell De R. Foenander, Developments in the Law Governing Workers' Compensation in Victoria.
Melbourne: Law Book Company, 1956, p. 1.
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(apart from manual labour) was progressively diluted and finally removed in 1972. Other
restrictions, such as the exclusion of outworkers, survived until the 1985 WorkCare reforms.
More significant changes occurred with the 1937 legislation which established the
Workers' Compensation Board as the body for the determination of contested claims of
compensation instead of the general court system, and with the moves in the 1940s, noted
above, to include journey injuries and the adoption of the "arising out of or in the course of
employment" wording for the primary entitlement provision. This history stamped a particular
functional style and approach upon the operations of Australian workers' compensation
schemes. As the 1984 Victorian Cooney Report noted:
English workers' compensation legislation and the Australian statutes based
upon them reflected [the] perspective of an amelioratory measure the provision
of income support to compensate for wage loss as a result of industrial injury.
There was never a hint by the legislature that workers' compensation could
encompass any wider role in terms of accident prevention or the vocational and
social rehabilitation of injured workers. The enforcement of industrial safety
was seen to be the preserve of the inspectorate established to police the
provision of the Factories and Shops Act while, apart from some provision for
injured war veterans, rehabilitation was not a concept which entered the
consciousness of officialdom, being left to private charitable organisations. By
contrast, in Canada and in a number of American States influenced by the
German model, the provision of rehabilitation services was a prominent feature
of workers' compensation administration from the beginning.4
During the 1970s, the essentially tranquil nature of workers' compensation in Australia
began to change. One of the first markers of this change was the 1970 Conybeare report,
mentioned above. Judge Conybeare had long taken an interest hi North American
developments, and while his report was focused on rehabilitation it was characterised by an
expansionist perspective which, for instance, seriously questioned the role of common law in
the workers' compensation system.
On the national political stage, 23 years of conservative rule were brought to an end
with the election of the reforming Whitlam government. One of the first acts of this new

4Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Victorian Workers' Compensation in Victoria. Melbourne:
Government Printer, 1984, para. 2.5.5.
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federal Government was to invite Sir Owen Woodhouse, architect of New Zealand's
revolutionary comprehensive national accident compensation system, to investigate the basis
upon which a similar scheme could be introduced into Australia. The proposals outlined in the
1974 Woodhouse report would have totally transformed personal injury compensation in
Australia and spelt the end of state workers' compensation schemes. However, they fell into
the dustbin of history with the fall of the Whitlam government in 1975. Nevertheless, these
proposals generated ripples which would contribute to the changes in Australian workers'
compensation in the 1980s and beyond.
These changes were most dramatically expressed in the Victorian WorkCare reforms
which took effect from September 1985 and which are examined in further detail below.
However, the Victorian move to oust private insurers from an underwriting role was followed
in South Australia and New South Wales in their WorkCover reforms hi 1986 and 1987,
respectively. The recent process of change in Australian workers' compensation is reflected in
the fact that, over the last 2 decades, there have been at least 16 official inquiries into the
reform of workers' compensation schemes and that, since 1985, there have been nine new
legislative schemes introduced.
This situation of review and legislative change continues apace, with major scheme
reviews occurring in late 1996 in both Queensland and Tasmania and significant legislative
amendments enacted in a number of Australian jurisdictions, including Victoria during 1996.
The drivers of this recent volatility can be better understood by looking at the background to,
and evolution of, the 1985 WorkCare changes in Victoria.
The Crisis of Workers' Compensation in Victoria
The changes to workers' compensation arrangements which occurred in Victoria in
1985 represented a fundamental rupture with the general trend of workers' compensation
development noted above. The causes for the Victorian changes were primarily financial in
nature, although there were contributory factors in terms of the inefficiency of some the
system's delivery mechanisms. These financial features can be viewed at a number of levels,
involving both short-term and medium-term factors. The medium-term factors involved the
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volatility of the workers' compensation market between 1974 and 1981, while the short-term
factors related to the disappointing experience between 1981 and 1983, following which the
Government appointed the Committee of Enquiry into the Victorian Workers' Compensation
System (the Cooney Committee) to examine and report upon the problems of the Victorian
system.
Medium-Term Factors
In a medium-term perspective, the WorkCare changes were largely a response to the
erratic behaviour of the general insurance market, and particularly the workers' compensation
segment of that market, which was exhibited from the mid 1970s. This experience appears to
have resulted from the conjunction of a number of factors. First, there was the influence of the
federal Insurance Act 1973 which regulated the prudential operations of insurers. A number of
insurers were faced with problems in regard to financing the solvency requirements laid down
under the Act within their existing capital structure. The result was a "flight of premium"
when companies rejected workers' compensation business in an attempt to meet the solvency
margins. Most of these companies managed to secure the requisite prudential buffers and
margins after a couple of years, and were ready to buy back a market share in the workers'
compensation market through heavy discounting.
In addition, the federal Trade Practices Act 1974 began to change the very restrictive
environment that insurers were operating in. This enactment introduced a more competitive
commercial environment that required some years of adjustment, and was certainly a factor in
the premium volatility throughout the middle and late 1970s in all classes of insurance in
Australia.
Second was the fallout from the Australian Woodhouse inquiry and report. Had the
Whitlam government remained in office and the proposals of the Woodhouse report been
implemented, the insurance industry would have faced the prospect of losing all personal injury
business. This would have included not only workers' compensation, but compulsory thirdparty motor vehicle injury insurance and some other areas of liability insurance which involved
a personal injury component as well. Given that coverage would have been extended to the
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self-employed as well, there may also have been a significant loss of private disability
insurance business. Faced with the prospect of being ousted from personal injury lines
completely and the running out of the claims tail from existing reserves, the industry regarded
itself as significantly underfunded. Consequently, premiums were raised in the prospect of
meeting the run off involved. The quarantining of the Woodhouse legislation in the Senate
Legal and Constitutional Committee and the subsequent fall of the Whitlam government
removed this threat and contributed to the vigorous price-cutting war which followed.
Third, according to evidence given by insurance brokers to the Cooney Committee, the
mid 1970s coincided with an unusual over-capacity in the international re-insurance market.
One of the results was fierce competition for the premium dollar, and this was reflected in
heavy discounting in Australia. Thus, these three features combined to produce, from around
1975, a severe price-cutting war in the workers' compensation market, particularly in respect
of larger accounts. As interest rates were at historically high levels, part of this fight for
market share and premium income also represented the practice of cash flow underwriting to
secure funds which could be invested to take advantage of the prevailing high interest rates.
An additional element contributing to this volatility was the role of insurance brokers.
Around three-quarters of the market engaged a broker or used the services of an insurance
agent in obtaining employers' liability coverage. As a result, brokers had a central role in the
placement of insurance coverage and this choice was crucially influenced by the existence and
size of commission. When the State Insurance Office (SIO), after receiving a strong influx of
business in 1975, decided in 1976 not to pay brokerage fees for the securing of business, it lost
half of its workers' compensation portfolio within 18 months. In contrast, generous brokerage
fees led to brokers, in the period 1977 to 1979, placing a large volume of business with
Palmdale Insurance Company Limited. This insurer went into liquidation in February 1980
and, in Victoria, the payment of claims became the responsibility of the Insurers Guarantee and
Compensation Supplementation Fund.
This situation was exacerbated by the entry into the market of some relatively
aggressive new underwriters such as C.E. Heath and the American International Group (AIG)
who didn't face the claims tail of the established market players. These new entrants were
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aggressively targeting the larger employer accounts and the competition in this sector was
particularly intense.
The rate cutting peaked in 1978/79 and 1979/80, with an attempt to regain financial
rectitude beginning in 1979/80. Thus, surveying the period 1975/76 to 1981/82, premiums
increased by only 1 percent while general costs, as measured by the Consumer Price Index,
had doubled over this period, and claims costs had increased by some 120 percent.
Immediate Impetus
The immediate impetus which largely led to the demise of private underwriting in
Victoria was the dramatic attempt by insurers to suddenly regain much of the ground lost
during the period of ferocious rate-cutting. The huge increase in premium rates which occurred
in 1981/82 and 1982/83 had the effect of alienating the business community and making that
community amenable to other solutions. While Australia-wide the period between 1981 and
1983 showed an average annual rate of growth in workers' compensation premiums of some
49.3 percent, the premium spiral appears to have been even more severe in Victoria. The
various employer bodies provided extensive documentation of this dramatic increase to the
Cooney Committee.
A membership survey by the Victorian Employers' Federation hi November 1982
revealed that a majority of respondents had experienced premium increases in excess of 50
percent in the previous 12 months and some reported increases of 200 percent and 300 percent
between 1981 and 1982 despite declining or static claims rates. The Metal Trades Industry
Association of Australia reported on the experience of its membership, which showed
dramatically escalating premiums, unrelated to claims experience, of up to 500 percent. One
company had its premium increased by 184 percent between 1980/81 and 1981/82 even though
employment in this company had decreased by almost 17 percent and it had experienced no
claims for many years. The Victorian Small Business Development Corporation reported that
premium increases for small business in the previous 2 years had ranged from 80 percent to
400 percent with individual instances of more than 700 percent.
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The reason underlying this energetic attempt by the insurance industry to restore its
funding levels in this sector can be glimpsed through the actuarial report commissioned by the
Workers' Compensation Premiums Advisory Committee in 1983 and prepared by Richard
Cumpston, then a partner at E.S. Knight and Company, an actuary active in the general
insurance field. This involved an examination of the Form 11 returns by insurers to the federal
Insurance Commissioner, detailing the run off patterns for the 50 private insurers engaged in
the Victorian market, and an attempt to ascertain what the insurers' outstanding claims reserves
should be compared with what reserve provisions they had actually made. The conclusion
reached by Richard Cumpston was that while, collectively, these insurers had made provisions
of $501 million for outstanding claims, the required figure was some $723 million; that is, as a
group, they were under-reserved by some 31 percent.
The Problem of Contested Claims
While this roller coaster behaviour of the premium system over the period between
1975 and 1983 shook the confidence of the business community in the insurance industry's
handling of workers' compensation financing, there were also profound problems with the
existing system from the perspective of injured workers and the labour movement. At the
forefront of these complaints was the issue of delays in the handling of contested claims.
There was a steady and inexorable increase hi the backlog of claims before the
Workers' Compensation Board and in the time between lodgment of a claim before the Board
and its disposal, notwithstanding the expansion of the Board. By October 1983, there was a
backlog in excess of 14,000 cases, and the average time between lodgment of a contested claim
before the Board and the claim being brought for hearing was 24 months. A year later, by
October 1984, the backlog had further increased to some 17,000 cases.
Apart from the issue of delay, the operation of the system was itself flawed. The
chairman of the Cooney Committee, himself a barrister, was moved to describe it, in the
foreword to his report, as having "many of the features of a street bazaar."5 In particular, only

5Ibid., p. 2.
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1.6 percent of cases following this average 2-year wait were actually heard to judgment, while
some 62 percent of cases were being settled at the door of the court.
The Road to WorkCare
Following almost 3 decades in opposition, the Labor Party achieved political office in
Victoria hi April 1982. By the end of 1982, both the Treasurer, Rob Jolly, and the Minister for
Labour and Industry, Bill Landeryou, were the subject of a "deluge of complaints" from
employers concerning spiralling workers' compensation premiums as well as representations
from the labour movement about the delays at the Workers' Compensation Board. The
Government introduced interim legislation hi December 1982 and announced that it was
considering a thorough review of the system.
The Cooney Committee
In July 1983 the Government announced the appointment of the Committee of Enquiry
into the Victorian Workers' Compensation System, generally known as the Cooney Committee
after its chairman, Barney Cooney, a barrister and prominent member of the independent
faction of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The other four members reflected major
stakeholder interests. They were Jack Wood, a long tune former lay member of the Workers'
Compensation Board, who was nominated by the Trades Hall Council; J.C. Rademaker, a
senior business executive with extensive manufacturing experience as the employer
representative; Peter Jackson, deputy general manager of the State Insurance Office known for
his knowledge and expertise in workers' compensation insurance; and Bruce Lilley, then a
partner hi Coltmans, a legal firm which represented the interests of a number of the major
private workers' compensation insurers.6
The Committee received some 117 submissions and followed up with oral evidence
from 36 bodies and individuals who either represented key stakeholders in the system or had

6Ian Baker, then one of Bill Landeryou's ministerial advisers and later to achieve ministerial office
himself in a later Labor government, and a ministry research officer, Alan Clayton, headed the Committee's
secretariat as Executive Officer and Secretary/Research Officer, respectively.
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specialist knowledge and expertise. The stakeholder representation included injured workers 7
employer and trade bodies,8 trade unions,9 insurers and brokers, 10 doctors, 11 lawyers, 12
rehabilitation providers, 13 and risk managers. 14
In addition, a number of bodies with particular concerns about the operation of
workers' compensation were given representation, with evidence being taken from
representatives of the Equal Opportunity Board, the Ethnic Affairs Commission and the Small
Business Development Corporation. Individuals with specialist knowledge and expertise who
gave evidence before the Committee included Brendan Hammond, the Registrar of the
Workers' Compensation Board; Professor Harold Luntz of the University of Melbourne Law
School and one of the leading Australian authorities on accident compensation systems; Don
Rennie, a New Zealander who previously headed the research department of that country's
Accident Compensation Corporation; and Ted Hill, the legendary "king of compo," the
leading workers' compensation barrister and co-author of a book on this area. The Committee
also met informally with Judge Harris, who had conducted a review of Victorian workers'
compensation 7 years previously.

7North Richmond Workers' Compensation Support Group.
8Metal Trades Industry Association, Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, Victorian Employers
Federation and the Housing Industry Association.
'Australian Railways Union, Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia, Federated Liquor
Industries Union and the Victorian Trades Hall Council.
IOC.E. Heath Underwriting and Insurance, National Employers Mutual Insurance Company, and the
National Insurance Brokers Association.
"Australian Medical Association.
12Victorian Bar Council representing barristers. The Law Institute of Victoria, the professional
association for Victorian solicitors was scheduled to give oral evidence but at the eleventh hour withdrew due to a
sharp schism between the plaintiff and defendant wings of that body's workers' compensation section.
"Industrial Rehabilitation Service and Vocational Rehabilitation Service.
MAssociation of Risk and Insurance Managers of Australia.
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While the clear intention of some within Government was that the Committee would
simply "dust off the Harris recommendations and add some refinements,"15 the Committee in
fact undertook a comprehensive investigation of almost all aspects of the Victorian workers'
compensation system. This was sometimes a tortuous process,16 but the Committee completed
its report in early June 1984.
While the Cooney Committee report proved to be a very useful source document in
terms of detailing the ills of the system, as a vehicle for change it was hampered by the fact
that the Committee membership reflected the interests of the existing system and,
consequently, on many important issues these members voted to support the interests of the
constituency from which they were drawn. The analysis within the report provided a damning
indictment of the operation of the current system, and of its failures hi both economic and
social terms; however, when it came to recommendations and solutions the Committee largely
divided upon interest group lines.
One of the most hard-fought battles within the Committee revolved around how to
present (or perhaps disguise) the issue that "[cjontrol of the workers' compensation system has
through evolution been wrested from the institutional mechanism established to deliver benefits
to the injured and given over to captured by exogenous parties, namely insurers and the
medical and legal professions.*' 17 This was finally illustrated in Table 1.16 from the report,
which showed how the premium dollar in Victoria was distributed, (see Table 2.1)
On a number of important issues the Committee divided 3-2 in its decisions. The
recommendation that lump sum redemptions should be removed from the compensation system
on the grounds of being destructive of the successful operation of a rehabilitation-oriented
compensation system was adopted by this margin. Similarly, the recommendations that there
should be a continuance of private underwriting and not a move to a central fund, and limiting
15 A ministerial adviser quoted in Mark Considine, The Politics of Reform: Workers' Compensation from
Woodhouse to WorkCare. Centre for Applied Social Research, Deakin University, 1991 (Deakin Series in Public
Policy and Administration, No. 1) at p. 63.
I6lbid., pp. 62-81 for a good account of some of the workings of the Cooney Committee.
l7Report of the Committee, op. cit., p. 2.
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lump sums (apart from Table of Maims payments) to highly circumscribed situations were
adopted by this same majority. The recommendation that the common law action be abrogated
was taken on a 3-2 split, although the impact of this particular recommendation was essentially
negated by the rider to it that the appropriate forum for such action should be the future
implementation of a national accident compensation scheme.
The DMB Blueprint
The Cooney report represented a comprehensive review of a system in crisis, but little
unanimity in terms of solutions. However, during the period of the Committee's operation, Bill
Landeryou had resigned as Minister for Labour and Industry and, in a reallocation of
departmental functions, the administration of workers' compensation was transferred to the
Department of Management and Budget (DMB). Consequently, ministerial responsibility
rested with the Treasurer. This proved to be a crucial development.
One of the things which marked out the Cooney report from earlier Australian reviews
was the strong economic perspective which underlay much of its analysis. It included
indicative results of the impact of the recent shock increases in workers' compensation
insurance costs upon Victorian business as measured by the University of Melbourne's impact
model (ORANI). It was an approach that meshed with the agenda of DMB, which was quick to
see the importance of workers' compensation as an economic development issue, particularly
in terms of the effect of the financing crisis of workers' compensation insurance upon the trade
exposed sectors of the Victorian economy.
The new Department of Management and Budget, under Dr. Peter Sheehan as
Director-General, took an interventionist approach to transforming the Victorian economy. As
a vehicle for technocratic revolution it resembled some of the initiatives of Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis in the days of the "Massachusetts miracle." The Department was
the major architect of the Government's economic strategy for Victoria, which was released in
April 1984. A document entitled "The Next Step Forward" outlined issues concerning the
development of the Victorian economy over the next decade. It was followed by a series of
economic strategy statements giving a detailed outline of proposed initiatives in individual
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sectors. It is significant that the outline of the new WorkCare scheme was detailed in one of
these economic strategy statements, 18 the fifth publication in this series, following detailed
statements on state and regional industry policies, the Government's energy policy, the
Portland aluminium smelter, and the tourism strategy.
The workers' compensation statement saw "the current system of workers'
compensation [as] unsatisfactory both in respect of its effectiveness and efficiency [and having]
considerable scope to reduce the level of labour costs to Victorian producers, without reducing
the level of benefit to employees."19 It was perceived as a win-win situation. The Cooney
analysis had shown the degree of inefficiency and transaction costs within the old system. A
more modem and rational problem-solving approach could address these issues and share the
benefits between employers and workers, while the net result would be to advance the
economic development of the Victorian economy.
The contours of the new scheme were the result of the work of a high-level taskforce
within DMB which took the Cooney analysis and crafted a new framework for the funding and
organisation of workers' compensation in Victoria. While negotiations with the union
movement to secure their support for the new scheme produced a number of concessions in
respect of the benefit proposals,20 the major difference from the scheme originally conceived
by the DMB taskforce lay in the manner in which the new scheme was to be administered.
Initially it had been proposed that the new Accident Compensation Commission would
operate as a single fund, on the Queensland Workers' Compensation Board and New Zealand
Accident Compensation Corporation model. The fund would discharge the claims handling,
premium collection and other functions involved in the running of a workers' compensation
system. It was envisaged that, at least for an interim period, some or all of the claims functions
would be handled by the State Insurance Office, and that premium collection would be

"Victoria - Workers' Compensation Reform: Government Statement. Economic Strategy for Victoria
Statement No. 5. Melbourne: Government Printer (December 1984).
"Ibid., pp. 129-130.
20See Considine, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
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undertaken by the State Taxation Office, which was the vehicle for the collection of payroll
tax. Again, there were New Zealand analogues for such interim action.
The decision to move to a system of claims administration "agents" resulted from
pressure from significant areas of the business community, who were concerned that a
government monopoly would become overly bureaucratic and inefficient, and also from the
Insurance Employees Union, which was alarmed at the prospect of significant redundancies
among its members as a result of the move to a monopoly state fund. This change was made
relatively early in the planning process and was incorporated in the Government statement
where it was advanced as a basis to "ensure minimum insurance industry disruption, increased
business opportunities and maximum efficiency.**21
WorkCare in Operation
WorkCare is a term which has both an extended meaning and a more circumscribed
signification. In its extended sense it refers to the triad of agencies, the Accident Compensation
Commission (ACC), the Occupational Health and Safety Commission (OHSC), and the
Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (VARC), as well as the schemes administered by
them. The objectives of the ACC, expressed in its legislative charter, included one to "ensure a
coordinated approach in the implementation of the accident compensation scheme in liaison
with the [Victorian Accident Rehabilitation] Council and the Occupational Health and Safety
Commission that emphasizes accident prevention, rehabilitation and operational efficiency."22
However, the degree of coordination in practice fell well short of the rhetoric accorded
to this goal. It is true that there was cross representation on the Boards of these three agencies
and even a WorkCare Co-ordination Committee, comprising the chief executive officers of
ACC and VARC and the Chairperson of OHSC, together with a senior representative from the
Department of Labour to provide coordinated executive policy and strategic management
decisions. Nevertheless, to the extent that coordination existed, it was in a formal sense rather
21 Victoria - Workers' Compensation Reform, op. cit., p. 15; also Ch. 9, "The Role of Existing Insurers.'
^Accident Compensation Act 1985, Section 19(c).
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than one which involved significant functional integration of approach and activities. To a very
considerable degree the agencies were separate trains going in a similar direction rather than
carriages of a single train.
In its more circumscribed sense, and the one which would be recognised by the
Victorian public, the term WorkCare refers to the system of reformed workers' compensation
arrangements which operated from the inauguration of the new system on 1 September 1985
until the beginnings of what is generally called WorkCover, from 1 December 1992. It is this
concept of WorkCare which is addressed in the following sections of this chapter.
Components of Scheme Operation
Far and away the most fundamental problem that WorkCare experienced was the
number and duration of long-term claimants hi the system. This was particularly pronounced in
the early years of the scheme's operations; at the tune of the DMB review in 1987 it was found
that around 18 percent of claimants with a standard claim (that is one involving weekly benefits
for more than 5 days) were still in receipt of these benefits after 12 months. While
this rate improved over the later years of the scheme (by 30 June 1988, the scheme's actuaries
were reporting a fall to around 12.5 percent), the level and duration of long-term claims in
Victoria remained comparatively high over the entire WorkCare period.
The duration issue had a dramatic effect on the scheme's funding ratio which, as can be
seen from Table 2.2, had fallen sharply during the first 4 years of scheme operation to a level
in 1988/89 of only 14 percent. This was almost entirely due to lengthening durations and the
resulting rise in claim liabilities. Table 2.2 shows that the number of new claims incurred was
actually falling through this period. The funding ratio improved following the 1989 reform
initiatives to around 48 percent in WorkCare's last year of operation. However, by then the
effects of these reforms had been exhausted, and the ACC was reporting that unless further
changes were made, the scheme's funding level would remain below 60 percent for the rest of
the decade.
Workers' compensation systems are extremely complex entities, in terms of both their
own dynamics and their interaction with external systems; as such, assigning rough measures
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of cause and effect and relative contribution of specific scheme features to particular system
outcomes is fraught with difficulty. Such an exercise is likely to overlook important exogenous
variables such as the state of the economy and the labour market or demographics, which have
profound effects and consequences, for instance, on return to work possibilities. However, a
thematic approach to aspects of the WorkCare system in terms of scheme administration, the
pricing system, the benefits structure, rehabilitation, and dispute resolution may assist in
illuminating some of the problems of system performance.
Administration of the WorkCare Scheme
At the heart of the administrative arrangements of the WorkCare scheme was the
system of agency relationships for the discharge of scheme functions. The collection of the
levy was undertaken by the Levy Collection Agency, which was an entity within the State
Taxation Office. The investment of the collected levy that was surplus to immediate scheme
needs was undertaken initially by three fund management agents selected on the basis of
tender; all were bodies associated with major banks. The major function of claims
administration was the responsibility of nine claims administration agents. These had all been
private insurers in the previous system who had successfully tendered for this role.
This element of delegated responsibility for claims functions was, as noted above, a
political compromise and a change from the original WorkCare blueprint. This compromise
had the effect of creating an arrangement unique in workers' compensation practice. No other
state workers' compensation fund hi the world operated in this manner. It was an arrangement
which was always going to be fraught with tension. Although it was essentially a relationship
between principal and agent (see Chapter 4), it suffered from the fact that the agent often had
an interest different (indeed sometimes fundamentally opposed) to that of the principal. The
most important of these differences were to emerge strongly in relation to the costs of claims
which straddled the operation of the previous private insurance system and WorkCover.
The claims administration agents were entities who had recently been engaged hi a
highly acrimonious fight with the Government over their removal from workers' compensation
insurance underwriting and thus had no reason to feel a special commitment to the success of
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the new system.23 The difficulty in achieving scheme goals through this arrangement was
compounded by the initial basis of claims administration agent remuneration. This mainly
consisted of a uniform fee for each claim registered, with an additional rollover fee for any
claim which extended into a second year's duration. As the WorkCare fund rather than the
agent bore the economic burden of the cost of claims, the profit-maximising strategy for an
agent would be to accept every claim and do nothing and hope that the claim would continue
into a second year.
In order to simplify the logistics of establishing the scheme during the 12-week (!)
implementation phase, employers were generally allocated to the insurer who had provided
cover immediately before WorkCare, where that insurer was a claims administration agent
under the new scheme. Not only did this arrangement result in disincentives for the claims
administration agent to undertake any recovery action against itself (as the former insurer on
risk) in respect of liabilities which straddled the two schemes, it also created an opportunity for
the transfer of some old system costs onto WorkCare.
The 1987 review of WorkCare conducted by the Department of Management and
Budget found evidence of old system claims being passed onto WorkCare and noted the
phenomenon of some 1,033 claims with 1 September 1985 (the date of commencement of
WorkCare) as the date of injury, notwithstanding that this day was a Sunday and that this
figure was without precedent for any other Sunday over the life of the scheme.24 The DMB
review also found widespread employer dissatisfaction with the performance of claims
administration agents, with employers complaining of delays in reimbursement, poor claims
review, irregularity in ordering medical examinations, lack of follow-up action in relation to

23It should be noted that the Insurance Council of Australia specifically denies this. They assert that the
nine agents went to considerable length to work through operational problems, including frequent meetings with
the Accident Compensation Commission.
24The insurance industry maintains that claims agents were instructed by the ACC to file claims on 1
September if there was any doubt about which Act pertained to the claim.
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return to work or referral to the Tribunal [and failing] to respond to employer's inquiries,
complaints and requests for information.25
These failures had generated a high number of representations to Members of
Parliament, Ministers, and the Ombudsman. In particular, the performance of two agents
(Accident Compensation Settling Agency and Manufacturers Mutual Insurance), was regarded
as sufficiently poor for their contracts to be terminated. C.E. Heath Underwriting and
Insurance was also cancelled at that time for other reasons. Yet another agent (Royal
Insurance) decided to withdraw from its contract following the announcement of a new system
of claims administration agent remuneration which was brought into effect from 1 October
1987.
The new remuneration system, while recognising prompt registration of claims, placed
the emphasis upon file closure with a weekly management component which decreased as the
number of weeks of compensation on the claim increased. As well, a bonus scheme was
introduced from 1 January 1988 which provided a performance bonus to claims administration
agents with increased return to work rates and more effective claims management. In its
1988-1989 annual report, the Accident Compensation Commission stated:
The critical administrative issue faced by the Commission remains the need to
enhance the performance of claims agents whose principal motivation and
objectives need not necessarily be compatible with those of the Commission.
The appropriate balance of economic incentives and sanctions, and mixture of
regulation and competition has proven to be difficult to find. 26
The Grafting of a package of remuneration provisions which more appropriately met
that balance proved to be a continuing challenge for the Accident Compensation Commission
over the entire WorkCare period and remains so today for the Victorian WorkCover Authority
(see Chapter 4). From the time of the introduction of the October 1987 remuneration
arrangements and the January 1988 bonus pool, refinement and enhancement of performance
measures have become almost an annual event.
"WorkCare: Government Statement, 31 July 1987, para. 4.10.
26Accident Compensation Commission, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 23.
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The composition of the claims administration agents was subject to frequent change as
well. Following the termination of agents' contracts in 1987, mentioned above, a new agent,
FAI Workers' Compensation, was added to the group and the ACC created its own agent,
WorkCare Compensation Services, partly to test new computer and administrative systems, but
also to assist with handling some of the open claims left after agent termination and
withdrawal. Following the termination of Mercantile Mutual's contract in 1989 and the
withdrawal by Compensation Business Services in 1990, there remained five claims
administration agents. This number rose to six with the admission of QBE Insurance in
February 1992.
One of the early problems of the claims administration agent operations, noted in the
1987 DMB report, was the lack of responsiveness to employer concerns. Beginning with the
new October 1987 contractual arrangements, the ability of employers to change agents was
enhanced and the process of introducing market competition into the agency operations was
progressively fostered by the ACC. This process reached its furthest extension under
WorkCare with the new agent contracts which took effect from 1 July 1992, which actively
promoted competition among agents to gain employer clients. The clear evidence is that agents
did become increasingly responsive to employer concerns and began to develop special
products and cultivate niche markets. This attentiveness to employer concerns appeared
motivated by gaining and maintaining desired market share and position and by offering a
wider range of insurance products to targeted employers. However, while the final phase of the
WorkCare period saw a much greater level and quality of service from the authorised claims
agents to employers than at the beginning of the scheme, there is little evidence that these
agents ever saw the injured worker as a client in the same manner that they belatedly came to
regard the employer.
Pricing System
The basis of the financing arrangements for the new scheme was the employer levy.
Since this amounted to a percentage of employee compensation, the ACC utilised the State
Taxation Office as its agent for levy collection since that body was already collecting payroll
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tax. The levy system operated with levy being paid annually (in arrears) by around 36,000
employers with an estimated liability of $650 or less and monthly (in arrears) by approximately
90,000 other employers.
Whereas the premium arrangements under the previous privately underwritten system
had been based upon occupational classification, the WorkCare levy system utilised an industry
rating based on a WorkCare Industry Classification (WIC) code derived from the Australian
Standard Industry Classification (ASIC). Under these arrangements all establishments of
employers were categorised according to 466 industry types and allocated to one of the seven
levy rates, which ranged from 0.57 percent to 3.8 percent of total employee remuneration.
The process of determining industry levy rates was done on the basis that the average
rate paid by employers on a state-wide basis would not exceed 2.4 percent of employee
remuneration over the first 5 years of the scheme. The result would be that the cost of the new
scheme to Victorian employers would be some 48 percent less than the indicative premium
rates operative under the old system. The Government costings for the new scheme predicted
that it could be fully funded over a period of 10 years at this average premium rate of 2.4
percent of remuneration. These costings were undertaken by Richard Cumpston (then at E.S.
Knight and Co.) and David Orford and Bill Szuch of Financial Synergy Pty Ltd and were set
out in a three-volume publication, Costing WorkCare. The target of 10-year full funding was
based on a number of assumptions, including:
a reduction in the claims rate (i.e., claims per 100 workers) of 15 percent;
a reduction in the cost per claim (as measured as a proportion of average
earnings) by 10 percent;
a rate of return on funds invested of 14 percent hi 1985/86 declining to a longterm level of 9.5 percent by 1990/91 compared with an assumed long-term rate
of growth of Victorian average weekly earnings of 7.5 percent; and
significant savings in the areas of legal, medical and administrative costs.
^ While the great majority of employers secured substantial reductions in workers'
compensation costs as a result of the new levy system, it was recognised that some employers
would pay more under the new system. Accordingly the Government agreed to a system of
interim levies under which employers whose levy rate would have been significantly higher
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than their fully funded insurance premium under the old system could receive a levy rate which
was equivalent to this former premium amount. By mid 1987, around 1,400 employers had
been granted interim levies upon this basis at an estimated system cost of around $6 million
annually.
^ It was intended that the interim levy arrangements would cease on 30 June 1986 when it
was anticipated that a bonus and penalty system would be introduced. However, this
introduction date was deferred and the interim levy system was progressively extended to 30
June 1987, then 30 August 1987 and finally 30 June 1988, with the introduction of the bonus
and penalty system from 1 July 1988. The experience of the scheme in its first 2 years of
operation showed it falling behind the required performance necessary to track the 10-year full
funding curve. In these years the average levy rate was 2.2 percent rather than 2.4 percent of
remuneration, which equated to an income shortfall from target over this period of more than
$100 million.
This shortfall was contributed to by a number of factors. First, the data deficiencies of
the previous system created great problems in estimating the true industry claims experience,
and thus the determination of proper levy rates for particular industries was prone to
considerable error. Secondly, following the commencement of the new scheme a number of
industries successfully challenged their designated rates and were reassigned to a lower levy
band. Thirdly, the pattern of employment growth was more varied than predicted and the
highest growth proved to occur in low levy rate industries. Fourthly, the under-registration of
employers was skewed towards high levy rate industries.
A reallocation of industries and levy rates on the basis of actual claims experience over
the first 2 years of the scheme resulted in an average levy rate of 2.4 percent in 1987/88, but it
fell to 2.3 percent in 1988/89, largely as a result of economic restructuring and industry
reclassifications. As a result of the legislative reforms following the Rowe Committee review,
the average levy rate was sharply increased to 3.3 percent of remuneration (comprised of an
average prescribed industry rate of 3 percent and a 10 percent surcharge) as from 1 October
1989. The band of levy rates was considerably widened from 0.4 percent to 7.0 percent of
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remuneration (effectively 0.44 percent to 7.7 percent through the operation of the surcharge).
As well, the industry classification system was expanded to cover 516 industries.
An attempt to provide a financial incentive for employers to improve their WorkCare
claims record was made with the introduction of a bonus and penalties scheme from 1 July
1988. This scheme covered all employers with 1986/87 remuneration of $450,000 or more and
extended to some 7,000 employers with around 29,000 establishments. The scheme was
revenue neutral and underwent a series of revisions to increase the rate of contribution to the
Bonus Fund from which bonuses were paid (progressively from 25 percent to 50 percent to 75
percent) and to extend its operation to small employers hi 1989/90. In the final year of
WorkCare's operations, around 85 percent of workplaces earned a bonus and about 13 percent
incurred a penalty under this system.
The ACC, in early 1992, began a major review of the total design of the pricing
system, considering both Australian and overseas models. Much of this work would bear fruit
in the early WorkCover period in the implementation of an experience rating system which has
underpinned the financing of this successor scheme.
Dispute Resolution
With the inception of WorkCare, the Workers' Compensation Board, the body which
determined disputed claims under the previous workers' compensation system, was replaced by
the Accident Compensation Tribunal. The Tribunal was structured into three separate
divisions. First, a Conciliation Division provided a sifting role. It heard all genuine disputes
and was the body which initially considered all other new system disputes and convened
Preliminary Conferences to facilitate the settlement of old system claims. Secondly, a Board
Division was constituted to run off the backlog of old system matters which had previously
been dealt with by the former Workers' Compensation Board. Finally, a Tribunal Division was
to resolve disputes about new system cases which had not been resolved at the Conciliation
Division.
The overwhelming majority of claims were heard by the Conciliation Division and most
related to genuine disputes, a term which referred to the measure in the Accident
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Compensation Act which provided that claims for weekly payments had to be accepted or
disputed within 21 days of the receipt of the claim by the employer. A claim which was not
disputed within this period was deemed to be accepted. In the first 2 years of WorkCare's
operations, the percentage of total claims which were disputed in this manner was 5.2 percent
(1985/86) and 5.7 percent (1986/87). Following the 1987 review and changes to the claims
administration agents remuneration, under which a proportion of such remuneration related to
the disputation of claims, the percentage of total claims disputed as to initial entitlement rose to
15.1 percent in 1987/88.
One aspect of this dramatically increased rate of agent disputation was the similarly
dramatic level of withdrawal of disputes in relation to initial entitlement. In 1987/88 of the
12,445 disputes lodged by claims agents under Section 109, 5,420 (43.5 percent) were
withdrawn by the agent and, hi the following year, 6,779 (46.9 percent) of the 14,449 disputes
lodged were similarly withdrawn. In large part this phenomenon reflected the difficulty
experienced by agents hi assembling the necessary information in order to make a
determination of liability within the statutory 21-day period. As a result, this period was
increased to 28 days under 1989 legislative changes.
The initial institutional structure relating to contested claims resolution underwent a
number of changes over the life of the WorkCare scheme. The 1987 legislative amendments
restructured the Tribunal into an Accident Compensation Division, a Workers' Compensation
Division, and a Contribution Assessment Division. The latter division was created and granted
wide powers to resolve issues relating to contributions between the ACC and insurers
operating under the previous workers' compensation system. It was composed of one
Presidential (i.e., judicial) member. Members of the previous Conciliation Division were
metamorphosed into Arbitrators and essentially performed their former duties as members of
either the Accident Compensation Division or the Workers' Compensation Division.
More significant was the change brought about by the 1989 legislative reform package
which saw an administrative review body, the WorkCare Appeals Board (WAB), interposed as
an independent body between the ACC and the Accident Compensation Tribunal. The WAB
commenced operations in March 1990 and was empowered to review any decision (or any
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failure to make a decision) by the ACC. The claimant had a period of 60 days following
notification of a decision to apply for a review before the WAB. However, if a claimant, in
cases involving termination or alteration of benefits, lodged an application for review within 21
days of notice of the decision, then such claimant would continue to receive their weekly
benefits until the WAB made its decision. This created an understandable incentive to appeal
all such cases within the 21-day period of benefit preservation.
The operation of the WAB was governed by a further set of stipulated times hi which
various material had to be submitted. While neither the ACC nor the employer was granted a
right to appear before the WAB, the ACC was required and an employer was able to make a
written submission to the WAB within 14 days of an application being lodged. The claimant
could also make a statement, but had 21 days to do so and had access to both the ACC and
employer's statements. As well, a set fee was provided for the cost of case preparation and for
medical examinations organised by the claimant or the claimant's representative, including
travel costs relating to a claimant's attendance at the WAB. In 1990/91 these costs amounted to
some $6.1 million, of which 57 percent related to case preparation, 42 percent to medical
examination costs and 0.7 percent to claimant attendance costs. With the number of
applications to the WAB doubling in the following year, these costs also more than doubled to
$14 million in 1991/92.
The Road to WorkCover
WorkCare a System under Review
During the 7 years of its operation, WorkCare was the subject of ongoing examination
and scrutiny. Mention has been made of these reviews hi the previous section, as they were
often the trigger to elements of scheme modification and change. The Government WorkCare
Statement which was released at the end of July 1987 was the end product of a 9-month review
by the Department of Management and Budget of the scheme. While the Statement touched on
a range of issues, these were essentially subsidiary to the problems of return-to-work
performance. It stated:
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The most important deficiency of WorkCare to date has been in the area of
return to work. Thus, while the number of standard WorkCare claims has been
higher than anticipated and measures are necessary to tighten access to
WorkCare benefits, the major area of concern is the number and duration of long-term
claimants in the WorkCare system.27
The Government Statement announced a 10-point reform programme, the major
elements of which became part of the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1987 which
came into force on 1 December 1987 and which were supplemented by the Accident
Compensation Regulations promulgated on 4 January 1988. These measures included
provisions for a tightening of access to benefits, standardised medical certificates, a widening
of the grounds upon which benefits could be suspended or terminated, the appointment of a
complaints investigator, capping of common law damages, and increased penalties for
fraudulent activities. They were complemented by administrative changes within the ACC such
as the establishment of the Employment Monitoring Unit and new procedures on claims
monitoring and the new performance-based claims agents contracts.
Following the DMB review, the attention surrounding WorkCare, particularly as a
result of the parliamentary debates upon the 1987 legislation, led to the Government
establishing, in November 1987, a Joint Select Committee of the Victorian Parliament to
further examine the system. The Committee had both a specific and a broad mandate. The
former was to investigate the question of contribution to the ACC from pre-WorkCare insurers
hi relation to injuries whose origins partly lay prior to the establishment of WorkCare. The
latter was an open-ended investigation into all aspects of WorkCare.
The Committee, under the chairmanship of Barry Rowe, tabled its first report, into the
question of pre-WorkCare insurer contribution, in late March 1988. This report (by a majority)
endorsed the Government's view that contribution should exist in respect of all claims which
had a part pre-WorkCare origin and not, as the insurers had claimed, that such contribution
only applied to injuries of gradual process. The Government then legislated to insert an

"WorkCare: Government Statement, 31 July 1987, para 1.6.

2-27

extensive legislative regime into the Act to govern the contribution issue. This legislation was
proclaimed on 11 May 1988.
The Final Report of the Rowe Committee was delayed by parliamentary elections in
October 1988 and was finally tabled in November 1988. The two-volume report made some
124 recommendations for change. Apart from its recommendations in respect of a changed
system of contested claims resolution, most of the recommendations contained hi the Rowe
Report were process and procedure oriented, concentrating on matters such as information
dissemination (including the production of quarterly reports from the various WorkCare
agencies), redesigned claim forms and medical certificates and changes to the operating
procedures, policy guidelines, and remuneration arrangements hi respect of claims
administration agents.
The Government, however, moved to introduce a more extensive package of changes to
the WorkCare system with the Accident Compensation (General Amendment) Act 1989 which
was assented to at the end of September 1989. This was the second significant reform package
following the 1985 legislation. It was a comprehensive set of measures which included
raising the average levy rate from 2.4 percent to 3.3 percent (including the 10
percent surcharge;
the reduction of the rate of weekly payments from 80 percent to 60 percent
PIAWE for workers on benefits for more than 12 months with a work capacity
or level of impairment below 15 percent;
replacement of the previous minimum-floor arrangements with a compensation
supplement for lower-paid workers;
increasing the period that an employer had to keep a job open for an injured
worker from 6 months to 12 months; and
introduction of the WorkCare Appeals Board as the body responsible for the
initial stage of contested claims resolution.
WorkCare the Internal Repositioning Process
The 1989 legislative reforms provided a breathing space for the WorkCare system,
especially in respect of the former downward financial spiral. This can be seen from Table 2.2.
The WorkCare fund in 1989/90 reported an operating surplus of some $373.7 million
compared to a deficit of $12.3 million the year before; this was due mostly to increased
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revenues as claim payments only declined slightly. Even more strikingly, the unfunded
liabilities of the scheme fell by more than 40 percent, from $4.182 billion to $2.476 billion,
between 1988/89 and 1989/90, and the funding ratio more than doubled, from 14 percent to 30
percent, over this period. This obviously reflected the actuarial impact of the system changes.
These gains continued to consolidate during 1990/91 and 1991/92, with the unfunded
liabilities of the scheme being estimated at $1.819 billion and $1.862 billion, respectively, and
the funding ratio rising to 46 percent in 1990/91 and 48 percent in 1991/92. However, during
these years the Victorian economy had moved firmly into recession and it was becoming clear
that this, particularly as it was reflected in labour shedding, was beginning to have a significant
impact upon the scheme, both hi respect of levy income and difficulties hi returning injured
workers to the workforce.
The 1991/92 ACC annual report represented a clarion call to action to address these
issues. The new managing director, Andrew Lindberg, bluntly declared that
Once again the WorkCare scheme is at the cross-roads. By year end, the
1989 reform measures had run their course and there is no doubt that further
substantial legislative reform is necessary to significantly reduce the financial
and social costs of workplace injury in Victoria. 28
The ACC managing director stated that the ACC stood "ready to provide every assistance to
the Government to implement change during 1992/93. "29 The organisation had already
embarked upon a process of analysis and preparation of alternative approaches.
The centrality of the link between claims duration, particularly the number of long-term
claimants, and the attainment and maintenance of a fully-funded scheme at a levy rate
comparable to that of surrounding schemes was brought to the fore through research
commissioned by the ACC. This research, conducted by the Boston Consulting Group,
estimated that around 70 percent of the cost differential between the Victorian system (with an
average levy rate of 3 percent of remuneration) and that across the border in New South Wales

28Accident Compensation Commission, Annual Report, 1991/92, p. 6.
29Ibid.,p. 7.
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(then operating on an average levy rate of 1.8 percent of remuneration) could be accounted for
by the different duration experience of the two systems.30
Further, a visit to the United States by the ACC managing director had reinforced the
view that, on the basis of Australian and overseas experience, the "compensation cycle" could
only be broken by
a workplace centred system of rehabilitation and return to work, supported by
strong financial incentives and obligations for employers to get injured workers
quickly and safely back to work and for employees to rehabilitate, retrain and
find suitable employment;
a more direct and less litigious approach to reviewing benefits with minimal
involvement of lawyers;
reduced benefits for those claimants capable of work with increased support for
the seriously injured;
restricted access to common law in favour of more efficient forms of
compensation; and
integrated administrative and service delivery systems.31
The Move to WorkCover
Given these antecedents, it was highly likely that 1992/93 would see further significant
changes to the WorkCare system. When and by whom such change would be implemented
would depend upon the election cycle. The Labor Government that had been in power since
1982 was internally divided and weakened by financial management questions, particularly in
relation to the sale of the State Bank and the failure of the Pyramid Building Society. As
predicted, a Liberal-National Party coalition scored a landslide victory in the October 1992
elections. The new Government moved to completely overhaul the WorkCare system through
the introduction of a new WorkCover scheme as one of its first legislative initiatives. While in
Opposition, the new Government had commissioned the Tasman Institute, a conservative think
tank, to provide the blueprint for a new system of workers' compensation arrangements. This
report, with accompanying actuarial costings, provided the basis for dramatically overhauling

^Boston Consulting Group, Benchmarking Best Practice: Cost Drivers in Australian Workers'
Compensation Systems (July 1992).

''Accident Compensation Commission, Annual Report, 1991/92, p. 7.
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the WorkCare system. This was augmented by input from other sources and a new set of
proposals was rendered into legislative form and introduced into Parliament on 30 October
1992. With a majority in both Houses of Parliament, the new measure, the Accident
Compensation (WorkCover) Act 1992, quickly completed its parliamentary stages and received
Royal Assent on 19 November 1992. Workers' compensation in Victoria moved from
WorkCare to WorkCover on 1 December 1992. The new WorkCover system and its
performance are the subjects of the remaining chapters of this review.
Concluding Observations
The WorkCare changes involved a significant break with the past tradition of workers'
compensation development. There were no Australian models to hand. Queensland had
legislated to establish a state monopoly scheme hi 1916, but the Queensland system (even at the
time of the introduction of WorkCare) maintained limitations on the duration of weekly
payments of compensation which were much more stringent than those in Victoria. Indeed, in a
functional sense, the more radical step was not the change from private insurance to a state
fund, but the move to operate an extended wage loss system. This broke the general mould,
which had existed from the origins of workers' compensation in Australia, of such schemes
only providing circumscribed coverage (usually through prescribed monetary limits) of income
loss, with more income protection for more extended periods being primarily the responsibility
of the federal social security system. In addition, the traditional arrangements in workers'
compensation schemes for dealing with extended duration claims through lump sum
redemptions was proscribed except in very limited situations.
The move to an extended wage loss system placed enormous responsibility upon the
institutional mechanisms and processes in charge of injury prevention, rehabilitation, and
return to work. As became clearly evident very early in the WorkCare scheme's operation, the
issue of extended duration and long-term claims would be the major threat to its continued
economic viability. If the system was to operate under its original legislative mandate, it would
require a sophisticated and proactive system of claims administration. The breadth of the
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managerialist vision had to be matched with the strength and depth of the operations administration
But the operation of the system of claims administration agents was plainly disastrous
at least in the early days of the set fee per claim remuneration arrangements. This system, born
of political compromise, introduced a unique variant to workers' compensation administration
Questions persist as to whether a different set of remuneration arrangements could have
provided the necessary basis for administrative excellence and whether the initially preferred
arrangements with respect to a state fund operation would have fared better. The first of these
questions is still being played out; the issue of how to align in the optimal manner the actions
and behaviour of a third party with scheme goals through economic and other incentives
remains a challenge for WorkCover in its present form. The second is somewhat moot.
Overseas experience can point to a number of state funds which are a bureaucratic and
financial mess. Yet, it can also illuminate occasional systems of this type which are essentially
fully funded and rank among the world's best; British Columbia and Washington are two such
examples.
The establishment of an extended wage loss system also brought into sharp focus the
issue of the relationship between workers' compensation and the labour market, and in
particular the vexed question of the treatment of permanent partial incapacity. Conceptual and
legal difficulties had always existed in this regard previously, but their practical (and
particularly their financial) effect had been muted by the general limits upon the duration of
weekly benefits.
The issue is central to the issue of scheme boundary differentiation; that is, what is the
basis upon which workers' compensation schemes delimit their proper area of responsibility
and avoid become de facto unemployment insurance schemes. In other words, for what period
and at what level should workers' compensation support continue for persons whose recovery
from injury leaves them with a work capacity, but whose inability to secure employment
results primarily from the state of the labour market. This issue had been largely left open in
the original WorkCare scheme arrangements, and attempts to provide answers were important
components of the 1987 and 1989 amending legislation.
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The influence of labour market conditions and their effect upon scheme operations was
heightened when the Victorian economy moved into recession. As the economic downturn
increasingly affected employment levels in the economy, there was a direct impact on both
return-to-work opportunities and upon scheme financing in a system where income is
determined by a levy upon employee remuneration.
The lack of coordinated action between the WorkCare agencies also meant a dissipation
of effort and almost certainly a degrading of ultimate results. The potential of using a single
fund and its comprehensive data base for sophisticated, targeted injury prevention initiatives
was never realised. Similarly, the largely arm's-length arrangement between the agencies
responsible for claims and rehabilitation/return to work, undermined the basis for an integrated
problem solving approach and created confusion for employers in having to deal with different
agencies over a single workers' compensation claim. Employers and injured workers were
passive participants rather than having a controlling involvement in the workers' compensation
process. A strong workplace focus was a comparatively late development under WorkCare, but
when it came (such as in VARC's Injury Management Program) it yielded superior results and
provided indicators for future scheme redesign.
While WorkCare is acknowledged to have been a failure, its problems informed the
design of WorkCover and are reflected in many of the features of the present scheme. In
particular, the strong focus on the return-to-work goal under WorkCover directly reflects the
failure of WorkCare to achieve return to work for so many claimants. Concentration on
incentive effects for authorised insurers results from the failure to adequately consider such
issues under WorkCare. Dissatisfaction with both the private approach to workers'
compensation (pre-1985) and the WorkCare approach (1985-1992) led Victoria to develop the
mixed approach that we find today under WorkCover. It is to that system that we now turn our
attention.
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Table 2.1 Where the Premium Dollar Goes Victoria (circa 1983)
Weekly Payments

22%

Redemptions

16%

Common Law

10%

Death

3%

Table of Maims

1%

Hospital and Medical

17%

Administration

15%

Legal

12%

Brokerage

4%

TOTAL

100%

Source: Cooney Report, Table 1-16.
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Table 2.2 Performance of the WorkCare Scheme: 1985/86 to 1991/92
1985/86'

1986/87

1987/88

1988/89

1989/90

1990/91

1991/92

81,883

100,116

95,069

91,965

83,745

77,113

70,479

471

747

632

854

1,250

1,407

1,321

65

333

538

715

694

749

910

Operating Surplus/
(deficit)4 ($M)

353

335

(9)

(12)

374

472

193

Net Outstanding
Claims Liabilities
($M)

535

2,300

2,720

4,865

3,532

3,347

3,583

Net Assets5 ($M)

369

704

694

682

1,056

1,528

1,721

Unfunded Liabilities
($M)

165

1,596

2,025

4,182

2,476

1,819

1,862

69.0

30.6

25.6

14.0

29.9

45.7

48.0

Estimated Incurred
Claims2
Total Income3 ($M)
New Claim Payments
($M)

Funding Ratio (%)

Source: Accident Compensation Commission Annual Reports
'10 months only; from 1 September 1985
2Figures include actual claims for the period, together with an estimate of the number of incurred but not yet
reported claims (IBNRs) estimated at 30 June 1992.
'income from levy, investments and other sources.
4Excluding movement in outstanding claims liability.
5Net assets excluding recoveries.
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Chapter 3 GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATION OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION IN VICTORIA
This chapter will provide a brief introduction to the structure and functions of the VWA
as of July 1996. While many of these topics will be explored in more detail later, it is useful to
provide an overview, particularly for the reader who is not already familiar with the Victorian
workers' compensation scheme. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the volume of
claims hi Victoria.
The Legislative Mandate
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) was created by the Accident Compensation
(WorkCover) Act of 1992, which completely restructured the workers' compensation system in
Victoria, as recounted in the previous chapter. According to the Accident Compensation Act
1985, as amended (the Act), the objectives of the Authority are to
(a) manage the accident compensation scheme as effectively and efficiently and
economically as is possible;
(b) administer . . . [the Act] . . . and any other relevant Act;
(c) assist employers and workers hi achieving healthy and safe working environments;
(d) promote the effective occupational rehabilitation of injured workers and their early
return to work;
(e) encourage the provision of suitable employment opportunities to workers who have
been injured;
(f) ensure that appropriate compensation is paid to injured workers in the most
socially and economically appropriate manner and as expeditiously as possible;
(g) develop such internal management structures and procedures as will enable the
Authority to perform its functions and exercise its powers effectively, efficiently
and economically. (Section 19)
The functions of the Victorian WorkCover Authority are very comprehensive. It
oversees the workers' compensation insurance system, including regulating authorised insurers
and superintending the operation of the WorkCover Authority Fund, which acts as a 100
percent re-insurance fund, and thus bears the actuarial risk of the Victorian scheme. As part of
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its workers' compensation responsibilities, the VWA also regulates the public and private
system that accomplishes the medical, physical, and occupational rehabilitation of injured
workers. It is largely responsible for maintaining the focus of this system on the effective,
economical, and durable return-to-work objective.
It manages (effective 2 July 1996) the occupational health and safety system in Victoria,
including standards setting, inspection, enforcement, education, and prosecution activities. It is
responsible for public safety under the Dangerous Goods Act, the Road Transport (Dangerous
Goods) Act, and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act. The VWA also acts as the main policy
development and evaluation body for the areas of workers' compensation and occupational
safety and health in Victoria. As such, it works closely with the Ministry for Finance in
formulating public policy in these critical areas. It also has general responsibility for fostering
a co-operative consultative relationship between management and labour in relation to the
health, safety and welfare of persons at work (Section 20). According to the Victorian
WorkCover Authority, 1995-96 Annual Report, "WorkCover exists to prevent work injuries,
achieve return to work after injury, provide fair compensation and deliver quality service to
both workers and employers at a competitive cost to business." (p. 7)
VWA Governance
The VWA is headed by a Board of Management, which includes a full-time Director,
who acts as Chief Executive of the Authority, and not more than six part-tune Directors,
appointed by the Governor in Council (Sections 24-26). Directors serve at the pleasure of the
Governor in Council for terms not exceeding 5 years and are eligible for re-appointment. It is
also provided that the Governor in Council may appoint one of the Directors to be Chairperson
(Section 27). The Board of Management meets at least 10 times in each calendar year at the
call of the Chairperson, and a majority of Directors in office constitute a quorum. Questions
are decided by a majority of votes of the Directors present and voting on the question. The
Chairperson, or other person presiding, has a second, or casting, vote in the event of a tie vote
(Section 28).
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The Director of the Board and Chief Executive of the VWA is appointed by the
Governor in Council and "... any act, matter or thing done in the name of, or on behalf of,
the Authority, by the Chief Executive is to be taken to have been done by the Authority."
(Section 25) The remuneration and terms and condition of appointment of the Chief Executive
of the VWA are not set by statute, but are determined by the Governor in Council.
The Act also establishes the WorkCover Authority Fund. It receives premium income,
investment income, penalties, and other income and is responsible for payment of
compensation, rehabilitation, and any other payments required under this or any other Act.
This specifically includes the costs of the Health and Safety Division (and the predecessor
Health and Safety Organisation as described in Chapter 8). In addition, the Fund is responsible
for the payment of the costs of administration of the VWA (including the Board of Directors
and the WorkCover Advisory Committee), the costs of the Medical Panels, the County Court,
Magistrates' Court and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal arising from the operation of the
Act. (Section 32(4)) In addition, "the Authority may obtain financial accommodation subject to
and in accordance with the powers conferred on it under the Borrowing and Investment Powers
Act 1987." (Section 33)
The statute also calls for a WorkCover Advisory Committee, appointed by the Minister,
to advise the Board in relation to its objectives:
(a) to promote a healthy and safe work environment; and
(b) to ensure that appropriate compensation is paid to injured workers in the most
socially and economically appropriate manner and as expeditiously as possible; and
(c) to promote the occupational rehabilitation and early return to work of injured
workers. (Section 31A(1))
The Advisory Committee is to include persons with a sound knowledge of the law relating to
accident compensation, persons with experience in hospital services or medical services,
occupational health and safety, occupational rehabilitation, and persons with experience in
accident compensation who are nominated by Victorian employer and employee groups.
(Section 31A(2))
In its insurance role, the VWA operates, in essence, as a re-insurer that bears the full
underwriting risk of the scheme. The day-to-day collection of premiums and payment of
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compensation benefits under the Act are conducted by authorised agents, generally referred to
as "authorised insurers." See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of this relationship, perhaps the
most unique feature of workers' compensation in Victoria. The Authority has the power to
appoint and terminate such authorised insurers. In July 1996, there were 14 authorised insurers
operating in Victoria. Authorised agents must keep appropriate accounting records relating to
transactions under the Act, and the Authority may compel the production of such accounting
records for audit and inspection as necessary. (Section 23 (6) and (7)) In fact, the VWA has
exercised considerable oversight and control over the authorised insurers (see Chapter 4).
Other Major Players in the Victorian Workers' Compensation System
The Governor in Council, the Parliament, and the Minister are the ultimate sources of
authority in the Victorian workers' compensation system. The VWA is the major
administrative agent, but not the only major player. The County Courts and the Magistrates'
Courts review decisions of the VWA and its authorised insurers. The Administrative Appeals
Tribunal also hears certain disputes about workers' compensation matters. The Conciliation
Service attempts to prevent disputes in workers' compensation cases from spreading to the
courts. Medical Panels are constituted for individual disputes and hold sway over the decisions
that will ultimately determine compensability of individual conditions. The function of all these
entities is described in full in Chapter 6, Disputes and Their Resolution. They will only be
briefly highlighted here.
Conciliation Service
The Act specifies that "... the Authority must engage persons nominated by the
Minister as Conciliation Officers." (Section 54) However, the VWA appoints "... such other
officers and employees as are necessary ..." (Section 54) Thus, the Conciliation Service has a
unique status and reporting relationship as they are employees of the VWA, but answering
directly to the Minister for their performance. According to the Act, "... the Senior
Conciliation Officer . . . must observe any guidelines issued by the Minister." The
Conciliation Service had a staff of 81 at 19 March 1996 and a 1995-96 administrative budget of
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Conciliation Service had a staff of 81 at 19 March 1996 and a 1995-96 administrative budget of
$4.1 million.
Medical Panels
Medical Panels are nominated by the Convenor, who is appointed by the Minister. The
Panels are drawn from a list of medical practitioners appointed by the Governor in Council and
may consist of one, two or three members as determined by the Convenor of the Medical
Panels. As discussed in Chapter 6, a Medical Panel is charged with giving its opinion on any
medical question in respect of injuries arising out of, or in the course of or due to the nature of
employment. . . (Section 67) Cases may be referred to a Medical Panel by a Conciliation
Officer, the County Court, an authorised insurer or self-insurer, or the VWA. Medical Panels
had a 1995-96 administrative budget of $485,000.
The Courts
The courts in Victoria have broad jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters.
Since workers' compensation in Victoria is not an exclusive remedy for the worker against
his/her employer, there is a considerable amount of court activity. However, a matter may not
be taken to court in Victoria unless it has first been through Conciliation Services. This is an
attempt to prevent expensive litigation over matters that could be resolved more directly
between the parties. The Magistrates' Court may not hear matters involving death claims and is
limited to matters involving less than $40,000 or 104 weeks of weekly benefits. (Section 43)
County Court is somewhat more formal than Magistrates' Court, but still not bound by rules of
evidence. (Section 44) Either Magistrates' Court or County Court may refer a matter in dispute
to a Medical Panel, and is bound by the determination of such a panel. Decisions of the Court
can be appealed to the Supreme Court, but only on questions of law. (Section 52)
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Administrative Appeals Tribunal
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal also adjudicates disputes emanating from the
workers' compensation system. The Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to the following range of
matters:
(a) various disputes about medical and like services under Sections 99, 99A or 99B
(bearing in mind that Section 99B is now repealed) after the Conciliation
requirement has been observed;
(b) contribution matters under Sections 129A- 129M.
There are other disputes over the funding of claims and other various issues that will be
discussed later in Chapter 6. The VWA transferred some $4.6 million to the Department of
Justice in 1995-96 to support the operation of the Courts and the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal with respect to workers' compensation matters.
Structure of the VWA
The VWA was reorganised in July of 1996 when it absorbed the former Health and
Safety Organisation (HSO) as the new Health and Safety Division (HSD) of the VWA. (see
Chapter 8) This consolidation represented an attempt by the government to provide closer
coordination between prevention efforts and monetary incentives. Figure 3.1 shows the
organisation of the VWA as of July 1996. The major operating arms of the VWA are the
Health and Safety Division, the Scheme Regulation Division, and the Scheme Development
Division. In addition, there are a number of important corporate service groups that are part of
the central administration of the VWA. These include Corporate Affairs, Information Services,
and Finance and Corporate Services. There are also the normal corporate functions of Human
Resources and Legal Services, attached directly to the office of the Chief Executive. Figure 3.1
depicts the broad structure of the VWA as of July 1996 (i.e., right after the reorganisation).
Health and Safety Division
The Health and Safety Division (HSD) of the Victorian WorkCover Authority is
responsible for administering health and safety legislation in Victoria, primarily the
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Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, and the Equipment
(Public Safety) Act 1994. HSD undertakes activities aimed at improving health and safety in
workplaces, strives to improve health and safety in the agricultural and farming sector, and
facilitates public safety. A major focus of HSD is regulating the transport, handling, and
storage of dangerous goods and hazardous substances, including the notification and
registration of premises and the licensing of drivers carrying dangerous goods. Licensing of
fireworks displays and the manufacture, use, importation, storage, transport, and sale of
explosives are also the responsibility of HSD. The structure and function of HSD will be dealt
with in detail in Chapter 8.
There are three Operations Sections organised geographically as Eastern, Central and
Western, with each headed by a Director. In addition to the Melbourne headquarters
operations, there are a total of 11 offices around the state, with each staffed by Inspectors and
(generally) an Information Officer and headed by a Manager. In addition, each of the Directors
has state-wide responsibility for a particular type of hazard. The Director of Eastern
Operations has state-wide responsibility for Work Environment Hazards; the Director of
Central Operations has state-wide responsibility for Plant Hazards; and the Director of
Western Operations has state-wide responsibility for Dangerous Goods. This matrix
management structure resulted from a 1994 independent consultant review of the organisation
and its mission.
In addition to the Operations Sections, there are three specialist sections that primarily
serve internal HSD needs. The Technology Section provides scientific, engineering and other
technical advice and support for the other sections. It also provides technical research and
analysis to identify and provide advice on current and emerging technical issues with potential
to impact on health and safety. It is composed of the Hygiene Unit, Mechanical Engineering
Unit, Occupational Medicine Unit, Chemical Technology Unit, and Ergonomics Unit.
The Strategy Section manages key policy, standards and strategy processes to achieve
HSD objectives. In association with other divisions it undertakes policy development, research
and review, standards development and coordination, strategic planning, management
information systems, marketing and awareness, corporate performance support, and
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investigations and prosecution. It is composed of a Legislation Policy Unit, Planning and
Review Unit, Standards Development Co-ordination Unit, Central Investigation Unit,
Organisational Development Unit, and Marketing Unit.
The third specialist section is called the Development Taskforce. It undertakes
initiatives aimed at identifying and developing creative approaches to the establishment and
marketing of HSD services. It manages projects to leverage HSD's impact externally with
business sectors, including employer and employee associations, educational institutions and
the general community. The key objective is the use of private sector and community sector
infrastructure to improve health and safety outcomes. This section was initiated as an
experiment in leveraging the expertise of the HSD through external organisations and
processes. It will be evaluated at the end of the experimental period for its overall impact on
HSD mission achievement.
Scheme Regulation Division
The Scheme Regulation Division has responsibility for the regulation of scheme
participants, including authorised insurers, self-insurers, medical and like providers,
occupational rehabilitation providers, and others. The Insurance Section deals with the
traditional regulatory issues that would be familiar in most workers' compensation systems in
North America, including the regulation of self-insurers. The relationship between the VWA
and authorised insurers is especially complex. The participation and oversight responsibilities
of the VWA in the insurance functions are greater than in a typical private workers'
compensation insurance system (as hi most U.S. states). Moreover, they are more complex
than those of a typical exclusive public workers' compensation fund (as in Canada and several
U.S. states), because private organisations are performing the basic client service functions.
This relationship and the general performance of the insurance system will be examined in
detail in Chapter 4.
Scheme Regulation's basic mandate is to regulate the performance of the authorised
insurers. It does this through its Insurance Section, which licenses insurers, audits their
performance, and monitors their outcomes with the Authorised Insurer Quarterly Performance
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Table. They also manage the Best Practice Incentive scheme which provided some $6 million
(about 10 percent supplement to base fees) in performance-based compensation for authorised
insurers in 1995-96. Scheme Regulation negotiates annually with the authorised insurers over
the terms of their compensation (both base and incentive-based).
The approval of self-insurers is also the responsibility of the VWA. Self-insurance is
treated as a privilege in Victoria and the VWA is mandated to determine whether an applicant
for self-insurance is fit and proper to be self-insured. (Section 142) The Self-Insurer Regulation
Unit of the Insurance Section does the staff work for the approval of self-insurers under the
Act. This does not just involve the question of whether the body corporate is able to meet its
workers' compensation liabilities and has the resources to administer claims on its own, but
also questions of the level of incidence and the aggregate cost of injuries, and the safety of the
working conditions maintained by the self-insurer. Only 23 self-insurers were authorised as of
July 1996.
The Investigations & Compliance Section is in charge of conducting such investigations
into questions of fraud and abuse as might be necessary. In addition, this unit conducted the
massive run-down of some 22,000 pre-WorkCover common law cases. The Investigations &
Compliance section also conducts the VWA payroll audits (or Wage Audits). The authority for
collecting the employer payment for workers' compensation insurance coverage was
transferred from the State Taxation Office to the VWA in 1993. As a result, the VWA had to
inaugurate a system of payroll audits, to insure that employers give accurate reports of their
employment and payroll levels. This has been done through a contracted external audit system
with a performance-based fee for the auditors, based on the amount of payroll they discover
that was not covered by VWA premium. In the first year of this program (for 1993-94
payrolls, completed during calendar year 1996), the VWA paid out $4.6 million in audit fees
for the recovery of $15 million in unreported premium and some $5 million in penalties.
The Health and Rehabilitation Branch reviews and implements policy on rehabilitation
providers (which, in Victoria, includes a wide variety of professionals, from physiotherapists
and chiropractors to naturopaths and massage therapists in addition to vocational or
occupational rehabilitation practitioners). The Health & Rehabilitation Branch also regulates
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the prices of medical and like services, conducts utilisation reviews, and promulgates practice
guidelines. These issues are reviewed in Chapter 5 below. Some of the functions have been
transferred to Provider Services section in the Insurance Branch, effective March 1996.
Chapter 7 examines the working of the occupational rehabilitation system.
The utilisation review consists primarily of a review of the frequency of treatment by
individual practitioners (medical, physiotherapy, chiropractic, psychological and others). "Bad
players" are identified internally by the VWA and resolution is sought in cooperation with the
relevant professional licensure group. In the past, one practitioner has had a licence to practice
suspended for a year and several have been fined and directed to conduct specific remedial
efforts.
Scheme Development Division
The Scheme Development Division is responsible for research and development,
business planning, legislation and policy issues, and the actuarial functions of the VWA. The
Legislation unit is responsible for drafting and interpretation of legislation; essentially it is the
legal eyes and ears of the VWA. The Policy unit provides support for policy development,
including intelligence on scheme practices in other states and other countries. This unit has
also been supporting VWA participation in the national Heads of Workers' Compensation
Authorities (HWCA) organisation and their drive toward greater standardisation of workers'
compensation law and practice among Australian states. The Business Planning unit produces
special reports and analyses for senior management at the VWA. It also calculates the key
performance indicators for the VWA and measures that performance against the annual
corporate plan.
The Research & Development unit supports external research designed to improve the
overall efficacy of the scheme in reducing injuries, or mitigating their effects. It had an
external grant budget of $700,000 in 1995-96. There have been some stimulating research
results generated, including the Ballarat Project, which sought to test the impact of general
awareness media ads on specific injuries in particular industries. It appears that significant
reductions in injury incidence and severity were obtained in a media campaign aimed at back
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strain in the hospital and trucking sectors in Ballarat. This unit also administers grants to
community-based organisations seeking to assist disabled workers with recovery and return to
work. This aspect is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
The Actuarial & Statistical Services unit is responsible for the actuarial assessment of
the Fund and the adequacy of the premium level to support the scheme. They use two outside
actuarial consultants with contrasting methodologies to inform these issues. In addition, this
unit is involved in developing the F factors for individual insurers. These F factors are used to
adjust individual authorised insurer claim reserve estimates to offset the historical tendency to
underestimate future costs. In essence, this prevents the scheme from tending to under-funding
by virtue of underestimation of future commitments emanating from current claims. This issue
is discussed in Chapter 4 below.
Information Services Division
Information Services had a 1995-96 budget of $21.2 million; but only about 20 percent
of this was spent on internal systems, as the rest was contracted out to Continuum, Australia.
Continuum administers the ACCtion main frame transaction processing system and a related
management reporting database that the VWA and the authorised insurers use for claims and
premium processing. Development and operation of ACCtion by VWA began in 1987, and it
was outsourced to Continuum in 1993. There has been a great deal of controversy about the
future of the ACCtion system, interlinked with the issue of further privatisation of the
Victorian scheme. Plans have been under development, and redevelopment, since 1992 for
replacing the aging ACCtion database. However, there has been no agreement to date within
the VWA, or between the VWA and the authorised insurers, as to the optimum strategy to
follow. The Authority also maintains PC and UNIX applications supporting internal operation
of the organisation. The VWA uses package-based payroll, financial, and records management
systems and has built Oracle-based systems in house to support specialised functions such as
audit management and conciliation.
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Corporate Affairs Division
Corporate Affairs does the public relations and public information work of the VWA. It
had a 1995-96 budget of $9.9 million, most of which was for media purchase. The Division
has maintained a very high profile in recent years with a series of public awareness campaigns
stressing the themes of return-to-work and prevention of workplace accidents. These
advertising efforts are given much of the credit for the turnaround in system performance and
the fundamental change in the workers' compensation culture in Victoria since 1992.
Finance and Corporate Services Division
The Finance and Corporate Services Division does the accounting, budgeting and
financial performance monitoring for the VWA. The Division had oversight responsibility for
claims payments of $670.4 million, payments to insurers and agents of $80.4 million, a total
VWA administrative budget of $69.4 million, and payments to other agencies of $24.5 million
in 1995-96. The management of the VWA fund reserves was transferred from this Division to
the Victorian Funds Management Corporation in late 1995, in an attempt to obtain greater
economies of scale in investment management. This agency manages about 3 billion in VWA
reserves, which generated net investment income for the VWA during 1995-96 of $286
million.
Claim Flow Analysis
There are three very different ways of looking at the dynamic population of claims in
any workers' compensation system. One can take a common point of origin approach,
grouping together all claims that originate in the same period. For the most part, such claims
will have common injury dates as well, but that is not always true since some claims may take
considerable time to be reported, for a wide variety of reasons. It is also possible to take a
common closing date approach, looking backward from the time that the claim is "resolved"
and developing aggregate measures over the duration of the claim. We put resolved in quotes
because the degree of finality of closure depends ultimately on the legal system, and because of
the potential for claims that seem resolved to resurface or reopen as conditions change. Third,
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it is possible to take a stock approach and just count the number of claims active at any point in
time. We will employ both the first and last of these methods to examine the flow of claims in
the workers' compensation system of Victoria.
Claims Lodged
Figure 3.2 shows the number of claims lodged with the VWA and its authorised
insurers during fiscal year 1995-96 (1 July 1995 through 30 June 1996) and their outcomes, at
least so far as these are known at this point. Of a total of 33,291 claims lodged, some 29,261
(or 88 percent) were paid by the authorised insurers and a total of 4,030 (or 12 percent) were
rejected. Of those rejected during 1995-96, only 374 (or 9 percent) had appealed that decision
as of 30 June 1996. This should not be regarded as the final appeal rate, however, as some
additional appeals can be expected after the end of the fiscal year on claims arising during
1995-96. As shown in the figure, very few of these disputes had yet settled by 30 June 1996;
with only nine resolved by that date, five successful and four unsuccessful from the claimant's
perspective.
Among the paid claims, disputes developed among 1,587 (or 5.4 percent) on some
matter subsequent to basic compensability. This could be over the level of the benefit, the
degree of impairment, the point of recovery, suitable work, rehabilitation issues, etc. The
29,261 paid claims included 7,491 (or 35 percent) "Medical Only" claims. These claims did
not involve loss of more than 10 days of work time (the "employer excess" or retained risk),
but did involve more than $407 in medical costs. Disputes developed among 108 (or 1.4
percent) of these claims.
There were 21,770 claims lodged in 1995-96 that received weekly payments, i.e.,
disability exceeded the employer excess of 10 days. This represented 65 percent of the paid
claims during the period. Among these, disputes developed between the worker and the insurer
in 994 cases (4.6 percent). As in the case of the other dispute rates, this should be regarded as
a minimal estimate, since some disputes are likely to be filed after the end of the fiscal year.
Victoria had 2,099 cases that received some occupational rehabilitation services during
the year (or 7.2 percent of paid claims). There were no disputes recorded among these claims,
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but again it is necessary to remember that insufficient time has passed for these claims to have
finally resolved, so it can be expected that additional disputes will be recorded in the future
against the 1995-96 cohort of claims. See Chapter 7 for a full description of occupational
rehabilitation in Victoria.
There were 3,143 cases that received compensation for maims under Section 98 of the
Act during the year (see Chapter 5). This represented 10.7 percent of the paid claims in
1995-96. Among those receiving payment, 583 (or 18.5 percent) showed a dispute sometime
during the life of the claim. Finally, 179 proceedings were commenced under common law for
damages. This is very preliminary, given the usual time delays with such claims, and can be
expected to expand severalfold before the ledger is closed on 1995-96 injuries.
Active Claims
Figure 3.3 gives a very different idea of the number of injuries that flow through the
Victorian workers' compensation system. It shows all "active" claims during 1995-96, or the
claims where some payment occurred during the fiscal year. The long duration of many
workers' compensation claims is readily apparent in the fact that there were over 100,000
active claims in 1995-96, as against only about 33,000 lodged during the year (from Figure
3.2).
Of the 100,124 active claims in 1995-96, 74,530 (or 74 percent) received weekly
payments during the year. Collectively, they received $258.4 million in weekly benefits, or
about $3,467 per claim. The figure shows that these cases received about 36 percent of all
VWA payments during the year. Further, it is shown that 9,780 (or 13 percent) of these claims
had conciliation services at some time and 42 involved Medical Panel referrals. In addition,
there were a total of 1,738 appeals to County Court and 558 to Magistrates' Court during the
year. Most of these appeals were not resolved by the end of the period, but among those that
had resolved during the year, 62 percent of Magistrates' Court and 60 percent of County Court
appeals had been accepted in favour of the worker.
Among the 25,594 medical only claims that were active during fiscal 1995-96, a much
lower rate of disputation was evident. Only 704 of these claims involved Conciliation Services
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and 16 were referred to Medical Panels. Further, there were 136 appeals to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal during the year with a success rate of 57 percent for the worker. These
relatively simple claims (less than 10 days lost from work) were paid a total of $64.0 million,
or about 8.8 percent of total payments during 1995-96.
Figure 3.3 indicates that there were 8,077 Section 98 (table of maims) claims active
during 1995-96 (or 8.1 percent of all active claims). However, these claims involved much
more than a proportionate amount of litigation, as the figure indicates that 4,856 of these (or
60.1 percent) involved Conciliation Services, and 3,343 (or 41.4 percent) involved Medical
Panel referrals. They also accounted for 385 appeals to Magistrates' Court and 633 appeals to
County Court. About 85 percent of both Magistrates' Court and County Court appeals were
accepted in favour of the worker. Total payments for maims hi 1995-96 amounted to $116.6
million, or about 15.7 percent of all system payments. Of this amount, about $12.6 million (or
10.8 percent) was for pain and suffering under Section 98A.
Last, Figure 3.3 shows that there were 727 common law actions "active" during
1995-96. While the number of these cases is not great, they are very expensive, with an
average payment of $137,689. In aggregate, payments to such cases involved $100.1 million
during the year, or about 13.8 percent of total payments. It is important to note that this
number includes some of the "run-off of pre-WorkCover common law claims, which were
being settled in bulk during the period. Furthermore, it could be expected that since these were
among the last "old" cases to settle, that they involved the most intractable issues. In fact, the
figure shows that $82.2 million went to these old cases. Of course, 100 percent of such cases
involve litigation; a total of 667 common law actions were filed in County Court and 60 with
the Supreme Court. As indicated in the figure, a small minority of these cases had resolved by
the end of the year.
With these preliminary elements in place, let us proceed to examine the specific
performance areas of the workers' compensation system in Victoria, beginning with the
insurance regulatory mechanisms in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.1
Victorian Workers' Compensation Administrative Structure
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Figure 3.2
CLAIMS LODGED IN 1995/96
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Chapter 4 REGULATORY ASPECTS OF THE VICTORIAN WORKCOVER SYSTEM
Chapter Objectives
The regulatory system plays a very important and interesting role in the Victorian
WorkCover scheme. Victoria relies on a combination of private insurers and a state authority
to manage the provision of workers, compensation insurance. Most systems hi Australia and
elsewhere tend to rely more heavily on the private sector to perform insurance functions. Other
systems utilise a state agency to provide workers' compensation insurance. Victoria is
somewhat unusual in that it delegates some insurance functions to the private sector while
others are retained by the Victorian WorkCover Authority. Similar arrangements exist in New
South Wales and South Australia.
The underlying premise or philosophy of the WorkCover scheme is important to
understanding the structure of its regulatory institutions and evaluating their performance. The
premise is that the state needs to bear the underwriting risk and closely manage the provision
of workers' compensation insurance to ensure that coverage is readily available to all
employers at the lowest possible cost while serving the overall social goals of the system. The
widely perceived shortcomings of the private system before 1985 are a legacy that helps to
explain the perspective that the government needs to take a close hand in guiding the system.
At the same time, the problems encountered with the public WorkCare system and the
government's desire to return more autonomy to the private sector have resulted hi the mixed
public-private system under the current WorkCover system.
Structuring a mixed system that provides the right controls and incentives and delegates
decisions to the most appropriate entity is a challenge given the many options available and the
complex interactions between government mandates and private choice. The government has
elected to maintain direct control over those parameters that it believes are essential to scheme
objectives and that are not likely to be achieved if left simply to market forces. At the same
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time, the government has delegated certain functions to insurers, with regulatory controls and
incentives, where it believes that private incentives and private choice can promote efficiency
and scheme objectives. Refining the mix of public and private functions and regulatory
controls and incentives is a task that will continue to challenge the VWA as it moves forward
into the 21st Century.
This mixed approach increases the responsibilities of the state in terms of providing
certain insurance services as well as closely overseeing the activities of private insurers. As
discussed below, the VWA confronts a significant principal-agent problem in inducing
authorised insurers to promote scheme objectives. The VWA must coordinate its functions
with those of private insurers to achieve the objectives of the system. In some respects, the
VWA and insurers operate as partners in working together to provide workers' compensation
insurance to employers and their workers. In other respects, the VWA acts like a traditional
regulator in ensuring that insurers' actions comply with scheme requirements and serve the
goals of the scheme. This gives rise to some unique issues for the VWA that are not present
with pure private or pure government workers' compensation insurance systems.
This chapter describes the relative roles of the regulatory authority (VWA) and the
insurance industry in achieving the goals of the Victorian workers' compensation scheme, and
it assesses their performance. Along the way, we will explore the limits of regulation and the
role of market forces hi such a mixed system.
Relative Roles of Market and Regulatory Mechanisms
Understanding the roles of government and private decision mechanisms is key to
understanding the management of the WorkCover scheme. Public and private entities share the
responsibility of providing workers' compensation insurance in Victoria but the nature of their
responsibilities differ and create relationships that are somewhat unique.
Figure 4.1 provides a schematic diagram of the delegation of insurance and regulatory
responsibilities among the different entities. The VWA administers the WorkCover scheme,
bears the risk through reinsurance, and regulates insurers and other providers. Insurers service
insurance policies, adjust claims, and assist employers with risk management. Employers are
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responsible for complying with statutory requirements for workers' compensation coverage,
selecting their insurer, and risk management. Other service providers and intermediaries
perform functions similar to their activities in other systems.
This section provides an overview of the relative roles and responsibilities of these
different entities in performing workers' compensation functions in Victoria. The basic
decisions made by regulators or through public choice mechanisms are identified, as well as
those decisions made by "the market" or private choice mechanisms. First, the nature of the
principal-agent problem is outlined to provide a frame of reference for the evaluation of the
regulatory structure.
Managing the Principal-Agent Relationship
The economic theory of the "principal-agent problem" is particularly relevant to the
structure of the Victorian WorkCover scheme. The problem arises when one entity, the
principal, wants to induce another entity, the agent, to take some action that is costly to the
agent (Varian 1992). It may be costly or difficult for the principal to directly observe the
behaviour of the agent, but the principal may be able to observe the outcome of the actions of
the agent. In the standard theoretical treatment, the principal's problem is to design an
incentive payment, s(x), which induces the agent to produce the desired output, x. However, in
some real-world situations, principals also may face constraints in observing the output
produced by the agent. This is more likely to be the case in complex systems like workers'
compensation, where the "product" has multiple dimensions which are difficult to measure and
involve a considerable tune lag between action and result. In this instance, a principal may
utilise an array of conduct and output measures, controls, and incentives to influence agent's
behaviour.
There are several principal-agent relationships nested in the structure of the WorkCover
scheme. Principal-agent relationships exist between (1) workers and employers; (2) employers
and insurers; and (3) the VWA and insurers. It is the relationship between the VWA and
authorised insurers that is of primary interest here, but it is important to understand that
scheme outcomes are not solely controlled by insurers. The VWA uses mechanisms that rely
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on insurers and employers to promote the objectives of the system and the interests of workers.
It is costly for insurers and employers to perform such actions and it is costly for the VWA to
monitor and control insurers' and employers' behaviour.
Agents typically face two types of constraints which influence their actions. One is a
participation constraint, which is the potential gain to the agent from engaging in other
activities. The principal must ensure that the agent receives at least this level of utility (or
profit in the case of a firm), i.e., the agent's opportunity cost, to enlist the agent's
participation. The second constraint involves incentive compatibility. This means that the agent
will choose that action which maximises his utility based on the incentive schedule offered by
the principal. In the standard theoretical model, the principal cannot control the agent's action
directly, but can only influence the agent's actions by the choice of incentive payments.
The solution of the principal-agent problem is relatively simple when the principal is a
monopolist with full information. The more interesting case is when the agent's actions are
hidden so that incentive payments can only be based on output. Assuming that output is not
fully controlled by the agent, then output-based payments to the agent will necessarily have a
random component and the optimal incentive scheme will involve some degree of risk sharing
between the principal and the agent. If the principal imposes too much risk on the agent, the
principal has to raise the average payment to compensate. On the other hand, if the principal
assumes too much risk, the agent has little incentive to perform well. The general solution to
this problem implies that greater uncertainty and/or greater risk aversion on the part of the
agent will force the principal to bear more risk. Moreover, if the principal faces both high-cost
and low-cost agents but is unable to accurately distinguish between the two, the principal will
choose a payment scheme that effectively yields the low-cost agent a surplus and the high-cost
agent just enough to make him indifferent between participating and not participating.
Arguably, the VWA faces a more complex problem in that it must achieve multiple
outcomes which are somewhat difficult to measure objectively. At the same time, the VWA
can monitor and regulate insurer conduct which may be precluded in other principal-agent
relationships. Hence, the optimal strategy for the VWA is determined by the relative cost and
effectiveness of controlling insurer conduct directly versus influencing insurers' output or
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performance through incentives. The challenge for the VWA is to implement a cost-effective
set of conduct and performance measures, regulations, agreements, standards, penalties and
rewards that will induce insurers and employers to maximise scheme objectives. The VWA's
primary tools to influence insurer behaviour are (1) the licence agreement; (2) audits; (3)
licence actions and penalties; and (4) the Best Practice Incentive (BPI) scheme. With the
exception of BPI, these mechanisms appear to be more oriented towards conduct than
outcomes. This system needs to be carefully evaluated hi light of the interests of the
government and the other stakeholders that affect WorkCover outcomes and the constraints
they face.
Role of the Victorian WorkCover Authority
The VWA wears several different hats under the current WorkCover scheme. One is
that of a government administrator responsible for the overall performance of the scheme and
ensuring that employers comply with scheme requirements. This role is akin to that played by
workers' compensation administrators in Australia and the U.S.A. under private systems. The
VWA's second hat is that of insurer. Some of the functions performed by insurers in private
systems are performed directly by the VWA. The VWA's third hat is that of regulator in the
traditional and non-traditional senses of the term. In this role, the VWA oversees insurers'
performance of the functions which they have been delegated as well as ensuring that insurers
meet the financial standards necessary to perform these functions.
Administrative Role
There are certain generic administrative functions inherent in any workers'
compensation scheme that are typically performed by a government authority, including the
VWA. These functions stem from the state's responsibility for the overall management of a
government-mandated social insurance scheme with statutorily prescribed coverage, benefits,
and eligibility requirements. For the VWA, these functions include system monitoring and
evaluation, recommending legislation, employer compliance, dispute resolution, and public
information.
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Insurance Role
In addition to administering the WorkCover scheme, the VWA performs some of the
functions that might otherwise be performed by private insurers. The insurance functions
performed by the VWA include bearing risk through reinsurance, pricing, funding claims,
reserve analysis, investment management, and compilation and analysis of claims data. These
activities were retained by the VWA when Victoria implemented the WorkCover scheme. The
VWA has sought to minimise the principal-agent control problem by undertaking these
activities directly, although the reinsurance function gives rise to a related moral hazard
problem. Without other controls and incentives, insurers would have no incentive to minimise
claim costs, as the VWA reinsures 100 percent of all claims payments. Such arrangements are
unusual in private reinsurance contracts (except for fronting arrangements), which involve
some risk sharing between the reinsurer and the ceding company.
Regulatory Role
Other insurance functions have been delegated to insurers. In one sense, VWA
functions as a contractor of services performed by insurers acting as vendors. In another sense,
VWA is a regulator, controlling insurers' entry into and exit from the market for private
workers' compensation services, as well as enforcing requirements and restrictions on insurers.
The blend of contractual, regulatory and incentive mechanisms reflects the VWA's strategy hi
managing the principal-agent relationship it has with authorised insurers in providing insurance
services to employers and workers.
The distinction may be more than semantic in terms of how the VWA exercises control
over insurers in various situations. The process for becoming an authorised insurer has many
characteristics of a contractual relationship between the insurer and the VWA. In effect, VWA
is a selective gatekeeper to the market for private insurance services purchased by employers.
Insurers agree, in writing, to a detailed set of requirements to gain admission to this market.
The VWA is able to exercise leverage over insurers by denying, revoking or degrading an
insurer's authorisation to serve the market. This is very much like the process for designating
servicing carriers for residual markets in the U.S. except that VWA-authorised insurers go on
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to compete for accounts, whereas in the U.S.A., employers are assigned to residual market
servicing carriers.
In a more traditional regulatory environment, the regulatory authority would not
typically enter into such detailed written agreements with regulated entities. The requirements
for admission to a market would be set by law and regulation and regulators would essentially
be compelled to admit any entity meeting the requirements. The VWA does act more like a
traditional regulator in overseeing certain aspects of insurers* market activities and services to
insureds that are governed by competition. The VWA's ability to direct insurers' behaviour at
this level is more limited, however.
The dual nature of this regulatory role allows the VWA to exercise considerably more
leverage in influencing the behaviour of its agents, i.e., insurers, in fulfilling scheme
objectives than other workers' compensation authorities. This is consistent with the philosophy
underlying Victoria's mixed public-private system, with its roots hi the previous WorkCare
system. The mixed approach places considerable responsibility on the VWA for scheme
outcomes which it seeks to fulfill through extensive market intervention. It also gives rise to
some tension and confusion about the relationship between VWA and insurers and the degree
of autonomy that insurers have. This dual nature of VWA's regulatory role will need to be
reconciled with any efforts by Victoria to enhance insurers' discretion within the WorkCover
system.
Insurers' Role
The insurers' role under WorkCover is more substantial than it was under WorkCare
but less substantial than it was under the private system previous to WorkCare. Under the
current system, insurers perform essentially all of the client service functions that would be
performed in a traditional private insurance market environment. These functions include
marketing, sales, underwriting, premium collection, loss prevention, claims adjustment and
payments, litigation, case management, setting reserves, and data analysis and statistical
reporting. These are the actions that the VWA seeks to influence through its system of controls
and incentives. Insurers do not perform insurance functions retained by the VWA, which are
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primarily risk bearing, pricing, and investment of policyholder ftinds. Insurers receive fees for
their services which are set by the VWA.
Insurers compete for accounts in order to increase the amount of service fees they
receive. Assuming there are some economies of scale in servicing workers' compensation
accounts and that service fees cover the marginal cost of servicing an additional account,
insurers can increase their profits by servicing more accounts and increasing their service fee
revenues. With the base price determined by the VWA, insurers compete on quality of service,
with particular emphasis on risk management services, and other in-kind services to
employers. 1 This is the way in which the VWA attempts to harness market forces and private
incentives to encourage insurers to provide high quality service and contain costs.
Role of Other Market Participants
The functions performed by other market participants under WorkCover—employers,
workers, producers, and vendors—are very much the same as in private workers'
compensation systems. Employers are required to carry workers' compensation coverage,
which they can purchase through an authorised insurer or they can receive approval from the
VWA to self-insure. Employers must take responsibility for compliance with statutory
requirements, employ safety measures to reduce losses, and assist in case management and
returning injured employees to work. Producers, i.e., agents and brokers, serve as
intermediaries between some employers and insurers and facilitate insurance transactions.
Vendors of risk management, claims administration, health care, and rehabilitation services
function and compete much as they do in other systems.
Description of Victorian Workers' Compensation Regulatory Scheme
This section provides a detailed description of the ways hi which the activities of
insurers are regulated by the state and how decisions are made by the VWA with respect to
By law, insurers are prohibited from making monetary kickbacks to employers to get their
business. However, it is commonly known that insurers do provide additional in-kind services and
equipment to employers, which effectively increase the value of services employers receive in relation to
the premiums they pay.
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workers' compensation services. The contractual as well as the traditional regulatory functions
of the VWA are outlined. Emphasis is placed on the most important aspects of the regulatory
scheme and other areas where regulators or insurers perceive that changes need to be made.
Outlining the regulatory structure is essential to assessing the structure and performance of the
market for insurers' services as well as the performance of the overall scheme. The federal
solvency regulatory system for Australian insurers, including WorkCover insurers, is also
described under Market Structure.
The VWA's regulatory functions are performed by the Scheme Regulation Division
which is headed by a director who reports to the Chief Executive (see Figure 2.1). There are 4
units within the Regulation Division, each supervised by a senior manager: (1) Health and
Rehabilitation; (2) Investigation and Compliance; (3) Insurance; and (4) Transitional Projects.
The principal regulatory functions are the responsibility of the Insurance Unit, which has
several sub-units, each supervised by a manager: (1) Business Systems; (2) Self-Insurers; (3)
Licence Management and Insurer Review; (4) Provider Services; (5) Regulatory Monitoring
and Planning; and (6) Executive Support.
The Regulation Division has the primary interface with the authorised insurers. The
Division is responsible for writing the licence document, the re-insurance agreement,
supporting manuals, and policy documents that outline what is required of insurers. The
Division also implements the Best Practice Incentive (BPI) scheme and prepares the Authorised
Insurer Quarterly Performance Table.
The Licence Management and Insurer Review unit is responsible for monitoring
insurers' compliance with the licence agreement, developing the framework for regulation,
remuneration, audits, performance visits, information, and technical interpretations of the act.
This unit also is involved hi helping to design and modify BPI provisions which are ultimately
determined by the Board.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics on the premiums collected and costs incurred by
the VWA under the WorkCare and WorkCover schemes over the financial years 1986/87
through 1995/96.2 As can be seen from this table, premiums, claims costs, and operating costs
2Unless indicated otherwise, references to specific years or periods are based on VWA "financial years"
which run from July 1 to June 30 of the following year. For example, a reference to 1996 will imply the 1995/96
financial year as defined by the VWA.
4-9

increased considerably over the period 1987 to 1993. Total costs increased from $412.5
million in 1987 to $1,223.3 million in 1993. Some of this increase is presumably attributable
to growth in the Victorian economy but it is recognised that costs also increased for various
reasons related to the WorkCare scheme (see Chapter 2). This trend was reversed with the
implementation of WorkCover. Premiums fell to $883.4 million in 1996. Claims and operating
costs also dropped significantly to $763.9 million in 1995 but increased to $897.6 million in
1996. Managing these costs while achieving the objectives of the scheme in serving injured
workers is the principal focus of the VWA's regulatory system.
Authorisation of Insurers
The authorisation of insurers to provide workers' compensation services in Victoria is
the principal foundation for the VWA's array of regulatory activities. The requirements for
authorisation, and the agreements which insurers must sign to become authorised, bind
insurers to a detailed set of obligations in performing workers' compensation services.
Regulators use this mechanism to supervise insurers' activities and compel good performance
with respect to scheme objectives. Regulators can restrict or withdraw this authorisation as a
way to sanction insurers if they fail to perform their obligations satisfactorily.
The Accident Compensation (WorkCover Insurance) Act of 1993 provides strong and
comprehensive authority to the VWA to regulate WorkCover insurers. The Act only allows
"authorised insurers" to issue or renew a WorkCover insurance policy. The Act requires
authorised insurers to be separate companies that only write Victorian WorkCover insurance.
All authorised insurers are subsidiaries of parent companies but must maintain certain firewalls
between them and their parents and affiliates. The secrecy provisions of the Act are also
significant and help to maintain this separation. An authorised insurer is not allowed to share
any individual employer or claimant information with its parent or affiliates. Insurers may
make payments to their parents for certain services. The VWA does not appear to be in a
position to closely evaluate or restrict these payments unless they are clearly excessive or
threaten an insurer's financial condition. Presumably, the requirement for separate Victoria
workers' compensation insurers is intended to increase the control of the VWA and help to
ensure that the insurer is focused principally on the WorkCover scheme.
An insurer incorporated in Victoria must apply for a licence to become an authorised
insurer. The VWA develops the form for application and the requirements for any supporting
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documentation. The Act prescribes fairly comprehensive criteria which the Authority may use
to consider licence applications, including:
the suitability of the applicant;
its financial viability;
•
the provisions of the memorandum and articles of association of the applicant;
the applicant's history of claims management;
the efficiency and effectiveness of the WorkCover scheme; and
any other matters the Authority considers appropriate.
The VWA may refuse an application if the applicant is authorised to carry on business
other than WorkCover or the applicant is not a wholly owned subsidiary licenced by the
federal regulator. WorkCover licences are granted for 12 to 24 months and can be renewed.
The VWA can deny renewal applications based on the above criteria, failure to comply with
the Act and conditions of the licence, and any other reasons deemed appropriate by the
Authority.
The VWA has broad authority with respect to additional conditions it may impose on an
insurer's licence. The VWA can require or prevent an insurer's undertaking of a specified
amount or class of WorkCover insurance. Insurers may not refuse to offer insurance to
employers unless mandated or approved by the VWA or the employer is not in compliance
with the Act. The VWA also can require an insurer to earmark certain assets to cover
WorkCover obligations. Insurers also may be prohibited from delegating claims management
to an intermediary.
The licence and supporting documents developed by the VWA set very detailed
conditions and standards for authorised insurers, which gives the VWA considerable ability to
control insurers' activities. These documents include a comprehensive checklist of items which
the insurer is expected to address in indicating its interest in becoming an authorised insurer. A
detailed description of these documents is beyond the scope of this report but it is helpful to
summarise their major components. The conditions of the licence cover such areas as
•
•
•

corporate requirements and arrangements;
responsibilities of the insurer;
audit requirements;
administration of the statutory fund;
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•
•
•

the insurer's market share;
the remuneration received by the insurer;
computer systems;
security;
warranties and covenants; and
suspension, cancellation and surrender of the licence.

Supporting schedules outline a code of conduct; insurers' quality control and audit program;
remuneration; computer systems; licence actions; and additional functions.
Insurers must have paid-up capital of not less than $2 million, which is equivalent to the
federal regulatory requirement. The VWA requires insurers to maintain and supply accounting
records which accurately record its transactions and financial position. In practice, the VWA
relies principally on the accounting statements required by the federal regulator. Insurers are
not allowed to attain a market share in excess of 49 percent. Detailed service standards pertain
to employer service requirements; processing insurance policies; charging premiums and
managing receivables; managing claims; managing long-term and severe injury cases;
resolution of complaints; and assuming policies from other insurers.
WorkCover licences may be degraded, suspended or cancelled for any reasons deemed
appropriate by the VWA. Insurers incur a financial penalty in direct proportion to the
percentage difference between the Minimum Success Rate (MSR) and the Sample Success Rate
(SSR), based on an audit of their compliance with the service standards, which is applied to
their quarterly service fee. The VWA may impose additional penalties for other breaches of the
reinsurance agreement and associated conduct and service standards. Financial penalties are
capped at 8.5 percent of an insurer's quarterly service fee.
If an insurer is penalised more than 5 percent of its service fee in any one quarter, its
licence will be qualified. Licences also may be cancelled or qualified for harassment of
claimants, fraud, incompetency or inefficiency, and breach of confidentiality. There are four
tiers of qualification or degradation depending on the length of time penalties exceed 5 percent.
These tiers ultimately lead to the cancellation of an insurer's licence if the situation is not
corrected.
Authorised insurers are required to enter into a reinsurance arrangement with the VWA
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in which insurers ftilly cede all premiums and losses to the Authority. This agreement
effectively transfers all underwriting risk to the Authority. The reinsurance agreement is very
detailed and covers a number of areas, including employer and worker services; premiums;
and claims and case estimates. The VWA also has the right to assign the policies, claims and
obligations of an insurer whose licence is cancelled to other authorised insurers. Policy forms
and related notices must be sent directly to the employer and not an intermediary. Employers
must pay premiums directly to their insurer and not an intermediary.
Reserving and Pricing
The VWA determines the price or rate charged for workers' compensation insurance.
This effectively eliminates direct price competition as a determinant of market performance.
The rate to be charged is promulgated by the VWA hi a premium order every year (signed by
the Governor-in-Council), as provided hi the Act. Victoria's pricing formula, detailed in
Figure 4.2, has been characterised as the purest experience rating system utilised in Australia.
It uses an unweighted 3-year average that balances sensitivity to changing experience with
stability. The premium calculation starts with the employer's prior rate and then adjusts this
rate based on experience.
The experience component is weighted by employer size (payroll) so that small
employers' rates are based less on their own experience and more on their industry and class
experience. With the exception of a $50 minimum premium, there are no size or risk-related
adjustments such as policy or loss constants, premium discounts, and schedule rating. As an
employer becomes smaller, the formula effectively lengthens the time span that occurs before
an employer is fully experience-rated. This contributes to the continuity of the formula.
Consequently, there are fewer abrupt changes in an employer's rate because of changes in
experience or other factors.
As noted in a VWA 1995 working paper, WorkCover Premium System, premiums are
designed to meet five principles:
1.

the system must be fully funded, i.e., premiums must cover all expected claims
payments;
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2.
3.
4.
5.

premiums must match claims risk and minimise cross subsidies;
the system must be statistically valid; and
the system must be based on sound insurance principles; and
the system must promote prevention and return to work.

Premiums must cover the estimated total liability for a particular policy year (as calculated by
two independent actuaries) plus the administrative costs of the scheme, including insurer
service fees. The total claims liability for a given policy year comprise actual payments made
in that year, claims incurred but not reported, and case reserves.
The general premium formula for an employer is based on the prior estimate or rate and
recent claims experience of the employer (calculated as an employer experience factor) as
follows:
premium rate = (Z) employer experience factor + (1-Z) prior rate;
where Z is the sizing and experience factor (ranges between 0 and 1) based on the employer's
total payroll weighted by industry risk, (see Figure 4.2) Because the prior estimate starts with
the industry rate for a new employer, the formula effectively increases the degree of
experience rating as the size and the length of experience of an employer increase. The
experience factor is based on the ratio of fully developed claim costs of the employer's
workplace as a proportion of the workplace remuneration over a 3-year period.
The experience factor also is adjusted by individual insurer F factors which are
designed to correct insurers' tendency to underestimate reserves.3 This is also intended to
prevent insurers and employers from gaming the system by underestimating incurred losses to
improve their experience adjustment. In theory, F factors are based on insurers' initial
estimates of reserves compared to their actual claims payments for a given policy year. The F
factors also adjust premiums for costs that are not reflected in the basic pricing formula, such
as VWA administrative costs and dispute resolution costs.
The Actuarial and Statistical Analysis Unit in the Scheme Development Division is
responsible for premium calculations as well as other statistical research required for scheme

The VWA indicates that, historically, reserves have been underestimated by 30 percent.
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administration and policy analysis. This unit provides the data and reports used by the
independent actuarial firms (Tillinghast and Trowbridge) to perform valuations of reserves at
the end of the financial year and for semi-annual updates. Starting in December 1996, the
actuarial unit began utilising its own models and performing its own actuarial valuations of and
projections for the scheme and compares its results against the analyses of the actuarial firms.
VWA staff cite evidence indicating their analyses and projections to be more accurate than
i
those of the actuarial firms. The VWA actuarial unit also found inconsistencies in the
assumptions used by the actuarial firms.
The actuarial firms also perform special analyses of the pricing formula and related
issues on request of the VWA. The VWA Unit employs analysts with a financial and statistical
background but does not have any staff actuaries of its own.
Service Standards and Enforcement
Insurers' performance requirements are outlined in the licence and reinsurance
agreement which include schedules outlining detailed and comprehensive standards of quality
of service and a code of conduct. The areas covered by these documents were listed above.
Generally, they require insurers to be diligent, responsive, timely and efficient in carrying out
their service functions. Their provisions establish specific minimum service requirements (e.g.,
the maximum number of days for processing policies, premium calculation and claims) as well
as general principles that support the objectives of the scheme in serving injured workers.
Arguably, these standards govern both conduct and performance. The ambiguity lies in
whether one regards "service" as an outcome or product. For example, there is a general
service standard requiring insurers to provide necessary information to employers which
includes a specific standard (among others) that insurers respond to employers' written
requests within 10 working days. Is the desired outcome (1) a well-informed employer? (2) the
provision of adequate and timely information by insurers? or (3) insurer responses to written
requests within 10 working days? The difficulty in measuring (1) and (2) may incline the VWA
to set a more specific, objective and measurable test as reflected hi (3). Regardless of how they
are viewed, the failure to meet these service standards triggers a regulatory response in terms
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of financial penalties and licence actions rather than an adjustment of incentive payments.
Enforcement of the standards is an important activity of the VWA. The licence
agreement includes a schedule outlining an insurer quality control and audit program. The
Insurer Audit Program (LAP) tests audit standards and insurers' compliance with the service
standards. Insurers must submit a self-audit program for approval to the VWA and are
required to implement that program. A director of the insurer must personally certify the
accuracy and regulatory compliance of its audits.
The Authority also retains the right to perform and does perform its own review of an
insurer's self-audit or conducts more detailed audits of its own. In practice, the VWA has
contracted with accounting firms to perform its audits. Financial penalties for identified
performance failures are exacted as a percentage of an insurer's service fee based on the
"success rate" of the transactions sampled compared with a minimum success rate. The
maximum penalty is 8.5 percent of the service fee for a given quarter.
The VWA is revamping its audit program to respond to recognised deficiencies in the
old program. The intent of the new program is to focus on broader measures of performance
and decrease the emphasis on penalizing minor errors. The new program outlines insurer
business functions, their components, and key objectives which are intended to help insurers
focus on the most important areas for testing and compliance. Sampling procedures are
carefully specified. Tested claims are required to satisfy all aspects of compliance but minor
failures will not constitute a failure of the test.
Remuneration
The remuneration system, outlined in a supporting schedule for the licence, determines
the service fee that an insurer will receive. The authority sets aside a certain amount of funds
in a service fee pool which is allocated to insurers according to their market share for each
quarter. For example, for the 1995/96 financial year, the VWA allocated $72.3 million in
service fees, or $18.075 million per quarter. Service fees are initially calculated at the
beginning of the quarter and recalculated at the end of the quarter to account for transfers in
business among insurers. The market share formula credits an insurer $115 for every policy it
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writes, plus 5.3 percent of the premiums derived from the policies it writes. This effectively
sets an average payment which each insurer receives for servicing a given policy or portfolio
of policies which is not based on performance. There also is a levy fee on debts incurred prior
to WorkCover that is assessed according to the time when the debt was incurred (3 percent for
post 30 June 1993 debts and 25 percent for pre 30 June 1993 debts). In addition, insurers can
receive a discretionary costs fee for non-common law related legal costs, medical costs,
investigation costs and other extraordinary costs as determined by the Authority. These
additional fees transfer some further risk from insurers to the VWA.
Best Practice Incentive Scheme
The Best Practice incentive scheme sets performance standards and provides financial
rewards to insurers for meeting these standards and/or improving their performance. In the
past, the measures have been (1) the cost of claims as a percentage of industry premiums; (2)
premiums collected as a percentage of the premiums to be collected; (3) the percentage of
reported claims referred to conciliation; and (4) claims duration. Insurers receive points for
meeting or exceeding performance benchmarks set by the VWA in monitored areas and
financial rewards are paid according to the number of points an insurer receives. For the
1995/96 financial year, the BPI payment was $6 million.
The VWA moved to a broader measure of performance for the 1996/97 BPI program.
Insurers will be rewarded on a sliding scale up to 5 percent depending on their relative
performance in bringing in actual costs below expected costs. The premium collection measure
also will be retained but the other measures will be dropped.
Monitoring and Statistical Reporting
Three units perform statistical analysis used by the VWA for management and public
information. The Regulation, Monitoring and Planning unit, in the Scheme Regulation
Division, is responsible for statistical information and reports, Best Practice Incentive scheme
calculations, market share calculations, remuneration fee calculations, and special requests.
The Actuarial and Statistical Services unit, in the Scheme Development Division, also prepares
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statistical analyses used for management information and planning, as well as premium and
reserve calculations. The Business Analysis unit in the Scheme Development Division is
responsible for preparing special reports and analyses for senior management and the Board.
This unit also has prepared the VWA's annual report for the last 2 years, but this function may
revert to the Scheme Development Division in the future. These 3 units are the principal users
of the VWA database.
The general database used for the various statistical analyses is extracted (weekly) from
the ACCtion system transactions information. Insurers are mandated to use this system
according to the licence document. This enables the construction of databases at a unit
transaction level which the VWA staff believes is essential for the type of analyses that are
performed. The database is divided into 200 tables, which facilitates analysis within a table but
which requires more effort to join data across tables. Almost all data from ACCtion is
captured. Historical data are not available for some elements. Anyone at the VWA can access
the data and data users have sought to agree on some standardisation of definitions (e.g., longterm claims) to ensure more consistent analyses across users.
The Regulation, Monitoring and Planning unit also is responsible for administering the
Legal Information Management System (LIMS) which requires insurers to record and report
legal actions. This helps the VWA keep track of legal actions and the impact of litigation on
costs. Data quality has been a problem with this system and VWA reconciles LIMS data with
other data to identify anomalies. Poor performance is communicated to regulate compliance.
Communications with Stakeholders
The VWA has a comprehensive communications strategy which is designed to acquire
and convey information to all major stakeholders. The stated purposes of this strategy are to
create and maintain stakeholder support; to minimise the frequency, severity and cost of
workplace injuries; to increase the rate at which injured employees return to work and improve
their maintenance at work; and to encourage quality service by insurers and providers. The
Authority conducts a number of programs using various media to implement this strategy.
Among its programs, as of July 1996, were publication of informational brochures;
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management of insurers' printing; translation of employers' brochures into different languages;
ethnic print and radio advertising; video production; promotion of new initiatives; displays at
trade conferences; press releases, media response and editorials; sponsorships; and stakeholder
liaison and networking. Insurers are responsible for printing their own insurance contracts.
While all of these activities are valuable in helping stakeholders and the general public
understand WorkCover, stakeholder communication is the most critical to the VWA regulatory
function. The VWA utilises a special insurer advisory committee to discuss regulatory issues
and communicate VWA policy. This and other forms of VWA communication with insurers
are important and deserve further scrutiny. This is especially true in Victoria's mixed system
where regulators apply a much closer hand hi managing insurers' service functions.
Self-Insurance Regulation
Self-insurers are regulated within the Insurance Unit of the Scheme Regulation
Division. Self-insureds have an advantage under the law, relative to other employers, in that
self-insureds can make immediate decisions as to whether a claim is compensable. Selfinsureds also avoid the cross-subsidy paid by other large employers who pay more than their
share of costs. Self-administration also is an option although it has been rarely used to date;
discussions are underway with two employers who seek self-administered status. Under the
act, self-administrators make their own claims decisions but the VWA carries the risk. Selfadministrators' premiums are reduced by the amount loaded for administration (i.e., the
servicing fee). Self-administration can serve as an interim step to full self-insurance, or as an
end in itself.
The VWA characterises its self-insurance requirements as the toughest among the
Australian states, except for Queensland. Self-insureds must have $200 million in net assets,
500 full-time employees, and be a corporate body. There are no group self-insureds. Selfinsureds also must demonstrate that they meet a "fit and proper" test, which involves
determining that they are financially viable and that they can serve scheme objectives. As of
December 1996, the VWA was authorised to approve self-insurance applications (previously
they had to be approved by the Minister of Finance). The fit and proper test has four elements:
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(1) financial viability; (2) claims performance; (3) workplace safety; and (4) the infrastructure
for administering claims. With respect to claims performance, the employer must be above
average for measures such as cost of claims, duration, and frequency. Workplace safety is
evaluated using HSD audit results.
Self-insurance authorisation is granted for an initial 3-year period, and every 4 years
thereafter. Self-insureds must obtain a bank guarantee for one-half of their liabilities as
certified by an approved actuary. Self-insureds must purchase unlimited excess coverage for
catastrophes. They also must implement a self-audit program and contribute to the WorkCover
fund, except for administrative costs. The self-audit program focuses on claims administration,
rehabilitation and loss prevention. Within the last year, the self-insureds have begun reporting
data which the VWA uses to monitor and benchmark their performance. Self-insureds are not
allowed to use captives nor third-party administrators. This is consistent with the intent of
using self-insurance to promote greater employer control of their own risk and claims.
There are currently 23 self-insured employers, accounting for 9 percent of scheme
remuneration. At the time of this study, the VWA had nine self-insureds under assessment and
was reviewing two new applications. Processing self-insurance applications also involves
negotiating the self-insured's assumption of the tail of its outstanding claims. The self-insured
receives any related premiums collected less any benefits paid.
There are barriers to self-insurance, in addition to regulatory requirements, which help
to explain why it is not more predominant. These barriers include employer apathy (which may
be encouraged by the decrease in premium costs under WorkCover and the strong experience
rating component of the pricing formula), the fact that workers' compensation is not viewed as
a core competency of employers, and the rigorous assessment process.
Investment Management
The Victorian Funds Management Corporation (VFMC) manages the funds
accumulated by Victorian government agencies, the bulk of which are owned by the
Transportation Accident Commission and the VWA. For the VWA, these funds cover the
Authority's future obligations to claimants as well as any surplus it maintains. Participation in
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VFMC is voluntary for government agencies. VFMC currently manages $7 billion, of which
about $3 billion is owned by the VWA.
The VFMC investment strategy emphasises growth and income within certain
prescribed constraints. The VFMC's inflation-adjusted return is between 4 and 5 percent.
VFMC management believes that its performance is quite comparable to that of insurers and
other conservative portfolio managers. The VFMC would like to match the liability profile of
each fund with its asset duration and return. The funds have to be 95 percent invested. Average
asset duration is 2 to 3 years. The VFMC can invest in derivatives for hedging purposes.
The mix of VWA assets are 35 percent domestic equities; 20 percent foreign equities;
10 percent domestic interest income investments; 10 percent foreign interest income
investments; 10 percent inflation-indexed investments; 10 percent real estate; and 5 percent
short-term investments. Interest income earned on VWA assets allows the VWA to collect less
in premiums than would otherwise be needed to cover its future obligations. Thus, the earnings
of the funds are an important influence on the price of insurance.
Market Structure
Some elements of the structure-conduct-performance framework used by industrial
organisation economists are employed in this section and the next to analyse the market for
private insurance services under WorkCover. Figure 4.3 outlines this framework. The
principal-agent problem also is important to understanding the behaviour and performance of
insurers. This section focuses on those structural aspects of the market for the services
provided by insurers that are critical to the system's performance. The key factors that
influence market structure are regulation, insurer cost functions and market strategies, and
employers' ability and inclination to shop for insurers' services. To the extent there is a market
for certain services performed by insurers, parameters such as the number and size of insurers,
entry and exit, and how insurers differentiate their services are important to understanding how
this market functions. This discussion is relevant because changes in the structure of the
market would affect scheme performance.
4-21

Federal Regulation
In addition to regulation by the VWA, Victoria's workers' compensation insurers also
are subject to supervision by the federal regulator, the Insurance and Superannuation
Commission (ISC). The exercise of ISC's jurisdiction over WorkCover insurers is unclear, but
it could effectively limit the insurers eligible to apply for authorisation to become a
WorkCover insurer. The ISC also regulates the holding companies for WorkCover insurers
which could indirectly affect the structure and performance of the market for insurer services
under WorkCover.
The ISC focuses primarily on solvency, with an emphasis on "supervision" rather than
"regulation." This means that ISC tends to monitor and consult with insurers frequently and
persuade them to rectify problems, rather than enforcing detailed regulations specify ing what
insurers can and cannot do. There only have been a handful of insurer failures since the ISC's
inception in 1973. Its objective is to limit the cost of insolvencies, not totally eliminate them.
The primary responsibilities of the ISC are to establish limited restrictions on insurers;
supervise specific aspects of insurers' financial structure and operations; monitor prudence;
enforce minimum standards; and maintain close contact and consultation with insurers. The
ISC must approve the independent auditors used by insurers. An Australian Valuation Office is
used to confirm real estate values.
The ISC system establishes three progressive layers of financial tests: (1) a solvency
margin; (2) a capacity margin; and (3) a prudential margin. Regulatory attention and
intervention intensifies as an insurer falls below these tiers. The solvency margin is the lowest
tier ($2 million in surplus) and could trigger regulatory takeover of a company, if necessary.
The ISC works with a company to try to avoid insolvency, if possible. The ISC is now
considering establishing risk-based capital standards as have been implemented in other
countries.
Insurers are required to file quarterly and annual financial reports. The ISC sets
accounting standards for insurers who are required to report investments at their market value.
Financial reports must be certified by independent actuaries and accountants. The ISC does not
emphasise comprehensive regulatory exams but does perform targeted exams which focus on
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particular areas of concern. Much of the ISC's interaction with insurers is confidential. The
ISC communicates regularly with the states on matters of mutual concern. Of course, the states
can also revoke an insurer's authorisation for state-controlled business which can create a
solvency problem.
Historically, the ISC has exercised limited regulation of insurer market practices and
relied on the common law to protect consumer rights. The ISC authority in this area is
provided by the Insurance Contracts Act of 1973 which defines the regulatory relationship
between insured and insurer and codifies the aspects of common law which govern this area.
The Act was expanded in 1994 to give more power to ISC to enforce codes of practice. The
industry also operates a consumer complaint tribunal which seeks to resolve insured-insurer
disputes.
There are 169 authorised insurers in Australia representing 18 groups. There are 25
authorised reinsurers and a handful of captives. The ISC prefers that international insurers
establish Australian subsidiaries as opposed to branches. The ISC does not regulate alien
insurers but regulates the intermediaries that broker international transactions. There are no
restrictions on consumers' purchase of insurance from alien insurers. Domestic groups hold the
predominant share of the Australian market.
The ISC does not regulate state-owned and state-controlled insurers. Victorian
WorkCover falls into a gray area in that insurers write the business but cede all of it to the
VWA. Technically, this requires the ISC to regulate authorised WorkCover insurers in
Victoria, but, in practice, the ISC appears to pay little attention to these insurers. Yet, the
VWA relies on ISC financial requirements and financial reports to evaluate and monitor
authorised WorkCover insurers. The regulatory responsibilities of the ISC and the VWA with
respect to Victorian workers' compensation insurers will need to be clarified and coordinated if
Victoria delegates more insurance functions and decision making to authorised insurers.
Number and Size of Insurers
As noted above, there are currently 14 authorised insurers providing WorkCover
services. This number may be somewhat less than the number of insurers that might typically
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write workers' compensation insurance in a private market system in a state of comparable size
to Victoria. However, it should be pointed out that the relevant market in which insurers
compete does not cover the full scope of workers' compensation insurance. Rather, it is the
market for the set of services delegated to insurers. This effectively limits the size of the
market to competition for the services and service fees allocated to insurers, i.e., only 5 to 6
percent of the total premiums collected. Moreover, entry is closely regulated, services are
highly prescribed, and potential profits are constrained. For these reasons, we would not
expect a large number of insurers to service the WorkCover market. With these considerations,
14 insurers appears to be a reasonable number of companies to serve the market and should
provide an adequate number of choices to employers and adequate competition for employers'
business.
The market also is relatively concentrated, with a few insurers holding a dominant
share of the market. Table 4.2 tracks the concentration of the Victorian workers' compensation
insurance market since 1993. The top four insurers held 73.6 percent of the market in 1993
and 67.3 percent of the market in 1996. The Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index was 1,618 for 1993
and 1,374 for 1996.4 The 1993 levels of concentration would be considered relatively high by
conventional standards, but the decrease in concentration over the last 4 years is significant and
suggests a fairly competitive and dynamic market environment. Concentration increased in
1996 with the merger of CIC and Heath and the exit of AIG, but the resulting increase in the
HHI was only 50 points. Moreover, the current levels of concentration are reasonable given
the relatively small size of the market for insurer services. Smaller markets would be expected

4The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure of market concentration that
measures the relative size distribution of all firms in the market. It is calculated by summing the squared market
shares of all firms. This gives disproportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger insurers which
is consistent with economic theory about the relationship between firm size and market power. The U.S.
Department of Justice anti-trust guidelines define HHI's between 1,000 and 2,000 as constituting moderate market
concentration and HHI's in excess of 2,000 as constituting high market concentration. Note that these benchmarks
have been established for national markets that are larger and more difficult to enter than smaller state markets.
Most state workers' compensation markets in the U.S.A. have HHI's between 1,000 and 2,000 but are viewed as
highly competitive.
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to be more concentrated, all else equal (Klein, Nordman, and Fritz, 1993). It is not uncommon
for larger state workers' compensation markets in the U.S. to have comparable levels of
concentration.
Table 4.3 tracks insurer market shares over the last 4 years. Several large insurers have
lost market share and some smaller insurers have gained market share over this period. If this
is the result of effective competition by more efficient insurers, it bodes well for the
performance of the market. On the other hand, if this trend reflects unfair competition or
attempts to secure business with excessive extra services or manipulation of premium
classifications, then it should be a matter of concern.
Entry and Exit
The level of entry and exit has been somewhat limited under WorkCover, but given the
size of the market and the tight licencing requirements, it appears reasonable. Table 4.4
summarises this activity from a statistical perspective. Nine insurers were initially authorised
as servicing agents under WorkCare. In 1987/88, four of these agents dropped out and two
more insurers became agents, resulting in a net decrease of two agents. In 1989/90, two more
agents dropped out, leaving five authorised agents in the system. Through the end of
WorkCare, two new insurers entered the market, one insurer resumed operations, and one
insurer dropped out. Exits were prompted either by termination by the VWA or voluntary
withdrawal.
The demands upon and incentives for servicing agents under WorkCare encouraged
fewer insurers to be in the market than the more promising business opportunities opened
under WorkCover. It is apparent that some companies were induced to become authorised
insurers because of expectations about growth and profit opportunities resulting from greater
privatisation. If these expectations are not realised, there may be some retrenchment and exits
by currently authorised insurers. Exits could be even more numerous if insurers are required to
establish their own information and transaction systems. Although WorkCover entry
requirements and barriers are relatively high, they do not seem excessive considering the
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orientation of Victoria's mixed system and do not appear to have seriously compromised
competition.
However, the issue of entry barriers and market concentration requires continued
attention by the VWA. Some insurers may exit if it becomes too costly for them to operate in
this market and/or if Victoria does not privatise the market. This could dampen competition
and reduce incentives for the remaining authorised insurers to be innovative and improve their
quality of service. It also could reduce the VWA's leverage in influencing insurers' conduct.
Additionally, if Victoria moves to greater privatisation, entry requirements would have to be
reassessed to ensure they are commensurate with the requirements for a system that places
more emphasis on private choice and competition. It would be desirable to have additional,
financially strong insurers enter the market if it was privatised.
Insurer Differentiation
Insurer differentiation of their services is the principal mechanism for competition in
the Victoria WorkCover market. Historically, there has been a perception that insurer
differentiation has been limited but this may be changing. All the insurers interviewed
contended that their service strategy is different than their competitors and essential to
increasing their market share. It is difficult to evaluate the validity of this contention without
more extensive examination and comparison of insurers' services. Some insurers may be
enhancing their services and targeting niche markets in anticipation of greater privatisation.
Indeed, many insurers cited efforts to improve their facilities to analyse employers' experience
and help them contain costs. Delegation of information system responsibilities to insurers and
publication of insurer performance statistics could also encourage insurer service
differentiation. Future adjustments in the regulatory scheme will likely have a significant
impact on this dimension of market structure.
Market Performance
This section evaluates how well the scheme performs in areas that are affected by
regulation and insurers' activities. Because of the unique nature of the Victorian scheme in its
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reliance on a combination of public and private choice, the framework of this analysis differs
somewhat from the conventional market structure-conduct-performance analysis. The primary
question is how well the mixed system of public-private provision of workers' compensation
insurance has achieved the objectives of the WorkCover scheme. This is a difficult question to
answer because of the close integration of VWA administrative and regulatory responsibilities
and insurer activities. The performance measures available reflect the impact of all of these
institutions and it is difficult to isolate the effects of regulation and market structure per se.
Hence, this performance analysis is somewhat general and its reflection on insurer efficiency
must be qualified.
It helps to have a historical perspective in evaluating insurers' performance under the
current WorkCover scheme.5 Most observers agreed that the system was in bad shape prior to
WorkCare. Pricing was extremely cyclical and coverage was difficult to purchase and very
expensive when the market hardened. Small employers were most vulnerable to this market
volatility. Large employers had more leverage to make deals with insurers.6 Under the
WorkCare scheme, the system was plagued by runaway costs, excessive durations, and a
growing class of dependent injured workers. As discussed below, under WorkCover, prices
have been stabilized, costs have decreased, and the availability of coverage is not an issue.7
Underwriting and Availability of Coverage
Insurers' underwriting responsibilities are considerably different under Victoria's mixed
system than under a private system. In a fully private system where insurers bear the risk,
underwriting is key to the insurers' risk management and avoidance of adverse selection. In
this environment, an insurer will reject employers who are perceived to be too risky hi relation
to the insurer's price structure, causing claim costs to exceed the premiums collected and
5See Chapter 2 for a more thorough account of the history of workers' compensation in Victoria.
6 Tasmania's private workers' compensation market is often cited as an example where cyclical pricing
occurs when there is minimal regulation.
7At the same time, recent developments in New South Wales indicate that this mixed public/private model
is not immune to these problems.
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attracting more high-risk employers. However, under WorkCover, insurers do not face this
problem. For this reason, insurers' underwriting function is confined to proper classification of
risk and determination of the correct premium, which they perform on behalf of the VWA.
Insurers interviewed, for the most part, confirmed that they are not selective in terms of the
types of risks they seek to write.
To a limited extent, some insurers may use underwriting to tailor their business towards
employers for whom the standard service fee is perceived to yield a larger profit margin given
the level of service that the employers will require and the potential for audit exceptions and
penalties on the handling of their claims. This strategy has to be implemented through selective
marketing and service perquisites. Some insurers, anticipating privatisation, also may be
seeking to write employers that they perceive will be more profitable in a private system under
which they would bear the risk.
Because insurers have little incentive or ability to reject high-risk insureds, the
availability of workers' compensation coverage is not an issue per se in Victoria, in contrast to
private systems. Under Section 11 of the WorkCover Act, an authorised insurer may not,
without the consent of the VWA, refuse to issue or renew an insurance policy to an employer.
This provision does not apply if the employer has not complied with the law or regulations
governing WorkCover. Hence, there is no need for a residual market mechanism as in private
systems where insurers can refuse to write an employer for a number of reasons. Only the
supply of special additional services are subject to insurer discretion and may be less available
to small and high-risk employers.
However, other performance issues do arise in this area. Insurers' diminished
incentives for accurate underwriting can result in instances of incorrect classification and
pricing. Indeed, some insurers take pride in their ability to lower employers' premiums by
reclassifying their workforce. This is appropriate if an employer has been misclassified but
there also is the potential for manipulation of classification for competitive purposes. We do
not know whether this is a serious problem or not. The audit process is intended to prevent
classification and pricing errors but it is an imperfect substitute for stronger insurer incentives
to get it right.
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Marketing
VWA officials observe that competition among insurers to attract employers does not
appear to have had a significant effect on employers' selection of insurers or insurers'
performance. The VWA indicates that turnover of employers is limited, less than 1 percent
annually. 8 Insurers tend to market their services in a traditional "promotional" sense but,
historically, do not appear to have focused on their relative performance in terms of outcomes.
Employers lack the information to effectively identify the better performers. There are other
reasons why employers may rarely move their business, including other insurance coverages
they may purchase from an insurer and the relationship they have established with an insurer.
Reserving
It is possible that some insurers would have difficulty hi estimating losses and pricing
coverage for workers' compensation without the Authority's assistance. VWA staff noted that
insurers typically do not have the analytical resources to determine adequate reserves and
evaluate their risk. This is significant given the long tail of workers' compensation insurance
claims. According to the VWA, insurers consistently underestimate the development of case
reserves and EBNR. Studies indicate that a significant portion (60 percent) of losses are not
paid until 5 years after the injury year, so it is easy to see how insurers might underestimate
needed reserved.
The VWA acknowledges that some insurers are getting better at analysing their losses
and their risk at a technical level, but senior company managers sometimes do not use this
analysis to make good business decisions. It also was observed that insurers in Victoria had to
climb a big learning curve, and that approximately 50 to 60 percent of insurers have made
considerable progress, but 20 percent are doing a poor job. The F factors are intended to adjust
for the reserving accuracy of each insurer, but this objective may be obscured if F factors are

8 This contrasts with a Boston Consulting Group survey of 300 Victorian employers, among which 14
percent had changed insurers within the last year (Boston Consulting Group, 1995).
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also used to adjust for scheme costs not reflected in the base rate. At the same tune, it is fair to
point out that the ACCtion system is not designed to make it easy for insurers to extract this
information and perform this kind of analysis.
Premium Collection
Employer reporting of remuneration and the collection of the proper premium has been
an issue in Victoria, as elsewhere. In the 1993/94 financial year, the function of premium
collection was transferred from the government to insurers. VWA audits of selected employers
have identified $15 million in unpaid premiums, plus $5 million in penalties. The VWA will
audit a random sample of employers this year to estimate the magnitude of under reporting.
The VWA believes that this is a function which should be delegated to insurers. Competition
among insurers for accounts and employers' desire to lower their premiums create
disincentives for proper reporting of remuneration. The fact the premiums are fully ceded to
the VWA reduces insurers' incentive to collect the full amount due the VWA. However, VWA
staff do not perceive this to be a significant problem in relative terms as they indicate that 99
percent of premiums are collected properly.
Premium and Claim Costs
The overall cost of the WorkCover scheme is a principal concern of most stakeholders.
Even workers and non-insurance providers have a stake hi this, as increasing costs will
increase pressure to lower benefits and medical and rehabilitation services. To the extent that
costs can be minimised by effective loss prevention and return to work strategies, more
resources are available to pay benefits and provide additional services to injured workers. As
noted above, the overall cost of the system is affected by all the institutions Involved in
regulating and providing WorkCover services. Hence, while it is instructive to examine cost
trends, it is problematic to attribute these trends among the different institutions affecting
them.
Table 4.5 shows figures for the basic premium rate (premiums divided by leviable
remuneration), the published rate, and the ratio of claims payments to premiums for the 19864-30

1996 period. The decrease in the published rate from 3.3 percent in 1992 to 1.98 percent in
1996 is a remarkable accomplishment, and is currently the lowest rate among Australian states
at 1.8 percent for 1996-97. The ratio of claims payments to premiums on a fiscal year basis is
an imperfect performance measure because the premiums are associated with a different set of
policies than the claims payments. Over the period 1994-1996, the average annual ratio of
claims payments to premiums was 81.1 percent. To the extent this fiscal year ratio reveals
anything about the policy year experience, it suggests a relatively efficient level of
performance, in terms of the relation of benefits received to benefits paid, that is
commensurate with the experience in competitive workers' compensation insurance markets.
Several factors have contributed to this improvement. One is system reforms under
WorkCover. Another is refinement of the pricing formula and restoration of full funding to
increase employers' incentives to reduce losses. A third factor is VWA and insurer efforts to
encourage loss prevention and improve case management. Public dissatisfaction with the
abuses under WorkCare and a change in the culture pervading workers' compensation
insurance also may have helped to discourage workers "rorting" the system.
The ability of Victoria to sustain this low cost is a subject of considerable discussion.
Many observers point to underlying cost drivers that will ultimately force premiums up. It is
typical for costs to rebound in systems that have undertaken significant reforms as different
interest groups whittle away at the reforms and search for new ways to stretch the system.
Victorian officials are aware of this tendency and are seeking to further increase efficiency and
forestall erosion of previous reforms.
Profitability
The profitability of WorkCover insurers is particularly difficult to measure and a source
of considerable disagreement. Insurers contend that the service fee is inadequate and that
selling WorkCover services is not profitable enough to sustain their long-term operations under
the current system. The question then is why insurers stay in the market. One possible
explanation is that profits are higher than they are alleged to be, particularly considering that
risk is low. Another reason is that some insurers expect to increase their profits by increasing
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their market share and benefiting from privatisation. A third possible explanation is that there
are economies of scope in marketing WorkCover insurance with other coverages supplied by
affiliates and that the overall profits from selling a package of coverages makes WorkCover
business more viable.
Table 4.6 presents aggregate figures on scheme financial performance. While year to
year financial results are somewhat volatile, it is apparent that there has been significant
improvement over this period. The scheme sustained a net loss every year during the 19861989 period. Since then, income has exceeded expenditures in all but 2 years.
While the scheme's financial performance appears to be much improved, what do the
data indicate with respect to insurers' financial performance? Table 4.7 presents income figures
by insurer for the 1995 report year based on ISC statistical reports. These figures do not
appear to be very meaningful given the peculiarities of the WorkCover mixed system.
Because insurers cede all premiums and losses to the VWA, their income is a product
of their expenses from providing insurance services and the revenues they derive from service
fees and any investment income from assets they hold. There is a wide variation among
insurers in terms of expenses and income which may be partly due to differences in results
reported on a calendar year basis for ISC versus results that would be measured on a policyyear basis. Also, income and expense figures are subject to considerable manipulation from an
accounting perspective, particularly with respect to reporting payments to parents and affiliates
for the services they render. Hence, it is difficult to evaluate insurers' claims of inadequate
profits.
In 1995, insurers' profits after income taxes varied from a negative 34.2 percent of
premium revenue to a positive 20 percent. Many insurers reported zero or negative profits and
the median profit rate for all insurers was zero. Closer analysis of more consistent financial
data will be necessary to develop meaningful profit estimates. Still, it is unlikely that such an
analysis will find that insurers are making excessive profits from WorkCover or one would see
much greater interest from other insurers to get into the market. The question of what insurers
require in terms of a fair rate of return on investment will depend heavily on the changes that
Victoria will make in increasing private choice under WorkCover.
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Products and Quality of Service
There is not true competition among WorkCover insurers in terms of products offered,
as the basic WorkCover policy and coverages are prescribed by law and cannot be modified.
However, if we adopt a broader concept of product that encompasses the full set of services
offered by insurers then there is some opportunity for service differentiation and the question
of service performance becomes relevant. Clearly, insurers can affect scheme performance by
offering more innovative and better services that help lower costs and promote other employer
and worker interests. However, a principal challenge that is present with any workers'
compensation system with private providers is the fact that it relies on first and second parties
to deliver services to a third party, workers, who do not control the other parties. Also, under
the current system, insurers and employers do not reap the full financial benefits from better
services (at least without a fairly long time lag) which diminishes the incentives for good
performance.
The VWA identifies service delivery as the greatest problem under the current system.
Insurers are not perceived as being innovative with respect to identifying problem areas and
developing solutions. Insurers do not have their money at stake and are alleged to view
problems to be WorkCover's concern. Insurers' efforts to help employers improve workplace
safety is one area of concern. VWA officials believe that insurers do not tend to provide
comprehensive loss prevention services as part of their normal package of services. In their
view, insurers' standard approach to risk management services is not geared towards
employment-related coverages that involve human resource considerations. They feel that
insurers fail to actively analyse their data to identify cost drivers or problem areas and
implement or recommend effective cost containment strategies to employers and public
officials. Insurers also are thought not be sufficiently responsive to small employers. The
VWA indicated that the loss prevention advice that is provided tends to follow the occurrence
of an injury. Insurers may negotiate separately with employers to provide more extensive loss
prevention services. As noted above, there are other risk management providers (sometimes
affiliated with insurers) who also provide loss prevention services in Victoria.
The VWA's view of the extent of loss prevention services provided by insurers
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contrasts somewhat with insurers' characterisation of what they do. All of the insurers
interviewed indicated that they perceive loss prevention and risk management to be an
important part of their services and one of the principal ways they differentiate themselves to
employers. At the same tune, insurers acknowledge they could do more in this area and some
are seeking to expand these services within the constraints they face. Lack of innovation by
insurers is attributed to inadequate remuneration.
Long-term case management also has been identified as a problem area (see Chapter 7).
From the perspective of the VWA, insurers are good at processing claims but not as good at
managing cases involving long-term and severe injuries. VWA staff indicate that insurers seek
to close claims as quickly as possible by paying lump sum settlements and through other
means. There is a concern that there still is an excessive number of long-term claims that could
be resolved. Of the approximately 4,500 serious injury claims (as of 30 June 1996), one senior
VWA manager "guesstimated" that only 900 would be completely unable to do any work.
Another 900 are probably drug dependent and would need to be detoxified before returning to
the labour market. Many remaining long-term claimants have had no recent medical treatment
and their current disability status is unknown. The VWA will investigate these cases for
potential long-term return to work as well as consider some claimants for psychological testing
and rehabilitation.
Several factors are identified as contributors to insurers' performance at service
delivery. One is the historical legacy of insurer practices with respect to claims management
which remains from prior systems. In this view, the insurance "culture" is not geared towards
conserving human capital; but rather in terms of "doing deals" to get workers to sell their
rights to further compensation. It is alleged that insurer personnel receive insufficient training
on effective claim management practices. It also is observed that employers do not seem to
discriminate among insurers very well. They do not know what to look for in terms of
selecting a good service provider. It also should be noted that, historically, the Authority has
not published performance statistics for individual insurers that would help employers select
insurers.
VWA officials indicate that insurers' service performance has improved since the
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implementation of WorkCover but that it still falls considerably short with respect to achieving
system objectives. At the same time, the authorised insurers tend to be more advanced than
other insurers in handling workers' compensation claims. Some of the improvements
developed under WorkCover have been extended to other areas of the insurers' business. The
question is whether insurers can make the leap to effectively manage the difficult, long-term
cases (roughly 20 percent of the total cases).
Table 4.8 summarises service performance statistics by insurer for the first quarter of
1996. The data indicate considerable variation in insurer service performance, particularly for
categories such as timeliness, case reserve accuracy, and medical panel delays. At first glance,
the performance of some insurers in the areas of timeliness and medical panel delays appears to
be quite poor. It is difficult to determine simply by looking at these data the extent to which
these statistical differences are attributable to true differences in performances and to what
extent they are attributable to differences in insurers' portfolios of risks. However, at first
blush, they do give credence to the view that some insurers are considerably better than others
in performing their service functions and promoting scheme objectives. If good controls for
differences in portfolios could be employed, it would enable analysts to target poor performers
and perhaps work with them to upgrade their performance. Significant differences in service
performance raise questions about the efficacy of the current incentives in encouraging all
insurers to provide good service. This issue will become more relevant when the VWA
publishes these performance statistics to allow employers to use this information in comparing
carriers.
Solvency
Insurer solvency and solidity is an important issue under WorkCover, although not as
significant as in systems where insurers bear underwriting risk. Under WorkCover, the VWA
assumes claims obligations, so an insurer's failure would not create problems in meeting these
obligations or create a deficit that would have to be covered by other stakeholders. On the
other hand, the failure of a WorkCover insurer, at the very least, would require the VWA to
transfer its policies, which would create some disruption and impose some transactions costs.
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Also, an insurer in financial trouble might lower its quality of service in an effort to reduce
costs, which would negatively affect scheme objectives and constituencies. Insurer solvency
and financial solidity may become more important if privatisation measures delegate more
responsibility to insurers and increase their level of financial risk.
Table 4.9 presents figures on assets and liabilities by insurer for 1995 as reported by
the ISC. Most insurers have net assets close to the $2 million capital requirement mandated by
the ISC and the VWA. Consequently, their ratios of assets to net assets and liabilities to net
assets (conventional measures of capital adequacy) tend to be much higher than the ratios that
insurers would normally maintain. Presumably, the parent companies of these insurers have
decided that it is not efficient to maintain higher levels of capital hi Victoria workers'
compensation insurers. Given that these insurers do not bear underwriting risk and their
parents are in a position to infuse more capital if needed, this does not raise a concern about
the financial solidity of these insurers that would be present if the circumstances were
different. Of course, if these insurers accept more risk in the future as the result of
privatisation measures, it is clear that they would need to be capitalized at a higher level to
satisfy safety objectives. They also would need to generate sufficient profits to provide
company owners with an adequate rate of return on this additional capital.
Regulatory Program Assessment
This section evaluates the performance of regulatory functions and issues raised with
respect to these functions. This analysis is based on interviews of regulators and insurers as
well as on quantitative or other objective measures of regulatory performance that are
available. We cite comments from the different stakeholders that were interviewed and reflect
on those comments. In many of these cases, we were not in a position to validate the comments
that we received. However, there are a few instances where data are available to add some
perspective on these issues.
While regulators and insurers are proud of their significant accomplishments under
WorkCover, both sides perceive the need to significantly improve certain aspects of the
regulatory program. Insurers, in particular, indicate considerable dissatisfaction with a number
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of things that regulators do and have called for substantial reforms. A strong theme in their
criticisms is their perception that regulators are too heavy handed and treat insurers in a
demeaning manner. Insurers do not believe that the VWA acts as a true partner with an
appropriate level of mutual respect and trust with insurers. Comments by some VWA staff
about insurers tend to confirm insurers' view of regulatory attitudes, although senior VWA
management is seeking to improve the relationship between regulators and the regulated.
Management of the Principal-Agent Relationship
The way in which the VWA manages its principal-agent relationship is key to the
performance of the regulatory program. Is the VWA using an optimal mix of conduct and
outcome measures, controls, and incentives to induce insurers to maximise scheme objectives?
Determining whether the VWA is using the best possible regulatory strategy is beyond the
scope of this report, but it is reasonable to make some observations on the cost-effectiveness of
some of its regulatory mechanisms. Mechanisms that are difficult and costly to administer and,
at best, have only a marginal positive effect on insurer performance should be reconsidered.
There may be other measures that could be initiated or strengthened that would accomplish the
job at a lower cost and/or with greater benefits.
Specifically, the VWA's relatively heavy reliance on conduct monitoring and control
versus outcome-based incentive payments should be assessed. Both regulators and insurers are
buried in the minutia of enforcing and complying with numerous detailed conduct-oriented
standards rather than focusing on and rewarding overall performance. This system is costly for
all parties, gives rise to significant tensions between regulators and insurers, may present
conflicting objectives, and may induce insurers to expend an excessive amount of effort on
nominal compliance with an arbitrary set of conduct standards at the expense of service
outcomes.
This approach also may be somewhat unusual relative to the ways in which most
principal-agent relationships are managed. Moreover, the vision for insurers' role under
WorkCover may be somewhat different now than what was envisioned when the current
regulatory system was implemented. Is the regulatory system still optimally designed given the
4-37

present direction of the WorkCover scheme? This question is nested within the broader
question of the delegation of insurance functions between the government and insurers. If
insurance functions are reassigned or other changes made to enhance the role of the private
sector, how should regulatory policies be modified?
Some aspects of the principal-agent problem faced by Victoria might be obviated by
delegating more responsibilities to and increasing reliance on market forces and private choice.
This section considers the cost-effectiveness of current regulatory mechanisms as well as more
fundamental changes to the regulatory structure that would significantly alter the principalagent relationship between the VWA and insurers.
Authorisation of Insurers
The authorisation process appears to be fairly rigorous although not necessarily
inappropriate given the responsibilities shared between the VWA and insurers and the conductoriented nature of the regulatory system. Interviewed insurers did not complain about the
authorisation process but they may see an advantage to it to the extent that it discourages entry
by other insurers. Moreover, the requirements for authorisation do not appear to be so steep as
to prevent an adequate number of insurers from serving the market hi its current form. The
detailed and well-documented standards promote a mutual understanding of what is expected
from insurers and a clear basis on which to judge their compliance.
On the other hand, greater reliance on outcome as opposed to conduct standards might
be easier to administer and achieve greater success in promoting scheme objectives. This
would require the VWA to design a more limited set of performance standards that would
focus on insurers' results rather than how they achieved those results. Performance standards
could encompass any outcomes with appropriate weights that the government determined to be
desirable, including minimising claim, legal and administrative costs, timeliness hi processing
claims and paying benefits, conformance with the statutory requirements of workers'
compensation, and success in returning injured workers to productive employment. The VWA
could set minimum performance standards in these areas and a system of rewards and penalties
based on insurers' performance relative to the standards. While there are already some
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elements of this approach in the current regulatory system, the emphasis on outcome-based
incentive payments could be significantly enhanced.
Victoria might also revisit its requirement that authorised insurers be separate
companies that only provide WorkCover coverage. The rationale for this requirement is still
somewhat unclear to an external evaluator. It is not obvious that requiring separate WorkCover
insurers improves performance in serving WorkCover objectives. While this has not
necessarily proven to be an excessive entry barrier, removing this requirement could reduce
administrative costs for insurers and possibly attract more efficient companies. The VWA
could still enforce conduct and performance standards on authorised insurers, regardless of
whether WorkCover was their sole business.
If Victoria moves to a more private system, it will have to reexamine its licencing
process and determine what is appropriate under a different regulatory scheme. In such an
environment, more consideration would need to be given to financial evaluation and
monitoring as well as rate and market conduct regulation. Intensive monitoring and regulation
of insurers' conduct and performance may be less feasible and necessary if private incentives
replace the VWA as the principal regulator of insurers' activities. In addition, it would be
preferable to have a larger number of insurers compete in an insurance market where the
product includes risk bearing.
Service Standards and Enforcement
The audit program is cited frequently by insurers as a problem area. They express the
concern that auditors lack sufficient expertise to understand what they are auditing, and that
audits are too focused on identifying minor exceptions to arbitrary performance standards and
miss the "big picture" in terms of insurers' overall performance. Consequently, insurers are
induced to focus on activities aimed at avoiding audit exceptions rather than overall
performance and scheme objectives. Insurers also complain that the audits are aimed at finding
and penalizing errors rather than giving insurers an opportunity to cure problems identified and
sanctioning the failure to cure identified problems.
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However, it should be pointed out that one of the objectives of an audit program is to
encourage insurers to comply with service standards before they are audited. If insurers are
only penalized after they have had an opportunity to cure problems found by external auditors
insurers' incentives to comply with standards proactively are diminished. The solution may be
a combination of better standards and the selective use of retrospective as well as prospective
penalties to induce optimal conduct. Some errors may be obvious failures to comply with
established standards that insurers should have corrected or avoided on their own, while others
may reflect legitimate ambiguities or situations which insurers clearly could not have avoided.
Auditors also should be properly trained and not solely junior staff with little or no insurance
experience. Insurers could be encouraged to establish more rigorous self-audit programs.
The new audit program may effectively address many of these concerns. Insurers
indicate that they believe that the new audit program is a substantial improvement over the
previous one. At the same time, some insurers expressed surprise and frustration that certain
provisions of the new program still contain unfairly punitive aspects that they did not expect.
Not all insurers, however, share the view that the new audit program departs from what was
discussed.
A more radical idea would be to do away with the audit program altogether. This would
not be feasible if the VWA retains a heavy emphasis on enforcing conduct requirements but it
might be reasonable if it shifted its focus to performance standards and incentives.
Performance measurements and incentive payments would need to be strengthened to offset
decreased emphasis on conduct regulation. The advantages of eliminating the regular audit
program would be reducing the costs of conducting and complying with the audits and
refocusing insurers' efforts towards achieving the best results in the way most efficient for
each insurer. This would not preclude the VWA from performing limited market conduct
exams on a random basis or specialised targeted exams in response to employer and worker
complaints of poor performance.9
9 Market conduct examinations, in the traditional sense, would be more limited in scope than the current
service audits. Market conduct examinations would assess whether insurers were complying with statutory
requirements and the terms of their contracts with insureds.
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Pricing and Reserving
Opinions differ on the desirability of the scheme's current pricing formula. It is the
primary mechanism which the VWA uses to influence employer behaviour. The VWA believes
that the formula has performed relatively well hi helping to restore the scheme to full funding,
establishing more accurate, risk-based premiums for employers, diminishing cross-subsidies,
and enhancing employers' incentives to improve their experience. At the same time, the VWA
recognises that the formula is not perfect and that there may be ways to improve it.
One of the significant issues is the cross-subsidies that still exist within the current
formula. These cross-subsidies primarily benefit small employers. They stem from (1) the
$15,500 remuneration deductible; (2) the $7,500 exemption limit below which employers do
not have to pay any premium; (3) the small sizing and experience (Z) factor for small
employers; and (4) the maximum industry rate of 7 percent. The VWA estimates that the crosssubsidy to small employers from the first three factors amounts to approximately $20 million.
A 1995 VWA working paper (WorkCover Premium System) discusses these and a number of
other issues and options.
Among the many options that have been identified for discussion purposes are: placing
a floor on the Z factor and adjusting the Z factor for an employer's industry's performance in
broad bands to help small employers; including dispute resolution administrative costs hi claim
costs; increasing variable excess options available to employers; and refining classifications to
the three- or four-digit industry level. The VWA points out that changes to the premium
system should not be considered in isolation but evaluated as a set in terms of their impact on
employers and scheme objectives.
Among the goals of the options identified above are to make an employer's rate more
responsive to its experience and to help small insurers who are not large enough to benefit
significantly from individual experience rating. This would increase the interest in industry
wide cost containment and best practice initiatives. However, while these are laudable
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objectives, individual employers still could pursue a "free rider" strategy by benefiting from
the safety investments of their competitors without making commensurate investments of their
own.
There also are questions with respect to the simplicity and transparency of the pricing
formula. There appears to be different opinions among VWA staff on this issue. The Authority
does receive a number of complaints from employers, particularly small ones, that the formula
is too complex and difficult to understand. However, one advantage of the formula cited is that
there is no formal mechanism for insurers to cut "side deals" with employers which would
further complicate employers' understanding of the basis of their premium calculation. This
presumably focuses employers' attention and incentives to improve their experience.
Other experts outside the VWA criticise certain aspects of the pricing formula. They
note that the prior rate component of the formula dampens large swings in the premium. At the
same time, it serves to perpetuate the cross subsidy built into the formula. The prior rate
approach differs from the more common method of blending the industry rate with the
experience of an employer, as is done in New South Wales. An alternative would be to employ
a more traditional experience rating formula which would adjust an employer's rate more
quickly based on its relative experience. While this would diminish the degree of continuity hi
the current formula, it would reward and penalize employers more promptly according to their
experience and enhance their incentives to prevent and contain loss costs.
VWA staff respond that the current formula's greater reliance on an employer's
previous experience provides a better prediction of the employer's future experience, based on
statistical theory. They also point out that greater reliance on industry experience would
provide a greater cross subsidy to poor performing employers. Credibility theory suggests that
placing excessive reliance on a small employers' prior experience would lead to inaccurate
pricing with respect to a small employers' future experience. Indeed, VWA staff note that
when the scheme employed lower sizing constants then it tended to "bleed premium'' and,
hence, it was raised to $360,000 in 1995-96 which it believes to be the right level. In sum,
they conclude that recent changes will result in a reasonably balanced price structure, with the
exception of the cross subsidy still provided by the $15,500 remuneration deductible.
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It is reasonable to surmise that the VWA's F factors have contributed to the
improvement in reserve estimates over time and have helped to expedite the transition to full
funding. However, the F-factors still receive considerable external criticism from outside
experts, as well as insurers. It is alleged that the F factors are a catchall that picks up any
errors hi previous premium calculations, as well as under-reserving. This is perceived as
inequitable in that it has a disproportionate impact on large employers who, in effect, pay for
the prior miscalculations of the scheme. VWA staff disagree that F factors are employed as a
catchall for previous errors, noting that the factors only relate to the previous year.
It also is asserted that the $15,500 statutory deduction has a large impact on F factors.
If this criticism of the F factors is correct, they should not be manipulated simply to maintain
the appearance of a low base rate. It should be noted, however, that regardless of the accuracy
of this criticism, the F factors are intended to adjust premiums for costs that are not reflected
in the individual employer pricing formula. It would be more straight-forward to incorporate
these costs directly into the base rate. At the same time, some type of mechanism like F factors
is needed to correct the incentives of insurers and employers to underestimate reserves when
then* own funds are not at risk.
Remuneration
A significant limitation of the current remuneration formula is that it fails to
discriminate among the levels of service that insurers are required to provide for their
respective portfolios of risk. It also does not discriminate among insurers in terms of their
performance or quality of service to employers and claimants. For example, an insurer does
not receive a greater amount of fees if it manages a disproportionately higher number of longterm and difficult cases, which require more intensive management. Similarly, the
remuneration formula does not reward insurers for doing a better job at loss prevention and
case management, resulting hi lower claim costs and higher success in returning injured
employees to work. Insurers bear the additional cost of these efforts but the financial benefits
accrue to the VWA, injured workers, and employers. The Best Practice Incentive scheme is
intended to provide financial payments to insurers for better service but its performance
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measures are imprecise and the total amount of the rewards is small. Some complain that
insurers with a disproportionate share of employers with short-term and less difficult cases are
unfairly advantaged under the current remuneration scheme.
The VWA is aware of these concerns and is considering changes to address them. It has
discussed negotiating customised contracts with each insurer, rather than one generic contract
with each insurer. This would allow the VWA to recognise the type of portfolio held by an
insurer in determining its remuneration. The VWA also has discussed inducing insurers to
lower costs by sharing a portion of the savings with them. This kind of approach may have
considerable merit and should receive serious consideration.
Best Practice Incentive Scheme
The total amount of BPI payments that can be made, $6 million, is relatively small
compared to the remuneration provided through the service fee, approximately $70 million.
Consequently, the impact of the program on insurer behaviour is limited. However, the
program also may influence behaviour through the signal it provides which could provide a
psychological motivation to some insurers' management. VWA staff expressed the view that
the financial impact of the program is more significant than any signalling aspect. This
perception may change if employer performance statistics are published. Still, as long as the
VWA bears the burden of claim costs, the needs to find ways to increase the financial
incentives for good performance. This could be accomplished through increasing BPI payments
and/or revamping the remuneration scheme.
This area, along with service standards and enforcement, deserves serious
reassessment. Could the VWA achieve greater success in promoting scheme objectives at a
lower regulatory cost by increasing performance-based incentive payments? This would be
another way to enhance insurers' gains and incentives from better performance. Similar to the
current system, insurers could receive a minimum service fee for meeting minimum
performance standards and additional payments for exceeding these standards. The difference
would be that performance payments would comprise a greater portion of insurers' total
remuneration. Scheme cost savings could help to fund incentive payments. Economic analysis
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could be employed to determine the optimal incentive payment system. Such a system would
require close attention to refined outcome measures to minimise biases and incentive
incompatibility.
The outcomes that could be measured and rewarded could include (1) minimising
claims, legal and administrative costs; (2) paying the benefits required by statute on a timely
basis; (3) timely remission of funds to the VWA; (4) returning injured workers to productive
employment; and (5) any other outcome that the government seeks that is not encompassed in
the first four. These outcomes are subject to objective if not perfect measurement. While any
performance measurement and reward system will necessarily be imprecise, the VWA could
redirect its regulatory resources to developing and monitoring cost-effective measures and
incentive payments. To optimise performance, the outcome measures would need to encompass
any objective that the government perceives to be important and that insurers would be inclined
to ignore or diminish if not rewarded. Hence, the system would have to establish an
appropriate balance between incentives to contain costs and pay benefits so that workers would
get no more or no less than what they were entitled to.
Monitoring and Statistical Reporting
The Authority's database gives it a distinct advantage in performing various analyses
necessary for proper pricing and analysing cost drivers. The VWA can conduct statistical
analyses using unit transaction data for the entire system. Hence, the database provides
maximum credibility and flexibility that considerably exceeds what any insurer can perform
with its own data. This includes valuation of individual case reserves that can be estimated with
a high degree of accuracy. On the whole, it appears that VWA prospective loss cost estimates
have proven to be relatively accurate relative to actual experience (aside from the criticisms
about the need to manipulate F factors). The VWA also has been able to set adequate rates
which have quickly restored it to full funding since the implementation of WorkCover.
The tie between the detailed transaction information extracted from the ACCtion system
and the VWA's database significantly contributes to the flexibility, content, accuracy and
timeliness of the VWA analysis. VWA can turn around loss cost estimates and premium
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calculation within weeks after the end of injury year. This far exceeds the capabilities of
workers' compensation authorities in most other states in Australia or in the U.S.A. However
the VWA believes that the ACCtion system is becoming outdated and needs to be replaced or
turned over to insurers to develop their own systems. The high cost of replacing the ACCtion
system is obviously a significant motivation to delegate this function back to insurers.
Some insurers also express a preference to use their own systems which are tailored to
their specific needs and other information systems. Understandably, these tend to be larger
insurers with stronger information systems departments within their company structure. They
do not hide the fact that they perceive requiring insurers to develop their own systems will
serve as an entry barrier that will help to cull the market of marginal players. Other insurers
express concerns about the cost and their ability to develop their own systems.
Most insurers, regardless of their views on whether there should be a common system,
indicate that the current system is not well suited to their needs to extract information to serve
their clients. Indeed, some insurers' disproportionate demands on the ACCtion database has
been a source of contention and compelled the VWA to attempt to restrict excessive use of the
database. This further frustrates insurers, who believe they are unfairly criticised for not doing
more analysis to help their clients better manage risk and claims. Developing a cost-effective
solution to this dilemma which will serve both regulators and insurers is one of the biggest
challenges facing Victoria.
Self-Insurance
As noted above, Victoria's requirements for self-insurance are relatively stringent and
few employers are self-insured. There is considerable interest in easing restrictions on selfinsurance and self-administration. Self-insureds tend to improve their experience although this,
in part, may reflect a selection bias. Other perceived advantages are self-insureds' increased
control over claims management, ability to consider other human resource issues involved with
claims, and the involvement of various levels of management in cost containment efforts. The
VWA is interested in opening the process to encourage the 250 largest employers to move
towards self-insurance. It is envisioned that self-insureds would still need to satisfy stringent
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but more flexible capital requirements and demonstrate that they have achieved an initial level
of performance based on health and safety measurements.
There are several ways to make self-insurance easier. The Boston Consulting Group has
recommended liberalising the capital requirement using some form of a point scoring model.
Allowing insurers to increase their deductible or level of retention could be another approach
to increasing self-insurance. The Boston Consulting Group also has suggested raising the
variable excess limit from 10 days to 26 weeks as another way to allow employers to retain
more risk. Victoria already has the highest limit in Australia, as the other states typically have
5-day limits. The current 10-day variable excess provision could be adjusted to anywhere from
1 month to 1 year, depending on the size of the employer and other considerations. Selfadministration also could be expanded by easing its requirements. The VWA believes that it
will be necessary to perform an actuarial analysis of expanding self-administration to establish
the correct incentives. Self-administrators will have to demonstrate that they are financially
viable and employ a full-time WorkCover administrator.
There are some concerns with respect to increased use of self-insurance, such as
employers suppressing claims and adverse selection. The cross-subsidy to small employers
would have to be resolved to avoid excessive adverse selection. In the U.S.A., cross-subsidies
and other factors have helped to push approximately 30 to 40 percent of the workers'
compensation insurance market into self-insurance. But it is very important that an employer
choose self-insurance because of its underlying efficiency, not as a way to avoid the payment
of cross subsidies or administrative cost levies.
The VWA might consider allowing group self-insurance. Self-insurance is not viable
for small employers unless they participate hi a group plan. The VWA has not favored group
self-insurance because risk is shared among group members and, hence, diminishes a
participating employer's incentive to reduce risk. However, requirements for group selfinsurance can be structured in such a way that participants can still gain some efficiencies
without abusing the system to avoid paying their fair share of costs. Group self-insurance can
be limited to employers in a common industry or trade association, where members of the
group can combine efforts to address similar safety and claims management problems. A group
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also can exercise peer pressure on its members to contain costs, particularly if it can charge
risk-based premiums and exclude employers that fail to meet the group's standards. Group
self-insurance would expand options for small- and medium-sized employers and increase their
bargaining power with insurers.
The prohibition against the use of third-party administrators by self-insureds also might
be reconsidered. The VWA has noted that one of the barriers to self-insurance is that
employers do not view this as one of their core competencies. However, access to a third-party
administrator would allow a self-insured employer to outsource claim administration if that is
more efficient while maintaining a strong incentive to prevent losses and return injured
workers to productive employment.
Communications with Insurers
Poor communications with regulators ranks near the top of insurers' concerns with the
current regulatory scheme. Insurers loudly complain that regulators do not communicate with
them openly and respectfully as equal partners in the WorkCover scheme. Insurers contend
that the VWA's communication structure fails to support the close working relationship that it
purports to. Many VWA staff appear to have a different perception and do not believe
insurers' criticisms are justified. These different perspectives must be reconciled if the VWA is
to forge a more constructive and positive relationship with insurers.
This problem might be addressed through facilitated sessions in which both sides can
freely express their views. Understanding the other person's side is the first step to agreeing on
measures that will address the problem. The current advisory committee structure also might
be strengthened to increase the VWA's accountability to insurers. The advisory committee
could receive periodic reports and briefings and be notified of any significant developments or
issues that the VWA was considering. The VWA could establish a policy of formally
responding to questions, complaints and recommendations of the advisory committee and
providing support for any response.

4-48

Employer Information
The WorkCover regulatory scheme relies on employer choice to induce insurers to
control claim costs and provide good service. Competition among insurers to secure
employers' business is intended to counteract some of the perverse incentives implicit in the
principal-agent relationship between the VWA and insurers. If employer choice is to play this
role, employers must have the incentive and the necessary information to purchase services
from better performing insurers. It is intended that the experience rating aspect of the pricing
formula provide the proper employer incentives. Yet, it has been observed that employer
movement among insurers is limited, and insurers that score relatively low on the VWA's
performance benchmarks still write a significant amount of business. Some of this may be due
to imperfections hi performance measurement, but a lack of information on the part of
employers with respect to insurers' performance and its impact on their costs also could be a
contributing factor.
Providing information to employers is a critical component of the WorkCover
regulatory scheme. This information can take two forms. One is general education on how to
shop for an insurer and lower workers' compensation costs. This approach focuses on key
areas and disseminates high-level information to all employers, as well as more detailed
information on request. The other type of information is the publication of performance
statistics for individual insurers. The VWA is working on a prototype report for this purpose.
The objective is to help employers identify insurers who offer better service, and it could
ultimately help to lower employers' premiums by improving their experience.
Insurers are understandably concerned about the accuracy of such a report, but it has
the potential to attract employers to insurers with good performance records and increase
competition. The key is whether the report helps to better inform employers about insurers'
performance, or provides misinformation or is misunderstood by employers and encourages
movement to insurers who are not good performers in reality. The development of accurate
performance measures and useful explanatory materials will be essential to the success of this
effort. The VWA should be prepared to enhance the service performance data available to
employers and take other steps to improve employers' information and understanding of the
4-49

implications of their choices. The VWA's communications strategy includes a number of
promising initiatives, particularly the Best Practices program which is targeted at industries
with notoriously poor safety records, such as road transport.
There is an issue with respect to the relative roles of the VWA and insurers for
informing employers. In theory, the public sector has an interest in disseminating information
that promotes public goals, that it can provide most efficiently, and/or that would not be
adequately supplied by private entities. Generally, the VWA's information products seem to
meet at least one of these criteria. One service that might fall into a gray area is the
development of individual employers' claims experience reports for feedback and peer
comparisons. Ideally, this is something that insurers would prepare as part of their services and
promotion to employers. However, many insurers appear to lack the ability to prepare such
reports and since the VWA is the ultimate risk bearer, it has an interest in encouraging
employers to reduce losses. Improvements in insurers' access to employers' claims data and
greater competition for employers' business could facilitate shifting this task to insurers.
Other Regulatory Tools
The VWA has employed other administrative and regulatory devices to promote scheme
objectives. For example, under the Work Incentive Scheme for Employers (WISE) program,
the VWA agrees to pay half the salary of long-term claimants for 6 months to employers who
hire them. So far the program has had 172 placements. The VWA is developing a register of
interested employers to expand the program. Senior management would like to use WISE to
target the 3,000 "direct payees," claimants whose employers are no longer in business. There
is a proposal to pay insurers an incentive of $1,000 if they are able to return the claimants to
work.
Innovative programs like this can be valuable in a mixed system where private financial
incentives may be insufficient to encourage insurers and employers to achieve scheme returnto-work objectives. Such programs may need to be reevaluated in the context of privatisation
efforts which may or may not serve the same objectives.
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Private Choice and Regulation
Another option for Victoria is delegating more insurance functions to the private sector
This has been a subject of considerable debate and great uncertainty. When WorkCover was
first implemented, it was contemplated to be a transitional system that would eventually evolve
into a largely privatised system. That plan is apparently being reconsidered in light of the
concerns of employers and workers that such a change would not be in their best interests and
might reverse some of the gains that have been made. This report is not intended to analyse or
resolve the issues surrounding privatisation but it is useful to offer some observations on how
some privatisation options might affect and possibly ease the principal-agent problem faced by
theVWA.
Privatisation is not an either/or proposition hi the Victorian context, but rather a matter
of degree. Although full-scale privatisation is one of the options that have been proposed, less
comprehensive measures also have received considerable discussion. Victoria is evaluating the
degree of private choice and the significance of private incentives in promoting scheme
performance. Many believe that the VWA has obtained the most it can get from an agency
arrangement. Insurers do not have their money at risk, which diminishes their incentives to
contain costs and serve the global objectives of the scheme. Modifying incentives and
balancing regulatory mandates and private choice in a mixed system to achieve optimal
performance raises a number of difficult issues that will have to be resolved. For example, if
insurers bear more risk, then their ability to exercise underwriting judgment and pricing
flexibility and the resulting implications for the availability of insurance coverage would have
to be addressed.
Full Privatisation
The most radical proposal that has been put on the table is to return Victoria to a
private market system with limited regulatory oversight. This would entail having insurers
assume underwriting risk as well as the responsibility for setting prices and managing
investments. Prices could be regulated in some fashion, but privatisation proponents express
different opinions on how this should be handled. One approach would be to enforce, at least
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initially, uniform rates established by the VWA and/or a rating organisation with limited
opportunities for deviations. Constraints on insurers' pricing discretion could be eased over
time as insurers gain experience with the new system and its performance can be evaluated.
Insurers' rates could be subject to prior regulatory approval before they go into effect
or some form of file and write or write and file system, which would rely more heavily on
market forces to regulate rates. These approaches are often characterised as "competitive
rating" systems but this term is used differently by different people. In reality, the type of
approval process has less to do with competition than the extent to which regulators rely on
market forces. 10 In this discussion, the term competitive rating is used to characterise systems
where regulators essentially let the market set prices and only intervene if they perceive that
competition is lacking. Under a competitive rating system, advisory organisations might still
develop "advisory" rates or loss costs which insurers might reference in determining their
specific price structures.
Depending on one's perspective, full privatisation and competition could effectively
eliminate much of the principal-agent problem faced by the VWA. In theory, with full pricing
flexibility, employer choice and competition should regulate insurers' performance in
controlling costs. More efficient insurers could offer lower prices to employers who
demonstrated a commitment to loss prevention and effective claims management. The
regulatory function could be limited to policing insurers' financial soundness and compliance
with the requirements of the workers' compensation law and insurance contracts. The VWA
also could increase the information provided to stakeholders to enhance the effectiveness of
private choice.
However, the experience with the private system in place prior to WorkCare has
produced a healthy skepticism among many employers, workers and regulators with respect to

10 To illustrate, prior approval does not necessarily mean that regulators disapprove or require
modifications to rates. This policy effectively lets the market set prices. Conversely, under file and write or write
and file systems, regulators may frequently disapprove rates retroactively or threaten to do so if filed rates do not
conform to certain parameters. Under this policy, regulators effectively interfere with market forces and do not
rely solely on competition to govern prices.

4-52

whether such a system would follow the theoretical model. Cyclical movements in the supply
of workers' compensation insurance are common in private markets, as is price discrimination
between small and large employers. Regulatory measures can be employed to mitigate these
problems but to some extent they are unavoidable aspects of private markets where information
is constrained and buyers differ in their bargaining power. While full privatisation would
reduce the costs of regulation and compliance, it is unclear whether it would improve scheme
performance in terms of cost containment and assisting injured workers.
Altering the Reinsurance Arrangement
An alternative or complement to full privatisation would be to modify the reinsurance
arrangement between the VWA and authorised insurers to reduce the moral hazard problem
that arises with full reinsurance. The reinsurance arrangement could be structured more like
typical private reinsurance arrangements with retention levels, limits and pro-rata loss sharing
so that ceding insurers bear some risk and have an increased incentive to control loss costs. If
the VWA continues to set the premium rate, it would need to determine the amount of
premiums that an insurer would be allowed to retain to cover their increased risk and share of
losses. If insurers were to set prices, then the VWA would need to determine the price of the
reinsurance that it would provide to insurers. This would allow insurers to earn greater profits
in return for accepting more risk.
This approach would raise issues with respect to insurer solvency and their ability to
meet obligations to claimants and the VWA that would have to be addressed. If the government
were to continue to guaranty the payment of an insurer's loss obligations in the event of its
insolvency, the reduction of the moral hazard problem and the enhancement of private
incentives would be diminished. It would be better to require an insurer to maintain adequate
reserves to cover its net claims obligations and possibly require it to bolster its liquidity
through devices such as surplus notes to cushion unexpected increases in claims obligations.
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Capitated Payments to Insurers
A third option would be to borrow the concept of capitated payments from health
insurance managed care and apply it to workers' compensation. Under a capitated payment
system, insurers would retain the obligation to pay benefits to injured workers and would
receive a pre-determined payment to cover a given risk based on the risk's characteristics and
expected losses. If actual claims payments are less than the capitated payment, then the insurer
would pocket the difference as profit. If actual claims payments exceed the capitated payment,
then the insurer would bear the loss.
The primary advantage of this system is that it would maximise an insurer's incentive to
control costs through loss prevention and effective case management. At the same time, it
would impose all of the risk on insurers and increase their incentive to avoid paying benefits to
injured workers. This tendency would have to be controlled through monitoring and regulation
of insurers' compliance with statutory requirements and possibly additional incentive payments
to promote scheme outcomes other than cost containment. This might or might not be more
cost-effective than the current regulatory system. In addition, insurers would find this less
desirable than setting their own premiums.
Increasing Pricing Flexibility
The current system requires insurers to charge a uniform rate to force competition on
service. In practice, insurers have circumvented this restriction, to some extent, through "inkind" services to employers. Many regulators hold the view that unfettered price competition
would result in excessive price cutting to secure employers' business at the expense of quality
of service. However, it also is recognised that employers' incentives to switch to more efficient
insurers are diminished because employers do not gain a greater immediate reduction hi their
premium costs. Another approach would be to allow insurers to negotiate premium reductions
with employers subject to employers' commitments to take steps to reduce their risks.
Experience-based dividends to insureds or alternative forms of employer risk sharing (e.g.,
large deductibles, retrospective rating plans, and other discounts) also might be permitted, as
in the U.S.A.
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These devices could enhance insurers' and employers' incentives to control costs, but
they also would impose greater downward pressure on the payment of statutory benefits to
injured workers. Any change such as this might be implemented slowly over time to help
ensure that insurers' analytical capabilities are commensurate with the pricing flexibility that
they would be allowed and that adverse effects on workers would be prevented through other
performance controls and incentives.
Unbundling and Opening the Market for Insurance Services
Under the present system, a select group of insurers are authorised and required to
provide a full set of insurance services to employers and workers. An alternative approach
would be to allow different providers (including insurers) to offer various packages of
insurance services. For example, an employer could elect to purchase basic workers'
compensation insurance services from an insurer for short-term injuries and claims but
purchase management of long-term cases and rehabilitation services from another provider.
Self-insureds might purchase certain claims administration services from insurers or other
third-party administrators. This would allow providers to specialise in what they do best, with
resulting improvements in service efficiency and effectiveness.
Competitive State Fund
The public sector relinquished the role of being a direct provider of workers'
compensation insurance services which it performed for a time under WorkCare. However,
Victoria could explore the possibility of establishing a separate state workers' compensation
fund that would compete with private insurers. In the U.S.A., where about one-third of the
states maintain such funds, some have been very successful, while others have performed
badly. The primary reason for establishing a state fund is to provide a source of insurance to
employers rejected by the voluntary market, e.g., small employers. A second objective has
been to increase competitive pressure on private insurers. State funds have performed best
when their pricing and underwriting is not subject to political manipulation and they specialise
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in serving market niches, such as small retail establishments, that have been eschewed by the
voluntary market.
The current WorkCover regulatory scheme does not require a residual market function
but there may still be advantages to a properly-structured competitive state fund. Such an entity
could be chartered to prioritise the objectives of WorkCover and demonstrate the best practices
in loss prevention, claims management and rehabilitation. It could test the view held by some
that it is economically feasible to improve upon insurers' current service performance. Its
mission also could include serving any group of employers that is not well served by private
insurers. To avoid political manipulation, a state fund should be separate from the government
and managed according to sound business principles by a board of directors representing
employers, labour and the general public. To maintain a level playing field, it should be
subject to the same level of taxes and assessments as would any mutual insurance company.
Concluding Observations
Victoria's workers' compensation scheme has come a long way in improving the
efficiency and quality of the insurance services provided to employers and workers. At issue,
is whether it can achieve further significant improvement, either by refining its current
regulatory tools or making more fundamental structural changes. It is possible, but perhaps
unlikely, that fine-tuning the VWA's regulatory tools will make much of a difference. If
insurers' incentives and constraints stay essentially unchanged, one would expect their
performance to remain the same. Some insurers may continue to learn how to serve their
clients better, but they are unlikely to make considerable investments in innovation and
improving service with the limited profits offered by WorkCover under the present system.
Indeed, performance may deteriorate if insurers have been basing business decisions on
expectations about the future that will not be realised.
The expected outcomes of more fundamental changes to WorkCover regulation or
increasing the role of the private sector are uncertain but at least deserve exploration. It is
possible that the VWA could achieve equivalent if not better performance, at a lower
regulatory cost, by increasing its emphasis on performance- or outcome-based incentive
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payments rather than strengthening its enforcement of conduct standards. Additionally, there
are a number of ways to enable private choice to play a greater role in increasing the efficiency
and equity of system outcomes, when the costs and benefits of market decisions can be
properly aligned. Of course, policy makers will need to consider the effect of alternative
market and regulatory arrangements on the tradeoffs between cost containment and other
scheme objectives. Victoria should explore these options with an open mind and clear eye in
determining the future course of workers' compensation.
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Table 4.1 Premiums and Reimbursements ($M), FY 1986-1996

Fiscal Year

Total
Premiums

Total Claims
Payments*

Total Operating
Costs

Total Costs/
Premiums (%)

1986/87

586.8

332.6

79.9

70.3%

1987/88

705.9

537.7

103.7

90.9%

1988/89

795.1

715.4

181.5

112.8%

1989/90

1170.8

694.4

181.5

74.8%

1990/91

1261.3

749.2

185.6

74.1%

1991/92

1129.2

909.5

183.6

96.8%

1992/93

1127.8

1049.6

173.7

108.5%

1993/94

838.6

622.7

165.7

94.0%

1994/95

889.2

602.8

161.1

85.9%

1995/96

883.4

724.0

173.6

101.6%

* Claims expenses minus claims recoveries.
Source: VWA
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Table 4.2 Market Concentration, FY 1993-1996

Fiscal Year

No. of
Insurers

CR4*

HHI**

1992/93

8

73.6

1,618

1993/94

17

68.0

1,476

1994/95

16

64.2

1,321

1995/96

14

67.3

1,374

13.8

68.3

I Ml

Annual Avg.

* Combined market share of top four insurers.
** Sum of squared market shares of all insurers.
Source: VWA
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Table 4.3 Insurer Market Share Trends (% Premiums),
FY 1993-1996

Insurer
AIG
AMP
CATH
Hffl
CIC
HEATH
CU
FAI
GUILD.
GIO
MERC
MMI
NZI
QBE
SUN ROYAL
VACC
ZURICH

1996

1994

1995
—

2.4%
0.6%
17.4%
«
—
2.0%
8.7%
0.1%
14.3%
4.9%
23.6%
6.9%
12.0%
2.8%
2.2%
2.2%

1993

0.8%
2.0%
0.7%
—

0.6%
1.7%
0.6%
—

0.1%
1.1%
0.5%
—

13.5%
6.0%
1.7%
8.1%
0.1%
15.1%
4.3%
25.0%
6.7%
10.7%
1.9%
1.9%
1.7%

15.9%
5.7%
1.2%
7.4%
0.1%
14.4%
4.2%
27.7%
6.3%
10.1%
1.4%
1.6%
1.1%

19.9%
3.2%
1.0%
7.7%
0.1%
16.8%
4.4%
26.5%
6.2%
10.5%
0.4%
1.1%
0.5%

Source: VWA
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Table 4.4 Market Entries and Exits, FY 1986-1996
Financial Year

i
ON

No. of Insurers

No. of Entries

No. of Exits

1986/87

9

0

0

1987/88

7

2

4

1988/89

7

0

0

1989/90

5

0

2

1990/91

5

0

0

1991/92

6

1

0

1992/93

8

2

1

1993/94

17

9

0

1994/95

16

0

0

1995/96

14

0

2

Source: VWA

Table 4.5 Premiums in Relation to Remuneration, FY 1986-1996

Fiscal Premiums
($M)
Year

Remuneration
($M)

Premiums/
Remuneration

Claims
Published Payments/
Rate
Premiums

1985/86

478.2

20,830.6

2.30%

2.20%

13.1%

1986/87

707.9

27,049.7

2.62%

2.40%

47.1%

1997/88

735.3

30,878.9

2.38%

2.40%

71.5%

1988/89

828.4

34,839.5

2.38%

2.40%

85.7%

1989/90

1,208.2

38,070.3

3.17%

3.30%

62.9%

1990/91

1,298.7

37,941.9

3.42%

3.30%

66.5%

1991/92

1,141.2

37,598.0

3.04%

3.30%

90.3%

1992/93

1,100.0

37,960.1

2.90%

3.00%

101.8%

1993/94

838.6

39,637.2

2.12%

2.25%

83.8%

1994/95

889.3

42,759.0

2.08%

2.25%

77.2%

1995/96

883.4

45,026.5

1.96%

1.98%

82.2%

Source: VWA
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Table 4.6 Scheme Financial Performance, FY 1986-1996
As Percentage of Premium Revenue
Financial
Year

I

ON
CJ

Premium
Revenue

Claims
Expense

Underwriting
Expenses

Underwriting
Result

Investment
Revenue

General
Admin.
Expenses

Profit/Loss
Before
Abnormals

Profit/Loss
After
Abnormals

1985/86

$457.5

14.2%

4.7%

-35.8%

3.0%

6.9%

-39.7%

-39.7%

1986/87

$586.8

56.7%

5.7%

-263.2%

25.0%

7.9%

-243.8%

-241.0%

1987/88

$705.9

76.2%

3.8%

-39.5%

-10.6%

10.9%

-60.8%

-60.8%

1988/89

$795.1

90.0%

6.3%

-266.0%

8.4%

16.6%

-273.9%

-273.9%

1989/90

$1,170.8

59.3%

5.4%

149.1%

7.0%

10.1%

145.8%

145.8%

1990/91

$1,261.3

59.4%

4.8%

50.5%

11.5%

9.9%

52.1%

52.1%

1991/92

$1,129.2

80.5%

-16.5%

17.0%

10.5%

-10.0%

-3.8%

1992/93

$1,127.8

93.1%

5.7%
n.a.

19.4%

15.4%

129.6%

129.6%

1993/94

$838.6

74.3%

8.4%

17.6%

11.5%

11.4%

18.6%

13.7%

1994/95

$889.2

67.8%

8.0%

-6.1%

24.2%

10.1%

8.4%

39.7%

1995/96

$883.4

82.0%

8.7%

-32.0%

32.4%

11.0%

-10.3%

-1.9%

Annual Avg.

$895.1

68.5%

5.6%

-28.8%

13.5%

11.0%

-25.8%

-21.8%

125.6%

Table 4.7 Insurer Income, Report Year 1995
As Percentage of Premium Revenues

Insurer

Premium
Revenue
($, 000)

Claims
Expense

Underwriting Underwriting
Expenses
Result

Investment
Revenue

General
Admin.
Expenses

Profit/Loss
Before Tax

Profit/Loss
After Tax

AIG

3,635

123.6

0.9

-7.6

2.1

0.7

-6.1

-6.1

AMP

13,562

113.7

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.4

CATH

73,066

0.6
-7.4

11.1

0.1

0.0

0.0
-0.4

0.0
-0.4

7.4

0.1

4.7

2.8

2.8

CIC

144,336

57.9
-8.5

CU

14,463

30.3

47.7

21.0

11.5

0.0

32.5

20.0

FAI

79,955

156.5

0.0

0.6

6.9

1.5

1.0

GUILD

37,795

67.5

18.7

0.0
-1.3

7.2

3.5

GIO

118,561

79.1

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

2.3
-0.5

1.7
-0.3

HIM

36,304

55.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

13,738

98.3

-40.3

0.3
-5.7

0.3

MERC

0.0
-3.2

5.5

MMI

232,093

51.9

0.0

0.0

-4.4

4.0

-51.5
-6.7

-34.2
-5.5

NZI

58,304

162.4

0.0

0.0

8.9

7.8

1.1

0.7

QBE

102,285

132.9

0.0

0.1

0.1

255.8

9.3

0.1
-0.7

0.0

8,787

0.0
-9.3

0.0

166,088

74.6

24.9

2.1

-3.9

5.3

8.7
-7.1

9.3
-4.0

ZURICH

10,131

180.8

0.0

0.0

7.4

7.4

0.0

0.0

Median

48,050

88.7

0.0

0.0

0.2

2.1

0.0

0.0

SUN ROYAL
VACC

Source: ISC

Table 4.8 Insurer Service Performance, First Quarter 1996

Insurer

Premium
Collection (%)

Claim Duration
104 Weeks (%)

Disputes (%)

Claim Cost Ratio
(%)

Timeliness (%)*

Time Loss (%)**

Case Reserve
Accuracy (%)
1993/94 Claims

Medical Panel
Delays (%)

AIG

99.2

37.5

13.0

52.8

0.0

49.5

72

50.0

AMP

97.1

26.5

18.2

50.9

0.0

47.1

117

36.4

CATH

100.0

37.1

10.6

47.5

50.0

54.2

136

100.0

CU

98.6

26.5

11.4

54.0

33.3

51.0

81

60.0

FAI

99.1

54.3

16.1

60.6

28.0

45.4

68

54.1

GUILD

95.9

12.5

42.1

31.9

0.0

45.5

660

100.0

GIO

95.4

31.9

16.3

57.2

19.2

52.4

101

91.0

HIH

98.4

45.0

18.2

53.4

25.0

51.9

67

61.5

MERC

96.8

35.7

12.7

67.7

8.3

49.7

128

77.4

MMI

99.4

41.6

15.8

48.5

20.0

50.1

139

69.3

NZI

97.6

46.5

14.6

57.7

11.1

50.3

124

81.5

QBE

96.3

35.2

15.9

58.1

17.7

47.9

129

34.8

SUN ROYAL

96.4

31.7

15.4

54.0

0.0

47.0

95

42.9

VACC

97.9

26.7

10.1

60.4

57.1

48.9

77

83.3

ZURICH

97.1

18.1

13.8

62.6

0.0

56.7

98

78.6

17.7

49.7

101

69.3

35.2
97.6
15.4
Median
54
Note: These performance measures are based on definitions used in VWA statistical reports.

* Cases not classified after 104 weeks plus cases classified after 520 days.
** Number of weekly payments in last 3 months.
Source: VWA Authorised Insurer Performance Table

Table 4.9 Insurer Assets and Liabilities ($, OOOs), 1995

Insurer

Assets

Liabilities

Net
Assets

Assets/
Net Assets

•——————
Liabilities/
_ Net Assets

AIG

17,773

16,271

1,502

1183.3%

1083.3%

AMP

37,531

35,531

2,000

1876.6%

1776.6%

CATH

175,105

126,106

48,999

357.4%

257.4%

CU

33,715

31,648

2,067

1631.1%

1531.1%

FAI

329,614

4,748

324,866

101.5%

1.5%

59,883

46,757

13,126

456.2%

356.2%

GIO

310,100

307,418

2,682

11562.3%

11462.3%

HEATH

182,100

180,100

2,000

9105.0%

9005.0%

MERC

168,633

73,460

95,173

177.2%

77.2%

MMI

575,965

573,198

2,767

20815.5%

20715.5%

NZI

244,122

241,340

2,782

8775.1%

8675.1%

QBE

280,277

278,124

2,153

13018.0%

12918.0%

SUN ROYAL

41,534

38,706

2,828

1468.7%

1368.7%

VACC

32,566

30,306

2,260

1441.0%

1341.0%

ZURICH

35,604

33,604

2,000

1780.2%

1680.2%

168,633

46,757

2,682

1631.1%

1531.1%

GUILD

Median
Source: ISC
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Figure 4.1
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Figure 4.2

Workers' Compensation Premium Calculation
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Figure 4.3

Structure - Conduct - Performance Framework
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Source: Scherer and Ross (1990)
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Chapter 5
BENEFITS

Chapter 5 BENEFITS
A worker is entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 if
there is an injury arising out of or in the course of employment and if the worker's
employment was a significant contributing factor. A worker's dependents are entitled to
compensation if an injury arising out of or in the course of employment was a significant
contributing factor, results in, or materially contributes to the death of the worker.
The language in this statute parallels that found in many other jurisdictions, in so far as
aarising out of and " in the course of employment" are utilised. Some jurisdictions connect
these phrases with "and" rather than "or," but the treatment of the terms in practice suggests
that this difference is somewhat academic. The requirement that the worker's employment was
aa significant contributing factor" is not commonly attached to entitlement language hi
workers' compensation statutes. Still, the compensation agencies and courts that apply such
laws may often interpret the law as if such a clause was present. However, hi jurisdictions that
have tended to be somewhat restrictive in their legislation regarding eligibility for benefits, the
courts have tended to widen it. The phenomenon has been observed in Australia: "The
Commission found that there has been a tendency for legislators to limit what qualifies as a
compensable injury or illness, while judicial interpretation has tended to expand coverage." 1
Benefits hi Victoria are similar to those found hi most industrialised jurisdictions.
Injured workers may be entitled to medical and like benefits as well as cash benefits paid in
weekly or lump sum form for temporary or permanent disabilities. An entitlement exists also
for occupational rehabilitation benefits, a subject reserved for discussion in Chapter 7.

'Industry Commission, Workers' Compensation in Australia, Report No. 36, 4 February 1994, p. 99.
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Medical Benefits
As in most jurisdictions, medical and like benefits (these include the various health care
providers as well as hospitalization, pharmaceutical, and prosthetic appliances) are provided
under the workers' compensation program. There can be an advantage to a worker to have
medical benefits provided under this program, rather than by the Commonwealth health
program. First, certain benefits are available to the worker at no charge only if it is a
compensable work injury, e.g., physiotherapy. Second, under the workers' compensation
program, and unlike the Commonwealth health plan, the law precludes action against a worker
for the payment of balances charged by providers for medical services.
However, "agreements" between workers and providers for the payment of balances do
occur. Employers have been known to pay balance bills as well.2 The medical provider may
also prefer that the treatment or service is paid for under WorkCover as the insurance fee for
the service is likely to be greater. All this suggests that some incentives exist for cost shifting
to occur on the part of the worker or the provider. An employer on the other hand may have an
incentive to shift the medical costs to the Commonwealth scheme so as to avoid having its
experience affected for WorkCover insurance rating purposes.
Initiating Benefits
A worker may receive medical and like services from the provider of the worker's
choice (this does not include occupational rehabilitation services). The employer is responsible
to pay the first $416 of these services, with any costs above this the responsibility of the
insurer. (This maximum, which is indexed, was applicable from 1 July 1996.)
An injured employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee must give notice of
the injury to the employer as soon as practicable. Until proper notice has been given to the
employer, there is not an entitlement to compensation. A claim for compensation for weekly
benefits must be served as soon as practicable, for death benefits within 2 years after the date

2Balance billing occurs where the service provider bills the recipient of the service or the employer for
any unpaid balance, should the insurer pay less than the amount invoiced.
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of death, and for medical and like services within 6 months after the date of the service. All of
these time thresholds can be waived or extended for cause. A claim for weekly benefits must
be accompanied by a certificate issued by a medical practitioner, though a worker without such
a certificate may ask that the County Court consider his/her entitlement to compensation.
In a claim for weekly payments, the employer must accept or reject the claim within 10
days of its receipt. The employer must forward to the insurer any claim for benefits for death,
maims, or for medical and like services within 10 days of receipt of the claim. Claims for
weekly benefits need to be forwarded to the insurer where either the employer rejects the claim
or the claim is likely to exceed the employer's responsibility of $416.
The initial medical certificate which accompanies the claim is issued for up to 14 days.
In exceptional cases where the injury is obviously very severe, e.g., spinal cord injuries, heart
attacks, etc., the initial certificate can be applicable for more than 14 days. For weekly benefits
beyond this initial 14-day period, a continuing certificate of capacity must be issued, for a
period of up to 28 days. Unlike the initial certificate, which can be issued only by a medical
doctor, the continuing certificate can also be issued by a registered physiotherapist,
chiropractor or osteopath. A certificate of capacity can relate only to a period of time no more
than 90 days from the date of the certificate.
An employer's decision to accept or reject a claim does not prejudice the insurer's
decision as to liability. The insurer has 28 days from the date of receipt of the claim to accept
or reject the claim and to give the worker written notice of the decision. If no written notice is
given within that time the claim is deemed to be accepted. Reasons for a decision to reject the
claim must be given. If the insurer accepts the claim, or if it is deemed accepted by the
insurer's non-response within 28 days, the decision is binding upon the employer for purposes
of its liability to pay medical and weekly benefits. No time limit is provided for the insurer to
accept or reject medical benefits only claims. A rejection of such a claim (Section 99), if
disputed by a claimant, must be taken to conciliation and if not resolved at that level, to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, (see Chapter 6)
The data in Table 5.1 are based on the number of claims reported hi each year for the
past 10 years. These are so-called "Standard Claims," that is, they have been standardised to
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take account of changes that have occurred in the law. Standard claims exclude journey claims
(no longer compensable for injuries after 1 December 1992), and non-fatal closed claims with
up to 10 days compensation and medical and like payments below the threshold (in July 1993
the employer became liable for up to the first 10 days of weekly benefits; prior to that the
employer was responsible to pay only up to the first 5 days of incapacity). Note that these
claims are not as of the year of injury, but as of the date reported.
The data in Table 5.1 reflect the substantial decline in claims reported over the past
decade. The drop is especially evident beginning in 1992/93. Several factors contributed to this
decline. First, certain types of claims were no longer compensable for injuries after 1
December 1992. (Of course, this includes journey claims, but the data in the table have
standardised for this.) Certain claims for stress-induced injuries related to personnel activities,
for example, ceased to be compensable. Additionally, the threshold for compensability was
raised by requiring that employment be a "significant contributing factor" to the injury. A
more intangible factor was the widely held perception that workers' compensation claims
would be harder to obtain under the new regime. To the degree that this attitude caused some
marginal claims not to be made, the new law was a factor in the decline, regardless of whether
the entitlement was actually changed.
Weekly Benefits
An injured worker entitled to weekly compensation under WorkCover will receive a
benefit that is tied to his/her pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). The PIAWE is the
worker's average weekly earnings for the previous 12 months if employed continuously by that
employer. It is calculated at the worker's ordinary time rate of pay for the worker's normal
number of hours per week. Organised labour representatives object to the fact that allowances
such as overtime payments, shift differentials, hazard duty allowances or dirt money are not
included in considering the injured worker's PIAWE. Workers employed less than 12 months
with the injury employer have their PIAWE calculated based on the lesser period, while
workers with less than 4 weeks in the job have their PIAWE calculated based on deemed
earnings. All weekly benefit payments are treated as ordinary taxable income.
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Weekly benefits are paid according to three distinct phases, i.e., the first 26 weeks of
incapacity, after 26 weeks of incapacity, and after 104 weeks in which a weekly benefit has
been paid or is payable to the worker. During the first 26 weeks of incapacity, the worker is
entitled to the lesser of 95 percent of his/her PIAWE or the weekly maximum benefit ($664 per
week as of 1/7/96). Cash benefits for the first 10 days of incapacity are the responsibility of
the employer, and not of the insurer. Though employers may select a "buy-out" option that
will insure them for the first 10 days of benefits, few employers choose to purchase it. It is the
practice in many industries for employers to "top-up" the benefit to 100 percent of pre-injury
earnings, at least for the first 26 weeks.
If the worker is partially incapacitated, s/he is entitled either to the difference between
$664 and the worker's earnings, or to the difference between 95 percent of the PIAWE and
earnings, whichever hi lesser. Earnings refer to current weekly earnings of the worker either
as a worker or as a self-employed individual. The concept legally also refers to what the
worker could earn in employment in his/her previous employment or in suitable employment
(notional earnings), but this basis for compensation is not currently being used.
After 26 weeks of incapacity, the wage replacement rate is lowered. This is in line with
the practice hi New South Wales, Queensland, the Northern Territory, and A.C.T. In
Tasmania, the initial compensation rate is lowered after 6 weeks and again at 25 weeks. The
Commonwealth and South Australia have rate reductions that occur at 45 weeks and 52 weeks
respectively. Though these rate drop-offs after specified periods are widespread across
Australia, they are not typical hi North America.
After 26 weeks of incapacity, a worker entitled to weekly benefits is likely to have a
reduction in those benefits. Essentially, the worker's benefits will be set according to one of
four possibilities:
(a) If the worker is found to have a "serious injury" (defined below), and the worker
has no current weekly earnings, the worker is entitled to $664/week or 90 percent
of the PIAWE, whichever is lower.
(b) If the worker is found to have a "serious injury" and the worker has some current
weekly earnings, the worker will receive the difference between 90 percent of the
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PIAWE and current weekly earnings or, if lower, the difference between $664 and
current weekly earnings.
(c) If the worker has no "serious injury" but is totally incapacitated, the worker
receives the lesser of $664 or 70 percent of the PIAWE.
(d) If the worker has no "serious injury" and is not totally incapacitated, the worker is
entitled either to the difference between 60 percent of the PIAWE and 60 percent
of current weekly earnings or the difference between $399 and 60 percent of
current weekly earnings, whichever is lower.
The cut in the wage replacement rate may have no effective impact on workers with a
very high PIAWE. For a worker with PIAWE of $948 or more, even with a reduction at 26
weeks from 95 percent to 70 percent, the worker's benefit would remain at the weekly
maximum $664. However, this worker would have experienced a lower rate of wage
replacement initially, since the maximum benefit of $664 is only 70 percent of his/her PIAWE.
The significant feature of Victoria's benefit scheme, and unique in Australia (or
elsewhere so far as we know) is to adjust the 26 weeks benefit according to whether or not the
worker is judged to have "serious injury." It means that a judgment needs to be made at this
stage regarding the degree of the worker's impairment. Obviously it can precipitate a
controversy between the insurer and the worker. This determination also will affect the
opportunity that may exist for the worker to seek a common law remedy. (This is discussed in
Chapter 6.) Though each of these considerations might discourage the use of the concept of
"serious injury" at the 26-week mark, there is an important reason for its use. Clearly, it is
meant to foster a significant incentive to return to work for those who might be able to do so
after 26 weeks, without placing that pressure excessively on persons with more significant
impairments.
The meaning of "serious injury" for purposes of adjusting the PIAWE replacement rate
at 26 weeks is found in the statute (Section 93B(5)). The "serious injury" threshold for
purposes of the 26-week rate adjustment is that the worker is judged to have an impairment
that is rated at 30 percent or more by the standard of the American Medical Association's
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (second edition).
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The "serious injury" decision for the 26-week determination is based solely on
impairment and not on any broader notion such as disability. The rating at 26 weeks is for
purposes of knowing whether the worker is impaired above or below the 30 percent level only.
It is not used, therefore, to determine the extent of the worker's permanent impairment or
disability level for the purpose of awarding some benefit for permanent disability. It is also
arguable whether the 26-week decision regarding "serious injury" was intended to be used for
purposes of allowing the worker access to the common law for the work injury. However, the
presence of a "serious injury" is a necessary condition for a worker to have access to the
common law remedy.
To clarify this issue, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the law was amended
hi 1996 so as to differentiate, explicitly, the 26-week determination of "serious injury," from
the subsequent determination made for the purpose of deciding eligibility to use the common
law remedy. The "serious injury" determination is also utilised for the purpose of deciding
whether or not weekly benefits can be paid beyond some maximum period established hi the
law for the receipt of such benefits. Again, the 26-week determination of "serious injury" is
not the basis, customarily, for that decision.
The weekly benefits rate determination at 26 weeks is the basis for any continuing
weekly benefits paid. However, the 1992 law provided that for injuries occurring on or after
1 December 1992, weekly benefits would be terminated after 104 weeks of incapacity, except
if either of two situations existed at that point. Weekly benefits would not be terminated
automatically at 104 weeks if the worker was either "seriously injured" or totally and
permanently incapacitated. The 104-week determination represents a very large target, that is,
a threshold with several very important implications for the parties. First, it may or may not
rule out the possibility of the worker being paid very long term benefits. Further, as observed
above, it determines whether or not the worker has access to the County Court for a common
law remedy.
Some persons have argued that the 104 weeks of incapacity created an unfair situation
for certain workers who had sought to return to work, possibly for modified duty or for limited
hours only. Where a worker had engaged in such activity, considered to be laudable and
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consistent with the spirit of the 1992 law, this time was considered to be within the period of
incapacity. As such, 104 weeks of incapacity might provide the diligent employee less than 104
weeks of compensation, since benefits would terminate according to the law. In 1996, this
concern was eliminated. As a result of the amendments enacted, weekly benefits are terminated
(save for the two exceptions noted above) after 104 weeks of compensation benefits have been
paid or an entitlement existed, and not based on 104 weeks of incapacity.
The 1992 legislation also provided limits on compensation for workers already
receiving weekly benefits on its effective date. For a worker who had received weekly benefits
for less than 52 weeks, the weekly benefit would be terminated after 104 weeks of incapacity,
including any period prior to the effective date of the law, unless found to be "seriously
injured" or totally and permanently incapacitated. For a worker who had received 52 weeks or
more of weekly benefits, the worker's entitlement would cease after 52 additional weeks of
incapacity, except if the worker had a "serious injury" or was totally and permanently
incapacitated. Needless to say, this guaranteed that there would be numerous disputes over
"serious injury" and total and permanent incapacity determinations, as the Authority sought to
resolve the claims of many long-term recipients that had been added to the rolls under
WorkCare.
A worker is not entitled to weekly benefits when the person attains retirement age.
Retirement age means either age 65 or the normal retirement age in that occupation, whichever
is earlier. For example if commercial airline pilots routinely retire at age 60 in Victoria,
weekly benefits would be terminated at that age. However, if a worker is injured on the job
after reaching retirement age, that person is entitled to receive weekly payments, but only for
the first 52 weeks of incapacity.
Another measure to tighten up eligibility for purposes of curbing certain perceived
system abuses involved claims for benefits after the worker ceased to be employed by an
employer wherein the injury was said to occur. No longer will such a claim be accepted unless
the worker can satisfy the insurer that the claim reasonably could not have been made while
employed with that employer.
Table 5.2 shows the level of payments for weekly benefits for the past decade. With the
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enactment of the 1992 legislation and the subsequent amendments, aggregate payments for
weekly benefits fell sharply. First, the number of new claims for benefits fell in the period
after 1 December 1992 for the reasons given earlier. Second, the number of long-term
recipients fell sharply, a major goal of the 1992 change. Additionally, WorkCover was able to
shorten the average length of time that persons stayed on weekly benefits, another central focus
of the 1992 law. Also, hi mid-1993 the employer became responsible for the first 10 days of
weekly benefit payments, up from the previous level of 5 days.
Terminating Weekly Benefits
A sticking point in every workers' compensation system occurs where the insurer seeks
to alter (reduce) weekly compensation payments or terminate paying them altogether. Systems
that have become especially sensitive to matters of cost recognise that prompt alteration or
termination of payments where circumstances call for this can represent a significant source of
potential cost reductions. Balancing this concern is the need to treat the injured worker fairly.
Thus, if the insurer has no restraint on its ability to change benefits, it can place the injured
worker in a very difficult position, especially if any appeal process is slow or back-logged.
There are numerous provisions of the law, some of which have been noted above,
which provide reasons to terminate benefits. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The expiration of a fixed period of benefits, e.g., at 52 or 104 weeks;
The attaining of retirement age;
The worker has left Australia (unless "seriously injured" or totally and
permanently incapacitated);
The recipient serves a prison sentence;
The worker has received a lump sum on termination of employment for
redundancy or severance, or for certain superannuation or retirement lump sums;
The worker has returned to any work;
The worker's notional earnings have increased;
The worker's benefits were obtained fraudulently.

In most cases, the worker must be provided with written notice of the decision to
terminate or alter weekly benefits, and in some instances, there are fixed periods for which
benefits must be continued, subsequent to the provision of notice.
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If a worker has received weekly payments of compensation for at least 12 weeks, and
has provided the insurer with a certificate of capacity, the benefit cannot be terminated or
lowered for the period covered by the certificate without giving proper notice. For a worker
who had been receiving weekly benefits for a continuous period of at least 12 weeks, but less
than 1 year, the period of notice is 14 days. For a worker who has received weekly payments
for a continuous period of 1 year or more, the period of notice is 28 days.
Disputes regarding termination of benefits tend to be commonplace in workers'
compensation systems. The insurer, for example, may believe that the worker's condition is
such that return to work is possible. In Victoria, in such instances, the insurer has the worker
examined by either the treating medical provider or one that the insurer selects. These disputes
are moved quickly into the Conciliation Service where the Conciliation Officer may direct that
benefits be continued (discussed in some detail in Chapter 6). Presently, a worker can obtain a
Conciliation Conference quickly, i.e., under 28 days, but if the parties cannot settle
voluntarily, lengthy delays can ensue either at the Medical Panel stage or as the dispute is
litigated in the Courts.
However, the relatively rapid access to Conciliation, the requirement that some notice
be given the worker of the intent to terminate (at least where benefits have been paid for some
time), and the ability of the Conciliator to direct that payment be made for some previous or
prospective time periods, under certain circumstances, appears to serve the needs of both sides.
By contrast, some other jurisdictions require that payments continue until an adjudicator has
made a determination (which may mean that many months pass with benefits being paid) or
permit insurer termination at will with no weekly benefits until the adjudicator, perhaps many
months later, orders resumption.
The extraordinary success in curbing long-term claims (claims with over 260 days of
compensation) is evident in Table 5.3. Long-term claims were developing at a rate of 50006,000 per year in the years before WorkCover's enactment. By 1993/94, the number had fallen
below 2,000, and it continued to drop in 1994/95. Because of the limited time involved, one
cannot yet make any judgement about the number of new long-term cases for claims reported
in 1995/96. In December 1992, there were 16,600 long-term claims open. As of 30 June 1993,
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this had fallen to 13,300 claimants, and by 30 June 1996, the number of open long-term claims
was 10,013. That represented about 50 percent of the number that existed in 1991.
In addition to issues relating to the termination of weekly benefits, parallel ones arise
regarding their alteration. It has been noted that weekly benefits may be altered due to changes
in the worker's notional earnings or any current weekly earnings, and the 26-week threshold.
Payments will be adjusted, also, to reflect any payments that a worker might have received
from the Department of Social Security. These social security benefits paid will also serve as
the basis for offsets against any lump sum benefits with a pecuniary loss component (Section
135A, Section 115, and certain claims under Section 135(1)).
Death Benefits
Where an injury that arises out of or hi the course of employment materially contributes
to or results in death, the worker's dependents are entitled to compensation. From 1 December
1992 to 30 June 1994 death claims were processed by the insurer, and any disputes were
referred to the County Court. Since 1 July 1994, death claims have been determined by the
County Court.
Eligible dependents must meet one of three conditions:
•

The person, at the time of the worker's death, was partly, mainly or wholly
dependent on the earnings of the worker.

•

The person would have been partly, mainly or wholly dependent on the worker's
earnings, but for the incapacity due to the work injury.

•

The person is the worker's spouse (common law or actual) and lived with the
worker on a permanent and bonafide domestic basis. No account is to be taken of
a spouse's earned income or to any savings from such earnings.

If there are no dependents wholly or mainly dependent on the worker's earnings, the
County Court may award benefits, which it considers to be reasonable, to partial dependents.
Where the worker has left both total and partial dependents, the County Court will allot
compensation as it sees fit. The possibility that a spouse could be denied compensation because
of the spouse's financial independence due to non-earned income is unusual. It introduces a
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means test of sorts into workers' compensation for a spousal benefit, a rarity in workers'
compensation programs.
The death benefit that the County Court can award is a fixed amount set by statute (and
then indexed). As of 1 July 1996, the death benefit was $131,190. Beyond that amount, each
dependant child is entitled also to compensation, with the sum based on the child's age. As of
1 July 1996, a child below the age of 1 year could receive $25,000, while any children age 16
up to age 21 (and a full-time student) would receive $5,650, if they were wholly or mainly
dependents of the worker. In addition to workers' compensation benefits, a dependant of a
worker may recover damages under the Wrongs Act (1958) in respect of the death of a worker.
The Court must not award in excess of $500,000 in respect to the work fatality.
Data on fatal claims for the past 10 years are shown in Table 5.4. The number of
workers' compensation claims for fatality have fallen in recent years. Overall, they represent a
rather small proportion of system payments. Over the past 10 years there has been an average
of 186 claims per year, though for the past 3 years ending in 1995/96, there have been only an
average of 127 claims. (Both averages are by report year. The numbers have been standardised
by excluding journey claims.) In 1995/96 payments of compensation for death claims
(excluding any damages awarded) were less than 2 percent of all benefits and lump sum
payments that year (including damages). Though average lump sum payments per death claim
were well above the averages found earlier hi the decade, the smaller number of claims has
meant that total expenditures were considerably below earlier levels.
Benefits for Maims and Permanent Disabilities
It is only the rarest jurisdiction that finds that it can operate a workers' compensation
scheme with little or no difficulty in respect to permanent disabilities compensation. All
systems use one of three bases for making permanent disability awards, or they apply some
combination of them. In some jurisdictions, the permanent disability award is based,
exclusively or nearly so, on the degree of medical impairment that the worker is found to have
sustained. Thus, workers with equal degrees of impairment are entitled to equal or parallel
levels of benefits. The same principle is utilised where a particular injury is found on a
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schedule or a list. Most commonly, such scheduled losses apply only to body extremities and
to eyes. In either case, some jurisdictions use this basis but may adjust the benefit levels,
automatically, in line with the worker's age. In some, an adjustment is made, also by formula,
for the worker's occupation. Some jurisdictions will take this impairment-based determination
and translate it to a benefit amount, while other jurisdictions will adjust it further by the
worker's pre-injury average weekly earnings.
A very different basis for determining the level of permanent disability benefits is to
base it on the anticipated loss of earnings due to the worker's injury. Since projecting what
future earnings losses will be is highly subjective, a variety of methods is employed to gauge
those losses. Commonly, consideration is given to the degree of medical impairment, the
worker's age, education, work experience and language limitations, with different weights
(informally) applied to each.
A third basis for setting compensation benefits for permanent disability is one identified
as wage loss. Unlike the previous approach that forecasts what the loss of wage earning
capacity might be, the wage loss approach compensates on the basis of actual incurred losses.
Consequently, there would be no benefits paid under wage loss for permanent disability even
where the worker sustained a considerable impairment, if that employee had returned to work
at the pre-injury average weekly earnings level, or higher.
Each method has certain drawbacks. To some extent, the shortcomings have caused
some jurisdictions to mix their approaches, so as to avoid the worst features of each and to
utilise the strengths of each approach. In Victoria, benefits for permanent disabilities that are
not totally incapacitating are compensated in one of four ways according to the specific nature
of the injury.
Section 98 Losses
The Table of Maims lists 46 impairments ranging in severity from quadriplegia or the
total loss of two limbs or both eyes, to the loss of a joint of a lesser toe. The maximum benefit
payable for a maim, as of 1/7/96 is $102,460. For each impairment, a percentage or range of
percentages is listed. For example, the total loss of the right arm is listed as 80 percent. Thus,
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a worker who lost the right arm, totally, would be entitled to a lump sum benefit under Section
98 of $81,968 (0.8 x $102,460). If the worker lost a fraction of the arm, that fraction, applied
to $81,968 would be the maims benefit paid as a lump sum. This would be in addition to any
weekly benefits that the worker received, and the worker might seek further compensation
under common law. The award would likely be an offset against certain damages under
common law, discussed later in this chapter.
This basic benefit under the Table creates areas for dispute, especially on medical
matters. The loss of a member or extremity includes the (permanent) loss of its use. Thus, for
example, a dispute can arise both over the issue of whether there has been any loss of use of a
leg, as well as the quantitative assessment of that loss. There can be a dispute over whether or
not the loss entails an "industrial loss," that is, the ability to use the member for industrial
purposes.
Medical differences that generate disputes may also emanate from a preexisting
condition. Any permanent loss that existed prior to the work injury would not be compensated.
Thus, an injury that is rated at 10 percent to a leg with a 40 percent preexisting impairment
would be rated at .10 divided by .60 (the preexisting level of non-impairment) or 17 percent.
This is in contrast to some jurisdictions that might rate the same worker as 50 percent impaired
(.10 + .40).
Several things should be noted about the Table of Maims. First, the rating of an
impairment need not be done through the use of any specific guide or criteria. (An exception is
noted below.) Various bases can be found for determining the degree of loss of use of a
member. Concepts such as "industrial use" only provide more latitude for assessing the degree
of impairment. Second, the degree of impairment, for purposes of setting the maim benefit
under Section 98, is not likely to be the same as the estimate of impairment for purposes of
determining whether or not the worker is "seriously injured." A judgment regarding
impairment for purposes of determining whether "serious injury" has occurred can affect the
size of the weekly benefit after 26 weeks, the possible continuation of benefits after 104 weeks,
and the accessibility to the common law remedy.
The Table of Maims provides benefits that are based almost purely on impairment. The
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injured worker's age, occupation, and subjective factors have virtually no bearing on the
worker's benefit. Moreover, if two workers sustain the same injury, their lump sum benefit
will be the same, despite any difference in their pre-injury average weekly earnings. And if
one worker has returned to work and the other has not, it is likely to be immaterial for
purposes of setting the maims benefit. Of further note, in addition to the list of 46
impairments, disfigurement of the face and of the body are listed on the table. While many
jurisdictions use schedules that are in form similar to the Table of Maims, few of them
explicitly list disfigurements.
Back Cases
In the 1985 WorkCare legislation, impairments to the back, neck, and pelvis were
incorporated into the Table with special treatment hi such cases for evaluating and
compensating any permanent disability. (For brevity, these will be called "back cases"). The
special treatment for back cases begins with the requirement that they be rated in accordance
with the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,
(2nd edition). Note, that this is the same source to be used in determining whether or not a
worker has a 30 percent impairment or more, thus qualifying the worker as being "seriously
injured."
Because back cases must be rated according to the Guides, and the Guides are based on
a whole person basis, not consistent with the 46 impairments found hi the same schedule, an
adjustment is made. Impairments of the back, neck, or pelvis are listed hi the Table as being
within a range, respectively of 0 - 60 percent, 0-40 percent and 0-15 percent. Consequently,
the maximum benefit for a back, neck, or pelvis impairment as of 1/7/96 would be $61,476,
(60% x $102,460), $40,984 (40% x $102,460), or $15,369 (15% x $102,460), respectively.
The back, neck, and pelvis cannot be rated as more than 60%, 60%, and 50% of the
whole person according to the AMA Guides (2nd edition). The Authority has interpreted the
application of Section 98 as it pertains to back cases to mean that the specific rating is not the
percentage of the maximum dollar benefit specified in the Table. Instead, it is the rating
divided by the maximum whole body percentage suggested in the Guides. For, example, a
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pelvis impairment rated as 10 percent loss of the whole person would entitle the worker to
10%/50% (the pelvis' whole body maximum), meaning a 20 percent loss of the pelvis with 100
percent of the pelvis valued at $15,369. Thus, a benefit would be paid of
10% / 50% x (15% x $102,460) = $3,074.
Similarly, a 30% whole person rating of a neck injury would yield a maims benefit of
30% / 60% x (40% x $102,460) = $20,492.
That back cases are evaluated differently than extremities for disability compensation is
not altogether surprising. Many jurisdictions have traditionally had scheduled benefits for
injuries to extremities and other bases for determining benefits to backs, including necks, and
to internal organs. Yet it must also be pointed out that some other jurisdictions do not employ
this distinction, relying instead on some scheme that is consistent for all injuries. Certainly the
AMA Guides could be employed to evaluate body member or eye injuries as they are now used
in the cases of back, neck and pelvis injuries.
A second noteworthy characteristic of this Table is its exclusions. There are no maims
benefits for injuries to most internal organs, including—strikingly—those of the respiratory
system. Thus, workers with any of the pneumoconioses are not entitled to a lump sum maims
benefit, nor are persons with comparable claims for cancer and other occupational diseases,
though weekly benefits can be paid for such conditions. At best, if workers with such
conditions successfully pursue a common law remedy, there is no offset for a previously paid
maims benefit. While few jurisdiction would place such conditions on a benefits schedule, they
generally would compensate such conditions as an unscheduled loss, essentially parallelling the
manner in which back cases are compensated.
It must also be noted that there is no maims benefit for mental injuries, except where
they may involve permanent brain damage. Thus, while a worker may be able to claim weekly
benefits, common law damages, or be rated as "seriously injured" due to the result of some
mental stress, there is no maims benefit under the existing Table. However, prior to the
passage of the 1992 change in the law, a worker could receive a maims benefit for the "loss of
mental powers."
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Hearing Loss
Claims for loss of hearing have been frequent and have represented a significant share
of the benefits paid for maims. As such, hearing loss claims are treated somewhat differently
from other permanent disabilities due to injuries that arise out of or in the course of
employment, with the employment being a significant contributing factor. The benefit rate
associated with total loss of hearing is 65 percent in the Table. Any compensable partial loss of
hearing is set as that percentage loss times 65 percent times the maims maximum at the time
($102,460 as of 1/7/96). However, there is no benefit if the degree of hearing loss that is
attributed to the employment is rated below 7 percent.
Hearing loss must be rated by one of the 56 or so specialists approved by the Minister
on the recommendation of the Convenor of the Medical Panels. The rating of hearing loss must
be done in accordance with Improved Procedure for Determination of Percentage Loss of
Hearing by the National Acoustic Laboratory. A determination made by an approved person in
accordance with the procedures set out in the legislation and the regulations is conclusive
evidence of hearing loss.
In hearing loss claims, the date of injury is the date of the claim, if the worker is still
employed in the employment out of which the claim arose. However, if the claimant is no
longer working in the employment out of which the claim arose, the injury date is the last day
of employment at that establishment. The implication of that difference is that the aggregate
sum available for an injury from the Table is adjusted (upwards) annually. A difference in
injury date can result in a higher or lower maims benefit being awarded.
Compensation for Pain and Suffering
Most jurisdictions do not provide compensation, expressly, for pain and suffering.
Indeed, losses for pain and suffering are often considered inapplicable in workers'
compensation claims, at odds with one of the bases for damages in tort or common law
proceedings. This fine line is at best academic. The existence of and the degree of pain, at
least, must have some effect in many instances where awards are made for permanent
disabilities. In a jurisdiction that awards such benefits on the basis of either the projected loss
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of earning capacity or the actual loss of earnings, pain can serve to limit a worker's range of
employment options or the quantity of employment that can be obtained. For jurisdictions that
award permanent disability benefits strictly on an impairment basis, pain is often the factor that
can limit a person's range of motion, their ability to undertake lifting or bending and so on.
Hence, it is somewhat unrealistic to argue that pain and suffering are not a part of a permanent
disability benefit, even where the law would seem to rule that out.
In Victoria, pain and suffering under Section 98A were expressly included in the 1992
legislation. Benefits under this section are available only to workers with injuries listed in the
Table of Maims. In keeping with several significant features of the WorkCover law, a benefit
for pain and suffering is available only to workers whose maim has been a significant one. As
of 1/7/96, the threshold for access to a benefit for pain and suffering is a maims award of
$11,000 or higher. Thus, a worker with a non-back impairment rated at below 11 percent, or
an 18 percent back impairment (yielding less than an 11 percent whole person rating) is not
entitled to an award under Section 98A. A pain and suffering award is not available to a person
with diseases or injuries affecting internal organs, since such conditions, as noted, are not
listed on the table.
Awards under Section 98 are designed to be determined in an objective manner. In
large part, one should expect that, aside from any vested interest that a rater might have,
ratings done by different raters would cluster closely around some central tendency. This quest
for consistency, be it for back cases or any other maim, is one justification for employing an
impairment-based approach to permanent disability compensation. That issue stands out when
considering the benefits available under Section 98A. There is almost no guidance in the Act as
to how to determine the size of such an award. As of 1/7/96, the maximum benefit that can be
paid for pain and suffering is $55,040. The law states that this maximum amount is to be
payable "only in a most extreme case and the amount payable in any other case shall be
reasonably proportionate to that maximum amount having regard to the degree and duration of
pain and suffering and the severity of the injury or injuries." (Section 98A(3))
It seems clear that there is considerable room for negotiation (subjectivity) in setting the
award for Section 98A. In some instances, the parties appear to have settled on an award under
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Section 98A based on a rule of thumb of 50 percent of the settlement value for the Section 98
benefit. In some instances, the flexibility that exists in setting the benefit amount under Section
98A is utilised to bring over-all resolution to a claim where a dispute exists over some other
issue(s).
Lump sum maims benefits have grown substantially over time. One simple measure of
this is the changing value of total maims payments per year from 1986/87 till 1995/96, as seen
in Table 5.5. The growth of maims lump sum payments is also evident in the second column,
which shows the ratio of maims payments, including pain and suffering payments since
1993/94, to the total of weekly benefit payments. Part of the very rapid growth of this ratio is
due to the decline since 1991/92 hi the value of weekly benefits payments, associated with the
enactment of WorkCover. In recent years a portion of the increase has been associated with
benefits for pain and suffering under Section 98A of the law, introduced after 30 November
1992. However, it is also due simply to the growth in maims payments claims.
The data in Table 5.6 reflect the types of injuries for which maims payments have been
paid over the past 10 years. As noted in the text, hearing disorders have been a major source
of maims claims, particularly before the latest 2 years. Indeed, over the 10-year period, fully
51 percent of all compensated maims claims were for hearing disorders, though these claims
accounted for only 28 percent of aggregate payments. Part of this disparity reflects the
relatively low cost per claim for hearing loss, compared to other maims, and because so many
of the hearing loss claims occurred in earlier years when benefits payment tended to be lower.
Of special note is the rapid growth over the past 3 years in the payments for the loss of
mental powers. This reflects payments made for work injuries that occurred prior to
1 December 1992, at which time the loss of mental powers was removed from the Table of
Maims. Curiously, prior to 1992/93 maims benefits for the loss of mental powers were so
small that any such maims were simply included in the category "other.** One well publicized
case involving a police officer's injury served to open the flood gates for maims for the loss of
mental powers.
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Medical Examinations - Section 112
There are a variety of matters that may cause an insurer to seek to have a worker
examined by a medical person that it selects. Such matters could include for example, whether
or not a compensable injury or illness has occurred, the continuing incapacity of the worker,
and the existence of and degree of any permanent impairment. Any claim or proceeding
commenced by or for the worker and the worker's entitlement to benefits can be suspended if
the worker unreasonably refuses to have or obstructs an examination.
Medical examiners under Section 112 are asked by an insurer to conduct their
examination, typically, at 1 of 3 times in the life of the claim. If the examination occurs within
the first 2 weeks of the claim, typically the insurer is inquiring into the matter of
compensability. If an examiner is asked to see a worker in the period 4 to 5 weeks into the
claim, the insurer is seeking some information about the prognosis for the condition and the
claim. Many of the examinations are conducted at about 20 weeks after the claim has begun, to
determine the issue of "serious injury" at the 26-week threshold. This will be a point where the
insurer has the medical practitioner rate the degree of impairment of the worker.
Medical examiners are selected by insurers from a list of persons who have been
approved by the Authority. Examiners must be drawn from the ranks of the medical
practitioners, or registered physiotherapists, chiropractors, osteopaths or psychologists. Some
treating medical persons who were not medical practitioners disapproved of having medical
examinations conducted only by practitioners. In their view medical practitioners were not the
best persons to examine workers being treated by other types of professionals. Hence, the set
of medical examiners has been expanded to enable, in most cases, these examinations to be
conducted by persons with training that is similar to that of the treating persons. However,
only medical practitioners are approved to conduct examinations for purposes of rating the
degree of impairment.
Similar to the situation in most jurisdictions, these medical examiners are viewed with
suspicion by many of the workers that they see, and by worker representatives. Perceived as
"insurance doctors," these examiners can make findings that will lead to the reduction or
termination of weekly benefits and affect the possibility of receiving any lump sum payments.
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When insurers continue to use the same individuals again and again to conduct these medical
examinations, and their opinions appear consistently to be injurious to the (financial) wellbeing of the worker, the process, inevitably, will draw some criticism.
From the perspective of the Authority, the ideal would be for all medical examiners to
be widely regarded as objective and professionally respected. No doubt this is the case for
some significant proportion of the medical examiners. Difficulties arise, however, for several
reasons. First, where a medical examiner no longer treats patients and limits his or her practice
to conducting insurance examinations, questions arise over both competence and objectivity.
The latter issue will arise where a significant portion of a medical examiner's income depends
upon being called upon by insurance companies for these purposes. Practically, it has been
difficult for the Authority to remove such examiners from the approved list of examiners.
Additionally, the Authority and insurers recognise that it is difficult to attract the
quantity of service needed from some medical persons, that is, those who are regularly heavily
demanded. The time lines in the law do not permit insurers to have the luxury of scheduling a
needed medical examination far into the future when that is the first available open date.
Further, some medical persons prefer not to do such medical examinations because they wish
to eschew potentially confrontational situations.
Other medical persons limit or avoid doing Section 112 medical examinations on the
grounds that they view the fees as inadequate. The fee paid to examiners depends upon the
person's credentials. As of June 1996, the fee paid to a specialist medical practitioner was
$289 with an added $82.45 if an impairment assessment was prepared. The fee covers both the
examination and the preparation of the report for the insurer.
Some criticism has surfaced regarding the rapidity with which some persons conduct
their Section 112 medical examinations. Some persons schedule these examination at 15-minute
intervals while others may give considerably more time to the worker examination. Some
medical examiners believe that they can be helpful to the treating medical person in either of
two ways. First, they may observe something in their examination that was not observed
initially by the treater. Second, the treating person may find it difficult to tell the worker
something that the worker does not wish to be told. Presumably, this is less difficult for the
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medical examiner to do, or for the treating person to do upon the recommendation of the
Section 112 examiner.
Lump Sum Settlements
Workers with compensable injuries or illnesses may be able to receive certain benefits
in the form of lump sum payment. (This does not consider a lump sum paid for any weekly
benefits to which the worker had been entitled but that had not been paid previously.) Lump
sum payments are paid for Section 98 and Section 98A benefits (maims and pain and
suffering), Section 92 payments (death cases), and for any damages won at common law.
Additionally, the law permits lump sum settlements to be made in a very limited set of other
claims. (Section 115)
If a worker is over the age of 55, and has been receiving weekly benefits for 104 weeks
or more, and is totally and permanently incapacitated, the worker can receive a lump sum
settlement if the total amount is $10,000 or less. (The $10,000 figure is set by regulation, not
by statute.) A worker that has received 104 weeks of benefits and is found to be "seriously
injured" may also be paid in a lump sum settlement, for purposes of using that sum for some
income-producing project. If the Authority is not persuaded that the funds will be used for such
a project, or if it appears that the project has a high risk of failure, the Authority is not likely
to approve the settlement. In practice, such settlements are granted only in exceptional
circumstances.
Lump sum settlements are calculated based on several factors. First, any future medical
payments for the compensable injury are calculated, taking account of the worker's condition,
age and life expectancy (according to Australian mortality rates by gender). For purposes of
appropriately discounting future expenditures, the Authority uses a discount rate of 3 percent.
Future weekly benefits, net of income taxes that are estimated to be payable, are also
discounted at 3 percent. (Recall that future weekly benefits would be terminated at age 65 or
the regular age of retirement in that occupation). Thus, the lump sum payment is the present
(discounted) value of any future medical and weekly benefits to which the worker is projected
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to be entitled plus, where appropriate, any lump sum benefits under Section 98 and Section
98A.
Typically, if the worker believes that there may be some potential damages to be
awarded, no Section 115 lump sum settlement is sought. The reason for this is that acceptance
of the lump sum settlement extinguishes the worker's right to any future compensation or
damages for the injury in question. Nothing prevents a worker from first settling under
common law and then applying for a lump sum settlement under Section 115.
Table 5.7 indicates the value of all the lump sum payments paid under Workers'
compensation over the past decade. Column 1 is the aggregate amount paid per year, and it
reflects an extremely rapid rate of growth hi such payments. From 1986/87 to 1991/92, the last
full year under WorkCare, aggregate lump sum payments grew from $11.5 million to over
$221 million. In 1992/93, payments exploded to over $378 million, substantially due to
common law damages payments associated with the large run-off of claims brought about by
the 1992 legislation.
One way to gauge the growth of lump sum payments is to compare them to weekly
benefit payments, which also grew substantially after 1987/88 (see Table 5.2). Column 2 of
Table 5.7 traces the ratio of lump sum payments to aggregate weekly benefit payments over the
decade. Lump sum payments increased from about 5 percent of the level of all weekly benefits
in 1986/87 to 52.2 percent hi 1991/92, and then jumped to equality in 1992/93. As the run-off
of common law cases results in fewer settlements, the percentage has begun to fall back.
The allocation of payments as lump sums are shown in Table 5.7. Column 3 is death
benefit payments as a percentage of lump sum payments showing that death benefits have
become an even smaller proportion of total lump sum payments. Column 4 is the percentage of
total lump sum payments that were paid for maims. (Included hi the maims payments are
benefits for pain and suffering under Section 98A. Such benefits were paid only hi the past 3
years and represented a negligible sum in 1993/94.) Maims benefits declined, proportionately,
after 1987/88 until 1992/93 due to the growth in importance of common law payments.
After 1992/93 maims payments began to grow rapidly, due in part to the limited
availability of other lump sum settlements (column 6). Common law benefits have grown
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dramatically over time, reaching a peak in 1992/93. Even over the past 3 years, the large bulk
of lump sum payments under common law are based on claims for injuries under WorkCare
By 1995/96, WorkCare claims still accounted for $79 million in lump sum benefits (about 35
percent of the total), but this was well below the amounts paid in each of the 3 preceding
years.
Medical Issues
The focus of this section is on a variety of issues relating to medical benefits that have
not been addressed thus far. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the role of medical
services for a workers' compensation system. Persons and businesses that provide injured
workers with medical services play a pivotal role in the system, from the determination of
elements of the compensability issue to factors that establish the size and duration of cash
benefits. Some jurisdictions have observed with alarm their high rates of growth in the cost of
medical services in workers' compensation. Some have also observed the growing share of
litigation costs that are paid for med/legal services.
The worker is entitled to have the reasonable costs of medical and like services paid
fully. Medical services are defined in the law (Section 5) and include the attendance,
examination or treatment of any kind of medical practitioner, or a (registered) dentist,
optometrist, physiotherapist, chiropractor, osteopath or chiropodist. In addition, medicines,
appliances, and prostheses are covered, as are other services that are not defined but are
available if they have been requested by a medical practitioner. Injured workers may also be
entitled to occupational rehabilitation services, but these are covered hi Chapter 7.
In summary, the Authority recognises four categories of health care providers whose
services are covered under the law. First, there are medical practitioners, who are the only
ones who can issue initial certificates of capacity in claims for weekly benefits. Second, there
are those registered professionals (dentists, optometrists, physiotherapists, chiropractors,
osteopaths, and chiropodists) who may be accessed by the injured worker directly. Third, there
are those that may provide a subsequent certificate. Such providers must be medical
practitioners, physiotherapists, chiropractors, or osteopaths. Fourth, there are other providers,
5-24

who have been approved by the Authority, whose services must be requested by a medical
practitioner. These include persons providing services in acupuncture, dietary analysis, home
help, massage, naturopathy, occupational therapy, pharmacy, psychology, remedial
gymnasium, social work, and speech pathology. In the cases of all four sets of providers, they
are approved by the Authority by dint of their membership in specific professional
associations.
As of 1 July 1996, an employer's insurance required that it pay a deductible of $416
before there is any liability for medical and like services by an authorised insurer. A worker's
entitlement to medical and like services ceases 52 weeks after an entitlement to weekly benefits
ceases, unless certain exceptions exist:
- The worker has returned to work but
- could not remain at work without medical and like services, or
- surgery is required, or
- the worker has a "serious injury" (a 30 percent or greater impairment); or
- The worker requires a modification of a prosthesis; or
- The service is essential to ensure that the worker's health or lifestyle does not
significantly deteriorate.
In the event that none of these conditions is met, the worker may have resort to the
general health insurance that exists outside of the workers' compensation system. However,
that insurance may be less attractive to a worker because of the presence of a deductible,
because certain medical services available under workers' compensation are not covered under
the Commonwealth plan, e.g., physiotherapy, and because only in workers' compensation is
an action against a worker for the payment of balances precluded.
Medical and Like Services Costs
Medical and like services costs have been the source of concern for some time in
Victoria. Many jurisdictions, including Victoria, have sought to control the growth of these
costs through fee schedules that limit the amount that service providers will be paid for their
services. The process of setting "reasonable" fees, as called for by the law, has been highly
contentious in recent years.
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In 1990, following some continuing dispute over medical fees between the WorkCare
administration and medical groups including the Australian Medical Association, the Victorian
government named a Compensable Patients Fees Review Committee chaired by Dr. lan
Siggins. Following the report of the Committee, the government agreed to pay medical fees
beginning 1 January 1991 based on the Commonwealth Medical Benefits Schedule (CMBS)
rates plus a loading that ranged between +24 percent and +49 percent.
The loadings, reflecting Siggins, were based on two sets of factors. First, there were
special circumstances in workers' compensation (and transport accident) cases that imposed
costs on the treating providers. Specifically, the loading factor included a factor for bad debts
(soon dropped), extra duration, extra service, practice disruption, slow payment, and list
adjustment. Second, the CMBS fee schedule allows for balance billing. Balance billing refers
to the practice of billing the injured worker directly for the "balance" of the bill after the
primary payer has made payment. Thus, that fee schedule is different from the actual or market
rate for medical services. The fee schedule under workers' compensation, where balance
billing is less likely, was stepped up to reflect the market rates that doctors were receiving
outside of workers' compensation.
Though a fee schedule increase had been negotiated immediately after the election of
October 1992, the enactment of the WorkCover law and the changed circumstances
surrounding that kept the newly agreed-upon schedule from going into effect. Since that time
there have been off-again on-again negotiations between the Authority and the Australian
Medical Association. In January 1995, the Authority announced an increase in the fee schedule
in the range of 1-1.5 percent. On 1 July 1995, as a result of the VWA's agreement with the
Australian Society of Orthopaedic Surgeons, a 5 percent increase was approved for orthopaedic
surgery. However, no agreement was reached at the time with the Australian Medical
Association.
Rates were revised as of 1 January 1996 based on the current CMBS fee schedule plus
the two sets of loadings (market rates and Siggins factors). The change was not the product of
any agreement reached with the Australian Medical Association. One set of fees that was not
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revised at the time was that for anaesthetists. A separate negotiation over their rates had broken
down.
To the extent that rancour exists over the issue of the medical fee schedule, it stems
primarily from two problems. First, the doctors (through their representatives) believe that
their fees have been inadequate, with special concern over the lack of increases in the past 4 to
5 years. In contrast, some in the Authority saw a need for little or no growth on the grounds
that the fees had been set too high hi 1991-92. A second source of friction emanates from the
process of setting these fees, with some of the doctors believing that bargaining power rests
entirely with the Authority. From their perspective, the Authority has acted unilaterally.
Disputes over medical fees are increasingly common hi many jurisdictions. And in each
of them other issues surround these controversies that tend to make their resolution more
difficult to achieve. Some of the pressure from the medical providers emanates from their
claim that medical bills are often paid only many months after their submission. The Authority
acknowledges that late payment of medical bills did occur hi the past too frequently, but that
the standard has been greatly improved in the last several years. As such, complaints about late
payments and disputed bills are considered to be past history, and (some at the Authority
believe) simply a handy argument to justify fee increases.
One group with a particularly strong criticism of the fee schedule is the anaesthetists. In
their view, the role that they play has changed, becoming more sophisticated and more
important. They contend that the fee schedule does not recognise the added complexity and
responsibility of then" roles. At this writing, three individual cases are pending at the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and the VWA is expected to revise the schedule based on the
findings in these cases.
There has developed a tripartite arrangement for the payment of hospital costs. Public
hospitals operate in Victoria under a fee schedule set by the state. Several years ago a dispute
between WorkCare and the public hospitals resulted hi an agreement whereby the Authority
would pay those hospitals based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). State Government now
pays also on the basis of DRGs, although the Transport Accident Commission does not.
Private hospitals are still not paid based on DRGs. A third group of (eight) private hospitals
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was selected to participate in a short-term pilot program 6 years ago. Though the pilot project
ended 5 years ago, that program continues. It involves providing financial incentives to each of
these hospitals to have workers treated and released more promptly than had been the norm.
Though only a small number of hospitals participate in this scheme, they have a
disproportionately large share of the hospitalized patients under workers' compensation.
The experience in many jurisdictions has been that tight controls over fee schedules
have been inadequate as a means to limit medical cost growth. Instead, control over utilisation,
in conjunction with a fee schedule, may be more effective. In the United States at least, control
over utilisation can come from several initiatives, primarily the adoption of managed care
programs.3 At this time managed care has not been developed in Victoria's workers'
compensation system. However, it is certainly true that insurers can challenge whether the
provision of certain medical services was necessary, and whether the service is required as a
consequence of a compensable injury.
One step with some potential to control costs and to provide appropriate treatment has
been the adoption recently of a protocol for use in back injury cases. Borrowing from an
earlier effort in South Australia, a medical advisory committee to the Authority recommended
this protocol. For other jurisdictions, medical protocols have been utilised in several different
ways, including as a basis for insurers to determine whether inappropriate or superfluous
services were being rendered. The protocol, in such instances can serve as a justification to
deny medical payments, as well as to identify providers that may (frequently) deviate from
accepted practices. The back protocol in Victoria has not been developed for these purposes.
Instead, it is to be and already has been employed as an instructional or advisory tool for
practitioners. Additionally, the protocol may aid the practitioner in persuading an injured
worker that the services being provided are appropriate ones, and that other treatments or more
frequent applications of services are not called for medically.

3See for example, P. Burstein. 1996. Benchmarks for Designing Workers Compensation Medical Fee
Schedules, Cambridge, MA: Workers Compensation Research Institute. See also S. Eccleston. 1995. Managed
Care and Medical Cost Containment in Workers' Compensation: A National Inventory, 1995-96. Cambridge, MA:
Workers Compensation Research Institute.
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Currently, there are no medical and like services for which a provider or an injured
worker must seek pre-authorisation from an insurer (excluding occupational rehabilitation
services). However, there are procedures to seek pre-authorisation from insurers and they are
being utilised. Where a provider fears that it may not be paid by an insurer for a service
requested by or for an injured worker, the pre-authorisation can assure it that it will be paid for
the services.
The data in Table 5.8 provide an indication of Victoria's experience with medical and
like services costs. Column 1 reveals the rapid growth in these costs from 1986/87 to 1991/92,
with much of the growth occurring earlier hi that period. In the last 3 years, under
WorkCover, health care costs have fallen substantially. Much of the decline is associated with
the reduction in claims for compensation that occurred in the wake of the 1992 legislation.
Some of the decline reflects the increased employer deductible for medical and like services
that occurred after 30 June 1992, when it was raised from $360 to $378 for injuries after that
date. (That deductible has been increased annually since 1 July 1986 through indexation. As of
1 July 1996 it has reached $416.) Though aggregate expenditures paid for medical and like
services have declined, they have not declined as rapidly as claims have. Consequently, the
costs per claim for medical and like services have grown every year over the past 10 years
(column 2).
How are medical and like services costs spent? The last five columns of Table 5.8 show
the percentage of total costs, allocated across five major categories. Not surprisingly, the
largest share of these costs are paid to medical practitioners. Over the past 5 years, this group
accounted for 30-33 percent of the medical and like services expenditure. There has been a
small steady growth of payments for physiotherapy services. By 1995/96 physiotherapists
received about 14 percent of all medical and like services expenditures (or about 44 percent of
the amount paid to medical practitioners). Expenditures for hospitals have ranged between 22
and 29 percent over the 10-year period, and have been concentrated between 24 and 27 percent
over the past 4 years.
The most significant changes in medical and like costs have been in the areas of
rehabilitation and ancillary medical services. There has been consistent growth,
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proportionately, in ancillary medical services over the past decade. It represents an area that
the Authority will want especially to monitor. Rehabilitation costs had fallen substantially after
the enactment of the 1992 legislation, though they have increased again over the latest 2 years
It should be noted that these figures include personal and household services ($6.1 million in
1995-96) and the cost of the WISE re-employment program (about $1.0 million in 1995-96), in
addition to the occupational rehabilitation services ($4.9 million in 1995-96) that will be
described further in Chapter 7. The costs of personal and household services, including
attendant care, counselling, household help, and modifications to home or car were included in
medical costs rather than rehabilitation under the WorkCare system. Thus, the figures across
the decade are not completely comparable.
Concluding Observations
There are a number of goals that the supporters of the 1992 legislation hoped to
achieve. Certainly, a reduction in system costs was a motivation, but that was certainly not its
only goal. Other concerns were that benefits were not adequate in certain, more serious injury
cases, and that the system was forcing employers to pay for injuries over which they had no
control. Another obvious concern was the length of time that people remained on benefits and
the incentive structure that contributed to this. Some of these issues are discussed elsewhere in
this report. However, certain observations regarding the changed approach to benefits since 1
December 1992 are appropriate here.
First, it has become clear that the effort to limit access to the common law remedy
through the use of the serious injury threshold has been weakened, both as a product of judicial
interpretations and as the 30 percent impairment level has become more readily attainable. The
use of psychological injury impairment as an add-on to the impairment level for a physical
injury has been instrumental here.
Disputes over benefits for maims and pain suffering were not eliminated, even after
Medical Panels became involved routinely. In fact, their frequency weakened the Medical
Panels by utilising them so heavily as to backlog them completely. The incentive structure for
workers, and for their solicitors, encouraged the issue of proceedings, primarily as a route to a
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settlement, with the worker's costs largely paid by the insurer. Settlements at the courthouse
steps for maims and for pain and suffering could also be utilised in order to reach some
understanding with regard to any continuing weekly benefits or damages that might otherwise
be sought at common law. Thus, despite the aim of the supporters of the 1992 effort to limit
the use of lump sum settlements, it seems apparent that this has not been fully successful. It is
very difficult to seal off one area of benefits from another where the parties are able to arrive
at a mutually agreed outcome in one of them. Compounding this is the incentive to move
benefits from a taxable source (weekly benefits) to a tax-free source (lump sum).
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Table 5.1 Standard Claims by Report Year*
Year
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96

Claims Reported
64,768
60,229
60,437
55,103
56,917
55,247
47,966
38,334
32,981
31,318

* All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded
Source: VWA
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Table 5.2 Weekly Benefits, Annual Totals*
Year
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96

Weekly Benefits Paid ($, 000)
$245,589
349,205
427,284
416,498
417,026
423,364
377,887
229,648
226,450
258,364

* All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded
Source: VWA
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Table 5.3 Long-Term Claims By Year Reported*
Year
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95

Long-Term Claims
Total
Standard **
9,727
9,094
6,739
6,304
5,718
6,130
5,330
4,909
6,134
5,735
5,461
5,147
2,730
2,629
1,905
1,904
1.818
1.817

* All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
**Standard claims exclude journey claims and non-fatal closed claims with up to
10 days compensation and medical and like payments below the threshold.
Source: VWA
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Table 5.3 Long-Term Claims By Year Reported*
Year
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95

Long-Term Claims
Total
Standard **
9,727
9,094
6,739
6,304
6,130
5,718
5,330
4,909
6,134
5,735
5,461
5,147
2,730
2,629
1,905
1,904
1.818
1.817

* All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
**Standard claims exclude journey claims and non-fatal closed claims with up to
10 days compensation and medical and like payments below the threshold.
Source: VWA
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Table 5.4 Fatal Claims*
Year

Standard Claims**

Total Claims

1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96

209
223
262
229
191
197
164
134
120
127

248
289
338
292
240
249
188
137
120
127

Death Benefits
($ thousands)
$ 5,321
6,983
12,947
14,233
13,845
16,439
10,513
7,898
7,020
8,903

* Claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
** Standard claims exclude journey claims.
Source: VWA
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Average Lump
Sum Payment
$ 53,750
46,248
51,172
56,037
60,197
70,553
71,032
78,197
92,377
89,924

Table 5.5 Maims Payments*
Year
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96

(Maims Payments) /(Weekly Payments)
2.1%
4.6
4.9
8.3
11.3
14.4
21.2
34.1
39.9
45.2

Total Payments ($ millions)
$5.2
15.9
24.7
34.7
47.2
61.1
80.0
78.2
89.0
104.1

•"Includes payments for Section 98A in the latest 3 years. Claims arising from self-insurers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
Source: VWA

5-36

Table 5.6 Percentages of Maims Payments by Type of Maim, 1986-1996*

I
10

Vision, Sight Loss
Upper Extremities
Lower Extremities
Hearing Disorders
Back Impairment
Neck Impairment
Pelvis Impairment
Severe injuries includ.
Paraplegia, Quadriplegia
Loss of Mental Powers
Other

1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
3.2%
3.3%
1.7%
3.6%
2.8%
2.5%
1.4%
1.3%
1.4%
1.3%
10.4
21.5
13.3
21.1
23.0
23.2
16.9
15.1
20.4
20.6
6.7
4.3
10.4
5.1
10.3
11.8
10.5
10.1
13.0
14.1
34.4
70.2
62.4
35.3
27.1
25.5
36.9
38.9
21.1
19.0
15.4
1.9
5.0
19.3
23.2
22.5
20.1
17.1
19.4
20.5
0.7
2.0
0.0
0.8
2.2
2.3
2.6
2.4
3.9
4.0
0.2
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
2.3
2.5
1.6
1.0
1.4
1.3
0.5
0.9
0.4
0.6
6.2%

-

-

8.6%

15.9%

* Claims arising from self insurers as of 30/6/96 are excluded
Source: VWA

9.0%

-

-

10.0%

10.7%

3.7
7.3%

8.1
6.0%

18.5
1.8%

19.2
0.5%

Table 5.7 Lump Sum Benefit Payments
Year

Lump Sum
Payments
($,000)

1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96

$ 11,454
29,991
48,371
76,498
121,555
221,267
378,037
221,821
218,186
226,050

Lump Sum
Payments/
Weekly
Benefits
4.7%
7.7
11.3
18.4
29.1
52.2
100.0
96.6
96.4
87.5

Death
Benefits

Maims
Benefits

Common
Law
Damages

Other
Lump
Sums

46.4%
25.9
26.8
18.6
11.4
7.4
2.3
3.6
3.2
3.9

45.2%
59.0
51.2
45.4
38.8
27.6
21.2
35.3
41.4
51.6

3.1%
12.8
20.3
34.4
45.5
49.6
63.6
50.4
53.9
44.3

5.2%
2.3
1.8
1.6
4.3
15.4
12.5
10.8
1.4
0.2

Source: VWA
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Table 5.8 Medical and Like Services Costs

Ln

I

u>
VO

Year

Total
(in millions)

Per Claim*

Medical
Practitioner

Physiotherapy

Rehabilitation

Hospital

1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96

$57.9
103.4
140.2
145.5
159.7
171.3
172.9
128.8
118.0
131.2

$644
1,228
1,656
1,880
2,158
2,517
3,077
3,159
3,341
3,941

36%
29
28
28
29
30
30
32
33
32%

12%
12
11
11
11
12
12
13
14
14%

14%
20
23
22
22
20
15
6
7
9%

29%
28
25
27
25
22
24
27
27
25%

* Total claims reported in that year. All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
Source: VWA

Ancillary
Medical
Services
0%
0
2
3
3
4
5
6
7

8%
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Chapter 6 DISPUTES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
Disputes arise in all systems of insurance, be they social insurance or a purely private
arrangement. Workers' compensation programs have developed a rich mixture of approaches
to cope with disputes. In recent years an increasing number of jurisdictions have sought to
minimise the incidence of these disputes, as awareness of their costliness has surfaced.
Additionally, a common goal has been to seek to settle the disputes that do arise hi a prompt
and, preferably, informal fashion. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods
employed in Victoria to deal with disputes in workers' compensation. The approach that is
taken is to focus on the various sub-systems that have been established to resolve and settle
disputes as they develop.
The role that a workers' compensation agency takes in matters of disputes can be
arrayed along a continuum. At one end are those public agencies that play a central and
decisive role in the resolution of disputes. Such agencies make the initial determination of
factual matters, and they may also be nearly the ultimate appellate body as well, if further
review in the courts is rare and difficult to obtain. At the other edge of the continuum are those
agencies that utilise direct and indirect measures to induce the parties to mutually resolve their
differences. Further, the agency itself may not decide disputes at all but, instead, have the
independent court system serve that function.
Since 1 December 1992, Victoria's approach to dispute resolution has placed it squarely
in the latter camp. The agency does not adjudicate disputes; instead, the WorkCover Authority
seeks to minimise the incidence of disputes, and when they arise, to have them settled rapidly
by the parties with a minimum of transaction costs. Where that does not succeed, as must
occur on occasion, the dispute is resolved in the courts. To assist the parties and achieve their
goals, workers' compensation depends heavily on a system of Medical Panels, in order to
bring to bear some objectivity and professional expertise on disputes arising over medical
matters. An independent Conciliation Service is empowered to assist the parties in finding
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common ground. Disputes that are not resolved at that stage, and those emanating from
common law actions, enter the court process. Even here, however, the WorkCover law seeks
to drive some cases to the less formal (and less expensive) Magistrate's Court rather than the
County Courts. A small number of disputes over some specialised issues can be resolved, if
not at the Conciliation Service, at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
Medical Panels
An important element in the dispute resolution process in Victoria is the system of
Medical Panels. In recent years an increasing number of jurisdictions have created and utilised
such Panels, in one form or another, to assist in the resolution of disputes involving medical
issues. 1 The goal of this approach, generally, is to have these issues decided by neutral persons
with appropriate medical expertise, who have no financial or other interest associated with the
outcome. Currently, such Panels are found in Victoria, New South Wales and Western
Australia; and Queensland employs a Medical Assessment Tribunal.
The use of the Medical Panel approach can provide several outcomes that many parties
would consider to be salutary. Aside from bringing some neutral professional expertise into the
process, the very existence of such Panels may serve to discourage excessive amounts of
litigation; as parties avoid disputing matters if they have little or no effective medical evidence
to support them. Additionally, the parties may have more satisfaction with the entire process
when the contending positions are evaluated by qualified neutrals.
Jurisdictions that have created Medical Panels have had to wrestle with many significant
issues concerning the procedures that they employ. Specifically, interest groups may give
support to, or oppose, such Panels depending upon the answers to a number of questions,
including:
What issues are to be taken to a Panel?
Who can serve on a Panel?
Who selects the Panel members?

'For example see Earth. 1985. Resolving Occupational Disease Claims: The Use of Medical Panels.
Cambridge, MA: Workers Compensation Research Institute.
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What is the size of a Panel?
How binding are the findings of the Panel?
In what form does the Panel report its findings?
On what basis does the Panel determine its findings?
To what extent does the Panel delay the dispute resolution process?
Medical Panels were established in December 1992 with the introduction of
WorkCover. It is independent of the Authority though its budget flows from it. The primary
responsibility of the scheme is spelled out in the statute Section 67(1): "The function of a
medical panel is to give its opinion on any medical question in respect of injuries arising out
of, or in the course of or due to the nature of employment before, on or after the
commencement of section 10 of the Accident Compensation (WorkCover) Act 1992 ..." The
definition of "medical question" consists of nine items identified in the statute (Section 5). In
1994, the function of the Medical Panels was expanded under Section 104 (see below). That
section does not refer explicitly to a "medical question." Consequently, the function of the
Medical Panels extends beyond that which is found in Section 67.
Under Section 67, a Conciliation Officer, the County Court, the Authority or an
authorised insurer or a self-insurer may require a worker—either one claiming compensation or
one who is receiving weekly payments under the Act—to submit themselves for examination by
a Medical Panel. If the worker unreasonably refuses to meet the Panel and answer its
questions, to supply relevant documents to the Panel, or to submit to a medical examination by
a member of the Panel, the worker may lose the right to payments or have them suspended.
The law provides that where the County Court exercises jurisdiction, the court may
refer a medical question to a Medical Panel for an opinion, and it must refer a medical question
if a party to the proceedings so requests (Section 45). In either case, the opinion of the Panel is
binding, subject to the County Court's opinion that new information on the medical question
has emerged since the Panel's opinion or the worker's medical condition has changed since the
opinion was rendered.
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Panel Members
One Panel member is appointed by the Minister as Convenor. The Convenor is
appointed to oversee the business of the Panels and to give directions as to procedures of the
Panels. Members of Medical Panels are appointed by the Governor in Council. They must be
medical practitioners, i.e., a registered medical practitioner within the meaning of the Medical
Practice Act of 1994. Currently, there are about 120 persons so designated in Victoria.
As noted above, the selection of Medical Panel members can be a source of
dissatisfaction by parties, who may question their neutrality (fairness) or their quality. A
number of issues have surfaced in this regard. First, it can be difficult to recruit certain
medical practitioners to the Medical Panel. If potential members are already very heavily
committed, if they perceive that Panel work may involve them in excessive contention or, if
they believe that such work inadequately compensates them, it may be difficult to fill the Panel
with highly regarded professionals. Further, some persons may be willing to serve on the
Panel but substantially limit the degree of their involvement.
In actual practice, the Victoria Medical Panel has had several specific matters to deal
with. First, the number of medical practitioners in some specialties is hardly adequate for the
number of cases requiring those skills, while there exists an excess supply in other fields of
specialisation. Second, while some Panel members allow themselves to serve only in a handful
of Panels, others will serve in 30 or 40 a month. Critics of the Panel point to these Panel
members who serve frequently as an indicator of a lack of quality, although no evidence has
been produced to show that frequency of service bears any relation to quality. A third issue
that has arisen has been the difficulty that might exist in removing any person previously
selected to serve on the Panel. Specifically, even if the Convenor sought to have a Panel
member removed, the Convenor was vulnerable to having a legal action brought against him.
However, Section 65(10) of the Act, inserted by the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act
1996 appears to provide the Convenor some protection hi this regard.
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Procedures
The party that refers the dispute to the Panel indicates the issue(s) that is (are) in
dispute. The Convenor then puts this issue(s) to the Panel for its findings. The issues that can
go to the Panel are either "medical questions" or other matters (see below) that the statute
directs can or must go to a Medical Panel. When an issue is referred to a Medical Panel, the
Convenor identifies the appropriate Panel member(s) on the basis of specialty, given the
medical issue in dispute, and availability. If a member has treated or examined the worker
previously, or is engaged to do so, they cannot be appointed to that Panel.
The Panel can consist of one to three members. In Victoria, each Panel member
examines the patient, usually separately. One member of the Panel is designated as the
Presiding member. After examination of the claimant, and an evaluation of any relevant
material supplied by the Convenor, each Panel member prepares a preliminary report. These
reports are exchanged and, based upon subsequent communication between or among the
panellists, a consensus is reached, which serves as the basis for the Panel's findings. These are
reported and certified by the Presiding member.
An issue has arisen over the preliminary reports of the Panels and their availability as
evidence. The preliminary opinions need not be released, nor must members provide additional
opinions. Ultimately, they must simply respond to the question(s) put to them. Moreover, the
consensus reports are often quite brief, and provide little or no explanation for the Panel's
findings. What is clear, however, is that it is the findings themselves that the parties need, if
they are to reach some resolution. What the Panels seek to do is to provide these findings,
while avoiding becoming involved hi the litigation themselves.
A goal of the Medical Panels has been to not delay the resolution of disputes. The
statute provides some tight time lines for this process. A Medical Panel must form its opinion,
in the form of a certificate, within 21 days after the reference is made. Further, the Panel has 7
days after forming its opinion to provide it to the relevant persons. This has proven to be
unworkable, and sizable delays exist in the process. There are several reasons for this, but a
key has been that the system has been vastly overburdened since 1994.
In the 1994 law change, the role of the Medical Panels was modified and greatly
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expanded. Specifically, where a claimant disputes an insurer's offer for a claim under Section
98 or 98A, the claimant must not commence proceedings until the claimant first refers the
dispute to a Medical Panel for an opinion as to entitlement to compensation and the extent of
any loss in terms of impairment, disfigurement or pain and suffering. Until 1996, claims made
under Section 98 or 98A went to a Medical Panel if the insurer's offer was disputed. However,
where the insurer did not respond with a determination regarding entitlement to the claim and
its extent within 60 days of receipt of the claim, the claimant could proceed to court.
The opinion of the Medical Panel is binding, essentially, on the insurer. Once the
Panel's certificate is issued, the insurer must make an offer under Section 98 within 14 days of
receiving the opinion of the Panel that is consistent with (or better than) the Panel's findings.
Similarly, it must do so with Section 98A claims, though this may involve some subjectivity.
The Panel's opinion is not binding on the claimant. If the dispute remains, i.e., the offer is not
acceptable, the Conciliation Service may become involved. Though the Conciliation Officer
may refer disputes over "medical questions" to a Medical Panel, and the opinion of the Panel
is binding on the parties, determining the extent of disability under Section 98 or of pain and
suffering under Section 98A are not "medical questions." Further, the courts have not been
completely supportive regarding the binding nature of the findings on the parties.
Medical Panels in Practice
The data in Table 6.1 show the number of referrals according to referring party over
the past 3 years. The numbers could hardly be clearer in terms of the changed character of the
Medical Panels. From 1993-94 to 1995-96, the number of referrals grew by almost 9 times.
This reflects the impact of the 1994 amendments. Secondly, Table 6.1 reveals that the activity
of Medical Panels is generated almost entirely by claimants, who must request a Medical Panel
as a step on the path to the courts in disputes over maims. For practical purposes, the courts do
not refer cases to the Medical Panel. That reflects the fact that very few disputes over maims
actually get to trial. It likely reflects also the courts' belief that the Panel's opinions are not
needed. Moreover, a court is bound, essentially, by the Panel's opinion when it has been
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referred by the court. The Conciliation Service's use of the Panel is mandatory in cases
involving disputes over medical questions.
Table 6.2 is confirmation of the impact of the 1994 amendments. By 1995-96, 97
percent of referrals to Medical Panels were made under Section 98/104, that is, disputes over
maims. It seems fair to summarize that the use of Medical Panels for all issues other than
maims benefits was negligible.
The data in Table 6.3 reveal the little that is known about the type of bodily injury
involved in disputes that are referred to a Panel. In 1993/94, about 44 per cent of referrals
involved "backs," and though the number of such cases grew, they were overtaken by the
ballooning of hearing loss claims/disputes in the next 2 years. However, as maims cases
swamped the Medical Panels in 1994/95 and 1995/96, increasingly the types of injuries were
coded as "multiple." Of course, "multiple" injuries can be the source of problems hi
constituting a single panel of medical specialists. However, the Panel may obtain consultation
from other specialists, where needed, to assist it hi reaching an opinion.
In almost all cases in 1995/96, two-person Panels were employed. (Table 6.4) Over the
past 2 years, not a single Panel was constituted on the basis of a single member. This reflects
the preferences of both the Panel members and the Convenor for a Panel that permits some
consultation within the Panel process. Table 6.5 reflects the professional specialisation of those
appointed to a panel in 1995/96. Hardly surprisingly, the dominant specialty required is
orthopaedics. Note the sizable number of specialists drawn from otolaryngology and
psychiatry. The lack of availability of psychiatrists to serve on Medical Panels in Victoria was
noted by a number of parties.
The explosion in Medical Panel activity has exacted a price. Delays and backlogs have
grown from 1993/94 to 1995/96. In the most recent year the median delay for the return of an
opinion reached 160 days. By July 1995, there was a backlog of 1,173 files; as the number of
lodgements grew, the backlog in July 1996 had grown to 1,345 files. By 1996, it was apparent
that disputes over maims were swamping the Medical Panel approach. Moreover, many of the
disputes did not appear to resolve as a result of the opinions of a Medical Panel.
Consequently, the system has been modified. Specifically, the 1996 amendments of
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Section 104 mean that if a worker disputes an insurer decision with respect to a claim for a
maims benefit, it no longer must be referred to a Medical Panel. Instead, it must be referred to
Conciliation. The Conciliation Officer may then refer the matter to a Medical Panel. The 1996
change does not require that the insurer make an offer consistent with the Panel opinion where
the disputed issue is not a "medical question." However, it seems likely that the insurer will
still be expected to make such an offer.
Medical Panels and the Future
The unknown is the extent to which Conciliation Officers will refer maims benefit
disputes to a Medical Panel. The 1996 law changes are likely to lead to some reduction overall
in claimant disputes over maims. That aside, Conciliators may or may not seek the intervention
of a Medical Panel. One view is that the 1996 law will lead to some reduction in the proportion
of claims resolved by the Conciliation Service. Indirectly, this may place some pressure on the
Service to show a higher rate of resolutions, and referrals to Medical Panels may be utilised as
a means to achieve a higher success rate. Early indications are that the use of Medical Panels
will be very limited in maims disputes.
A reduction in the utilisation of the Medical Panels is seen as a highly desirable
outcome. First, as the demand for Panels is reduced, it can lead to some reduction hi the delays
that have resulted from excessive demands. Second, it would reduce the problem created by the
inadequate number of practitioners available in certain specialties. Third, it would reduce the
need to depend so heavily on some practitioners, which previously created perceptions that the
quality of Panel members had slipped.
Relieving the pressure on the Medical Panels is regarded as vital. However, there still
appears to be something of an artificial distinction that exists regarding "medical questions." It
seems to stretch things to exclude disputes over the existence and extent of maims from the set
of "medical questions." Few workers' compensation schemes have found a generally accepted
method of resolving maims disputes. Many of the differences between claimant and insurer
regarding maims do involve medical matters, if not "medical questions." A rational and
objective method to resolve these matters must be found.
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A related question is the type of issue on which the Panel may report. Prior to 1996,
the law required the Panel to provide "an opinion as to (a) the entitlement of the claimant to
compensation," in Section 104 disputes. It requires little imagination to see that so broad a
question could have medical specialists reporting on issues that were fundamentally beyond
their domain. Some parties argued that this had occurred, and that particular language has been
replaced in 1996. It remains to be seen if Panel members will be made sensitive to the
somewhat less open-ended responsibilities that they will encounter in maims disputes.
The Common Law
In many jurisdictions, workers' compensation is the "exclusive remedy" that an injured
worker or dependant has vis-a-vis the employer. In virtually all of the U.S.A. and Canada for
example, the employer is shielded from common law actions by employees or dependents with
rights to benefits under workers' compensation. Actions for damages due to negligence can be
sought by workers not covered under a workers' compensation law, or from parties other than
the employer. (However, actions against fellow employees, labour unions, insurance carriers,
government inspectors and some others are also generally not permitted, leaving workers'
compensation as the exclusive remedy.)
Though access to the common law on behalf of employees against their employers is
absolutely barred hi many jurisdictions, the Australian experience is more of a continuum with
such actions barred in South Australia and the Northern Territory; limited access or benefits in
Victoria, the Commonwealth (Comcare, SeaCare), New South Wales, and Western Australia;
and unlimited access or benefits in Queensland, Tasmania, and the Australian Capitol
Territory.
The first worker's compensation law in Victoria (1914) preserved the common law
rights of employees. An injured worker had the option to claim workers' compensation .or take
proceedings for damages; the employer would not be liable under both remedies. Due to
legislative changes and judicial decisions, by 1970 an injured worker was able to claim both
workers' compensation and common law damages, although an offset of dual benefits was
applied.
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In 1985, the passage of the Accident Compensation Act spelled out and set certain
constraints on workers' access to dual benefits or compensation. Essentially, there was to be
no recovery for damages for pecuniary losses, except in death cases and in certain third party
proceedings where the employer was not a party. Workers were allowed to seek damages from
their employer for their pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life due to negligence. In
1987, the Accident Compensation Act was amended, to place limits on the damages for nonpecuniary loss. A ceiling of $140,000 was placed on these damages, and any amount paid for
maims under worker's compensation was to be deducted from awarded damages.
Common Law Under Section 135B
The legislation creating the WorkCover scheme created a sharply bifurcated approach
to the common law in the case of work injuries. The law sought to spell out common law
entitlements for injuries occurring before (Section 135B) and after (Section 135A) 1 December
1992. Though a grey area exists for some claims in terms of the applicable section of the law,
there are very significant differences between Section 135A and Section 135B. Under Section
135A, for injuries arising after 1 December 1992, access to the common law was substantially
narrowed. Workers had a brief period of time to commence proceedings under the less
restrictive Section 135B, with any subsequent suits to be covered, if applicable, under Section
135A. A flood of proceedings was commenced under Section 135B to avoid the possibility of
being unable to do so under Section 135A.
Initially, workers who wished to claim common law damages for injuries incurred
before 1 December 1992 were required to file their claims by that date. A grace period of 3
months was allowed for injuries that occurred in the 3 months prior to 1 December 1992. In
the last 10 days of WorkCare, approximately 10,000 writs were issued. By February 1993,
over 18,000 common law writs had been issued. A court decision in December 1993, followed
by remedial legislation, moved the final date for filing claims for injuries prior to 1 December
1992 to 30 June 1994.2 Ultimately the VWA was faced with having to run off 22,000 claims.
2See Robart v. Matchplan Pty Ltd., Supreme Court of Victoria - Full Court, 7267 of 1993.
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The Authority has had an enormous task in resolving more than 22,000 common law
claims for these "old" cases. Yet by July 1996, over 97 percent had been settled. In the 3
(fiscal) years beginning with 1992/93, WorkCover settled 9,690, 5,046 and 4,974 claims. The
Authority utilised a number of techniques to resolve this monumental number of common law
claims, including the use of alternative dispute resolution and the involvement of independent
expert evaluators.
An interesting measure employed to resolve these claims was one that discouraged
claimants from forcing some actual court involvement. The law required that common law
claims under Section 135B (but not Section 135A) be brought to Conciliation, and that the
court must not hear such proceedings unless the parties had attended a conference at which an
offer was made, either within 3 months of December 1992 or the commencement of
proceedings. If the Authority's final offer was not accepted by the worker at the conference,
the Authority's settlement offer could not be increased. The worker would be required to pay
both parties' costs unless the amount awarded by judgment exceeded 120 percent of the
Authority's final offer.
Fewer than 1.5 percent of the writs lodged resulted in a formal court determination.
The size of the settlements paid averaged $23,000. However, it is likely that the cases that
remain unsettled may involve not only more intractable issues, they may also involve, on
average, cases that will settle for amounts greater than that previously established.
Common Law Under Section 135A
Access to common law was generally narrowed by WorkCover legislation, though
elements of the law did broaden some parts of it. The law was enlarged to give workers access
to common law for damages to their loss of earning capacity. However, damages could be
awarded against an employer in such cases only where they exceeded $29,860. Recall that
proceedings for the loss of wage earning capacity had been permitted in Victoria prior to 1985.

6-11

A cap on such damages was set at $671,960.3 Common law damages for pain and suffering
also were not to be awarded if damages were assessed at less than $29,860. The ceiling on
common law awards for pain and suffering remained at the existing level of $184,740, to be
modified annually by indexation ($333,420 as of 1 July 1996).
The most significant change with WorkCover was the requirement that the injury be
found to be a "serious injury" in order for the workers to have access to damages under
common law. The inflow of claims for damages in 1992 and 1993 primarily were from those
who believed that they would not be found to have a serious injury, thereby being ineligible for
common law recovery. Under Section 135B, "old" cases had no such "serious injury" barrier.
The legislation, substantially modelled after the Transport Accident Act 1986, defined
"serious injury" hi several ways. Most attention was focused on a requirement that the injured
worker be found to be impaired by 30 percent or more, on the basis of an assessment made
according to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, 2nd edition. Persons familiar with the Guides recognise that a 30 percent
impairment level or higher represents a very significant impairment. Thus, despite reopening
access to damages for the loss of earning capacity, it was anticipated that the volume of
common law cases would drop off substantially from where it had previously been. The
expectation was that the reduction would occur amongst the claims for relatively minor injuries
and perhaps nuisance claims as well. Though such claims may not carry large awards or
settlements, their volume combined with their transactions costs were seen as burdensome.
Essentially, there are four possible mechanisms that will allow a worker to successfully
seek common law damages. First, if the insurer determines that the worker has sustained an
impairment of 30 percent or more according to the AMA Guides, the worker has a "serious
injury." However, the insurer may be satisfied that the worker has a "serious injury," even
absent the 30 percent determination, under the "narrative" definition of disability. In that case
the insurer is able to issue a certificate consenting to the bringing of proceedings. This might

^These dollar amounts are subject to annual indexing. As of 1 July 1996, these amounts were $32,860 for
the threshold and $739,690 for the maximum allowed.
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occur where the insurer believes that the court is quite likely to find "serious injury" and
chooses to avoid litigating the issue. A third mechanism is where a court gives leave to bring
proceedings. A final mechanism that enables the worker to bring proceedings follows from
Section 135A(19) and is described later. Of course, the question of "serious injury" simply
deals with the issue of access, and not with the need to prove negligence, the amount of
damages, or the need to prove that the employment was a "substantial contributing factor."
With WorkCover, the expectation was that the number of common law cases would
drop off precipitously. However, although a substantial reduction has occurred over what
would have been the volume in the absence of the 1992 legislation, worker solicitors have
learned how to widen access to the common law. This, in combination with certain judicial
determinations, has meant that common law still represents an important component of work
injury compensation in Victoria.
Procedures and the Expansion of Accessibility
The process that may lead to a common law determination begins, typically, with the
rating of an injured worker's impairment. The insurer will have the worker sent to a medical
examiner of its choosing, preferably a specialist in the field relating to the injury. The worker
is rated based on the AMA Guides, 2nd Edition. As indicated above, the worker is classified as
being "seriously injured" only if the rating is 30 percent or higher. If the worker is not found
to be "seriously injured," and no certificate is issued by the insurer consenting to the bringing
of proceedings, the worker still may apply to court for leave to bring proceedings.
It is important to note that a worker with no certificate consenting to his/her bringing
proceedings for damages was thought to face two sets of proceedings. First, the worker would
have to persuade a county court to give leave to bring proceedings for damages and then, if
this hurdle was overcome, would have to win a separate damages action. This creates an added
hurdle for the worker, a situation where winning at the initial level of dispute can leave the
worker with some costs, and it extends the time that the entire process will take. However, it
does parallel the process found in the Transport Accident Act.
Workers or dependents have 6 years in which to commence an action for personal
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injury or death. For an occupational disease, however, the worker has 6 years from the date
that the worker becomes aware both of the existence of the disease and that another person is
responsible for it. Similarly, where a worker dies without knowing they have a cause of action
the dependant has 6 years from the date that they became aware of the condition and its source
to commence an action. Courts are able to extend the statutory limits on the issuing of a writ.
Since 1993, the common law procedures have been defined by several important
judicial determinations. We note here only three that are considered to have had, or will have,
a major impact on common law cases. In Bowles v. Coles-Myer Ltd. (Bowles Case), J. Ashley
found that a worker was free to bring proceedings for damages where the insurer had not made
a determination on the matter of "serious injury" before the issuance of the writ.4 Though the
defendant asserted that a determination had been made before the writ was issued, J. Ashley
rejected that and ruled that absent such a determination, the worker was able to proceed to seek
damages. The consequence of the Bowles Case is to reduce the burden on the plaintiff, by
eliminating the need for the first trial, where the court finds that the insurer has not made a
(proper) determination of the existence of "serious injury." The worker is still obliged to
establish "serious injury" at trial.
Sections 135A(2A)-(2D), which were inserted by the Accident Compensation
(Amendment) Act 1996, and which were made applicable to any proceedings brought on or
after 25 June 1996, create a procedure to deal with certain issues raised by Bowles. Subject to
one exception, a worker may not bring proceedings unless a determination has been made of
the degree of impairment. If the written application by the worker is received within 104 weeks
after the injury, the insurer may refuse to make a determination if the condition has not
stabilized. If the condition is stable, or it is beyond 104 weeks, the insurer has 60 days from
receipt of the application to make a determination of the degree of impairment. If the insurer
does not advise the worker in writing of the determination within 60 days, or of its refusal to
do so within the 104-week window, the worker is entitled to bring proceedings, and have the
matter of "serious injury" determined in the proceedings.
4Bowles v. Coles-Myer Ltd. (1995) 1 VR 480.
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No doubt, some insurers will find this 60-day clock to be a difficult one to meet in all
applications. As such, some workers will find themselves with access to the court to have both
"serious injury" and damages decided in a single trial, due to an insurer's inability to act
within the time limits imposed.
In the LJ. Hanrahan v. Terrence John Davis (Hanrahan Case), the Court of Appeal of
the Supreme Court of Victoria found that a determination of "serious injury" under Section
93B(5) by the insurer satisfied the requirements of Section 135A(3), thereby deeming the
injury to be a "serious injury" for purposes of the common law action as well.5 Recall that a
determination is made by the insurer regarding "serious injury" for purposes of setting the
weekly benefits rate after 26 weeks of incapacity (Section 93B). In the Hanrahan Case, the
court found that the post-26-week benefit determination which found that the employee had a
"serious injury" enabled him to satisfy the test of serious injury, and to proceed to seek
damages against his employer.
The significance of the Hanrahan Case was considerable, as it essentially opened access
to common law relief for workers who were found to be "seriously injured" by the 26th week
of incapacity, but whose incapacity would have fallen below the 30 percent threshold
subsequently, as their healing continued and their condition improved. Section 135A(3A) of
the Act, inserted by the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996, seeks to rectify this. It
provides that a decision by the insurer that the worker has a serious injury for the purposes of
Section 93B is not to be taken to be a determination for purposes of Section 135 A (common
law), unless the decision specifically so states.
That change overturns the Hanrahan result, and is deemed to have commenced on 1
December 1992; however it does not eliminate it for any proceedings commenced and
determined before 16 May 1996. Much as the enactment of WorkCover triggered a flood of
actions brought for damages, a smaller but considerable number of claims for damages have
been initiated in cases where workers were determined to be "seriously injured" at 26 weeks,

5L.y. Hanrahan v. Terrence John Davis, Supreme Court of Victoria, No. 5312 of 1995.
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but did not or would not have been found to be "seriously injured" subsequently under Section
135A.
It is too early to judge how effectively Section 135A(3A) will serve to limit common
law actions. The response by injured workers and their solicitors suggests that Hanrahan is no
longer of importance, at least once these new claims are run off. Yet it remains that a finding
of "serious injury" at 26 weeks may serve to influence a court in deciding the presence or
absence of "serious injury" for purposes of a Section 135A determination. Thus, a worker's
solicitor can be expected to ask how a worker is not "seriously injured" currently when the
insurer itself found the worker's injury to be "serious" previously.
The third case, actually a set of cases, stem from the discussion above regarding the
mechanism that can be employed by an injured worker to seek damages. Specifically, Section
135A(19) provides a definition whose impact is still not fully understood:
In this section, serious injury means
(a) serious long-term impairment or loss of a body function; or
(b) permanent serious disfigurement; or
(c) severe long-term mental or severe long-term behavioural disturbance or disorder;
or
(d) loss of a foetus.
This section of the law, combined with Section 135A(4)(b), which says "a court, on the
application of the worker, gives leave to bring the proceedings," poses the greatest opportunity
to expand access to the common law remedy for workers with less than a 30 percent level of
impairment. A critical decision hi this regard is drawn from an attempt to seek damages under
the Transport Accident Act 1986, whose wording and application very closely parallel the
(amended) Accident Compensation Act of 1985. In that case, the court found that the plaintiff
could bring proceedings without consideration of the 30 percent AMA Guides threshold.6
The court found that the preponderance of medical evidence established that there was
an aggravation of a pre-existing back condition, which constituted "... a serious long-term
impairment of a body function—the function of the spine." Practically, persons familiar with

'Petkovski v. Galetti, 1994 I VR 426.
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workers' compensation matters recognise the widespread, frequent character of claims for back
injuries, with or without the complication of a pre-existing condition. In Petkovski v. Galetti,
the court allowed the claimant to seek common law damages as it found:
The unassailed evidence established that before the accident the applicant
was able to work full-time and effectively, albeit interrupted in occasions by
back problems. While the evidence of economic loss is skimpy, to say the least,
and the evidence is imprecise as to the normal working hours, it safely can be
inferred that they must have totalled significantly more than 30 per week; the
accident has effectively reduced them to 20. We accept as correct the submission
... that such an interference with working capacity may fairly be regarded as a
"serious consequence" for the applicant... (at 444)
In the Nichols Case, the plaintiff sought leave of the county court pursuant to Section
135A(4)(b) to issue proceedings for recovery of damages in a workplace injury.7 Judge Ravech
found in favour of the plaintiff, Nichols, allowing him to move to the next stage in his quest
for damages. The judge did so for several reasons. One doctor reported that the plaintiff s
injury and subsequent pain contributed to his depression. He accepted the doctor's explanation
that a person with an injury who is also depressed is likely to have difficulty in obtaining
employment. Judge Ravech noted other cases where "serious injury" was found based on
disablement from work or interference with the enjoyment of life. Because the plaintiff
appeared headed both for "difficulty" in obtaining future employment and to future periods of
unemployment, and due to his loss of enjoyment of life "serious injury" was found.
What Petkovski, Nichols, and other comparable decisions have done is to find "serious
injury" on the basis of disability and not impairment. As such, decisions of this sort create an
enormous opportunity for injured workers to access the common law remedy, despite then*
inability to meet the 30 percent impairment threshold in the statute. In fact, decisions of this
kind could move access back to where it was before 1 December 1992. However, today there
is also an entitlement to damages for pecuniary loss, which did not exist immediately prior to
enactment of WorkCover.
Petkovski, Nichols, and related cases do not represent a matter that is unique to

1 Glen Alexander Nichols v. Victorian WorkCover Authority etal. No. MC 9409103.
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Victoria. In a number of jurisdictions in and outside of Australia, legislation has tended to
move compensation of injured workers with permanent disabilities from one basis to another.
Specifically, with a view toward eliminating subjective evaluations of present and future
disability—primarily an assessment of the vague concept of the loss of future earning
capacity— laws have been changed to shift to a more uniform basis (assessing the degree of
medical impairment only). However, compensation agencies and/or courts have been difficult
to wean from the disability standard. Victoria sought to move to the impairment basis in 1992,
at least for purposes of limiting access to the common law. Clearly, if that was the intent, it
has not been entirely successful.
Yet another assault on the "serious injury" standard found in Section 135A arises from
the 30 percent threshold itself. A widely held perception is that the threshold is not as difficult
to reach or overcome as was envisioned in 1992. Specifically, workers with injuries may be
able to reach or surpass the 30 percent barrier because of the combined effects of the
workplace injury and any psychological sequelae of the accident, the injury and/or the pain that
results. This practice was legislatively prohibited in the December 1996 amendments to the
Act. Unlike many injuries, considerable subjectivity is involved in assessing the degree of
psychological impairment.
Damages
The damages under common law are described in Chapter 5 on benefits, and the floor
and ceilings have been noted earlier. It needs to be observed that the potential damages are
related to the probability of attempting to secure them. For example, any benefits paid to a
worker under Section 98 or 98A (maims or for pain and suffering) are deducted from damages
awarded, respectively, for pecuniary loss or for pain and suffering. As such, the greater the
payment under either of these provisions, the lower the net expected value of an action for
damages. It is alleged that the parties game the scheme accordingly. Insurers may pay higher
levels of benefits under Section 98 and/or Section 98A to reduce the likelihood of common law
actions. Workers and their solicitors will not turn down these higher payments, and they avoid
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the protracted and more challenging characteristics of a suit for damages. The Authority does
not condone this practice.
Yet another practical consideration works precisely against such a practice. Insurers are
under some pressure from employers to minimise the costs of any injuries their employees
sustain, due to experience rating. Because expenditures not made within 3 years of the injury
are not considered in setting the employer's experience modifier, the employer has a direct
incentive to have the insurer delay payments until the three-year window has been closed. As
such, were a Section 98 or Section 98A benefit to fall within the three-year period, and a
common law action result in damages that fall outside the three-year period, an incentive exists
not to bulk up the workers' compensation benefit so as to preclude having a subsequent action
for damages.
Any contributory negligence by the worker can proportionately reduce the amount of
damages paid. Because of the no-fault character of workers' compensation, contributory
negligence plays no role in benefits awarded there. Contributory negligence is considered by
the defence in proceedings, but it is said to be a difficult matter to win. Among other things the
employer owes a duty to care to all its employees. It is the employer that has the duty both to
instruct and to supervise the performance of the work. Consequently, contributory negligence
need not be found, even where the worker's conduct has caused or aggravated the injury.
Nevertheless, where contributory negligence may be a significant factor, it will reduce the
probability of a suit.
The Future
A critical question for workers' compensation, in terms both of its recent experience
and its future, relates to the future of common law actions. Clearly, a goal since 1992 has been
to bring down the volume of such actions. Setting aside the run-off of the 20,000 claims for
injuries under WorkCare, there has been a decline in such cases. However, there are mixed
views as to the importance of that observation. Some solicitors appear to believe that it is not
productive to rush to common law. Instead, they argue, the passage of time usually enriches a
claim for damages. According to this, there are cases where, currently, writs could be issued
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or leave sought to proceed to doing so. Instead, the cases have not emerged and are being held
back to maximise their value.
One basis for assessing the degree to which a potential exists for future actions for
damages is the number of cases where "serious injury" has been found by the insurer. Of
course, some of these will not result in proceedings since no basis for employer negligence
may exist. More importantly, the erosion of the "serious injury" barrier has already been
noted, and the potential number of damages actions may be much larger than the number of
previously determined "serious injured" workers. However, as of 30 June 1996, the Authority
reported that there were 3,277 claimants who had been found to be "seriously injured." As of
August 1996, the Authority believes that 1,423 common law matters have been lodged under
the WorkCover law. Some of these are obviously based on the legislative response to the
Hanrahan decision, discussed above.
The Conciliation Service
In many jurisdictions outside of Australia, particularly in North America, there is a
general pattern or approach to dispute resolution in workers' compensation cases. While
specifics differ from one system to another, a common formula places decision making for
dispute resolution in the hands of the workers' compensation agency. This is true even when
there is no allowance of private insurance (or even self-insurance), and the government
insurance fund may reside within the same agency that adjudicates disputes. Frequently, also, a
more or less autonomous appeals board or tribunal will take appeals of decisions reached by
the workers' compensation agency. Though all such approaches may permit appeals of the
decisions of such bodies to be taken to court, it is common to limit such appeals solely to
matters of law and not to disputes over facts. In some jurisdictions, access to the courts is
strictly limited to those matters and workers' compensation disputes rarely are decided at that
level.
Quite at odds with this approach is the model found in Victoria, and most of the other
jurisdictions in Australia. Under WorkCover, the Authority does not adjudicate disputes over
eligibility for, or the extent of, compensation benefits. Essentially, disputes related to these
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issues have traditionally been decided by tribunals in Victoria. Resorting to the courts to decide
such issues can burden the parties with significant transaction costs, it will likely create
important delays in their arriving at some resolution, and it can lead to backlog problems for
the courts which are already coping with large caseloads from other fields.
As a way to hasten the resolution of disputes over claims, and to avoid throwing all of
them into a court-centred process, the WorkCover legislation created the Conciliation Service.
The purpose of the Conciliation Service, essentially, is to help the parties to resolve their
disputes, thereby eliminating the need to take the next step, that is, to litigate the matter at
court. It functions by involving workers, employers and insurers hi an informal and nonadversarial process that aims to lead to a mutually acceptable agreement. The Ministerial
Guidelines for the Conciliation Officers identify the following goals of the Conciliation
Officer:

•

assist the parties to achieve durable resolutions and agreements, where possible;
be even handed and fair, and address matters on their merits;
maximise flexibility and informality;
facilitate return-to-work opportunities;
enhance on-going worker/employer employment relationship;
be prompt and timely in the conduct of the conciliation process and in dealings
with the parties;
reduce cost implications for the parties and the scheme and ensure that matters do
not unnecessarily proceed to the courts.
Procedures

From 1 July 1994, all disputes over compensability or benefits must be referred to
Conciliation, except those over death claims (Section 92), for maims (Section 98), and for pain
and suffering (Section 98A). Beginning in July 1996, however, disputes over maims and pain
and suffering also require mandatory conciliation.
Most requests for conciliation are initiated by workers who have been advised by the
insurer of a decision that is regarded as adverse to them. However, any party to a dispute, i.e.,
the insurer, the employer, the worker, or the Authority, may refer the matter to Conciliation.
A party has 60 days from notice by the insurer of its decision to lodge a request for
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conciliation. The Senior Conciliation Officer may allow this 60-day limit to be waived. Indeed
this is usually done when such a request is made, for to insist that the request fall within the 60
days may result in the applicant seeking relief from a court.
When a "Request for Conciliation" form is submitted, a referral certificate is issued
within 7 days, putting all parties on notice. On occasion, this will be sufficient to cause the
disputing parties to agree to settle, particularly where such cases may involve not a dispute so
much as the need for clarification or a better explanation of a decision. After the initial 7 days
have passed, a date is set for a conciliation conference. The worker and the employer (if it is
the first time that the employer is to attend such a conference) are each sent a video (in four
languages) and a brochure (available in multiple languages) describing what such a conference
entails. This step was taken to allay any apprehension that participants might have in advance
of the conference and to allow them to better prepare for it. Additionally, the worker is advised
that a translator can be made available to assist the worker at the conference.
The Act requires that the parties produce any document or information that the
Conciliation Officer considers necessary to resolve the dispute. The insurer is required to
submit any information or medical reports to the Conciliation Service within 48 hours of
receipt of notice that a Request for Conciliation has been lodged. The Conciliation Officer may
attempt to have the dispute resolved even prior to the conference, if sufficient information has
been made available and a settlement seems possible.
The Conciliation Conference will bring together the insurer, the worker, and frequently
the employer. The worker and the employer are entitled to be accompanied by a friend or
relative or some other person to assist them at the conference. Union representatives, for
example, often serve as an assistant for the worker. Significantly, a worker or an employer is
not entitled to be accompanied by a solicitor. If a party wishes to have their solicitor present,
approval must be given by both the contending party and the Conciliation Officer. On
occasions requests by workers to have a solicitor accompany them to a conference have been
rejected. However, such requests can and have been granted, particularly where it seems clear
that the opportunity to reach a settlement is greater where the worker has ready access to
counsel.
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If a solicitor does join the worker at a Conciliation Conference his/her fee cannot be
paid by the contending party. Since costs are not allowed as part of the conciliation process,
either the worker must pay the solicitor, or the solicitor must offer to serve without pay. Some
solicitors say that they charge no fee for Conciliation work where the client is a member of
certain labour unions.
The Conciliation Conference may enable the parties to move to an agreement. In some
cases, the agreement is shaped at the conference. In other instances, negotiations between the
parties may occur after the conference has occurred, possibly prior to a previously scheduled
second or subsequent conference. If the dispute involves a medical question, the Conciliation
Officer may refer it to a Medical Panel. The opinion of the Medical Panel must be accepted by
the parties as conclusive. However, the courts have not enforced this provision, and
settlements are made frequently following receipt of the opinion by negotiation between the
parties.
On some occasions, the parties are able to reach some understandings, but are unable to
arrive at an actual agreement. In such cases, the Conciliation Officer is able to make
recommendations regarding how the dispute may be resolved. The parties are not obligated to
accept the recommendations; instead, the Conciliator is simply extending his/her role as a
facilitator.
The Conciliator may be placed in the position of a decision maker. Where the dispute
relates to weekly compensation benefits and no agreement is reached, the Conciliator may
"direct" that payments be made or continue to be made. The Conciliator may only issue
directions where he/she finds that no genuine dispute exists. If there is a decision that a
genuine dispute exists, the matter of any past and future payments is left to the parties, either
to settle or to proceed to court. Directions can be revoked by a Conciliation Officer or the
County Court.
The Conciliation Officer may direct payment of weekly payments for the period prior to
the direction, but that period must not exceed 10 weeks. The Conciliation Officer is authorised
to direct that future weekly benefits be paid for a period not to exceed 12 weeks. After the 12
weeks have passed, the Conciliation Officer may direct that up to 12 more weeks of payments
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be made, though this is not permissible where the earlier direction was revoked by the County
Court.
Clearly, it is tricky matter for a Conciliator to fulfill the task of a facilitator while
retaining the potential role of a decision maker. However, this represents an accommodation to
the reality that no other decision-maker is present in the process, and the worker may be forced
to wait for the outcome of a court proceeding before receiving any weekly compensation
benefits. The accommodation here is tempered by the inability to direct that weekly benefits be
paid where a genuine dispute is perceived to exist. If a direction that weekly benefits be paid
has been issued, the worker is not required to refund those payments if the County Court
determines that the insurer was/is not liable to pay those benefits. However, if the claim was
wholly or partly fraudulent or made without proper justification, the Court may order that
repayment be made.
The Conciliation Officer
Conciliation Officers are appointed by the Minister of Finance and engaged by the
Authority. One of the Officers is appointed as the Senior Conciliation Officer, with
responsibility for the administration of the Service. A Conciliation Officer is not subject either
to the control or to the direction of the Authority. The Authority is not able to overrule any
decision made by the Officer in conciliating a dispute. As of June 1996, there are 21 mil-time
Conciliation Officers, nine sessional and part-time Officers plus three executives of the Service
who carry small caseloads as Conciliation Officers as well. The total staff is 62 persons on a
full-time equivalent basis.
There is no single preferred background for a Conciliation Officer as evidenced by the
broad range found in existing Officers. Clearly, strong interpersonal skills, good judgment, an
ability to listen carefully, a sense of fairness and the ability to appear fair, an understanding of
the law and skills in organising one's workload, all appear to be important characteristics.
The Conciliation Officers are organised into three teams. Once a claim is successfully
lodged with the Service, it is randomly assigned to a team. An exception to that exists where a
team has responsibility for the country district, with that assignment rotated among the teams
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every 9 to 12 months. Once a case is assigned to a team, it is referred on a random basis to one
of the Conciliation Officers. In 1996, some Officers had 80 to 90 cases assigned to them, and
that is viewed as an excessive caseload.
The Experience of the Conciliation Service
The responsibilities of the Service have evolved considerably in the 4 years of its
existence. Eligibility for weekly benefits was terminated for some persons who had been
recipients under the WorkCare scheme for 52 weeks or more at the time that WorkCover was
enacted. Among those persons considered not to be "seriously injured" or totally and
permanently incapacitated, benefits were terminated after the worker had been incapacitated for
104 weeks, including any period prior to commencement of the WorkCover Act. Additionally,
weekly benefits for other recipients who were considered not "seriously injured*' and not
totally and permanently incapacitated were terminated 52 weeks after the commencement of the
Act. These cases represented a sizable portion of the Conciliation Service's caseload in its first
year.
In addition, from 1 December 1992 to 30 June 1993 a total of 12,814 conferences were
concluded and 9,728 cases were settled under Section 135B. However, these were handled as a
transitional situation at the VWA, separate from the emerging Conciliation Service. A team of
transitional conciliators was also engaged in the clearing out of cases that had been filed at the
Accident Compensation Tribunal (eliminated by the WorkCover Act), but where the Tribunal
either had not commenced to hear the matter or had commenced to hear the matter but had not
completed the hearing or determined the matter. These transitional cases were to proceed to the
County Court but only after a conciliation conference had been held on the dispute. (Section
42) Approximately 3,600 matters were affected by this requirement, providing considerable
activity for conciliators through much of 1993.
Mandatory conciliation, except for disputes over Section 92, Section 98, and Section
98A, expanded the Service's responsibilities beginning in July 1994. As of July 1996, all
disputes over maims (Section 98) and over pain and suffering (Section 98A) must be referred
to the Service before commencing proceedings.
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One must conclude that the first several years of conciliation under WorkCover have
witnessed highly uneven flows of cases. Such shifts can create difficulties in terms of planning
training, and possible backlogs or excess capacity for the Conciliation Service. In fact, the
start-up period for the Service was a difficult one, with large numbers of claims heaped onto a
new organisation that was still taking shape. The results were large backlogs and delays. The
Service has overcome these and now is operating with good timeliness and no large backlog.
However, the requirement that Section 98 and Section 98A disputes must be brought to
Conciliation before proceeding to court could have some impact on the balance that had been
successfully achieved by mid 1996.
The data hi Table 6.6 reflect the number of applications for and disposals of cases by
the Conciliation Service. It shows the large difference between applications and disposals that
was created in 1992/93 but that was eliminated, largely, by the end of 1993/94 and fully
disposed of by the end of 1994/95. By the end of June 1996, there were 2,671 cases
outstanding, slightly below the number of new applications (2,568) plus reopened cases (182)
for May and June 1996, i.e., a 60-day backlog.
It must be noted that the number of applications and the number of disposals are less
than complete indicators of the Conciliation Service's activity. First, not all applications result
in a conference. A dispute may be resolved or dropped prior to the holding of a conference,
for example. In 1-2 percent of applications, the Conciliation Service finds that it does not have
jurisdiction. A small percentage of cases represent reopenings of cases.
Additionally, there is a sizable number of disputes involving maims and pain and
suffering that are being resolved in "facilitated discussions." In such disputes, a worker
solicitor may meet with insurers and a Conciliation Officer to settle a batch of that solicitor's
unresolved lump sum claims. The solicitor meets with each insurer separately, perhaps
spending an entire morning seeking to settle a score or more of unresolved cases.
Subsequently, the solicitor will contact the injured workers advising them of the offer that the
insurer has made. In most instances, the worker will, upon the solicitor's recommendation,
accept the offer. These facilitated discussions permit large numbers of maims cases to settle
without the need to directly involve the courts.
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From December 1992 through June 1995, 5,799 (or 19 percent) of 30,972 applications
to the Conciliation Service were for maims disputes. In 1995/96, 4,670 applications (or 31
percent) involved maims disputes out of 14,968 applications for all causes. Beginning in mid
1995, a dispute over a maims claim could be referred to conciliation by a worker concurrently
with, or as an alternative to, a referral to a Medical Panel, or an insurer could refer a Section
98 case to Conciliation where a worker rejected an insurer offer. (This change resulted from
the large backlogs at the Medical Panels.) Other major sources of dispute that result in
applications (as shown in Table 6.7) are rejections of claims by insurers, terminations of
benefits, insurer reductions of benefit payments, and medical issues, e.g., services for which
the insurer will not pay.
An Assessment
The workers' compensation community has provided us with mixed reviews on the
performance of the Conciliation Service. Initially, at least, the Service appears to have been
overwhelmed by the number of cases that it received, a particularly difficult situation for an
agency that was entirely new. The agency had to deal with hostility from some solicitors who
charged that the service was actually an operating arm of the Authority. Solicitors were not
pleased with their inability to have their fees paid by costs from insurers for their work at this
level. The changing responsibilities of the Conciliation Service over the past 4 years have
added to the challenge that the agency has had to meet, and it is clear that the overall caseload
that the Service has encountered has been imposing.
It seems quite remarkable that this agency now operates with virtually no backlog and
that it can accommodate, generally, the rigorous requirement that applications be conferenced
within 28 days of their receipt. In its first 2 years between 80 and 85 percent of its cases
(excluding applications where conciliation did not proceed or there was no jurisdiction) were
resolved, dropping to 65 percent in 1994-95 and 67 percent in 1995/96. This is an impressive
performance.
The legislation requires that matters may not proceed to court (except fatality claims)
unless first referred to Conciliation. All matters, other than maims cases, can proceed to court
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if not resolved within 28 days of being lodged with the Conciliation Service. Most solicitors
are willing to allow matters to proceed beyond the 28 days before issuing proceedings, so long
as they see some progress with the conciliation. However, some solicitors will delay providing
information after the Request for Conciliation has been submitted, so that resolution cannot be
effected within the 28-day period. As that period expires they will issue proceedings. To
prevent such efforts to evade the process, the 1996 amendments require that the Conciliation
Officer certify that the claimant has made a reasonable attempt to settle in disputes over mains.
It is difficult to assess the quality of a Conciliation Service on purely quantitative bases.
Where the agency does deal expeditiously with its cases, and where a sizable proportion of
them resolve without resort to the Courts, the agency clearly is providing an acceptable level
of service. As to its inputs, the Service appears to have an excellent information system to
serve its staff and executives, it has demonstrated its recognition of the importance of staff
development, and it has been allowed to adjust the number of its Conciliators as needed. The
agency also has demonstrated a degree of introspectiveness and a willingness to modify its
practices when they have appeared to be in need of change.
Surveys of workers, insurers, and employers were conducted in November 1994 and
June 1995 by an independent market research firm. It found that 86 percent of conference
attendees were satisfied with the Service (June 1995, compared with 80 percent in November
1994). About 80 percent were satisfied with the skills of the Conciliation Officer. These rates
are very impressive, particularly as they emerge from participants who are engaged in
controversy, and where zero-sum outcomes, or simply no outcomes except further litigation,
are often the result at this level.
Some criticism about the process, but not of the Service itself, seems to surface
regularly. First, some disputes appear to result from an insurer's reluctance to engender the
wrath of their insureds. Thus, the insurer makes a decision that is highly likely to generate a
dispute in order for the Conciliation Service to be identified as the source of an outcome that
the employer resists. The insurer knows what the outcome will be, but deflects away from
itself the anticipated employer dissatisfaction. This practice is certainly familiar from other
jurisdictions. Its incidence is difficult to measure and, hence, to compare. Because of the
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unusual nature of the relationship between insurers and employers, the problem may be
somewhat greater in Victoria than in most jurisdictions.
A second criticism is that the parties, and in particular the insurer, may attend
Conciliation conferences unprepared and/or unable to commit to a settlement. These
observations also appear to be universal in workers' compensation dispute resolution. It might
be possible for the Conciliation Officer to report instances of this sort to the Authority, which
in turn, could bring some greater pressure to bear on the authorised insurers. Such a role,
however, might put the Conciliator into an evaluative role, undermining her/his primary
responsibility to conciliate and to mediate the dispute.
The Future
Beginning in July 1996, disputes over permanent impairment must be referred to
Conciliation. These cases may not proceed to court until a Conciliator certifies that the
claimant has made a reasonable attempt to conciliate the matter. All medical evidence which
any party relies upon must be exchanged either at the time the claim is made or by the
conciliation stage. The claimant will not be able to commence court proceedings unless the
Conciliation Officer is satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken by the claimant to
settle the dispute. The certificate must identify copies of medical information provided by one
party to the other, as well as any information obtained by the Conciliation Officer (including
the opinion of a Medical Panel). It seems clear the 1996 amendments will enhance the power
of the Conciliator. Whether it does so at the expense of the Officer's role as a mediator, or
serves to strengthen it, remains to be seen.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Certain categories of disputes may involve the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT),
a body with a broad range of dispute resolution responsibilities that extends well beyond
workers' compensation matters. Indeed, only one of this Tribunal's judges hears all, or nearly
all, disputes arising out of the workers' compensation arena.
One set of disputes under workers' compensation arises from the transition to the
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Accident Compensation Act of 1985. Prior to the law's effective date, 1 September 1985,
private insurers sold coverage to Victoria employers for workers' compensation. Subsequently
insurance was provided by the state's Accident Compensation Commission (ACC). Not
surprisingly, disputes arose over whether injury claims were the financial responsibility of the
private insurers (old cases) or whether the state fund was to pay (new cases). A "Division 6"
was created at the ACC to assure that private insurers did not succeed in shifting the burden of
benefit payments from themselves. Disputes over this issue have largely been eliminated due to
the passage of time, though a sizable number were adjudicated at the Tribunal in 1992 and
1993. (Table 6.8)
A second set of disputes that have dimmed because of the passage of time are referred
to as Section 120 cases. Though private insurance for workers' compensation was ended with
the Accident Compensation Act of 1985, some private insurance carriers served as the
Accident Compensation Commission's "agents" to provide a variety of claims services for
employers. Disputes have arisen over whether or not these agents acted in the best interest of
the employers that they were paid to service. At stake is the experience modification factor that
an employer carries. Where an employer could demonstrate that its agent failed to serve its
interest appropriately, the employer's costs of insurance could be adjusted downwards. Section
120 has been repealed but a sunset provision has caused some claims to continue to be brought
to the Tribunal for adjudication, though none were brought from 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1996.
A third set of disputes arises from employer appeals arising from their insurance rates
and classification for rate setting purposes. The decision of the Tribunal in such disputes
cannot be overturned in court except over matters of law. The overall number of such cases is
small, at about 3 percent of total referrals.
The largest number of issues that have come to the AAT relate to disputes over bills
and appropriate services provided for medical and like services and occupational rehabilitation
services. A dispute over such an issue will not cause a review from the AAT unless the matter
has first been referred to Conciliation. Only 28 days after it has been referred to Conciliation,
or a certificate has been issued by a Conciliation Officer, can the matter be referred to the
Tribunal. Where one of its decisions is appealed to the AAT, the WorkCover Authority is
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required to reconsider its decision within 28 days of its receipt of an application for review by
the Tribunal.
Where the Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, it may refer a medical question to a Medical
Panel. If a party to the proceeding requests, the Tribunal must refer the question to a Medical
Panel. The opinion of the Panel is binding upon the Tribunal.
Disputes over medical bills and services need not go to the AAT. In some instances, if
both parties consent, the dispute can be taken to Magistrates' Court or County Court.
Bifurcating disputes can result in some multi-issue disputes being adjudicated separately, both
in a court and at the Tribunal.
In the past 2 years, the numbers of applications to the Tribunal have fallen off sharply,
primarily due to a decline in Division 6 and Section 120 (employer aggrieved by agents) cases.
It seems likely that the AAT's role in workers' compensation cases will be reviewed for
purposes of determinhig the desirability of eliminating its responsibilities in this domain.
The Courts
With only a few exceptions, the Courts (Magistrates' and County) of Victoria are
empowered to determine any matter or question under the Workers' Compensation Act 1958 or
the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (as amended). The Magistrates' Court cannot hear cases
arising from Section 92 (death claims) and it is limited to matters and directions concerning
sums not to exceed $40,000 or 104 weeks of weekly benefits. These two threshold values had
been $25,000 and 52 weeks respectively, prior to enactment of the 1996 amendments. In so
doing, the Government sought to move more cases into the Magistrates' Court that otherwise
would have been commenced in County Court. It also aimed at reducing the number of
disputes, overall, that were taken to the courts. This issue is described further below.
A number of exceptions exist to the generalization that the dispute resolution process
ends with the Courts. Matters relating to contributions and to the collection and recovery of
levies are adjudicated at the final stage by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Similarly, the
determination of the AAT is not subject to County Court review on disputes over Sections 99,
99A, and 99B, that is, compensation for medical, hospital and like services, the amounts that
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the Authority or insurer may pay for occupational rehabilitation, or the rates applicable for
occupational rehabilitation. An exception to this is found in Section 43, which enables the
County Court to inquire into, hear and determine any matter arising out of these areas if it is
related to another matter that is before the Court and arises from workers' compensation.
Except for claims for death benefits, proceedings must not commence in Magistrates' or
County Courts unless the matter has been referred to Conciliation, and either 28 days have
expired since the date of referral or a Conciliation Officer has issued a certificate indicating
that all action in respect of Conciliation has been taken. Prior to the changes brought about the
by the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996, disputes involving Section 98 or 98A
claims, maims and pain and suffering, could commence proceedings without the need to go
through Conciliation. Instead, beginning in 1995, a worker who was dissatisfied with an
insurer's offer under either section was obligated to use either Conciliation or a Medical Panel
before seeking a remedy at Court.
Procedures
In proceedings relating to workers' compensation, the County Court is not bound by the
rules or practice as to evidence. Evidence given in such cases must not be used in another civil
or criminal proceedings, except for issues of fraud, perjury or making false statement. The
Court may refer a medical question to a Medical Panel. If a party to the proceeding so
requests, a medical question must be referred to a Medical Panel. In either case, the Court is
bound to adopt the Panel's opinion, except where there is evidence that the worker's condition
has changed or new information has emerged since the opinion was rendered.
Medical reports that arise from a medical examination are admissible in evidence, and
the author(s) may be required to attend the proceeding and be cross-examined on the report. By
contrast, however, though a member of a Medical Panel is competent to give evidence in the
proceeding, a Panel member may not be compelled to give any evidence.
In many workers' compensation cases disputes over medical questions and related
matters arise. Several experienced practitioners pointed out that the Courts tend to be
especially responsive to the opinions of the treating doctor, much more so than the medico6-32

legal experts that may give evidence that points to a contrary outcome. At issue here are
matters that are evident in many other workers' compensation jurisdictions, essentially the
competence and integrity of the opinions of certain members of the medical/health care
community. Specifically, where a medical person is frequently called upon by the same side in
compensation disputes, their opinions may be discounted on the grounds that they approach
their work with preconceived views or biases. The most curious aspect of this phenomenon is
that they continue to be called upon by one side, though their views are given less weight by
the determiner of facts.
A party to proceedings before the County Court may appeal a decision to the Court of
Appeal/Supreme Court on a question of law. That party has 21 days from the date of the
determination to serve notice of their intent to appeal. The appeal application must be lodged
within 6 months of either the determination being appealed or the leave obtained to appeal by
the Supreme Court. The County Courts' determination is not stayed by the filing of a notice of
an intent to appeal or the lodging of the appeal. However, if a County Court's determination to
pay compensation benefits, other than weekly benefits, is appealed, it will allow payment to be
postponed, depending upon the progress of and the outcome of the appeal.
The law spells out the basis of allocating costs in proceedings. Where a party (other
than the Authority or insurer) has brought proceedings, the Court must award costs, including
costs directly related to conciliation, against the party who lost the judgment or decision. The
Court may include an order to award costs to the representative of a worker who has succeeded
in a decision.
In proceedings regarding maims (Section 98) and pain and suffering (Section 98A),
where the judgment for payment of compensation by the Court is equal to or less that the final
offer made by the insurer (Section 98B), the Court must order that the worker pay the insurer's
costs, and it must not order that the insurer pay the costs of the worker. Where the insurer's
final offer (Section 98) is less than the amount ordered by the Court, the County Court must
order that the insurer pay the worker's costs.
The County and Magistrates' Courts and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal each
have their own scale of costs. The scale is higher in the County Court than in the Magistrates'
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Court, in part because the latter is regarded as less formal and requiring less preparation on the
part of solicitors. Claims are heard more quickly in the Magistrates' Court, yet the difference
in scales provides an incentive for solicitors to prefer the County Court. Some solicitors argue
that the County Courts tend to be more familiar with the Accident Compensation Act and to
approach these disputes with more sophistication.
The Future
The Authority prefers that more matters that do go to proceedings be moved to
Magistrates' Court. In so doing, disputes are resolved more promptly, costs are lower, and
there is less incentive for workers' solicitors to go to court. As such, the law has been written
so as to discourage substantial utilisation of the County Court. In 1993, a provision was added
to the Act that required that costs be awarded to the worker or claimant according to the
Magistrates' scale (lower), if the worker or claimant brought the proceeding in the County
Court and the decision or judgment could have been made by the Magistrates' Court.
In 1996, the effort to limit the incentive to use the County Court was strengthened.
First, the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court was expanded by raising both the amount of
money (from $25,000 to $40,000) and the number of weeks of benefits (from 52 to 104 weeks)
it could award. Additionally, if a settlement or a compromise "is made in respect of
proceedings in the County Court" and the outcome could have been achieved by the judgment
or decision made in Magistrates' Court, then the agreement cannot provide for costs to be paid
by the insurer that exceed the amount that could have been awarded by the scales of costs from
the Magistrates' Court.
Any limits on costs awarded to the worker or claimant may be expected to reduce the
demand for litigation, primarily at the County Court level. However, the claimant's solicitor is
largely free to enter into an agreement with the claimant for a fee that will be greater than costs
payable by the insurer. Thus, the disincentives to litigate at the County Court, and at any level
could be partly mitigated as the privately set fee structure between worker and solicitor is
modified.
An exception to this laissez-faire approach, however, emerged hi the Accident
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Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996. Its impact could be highly significant, depending upon
how it will be applied. Specifically, this new section (Section 50A) provides that the County
Court may order that the legal practitioner be disallowed any costs from the client, and that the
legal practitioner pay the costs of other parties where a proceeding has commenced under the
following circumstances: (1) it was brought without reasonable cause, (2) the matter could
have been brought to Magistrates' Court, or (3) costs were incurred improperly or wasted due
to undue delay, negligence, misconduct or default.
Section 50A can be considered as a continuation of the battle to reduce litigation and its
costs by the Government. Along with the other amendments noted above, it will certainly
cause a shift of disputes out of the County Court. It will reduce the incidence of disputes that
are resolved "on the Court House steps," i.e., where the parties have little or no intent to
actually engage in trial, but simply use the threat of doing so to raise the settlement value of
cases. In large measure, the effectiveness of the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996
will depend upon the attitude of the County Court judges. If they view the County Court as the
appropriate venue to decide disputes hi workers' compensation disputes, even relatively minor
disputes, the impact of the law changes could be minimised.
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Table 6.1 Medical Panel Referrals by Referring Party
Referring Party
Conciliation Service
Authorised Insurer
Magistrates' Court
County Court
Self-Insurers
Claimant
Total

1993/94
362
13
9
1
0
0
385

1994/95
258
12
32
6
3
1,729
2,040

94%
4
2
0
0
0
100%

13%
1
2
0
0
85
100%

Source: VWA
Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because of rounding.
See also other tables (6.3, 6.7, 6.8)
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1995/96
52
11
21
3
2
3,312
3,401

2%
0
1
0
0
97
100%

"

Table 6.2 Medical Panel Referrals by Section of the Act
Section of Act
98, 98A, 104 (Maims)
111/111A
99 Medical and Like
93 Weekly Benefits
1 14 Termination
Other
Total

1993/94
156
82
43
69
0
35
385

1994/95

41%
21
11
18
0
9
100%

Source: VWA
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1,859
17
41
56
28
39
2,040

91%
1
2
3
1
2
100%

1995/96
3,343
4
16
21
6
11
3,401

98%
0
——^—0^-^-^^.
1
0
0
100%

Table 6.3 Medical Panel Referrals by Injury Type
Injury Type
Back
Hearing Loss
Arms
Back/Neck
Stress
Multiple
Loss of Mental
Powers
Other
Total

1993/94
169
44%
41
11
36
9
25
6
19
5
16
4
0
0
79
385

21
100%

1994/95
296
15%
477
23
7
139
46
2
16
1
587
29
7
142
337
2,040

Source: VWA
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17
100%

1995/96
398
12%
460
14
252
7
74
2
3
0
1,362
40
257
8
594
3,400

17
100%

Table 6.4 Medical Panels by Composition

One Member
Two Member
Three Member
Total

1993/94
39%
135
44
155
17
60
100%
350

Source: VWA
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1994/95
0
1,283
174
1,457

0
88%
12
100%

1995/96
0
2,075
61
2,136

0
97%
3
100%

Table 6.5 Medical Panel Appointments, by Specialty, 1995/96
Specialty

Total

Percent

Orthopaedic Surgery

1,838

35%

General Surgery

934

18

Otolaryngology

892

17

Psychiatry

734

14

Rheumatology

261

5

Neurology

133

3

Rehabilitation Medicine

114

2

Plastic Surgery

110

2

Neurosurgery

101

2

Other

126

2

Total

5,243

Source: VWA
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100%

Table 6.6 Conciliation Service Applications and Disposals
Year

Applications

Disposals

1992/93

10,791

4,034

1993/94

9,418

16,010

1994/95

10,763

11,434

1995/96

14,968

14,457

Totals

45,940

45,935

Source: VWA
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Table 6.7 Conciliation Service Lodgements by Type of Case,
1 December 1992 to 30 June 1996
Number
8,155
2,880
5,681
1,740
5,270
10,468
9,299
2,447
45,940

Type of Case
Rejection of Claim
Terminations (104 weeks and 52 weeks)
Terminations of Weekly Benefits
Alterations of Rate of Compensation
Reductions of Rate of Compensation
Maims
Medical and Like Services
Other
Total
Source: VWA
See also other tables (6.1, 6.3, 6.8)
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Percentage
18%
6
12
4
11
23
20
5
100%

Table 6.8 Accident Compensation Tribunal Files, and Other Applications Referred to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1 December 1992 to 30 June 1996
Determined

Referred

Issue
Contribution - Division 6

691

S.I 20 Employer Aggrieved

873

Levy
S. 99 Medical, Hospital, and like Expenses

87

Totals

3,038

1,387

Source: VWA
See also other tables (6.1, 6.3, 6.7)
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23% 666

25%

29

638

24

3

85

3

1,320

49

100% 2,709

100%

46
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Chapter 7 OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION IN VICTORIA
Introduction
Physical, psychological and occupational rehabilitation are all provided for within the
legislation. In the Victorian context, "occupational rehabilitation" covers specific, defined
services within the general rubric of rehabilitation. Practitioners in general medicine,
occupational medicine, physiotherapy, chiropractic, naturopathy, as well as many other health
and allied health professions are key providers of treatment services directed toward the returnto-work objective. However, it is the registered providers of Occupational Rehabilitation (OR)
that deliver most of the defined occupational rehabilitation services with which this chapter is
concerned.
The objective of "return to work" with the accident employer is the over-riding goal
and this message is reflected in legislation, publications and policies. As a regulator rather than
a provider of rehabilitation services, the VWA's primary mission is to set standards of service,
monitor compliance and ensure equitable outcomes. As the manager of the central fund, the
scheme must also pay for the services (through the insurers), maintain adequate reserves for
current and future rehabilitation costs, and monitor utilisation and outcomes.
The current status of occupational rehabilitation services in Victoria must be read hi
light of the evolution of WorkCover from its predecessor, the WorkCare scheme. Many of the
features, processes and outcomes of WorkCover are a direct reaction to the perceived excesses
of earlier systems. The current VWA system of occupational rehabilitation reflects the
concerns of the past while attempting to realize the current legislated mandate of rehabilitation
and return to work for all injured workers.
Thus, we will begin our review and analysis of occupational rehabilitation with a look
backward, at the history of rehabilitation hi Victoria. In particular, we will focus on the design
and performance of the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (VARC) under the
WorkCare regime from 1985 through 1992. Employer and insurer reaction to the perceived
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excesses of rehabilitation under WorkCare have been a critical determinant of current policy
and practice in this area. Then, we will move on to describe the legislative framework for
occupational rehabilitation, and the roles and responsibilities of various parties under the Act
We will specifically examine the organisational and administrative structure dedicated to the
delivery of occupational rehabilitation services and the independent agents who deliver those
services. The chapter concludes with a review of the limited data available on occupational
rehabilitation outcomes in Victoria, and some final thoughts.
History
Occupational rehabilitation is a relatively recent component of Australian workers'
compensation systems. As mentioned hi Chapter 2, this largely reflected the imprint of the
British legacy of the role of workers' compensation as simply being a circumscribed monetary
recompense for injury. For Instance, the Seamen's Compensation Act 1911 contained no
reference to rehabilitation whatsoever until its replacement with the Seafarers Rehabilitation
and Compensation Act 1992, and the Australian Capital Territory Workers Compensation Act
1951 similarly did not refer to rehabilitation until amending legislation in November 1994.1 It
is also significant that, even where there was explicit statutory recognition of rehabilitation, the
cultural ambience was such that this was little utilised in practice.
Thus, section 52 of the New South Wales Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (part of that
legislation from the time of its enactment) authorised the then Workers Compensation
Commission to draw from the Commission's funds such sums as may be necessary for the
purposes of the vocational re-education and rehabilitation of disabled workers. However, no
sum was hi fact ever drawn under this provision until 1969, and that small payment remained,
for some time thereafter, an isolated example.2
'Alan Clayton, "The Structure and Operation of Occupational Disability Arrangements" in John Urbano
and Alan Clayton, Review of International and Jurisdictional Best Practice in Return to Work. Canberra: Comcare
Australia, 1996, at p. 5.
2Workers' Compensation Commission of New South Wales, Report of the Inquiry into the Feasibility of
Establishing a System for the Rehabilitation of Injured Workers in New South Wales. " December 1970. (Judge
A. T. Conybeare, QC) Sydney: Government Printer, at p. 1.
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Indeed one of the distinguishing features of the Victorian WorkCare scheme, which
took effect from 1985, was the emphasis placed upon rehabilitation. The previous Victorian
legislation, the Workers Compensation Act 1958 contained only one reference to rehabilitation;
Section 26(2)(d)(iii), which simply provided that the reasonable costs of treatment and
assistance with respect to a worker's industrial rehabilitation was a compensable item. By
contrast, one entire Part of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (23 sections) was devoted to
the operations of the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council. At least another five
provisions in this Act related to or intersected with the area of rehabilitation. As well, it was
clearly spelled out in the Act that the legislative intention bespoke a commitment to vocational
and social rehabilitation.
So rehabilitation of the occupationally disabled was a relatively late development within
the evolution of Australian workers' compensation systems, only really emerging as an issue
following the pioneering Conybeare Report in 1970.3 By 1977, Judge Harris would note that
submission after submission made to his Inquiry had stressed the need for a proper system of
rehabilitation. This was not a simple matter, however, and the Harris Report alluded to the
difficulties facing the implementation of such a programme; in particular, a lack of trained
rehabilitation personnel, and a jurisdiction where the financing of workers' compensation was
in the hands of 70 insurers.4
Structure of WorkCare Rehabilitation
The initiatives which did develop from the late 1970s cast their own shadows. These
initiatives were largely undertaken by a few larger private insurers and had drawn the ire and
suspicion of the union movement. They felt that occupational rehabilitation was simply being
employed as a form of benefit control and raised confidentiality concerns that information
gained from the activities of the insurer's rehabilitation arm was being fed to the claims
3This process is traced in Alan Clay ton, "Attack upon the citadel: reform of Australia's anti-rehabilitative
statutes," Journal of Occupational Health and Safety-Australia and New Zealand, 1986, 3(4): 351-364.
4Board of Inquiry into Workers Compensation. Report, March 1977 (Judge C. W. Harris, Chairman)
Melbourne: Government Printer, 1977; para. 24.1, p. 107-108.
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department to be used to the worker's detriment. Thus, while there was strong union support
for rehabilitation in the new scheme, these prior concerns helped dictate the structural and
operational features of WorkCare rehabilitation.
Whereas in the Canadian provincial schemes the rehabilitation function is located within
the Workers Compensation Board, it was decided that primary responsibility for rehabilitation
would reside with the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (VARC), a body largely
independent of the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) even though that was the body
which provided its funding. A comprehensive Government statement, issued soon after the
announcement of the WorkCare reforms, referred to VARC as a body which would initially be
"responsible to the Treasurer but it is expected that a fully integrated system will be developed
hi the long run."5
One of the consequences of this division was that the claims process and the
rehabilitation process became largely separate systems. In particular, while VARC could
access information on the ACC data base, there were very strong controls on reciprocal flows
of information. These differences were reinforced by a significantly different culture within the
two organisations. As Mark Considine observed:
The ACC was run as an insurance fund which inevitably wished to minimise
costs. Many of its staff, including the managing director and the general
manager responsible for the claims agents, were recruited from the insurance
industry. VARC, in contrast, was from the start an organisation motivated by
clearly articulated welfare values. Staff were recruited from the human service
professions and viewed their job as being to provide every support to injured
workers.6
While the Government, through the Accident Compensation Act, had given a strong mandate
for a comprehensive system of rehabilitation for occupational disability, there were immediate
problems due to the lack of an effective vocational rehabilitation infrastructure and persons
5Victoria - Workers' Compensation Reform: Government Statement. Economic Strategy for Victoria
Statement No. 5. Melbourne: Government Printer (December 1984), at p. 50.
6Mark Considine, The Politics of Reform: Workers' Compensation from Woodhouse to WorkCare. Centre
for Applied Social Research, Deakin University, 1991 (Deakin Series in Public Policy and Administration,
No. 1), at p. 91.
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trained in the various disciplines (for instance, occupational therapy, rehabilitation counselling
and ergonomics) associated with this field. Accordingly, one of the primary concerns for
VARC, at least in the earlier years, was to build this system.
VARC proceeded to establish a number of public WorkCare Rehabilitation centres and
to approve private providers in order to establish a network of services in both metropolitan
and rural Victoria. In its first 10 months of operation it opened four WorkCare Rehabilitation
services in major industrial areas and approved nine private rehabilitation providers. Over the
next 6 years this network would rise to 82 service locations, involving eight WorkCare
Rehabilitation centres and an additional five WorkCare Rehabilitation sub-offices, and 69
locations operated by the 25 approved rehabilitation providers. The public WorkCare
Rehabilitation service facilities came to provide about a third of the market for vocational
rehabilitation services.
In relation to the supply and training of rehabilitation professionals, VARC, either
individually or in conjunction with the ACC, funded a range of initiatives, such as the
establishment of a Chair of Rehabilitation Medicine at the University of Melbourne, the
funding of undergraduate and graduate positions in various courses at the Lincoln Institute of
Health Sciences, and assisting the Australian Physiotherapy Association in its overseas
recruitment campaign. Ongoing training programmes for rehabilitation professionals were an
important part of VARC'S activities throughout its tenure.
Operation of WorkCare Rehabilitation
The Victorian WorkCare rehabilitation system grew to be one of the largest, in terms of
workers involved, of any comparable workers' compensation system. A decision was taken by
VARC, in mid 1987, that it would attempt to ensure that all workers off work for 12 weeks
would be offered rehabilitation. At that time this would have captured about one-fourth of all
time-compensated standard claims. In fact, by the end of June 1988 this had happened for
around 28 percent of workers with time-compensated claims during 1987/88, with more than
28,000 injured workers formerly employed by some 6,500 employers involved in
rehabilitation. As Table 7.1 shows this high level of rehabilitation involvement was a
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distinctive feature of the WorkCare system. The total cost of rehabilitation in 1987/88 was
$32.9 million, which represented about 3.2 per cent of total WorkCare expenditure in that
year.
VARC was also the regulator and gatekeeper in respect of the provision of
rehabilitation services. The issue of quality and appropriate utilisation control was an ongoing
issue. In April 1986 VARC instituted a central referral system, ostensibly for ensuring
effective management of the referral process and encouraging early referral and intervention.
Under this system, approved rehabilitation providers were required to submit a rehabilitation
plan to the VARC for approval prior to proceeding with its implementation. In preparing the
plan, approved rehabilitation providers were able to incur up to $200 of work, either in
assessing the client or engaging in the immediate delivery of services. However, authorisation
for any further payments was dependent upon approval from VARC. This approval process
became an unwieldy bureaucratic exercise and resulted in considerable delay in the provision
of services.
Just as the ACC experimented with controls and incentives for the claims administration
agents, so the VARC monitoring and control procedures and provider remuneration
arrangements went through a number of refinements and configurations. One of the problems,
particularly hi the system of mass rehabilitation which VARC was overseeing, was that the
monitoring and control system was largely process oriented and "check box" in nature. In a
response to this, VARC hi October 1991 implemented its Rehabilitation Case Management
Strategy which attempted to ensure quality control and compliance with scheme goals by
placing the approval and monitoring process in the hands of experienced rehabilitation
professionals.
While VARC was primarily wedded to a centrally controlled case management model
of rehabilitation, Dr. Jane Greacen, who headed its Programme Development and Training
Unit and would for a time be the Acting CEO of VARC, had from around 1987 begun
developing a workplace-focused Injury Management Programme. This programme was
launched in February 1988 with the approval of two firm-based rehabilitation services (Nissan
Motor Company and Smorgon Consolidated Industries) and a range of grants and other
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supports for companies to set up workplace-based rehabilitation arrangements. This model
began to gain increasing acceptance and in the last year of VARC's operation the companies
involved in this approach to rehabilitation were able to achieve almost total return-to-work
results (compared to that of 47.7 percent success for VARC operations overall), and average
rehabilitation costs associated with such return to work of only $417 (compared to that of
$2,337 overall). While one could expect better performance from participants in this
programme, being larger enterprises with better control and greater potential for the
implementation of return-to-work measures, nevertheless, the extent of the differential clearly
illustrated the potential of workplace-oriented programmes.
The Legacy of WorkCare Rehabilitation
While there was some discernible evolution in the approaches and practices of VARC
over its seven-year history, nevertheless, the enduring legacy and impressions left by the
"VARC experience" were, in a number of quarters, powerful and negative. In fact, "VARC"
and "rehabilitation" have come to be regarded as dirty words to employers. Some of the
reasons for this have already been alluded to, but this phenomenon, which was to influence the
manner in which rehabilitation was approached in the WorkCover system, has a varied and
complex aetiology.
First, there were very few strong champions of rehabilitation outside of some parts of
the trade union movement. Whilst almost nobody expressed outright opposition to
rehabilitation, its support, particularly from business and employer organisations, was often
tinged or qualified with reservations about its effectiveness, and the wisdom of placing too
much effort into a process controlled by "do-gooders" and "social workers." The structure and
form that rehabilitation took under WorkCare was influenced very much by trade union input
into the business/labour compact which acted as midwife to the new system, with the employer
influence being felt hi other areas such as the halving of the premium imposed upon business,
(see Chapter 2) As time progressed, the essentially tepid support of employer groups for
rehabilitation would change to concern and eventually outright derision for a system of which
they felt little sense of ownership or participation.
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Secondly, the scale of the changes to rehabilitation practice under WorkCare provided a
set of formidable challenges. In fact, "changes" is probably too neutral a word. What was
being attempted was a quantum leap from a situation where occupational rehabilitation hardly
existed at all to one that would represent one of the most extensive systems of rehabilitation
sponsored by workers' compensation anywhere in the world. In this process, especially in the
early years, the degree of managerial oversight and attention to the dynamics of scheme
operation which could be exercised by VARC was continually challenged and deflected by the
exigencies of creating the necessary infrastructure and training the requisite personnel to serve
the new system.
That is not to say that, even during this establishment phase, VARC adopted a
laissez-faire approach to scheme operations; quite the contrary, in fact. The strong control
approach adopted by VARC and its desire to micro-manage all aspects of the system was a
major cause of the bad feelings that came to surround rehabilitation under WorkCare and lay
behind much of the reaction under WorkCover.
The central referral system, which operated from April 1986, under which all approved
rehabilitation providers had to provide detailed rehabilitation plans before any significant
rehabilitation action could be undertaken, became a torment for most parties in the system,
including employers and insurers as well as the providers. As anything more than minor action
was subject to VARC approval, the system created a bureaucratic monster which
institutionalised inflexibility and delay.
The delays induced by this approval system often ran to 12 weeks, so that both
initiation of rehabilitation action and changes to it were hampered by a 3-month period of
inertia during which proposals were processed. Unfortunately, the approval process was very
much of the mechanistic box checking variety, and added little in the way of quality control or
utilisation control to the system. In functional terms its major impact was to engender cynicism
and resentment among a range of scheme participants.
The effects of this extreme micro-management were exacerbated by the decision, in mid
1987, to attempt to provide rehabilitation to all workers with injury durations hi excess of 12
weeks. As mentioned above, and illustrated in Table 7.1, the consequences were a relatively
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high participation rate in rehabilitation, with the concomitant feature of rehabilitation costs
becoming a significant element of overall scheme costs. A further complicating factor was the
open access to the system in terms of the source of referral to rehabilitation as illustrated in
Table 7.2. This compounded the impression of employers and insurers that rehabilitation was a
system that was largely out of control.
This issue of control was one that loomed large in the criticisms of VARC and the
rehabilitation system from a number of quarters. As already mentioned, the manner in which
VARC and the rehabilitation system was configured under WorkCare reflected trade union
concerns that structural and operational barriers should be established to prevent rehabilitation
being used, hi an instrumentalist sense, as a weapon of benefit control. The largely arms-length
arrangements between the ACC and VARC resulted in an uneasy, and often acrimonious,
relationship between these two bodies that developed strikingly different corporate cultures.
Most of the VARC staff saw themselves as the guardians of a holistic conception of
rehabilitation encompassing the entire range of medical, vocational and social rehabilitation.
They were very suspicious of ACC tendencies to see it as a handmaiden of the claims process,
a way to secure closure of a claim through return to work. These philosophical differences
existed over a number of issues. One illustration of the magnitude of such difference was the
attempt hi the first draft of the Bill which was to become the Accident Compensation
(Amendment) Act 1987 to banish the term "rehabilitation" totally from the Accident
Compensation Act and replace it wherever it appeared in that statute with the term "return to
work."
The point is that employers and insurers came to feel great antipathy toward the very
concept of rehabilitation, and rational discourse over the appropriate level of occupational
rehabilitation activity essentially ended. When the Victorian Liberal and National Party
coalition came to power late hi 1992, the scene was set for the wholesale replacement of the
VARC approach with a narrower concept of rehabilitation as, primarily, a focus on the final
goal of return to work. The remainder of the chapter describes this current system of
occupational rehabilitation in Victoria.
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Legislative Framework, Entitlements And Responsibilities
Mandate and Legislative Framework
The Accident Compensation Act 1985 includes the following objectives for the
Authority "[to] . . . promote the effective occupational rehabilitation of injured workers and
their early return to work; [and to] ... encourage the provision of suitable employment
opportunities to workers who have been injured."7 The legislation defines occupational
rehabilitation services in very particular terms to include only the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(1)
(m)
(n)

initial rehabilitation assessment;
functional assessment;
workplace assessment;
job analysis;
advice concerning job modification;
occupational rehabilitation counselling;
vocational assessment;
advice or assistance concerning job-seeking;
vocational re-education;
advice or assistance in arranging vocational re-education;
preparation of a return-to-work plan;
the provision of aids, appliance, apparatus or other materials likely to facilitate
the return to work of a worker after an injury;
modification to a work station or equipment used by a worker that is likely to
facilitate the return to work of the worker after an injury;
any other service authorised by the Authority.8

Operationally, the VWA has set in place a series of General Operating Principles to
guide insurers, providers and employers. These principles, outlined in the Claims Manual,
provide focus to the general legislative mandate. In particular, they assign direct
responsibilities to each party for occupational rehabilitation and return to work.
Insurer Responsibilities
The Claims Manual lays out the specific occupational rehabilitation and return to work
responsibilities for insurers in the General Operating Principles, numbers 10 through 13.
'Section 19(d) and (e) of the Act.

8Section 5, Accident Compensation Act 1985.
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Among these are the following, which clearly place the role of the insurer as central to the
rehabilitation and return to work effort.
Principle 10: Specific Objective

•

Insurers must have direct ownership of a specific objective ... to
return injured workers to work as soon as possible after the injury.
Insurers must actively support return to work by assisting and
encouraging employers to develop workplace based occupational
rehabilitation policies, initiatives and procedures that determine how
return to work injury management is seen, delivered and managed.
Insurers must also encourage employers to develop re-employment or
retraining practices highlighting the employers role in prevention and
rehabilitation and the control of costs.
Insurers must also make every endeavour to ensure that their employers
adhere to the legislative requirements of Occupational Rehabilitation and
return to work.

Principle 11: Workplace Assessments
•
Insurers must undertake/facilitate workplace assessments so as to ensure
that a worker returns to work with suitable duties and, if pertinent, with
any necessary workplace modifications made to their work environment.
Workplace assessments will also be used to achieve a full return to work
for partially incapacitated claimants. Insurers must liaise with all relevant
parties during all phases of the workplace assessment process.
Principle 12: Rehabilitation/Enhancing Job Opportunities
•
Insurers must be committed to the promotion of rehabilitation
programmes where they contribute to successful and effective claims
management. Insurers must develop a comprehensive programme with
specific case referral procedures to ensure that rehabilitation services are
available in a timely manner that target the rehabilitation needs of
workers. Programme emphasis must be given to the return to work of
partially incapacitated workers, the capacity of employers to re-employ,
vocational training, status reporting and work placement.
•
Insurers must be committed to increase the willingness and ability of
employers to support and maintain return to work objectives. The
benefits of a successful return to work through the offer of suitable
employment will be highlighted to employers.
Principle 13: Job-offers, Re-Employment and Re-training
Insurers must aim to return workers to their full-time pre-injury
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employment, wherever possible, by liaising with the employer to
facilitate their return to work through modifications, as required, to the
pre-injury employment work place and/or work procedures. Continuing
support and assistance will be given to workers during return to work to
maximise their income recovery potential.
Insurers must liaise with employers, workers, treating doctor/s and
rehabilitation providers to provide re-employment through a suitable job
offer where a worker regains a capacity for work.
(VWA Claims Manual, General Operating Principles, July 1994, p. 2)
Worker Entitlements and Responsibilities9
Under the legislation, workers enjoy certain entitlements with respect to the general
themes of return to work and rehabilitation. Financial benefits for workers engaged in
rehabilitation activities are identical to the benefits prescribed for all workers under the Act.
The cooperation of the worker is mandated in Sections 93A(3) and (4), which require a worker
to make every "reasonable effort" to return to work and to participate in occupational
rehabilitation service or a return-to-work plan. If rehabilitation efforts are successful and the
worker returns to work, financial benefits cease. There is also a provision for benefit reduction
for partial incapacity10 taking into account "notional earnings." 11 Key to these provisions is the
worker "making every reasonable effort to return to work" in "suitable employment."
Subsection 93D(2) defines where the worker is deemed not to be making "every
reasonable effort" in the following instances: refused to have an assessment made of the
worker's employment prospects, refused or failed to take the steps to obtain suitable
employment, refused an offer of suitable employment, or failed to participate in an
occupational rehabilitation service or return-to-work plan. Section 162 of the Act requires the
worker to attend interviews with appropriate representatives of the Authority or insurer "for
'Effective with Royal Assent on 17 December 1996, the Accident Compensation (Further Amendment)
Act 1996 allows the worker to choose an OR provider if the Authority, insurer, self-insurer or employer does not
offer or provide such a service.
'°Section 93A(1) and (2) covers the first 26 weeks.
"Notional Earnings are defined in Section 5 of the Act and the method of assessing these is defined in
93DA.
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the purpose of ascertaining whether worker's opportunities for employment can be enhanced."
"Suitable employment" is defined in Section 5 of the Act as work for which the worker
is suited having regard to the nature of the worker's incapacity and pre-injury employment,
age, education, skills, work experience, place of residence, medical condition, return-to-work
plan, and occupational rehabilitation services being provided. Note that the definition
specifically adds "whether or not that work is available."
Even if the worker is eventually found not to be entitled to compensation, expenditures
that have been made for occupational rehabilitation purposes are allowed and reasonable notice
must be given before these are discontinued. Benefits continue under Section 99 for a period of
up to 1 year, unless under 99(14) the worker has returned to work but could not continue by
virtue of surgery, prosthesis modification, and services to stabilize the worker's health or
lifestyle.
Survivors of workers fatally injured have no specific rehabilitation entitlements under
the legislation. While (family) grief counselling was introduced in July 1996, the regulations
are not yet published for its implementation. Assistance in managing the financial settlement
with WorkCover and vocational counselling are not offered by the scheme, although anecdotal
information from some insurers indicate that such services are sometimes informally offered.
Employer Responsibilities 12
One of the most notable aspects of the VWA system is the high level of responsibility
that the scheme places on employers. Where the Disability Management movement
internationally and the Total Injury Management concept defined by the Heads of Workers
Compensation Authorities' National Consistency Programme (HWCA, 1996) encourage
internalisation of return to work and occupational rehabilitation, the legislation and policies of
the VWA clearly mandate these as employer responsibilities. The Claims manual specifically
states that "The employer is responsible for injury management, including the identification
l2The Accident Compensation (Further Amendment) Act 1996 gives approval responsibility for OR
expenditures solely to the insurer.

7-13

and implementation of occupational rehabilitation services." 13 The insurer's role is supportive
and facilitative to the employer's ultimate responsibility. This philosophy is also evident in the
General Operating Principles for insurers quoted earlier.
Part VI of the legislation specifically outlines the requirements for employers with
respect to Occupational Rehabilitation, Return-to-work Plans and Risk Management. Under
Section 156(1) employers with payrolls of greater than $1 million must establish an
occupational rehabilitation programme. By 30 calendar days following an injury, every
employer must prepare a return-to-work plan and nominate a return-to-work coordinator.
(Section 156(2)(a)) Within a 90-day period after that, an employer must establish and maintain
an occupational rehabilitation programme. (Section 156(2)(b)(i))
The written occupational rehabilitation programme, which must be produced in
consultation with workers, is required to include a statement of the employer's return-to-work
policy, the name of the return-to-work coordinator and at least one provider of occupational
rehabilitation services. (Section 158) The specific return-to-work plan for an injured worker
must include an estimated return-to-work date, an offer of suitable employment and the steps to
be taken to facilitate the worker's return, including any occupational rehabilitation services that
are reasonably necessary to assist the worker in returning to and remaining at work. (Section
160)
Reinstatement of the worker is required by Section 122. Workers are entitled to return
to work within 12 months with the accident employer hi suitable employment. The employer,
however, can be relieved of the responsibility if he/she can satisfy the Authority that it is "not
possible for the employer to provide suitable employment.'' Failure to re-employ a worker may
result in penalties of up to $25,000, although this provision has rarely been invoked.
With few exceptions, employers are required to make all initial payments for medical
and like costs, including occupational rehabilitation costs. These expenditures count towards
the employer's "deductible" of $416. Prior to 1 July 1996 employer expenditures for
occupational rehabilitation services could be excluded from the calculation of the employer's

1'Section 6.10.1 Workplace Based Occupational Rehabilitation.
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excess with the "employer excess" for occupational rehabilitation separately limited to $1,200
maximum. 14 After that date, expenditures for occupational rehabilitation are no longer
separately tabulated, but all such costs are included in meeting the threshold for a claim to be
paid by an insurer and still subject to approval by the employer or insurer.
Beyond their responsibilities under the Accident Compensation Act, employers are
bound by the provisions of Health and Safety regulations, and Industrial Relations and Human
Rights legislation. Some employers expressed concern over the apparent lack of consistency
across these responsibilities, noting that in determining how best to deal with a particular
situation, an employer may have to ultimately consider which piece of legislation will be least
costly to offend.
Rehabilitation Process
Rehabilitation is far from a linear process. During the "life" of a claim, a worker may
experience several rehabilitation-oriented services and personnel. Each of the personnel also
have specific relationships with some aspect of the VWA and its authorised insurers. Figure
7.1 illustrates the complexity that may be involved in any rehabilitation case.
From both the mandate and the above diagram, the central role of the RTW coordinator
to the rehabilitation process is clearly evident. Equally important is the relationship between
the insurer and the Occupational Rehabilitation (OR) provider. Although the employer may be
required to name an OR provider, the main reporting relationships are to the insurer and the
RTW coordinator. Similarly, the physician, chiropractor, or naturopath may develop a
relationship with the worker but referrals to rehabilitation must occur through the insurer and
in consultation with the employer.
With so many "players** in the system, the concern for confidentiality of information
14 It has been common practice for insurers to exclude employer expenditures for OR services from the
calculation of the employer's excess. This was not the legislative intent of Section 99B but was accepted insurer
practice. Section 99B allowed employers to incur costs of up to $1200 (indexed to $1290 at time of repeal effective 1/7/96)) for approved Occupational Rehabilitation services without reference to their insurer. Amounts
beyond this limit were to be approved by the insurer when the services are determined to be reasonable and
necessary.
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was raised by a number of stakeholders. In order for insurers and employers to have adequate
information on which to base a decision, there must be information sharing. Many aspects of
medical and vocational history may be needed in the rehabilitation process. Despite strong
admonitions against inappropriate transfers of sensitive or personal information, the potential
exists for violations of individual privacy.
The initial rehabilitation process may be the purview of the employer and the return-towork coordinator, but in the longer term, others will be involved in the rehabilitation of
injured workers. The various services and personnel are described in later sections while the
following section takes a more global and theoretical view of the entire rehabilitation process.
Identification and Referral for Services
The vast majority of workplace injuries will result in little or no time loss and will,
therefore, require no rehabilitation intervention beyond medical treatment. For more prolonged
cases, however, physical rehabilitation may be needed. Identification of this need usually
follows medical assessment. In the typical case, the general practitioner will recommend or
refer an individual for physiotherapy. In some cases, the worker will self-refer for physio
therapy or chiropractic treatment.
Beyond this initial referral, the VWA model is designed with the employer's RTW
coordinator as the central contact between the employer and the worker. The RTW coordinator
is usually responsible for fulfilling the employer's requirement of creating a return-to-work
plan for the injured worker. Such a plan must be prepared within 10 days following 20
calendar days of a worker's total incapacity. Of course, such a plan does not necessarily
include OR services. It may also fall to the RTW coordinator to be the main contact for the
authorised insurer. Where a worker, treating medical practitioner, or the insurer believes a
referral to occupational rehabilitation services is in order, approval will be sought from the
employer. It will likely be the RTW coordinator who is involved hi approving a referral for
occupational rehabilitation services.
A referral for occupational rehabilitation services is a very specific activity. Unlike
vocational rehabilitation systems in North America that generally allow the occupational
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rehabilitation provider to determine the techniques and services likely to optimize the
assessment, intervention or outcome, in Victoria every service must be separately authorised.
This often involves several transactions including returned phone calls, faxes and consulta
tions. These add to overhead and may delay actual service delivery. Of course, this also
reflects the reaction to earlier WorkCare experience as described earlier.
Where re-training or alternate placement is involved, OR providers may well continue
their relationship and interaction beyond the employer-employee relationship, notwithstanding
the requirement for an employer to take a worker back within a year of injury. Figure 7.2
demonstrates the general sequence of events. The figure indicates the general timing of the
various treatments and interventions over the life of a workers' compensation claim. In
Victoria, the 20-day threshold for naming a return-to-work coordinator and developing a
return-to-work plan creates the opportunity for earlier review for potential occupational
rehabilitation than in other systems. However, organised labour has been very critical of the
actual results observed. It is alleged that many RTW coordinators see the plan as only a price
of paper to be sent to the insurer, rather than as an action statement. Of course, the goal of all
such interventions is to move the injured worker back more quickly to a higher level of overall
health and functionality.
In rehabilitation, it is relatively easy ex post to recommend early intervention in a case
that has gone awry. Ex. ante, however, identification of need is far more complex and
problematic. Success at such identification comes with experience and professional judgment.
For employers with a significant and continuous frequency of injury, it is possible for the
RTW coordinator to develop such judgment. Where there are few injuries, however, this is not
the case. In the critical first few weeks following an injury, it usually falls to the medical
practitioner to identify the need for rehabilitation services.
Within the insurers, there are a variety of mechanisms in place to see that the VWA
mandate for considering occupational rehabilitation referrals are followed. These measures
may include review of claims by a rehabilitation professional, consultation with claims
managers to identify cases that might benefit from an OR referral, or use of computer-matched
profiling to flag the claims officer to consider such a referral. Interviews, however, indicate
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that profile-matching is not common in Victoria, although some insurers are developing
proprietary software that may include this capacity.
The above model depicts the typical short-term disability case. In Victoria, there are
also a significant and growing number of workers whose injury is very profound, resulting in
total permanent impairment. These workers have special needs for rehabilitation, activities of
daily living; accessibility (adaptive, mobility and similar devices, as well as other adaptations
and modifications), and avocational counselling. Many of these cases have been inherited from
previous incarnations of the workers' compensation system in Victoria. In many cases, the
employer is no longer active. The direction, management, and administration of the worker's
ongoing needs is a shared responsibility between the authorised insurer and the VWA. Either
may contract for occupational rehabilitation or other rehabilitation services for these workers.
Claimants that have needs beyond the defined OR services may also be referred to
community-based programmes and services. These agencies may offer support and services to
the injured worker, his/her family and others who may be affected by the injury but who are
beyond the scope of the Act or the direct payment by the VWA. Several such community-based
organisations receive financial support from the VWA. Interviews indicated that these
organisations focus on advocacy and social rehabilitation of disabled clients rather than
occupational rehabilitation or return to work objectives. As such, they probably play a
significant role in improving the lives of their clients, even if they do not achieve a return to
work.
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Organisational and Administrative Structures15
There are three distinct structural aspects to the provision of occupational rehabilitation
services in Victoria: administration, claims management, and service delivery. The overall
administration, scheme design and regulation take place within the VWA. Claims management
initially falls to the employer but, once the employer excess is reached, the insurer usually
becomes the claims manager. Services are contracted for by insurers, employers, and workers.
£
Services are delivered by registered providers. This latter group is discussed in detail in the
section on Service Delivery Personnel.
Administration within the VWA
Within the VWA, the Scheme Regulation Department has primary responsibility for
rehabilitation issues. The Health and Rehabilitation Branch administers most aspects of
"medical and like" services as prescribed by Section 99 of the Act and provides registration,
analysis, and guidance to both insurers and providers.
Table 7.3 summarizes rehabilitation services covered by the VWA. The list of services
is quite broad and fairly typical of other workers' compensation systems. Of course, it is the
OR services that are the focus of this chapter. Medical and like services are discussed in
Chapter 5 of this report.
Registration
As noted in the table, only occupational rehabilitation services provided by an approved
OR provider may be paid as a medical and like expense. The approval process requires

isln considering these structural features of occupational rehabilitation hi Victoria, an important caveat
must be kept in mind. The market for rehabilitation services is not limited to situations controlled by the VWA.
There exists within the broader community both suppliers and consumers that are outside the formal relationships
identified above. Workers injured in non-work-related events, private citizens in need of rehabilitation services,
and individuals directed to services by non-workers' compensation insurance programmes make up a broader
market for rehabilitation services. In addition, both workers and employers who seek services outside the scheme
are beyond the scope of this analysis. The extent to which activity in this broader market overlaps, augments or
provides substitutes for those services and relationships described below has not been analysed.
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potential providers to submit an application and a fee to the VWA.16 The application requires
the provider to record information that demonstrates experience in occupational rehabilitation
shows evidence of their capacity to deliver these services, and gives an undertaking to ensure
these services are provided by qualified staff.
Providers able to meet these criteria may be given "unrestricted" status. "Restricted*5
providers may not meet all of the criteria, may lack expertise in a particular area, or be
otherwise limited due to the availability of certain services in their particular (often rural) area.
There is also another category of provider that is employer-based and generally part of a
self-insured employer's operation. An approved provider may consist of a full interdisciplinary
facility or a single practitioner. Once approved, providers are expected to handle at least 20
cases per year. Providers are also urged to attend a one-day training programme designed and
delivered by the VWA. At this writing, there are approximately 80 registered providers with
about 700 individuals approved to deliver services.
The registration process has been criticized by some as bestowing upon those who are
registered a de facto form of accreditation. Unlike other provisions that rely on registration
with (or eligibility for registration with) a professional governing body, the OR registration
process only requires the VWA to make a minimal assessment of a provider's credentials.
Apparently some providers use the term "approved VWA provider" as a means of promotion
or validation of their level of practice, expertise or service. In the absence of any professional
governing body offering accreditation, there are few alternatives open to the VWA. There may
be an opportunity, however, for the Victorian OR providers (VCORP) to institute such a
system at arm's length from the VWA. 17
16The application fees for OR providers effective from 1 May 1996 are $500 for approval of up to 10
individuals and $750 for approval of more than 10 individuals.
I7The suggestion that VCORP take on the role of an accrediting body was raised in the David Gadiel and
Lee Ridoutt paper, UA Review of the Occupational Rehabilitation Services Industry in Victoria," Health Care
Intelligence, December 1995, p. 75 and in various interviews. The worldwide trend to quality and standard setting
is exemplified by Australian Quality Standards, ISO 9000 movement in manufacturing and, more specifically, the
Australian Physiotherapy Association's practice accreditation, Council for the Accreditation of Rehabilitation
Facilities (CARF) and the Commission on Rehabilitation Counselor Certification (CRCC), which deal with
various vocational rehabilitation providers.
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Occupational Rehabilitation Services in Victoria
For any regulator, analysis is a key function. The ACCtion system provides the main
source of information for reports and analysis. Most reports are used in monitoring system
performance with analysis directed to specific studies, trend analysis, or to provide model data
for testing the effects of scheme design. The system outcomes section later in this chapter will
comment more fully on the adequacy of the data, however, for the following discussion it is
important to keep in mind that services provided by non-registered providers, internal
rehabilitation professionals, and self-insured providers are not fully accounted for.
Since all payment transactions made by insurers are coded and captured by the ACCtion
system, occupational rehabilitation "inputs" may be identified by provider, service, date or any
combination of these or other fields within the system. Table 7.4 provides the level of
occupational rehabilitation services for fiscal year 1995-96 at the VWA. In terms of the
number of individuals who received services, the initial occupational rehabilitation assessment
(code RC100) was the most frequent, with 3,254 individuals receiving such assessments during
the past fiscal year. 18 A total of $921,325 was spent on OR assessments during 1995-96. Some
2,418 individuals received OR counselling (code RC225), at a cost of $843,260 during the
same period. There were 2,171 workplace assessments (code RC295) conducted at a cost to the
VWA of $783,026 and a total of 2,023 vocational assessments (code RC315) were performed
on injured workers at a cost of $662,578 for 1995-96.
Job search assistance (code RC125) was provided to 1,446 clients at a cost of $683,540
and a total of 885 functional assessments (code RC113) were done at a cost of $288,146 during
the year. In addition, 357 individuals received functional education (code RC245) at a cost of
$110,039 and 322 individuals received advice or assistance in obtaining vocational reeducation
(code RC119). Some 210 individuals received vocational re-education services (code RC330)
at a current year cost of $162,873.

l8While it cannot be assumed that every individual receives an assessment upon entering the occupational
rehabilitation system, this number of 3,254 would provide an approximation to the number of individuals who first
qualified for OR during 1995-96. This can be contrasted with the roughly 9,000-10,000 individuals entering
rehabilitation annually during the VARC era (see Table 7.1).
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With the return-to-work focus of occupational rehabilitation in Victoria, it is quite
surprising that only 202 individuals received work conditioning services (code RC199) at a
cost of $77,885 and only 136 workplace modifications (code RC300) were done during the
1995-96 fiscal year at a cost of just $53,237.
A worker may, of course, receive more than one service in any category and services in
more than one category may be provided to a single individual. Services to workers are also
likely to be provided over time, so any snapshot will record services being provided for cases
having arisen in both the current year and previous years. For the 12 months ending June 30,
1996, a total of 7,042 individuals received services under the above codes. Table 7.5 indicates
the year of injury for cases receiving OR during 1995-96. About 65 percent of OR claims
involve injuries from the past 3 years.
As may be noted from the Occupational Rehabilitation Services codes hi the table, some
common rehabilitation interventions are not well defined. Group counselling, psychometric and
functional testing, and job search programmes-activities often performed in group sessions are
not identified in any unique way. We heard varying opinions both internally and externally on
how such services should be recorded. This apparent confusion may reduce the reliability of
the data for analysis purposes.
Data Resources
The adequacy of any data system is the prime determinant of the quality and utility of
the data generated by the system and the analysis that can be done with these data. To the
extent that the ACCtion system accurately reports recorded data, the analysis performed within
the VWA will be accurate and reliable. To the extent that the data are incomplete, inaccurate
or ill-defined, the reliability of any analysis will be suspect.
For the VWA, there are competing purposes in the design and utilisation of the data
resources. The ACCtion system is accessed by insurers and the VWA with the majority of the
input coming from the insurer operations. For assessing the utilisation of OR services, there
are several limitations to the system, however:
•

Services provided directly by the insured employers may not be captured;
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Services performed internal to an employer's or insurer's operation are not
recorded by the ACCtion system (although records may well exist in proprietary
applications within the employer or insurer operation);
Services provided by non-registered providers are not captured;
Services provided to workers employed by self-insured employers are not
captured on an individual or case basis;
Occupational rehabilitation "activities" (including vocational counselling )
provided by physicians, physiotherapists or others may not be recorded in the
ACCtion system.
The net result of these limitations is that the ACCtion system will provide accurate
payment information for officially "sanctioned" services, but is less likely to capture all the
services provided. Interview information confirms that each of these limitations has some
impact on the reliability of the data from a service measurement point of view. The nature of
these limitations will tend to understate the rehabilitation activity that is actually provided to
injured workers in Victoria. It is not possible to estimate to what extent this understatement
may be occurring in individual expenditure areas nor to estimate the rehabilitative or cash
value of these services.
Committees
Interviews revealed that various committees have been active and that the VWA does
work with provider groups (such as VCORP and the APA) to negotiate agreements, exchange
information and to develop specific programmes and services. For instance, the APA and the
VWA have been working together on guidelines for the treatment of low back injuries.
With the cooperation of the AMA and the APA, the Authority has established a "peer
review" process. Essentially, a committee of professionals from the appropriate discipline
reviews the practices of providers identified through analysis as having patterns of service
provision outside normal boundaries. In essence, providers identified as consistently billing for
services beyond the normal duration or frequency are reviewed by the committee. The
objective of the review is, in the first instance, to determine the reasons for the extensive use.
If the service provision is determined by professional peers to be beyond the norm, the
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committee works with the provider to inform and educate the professional in ways in which to
bring utilisation to within normally accepted levels.
Although this system is currently structured as a "utilisation" review, the understanding
of at least some of the participants is that the process will be expanded to include both a
general performance review through sampling and a parallel review of practices that may be
providing sub-optimal service to injured workers. The VWA also employs some medical ;
practitioners on a sessional basis to work on reviews and special projects. Other professionals
serve with authority staff on specialised committees to develop educational material and
guidelines.
The Authority also works with a stakeholder committee known as the Occupational
Rehabilitation Advisory Forum. This group has nominations from employer associations
(Australian Chamber of Manufacturers and Victorian Chamber of Commerce and Industry),
labour organisations (Victorian Trades Hall Council), insurers, self-insurers, and OR providers
(VCORP). The Forum was initially established to oversee the transition from WorkCare to
WorkCover and has maintained a high profile by assisting the Authority to determine the
future strategies/direction of occupational rehabilitation within the scheme. Significant input
and assistance has been received regarding possible legislative changes, implementation and
resolution of scheme operational and administrative issues, and the WISE programme.
Range of Rehabilitation Services and Programmes
Occupational Rehabilitation Services are primarily directed at promoting/facilitating
maintenance at or early return to work as soon as is practicable. Returning the injured worker
to pre-injury duties or suitable employment is preferred. Throughout our interviews, the terms
"return to work" and "rehabilitation" were used almost interchangeably, although the latter
was used with some reservations, apparently because of connotations from the WorkCare and
VARC experience.
Physical, occupational, and remedial therapy may all be important in providing the
basis for a successful return to work. Under the direction of the worker's physician or by
worker consultation with chiropractic, naturopathic or physiotherapy practitioner, these
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services are all available within the scheme. For those requiring orthotics and prosthetics, the
service, fitting and supply of these adaptive devices are also covered. The VWA is a sponsor
of the paralympic programme and some of Australia's elite athletes with disabilities have
become spokespersons for WorkCover. The depth of commitment of the organisation to this
ideal is reflected in policies that allow for the purchase of such items as specialised prosthetics
and wheel chairs for competition.
There is no defined "early intervention" programme within the jurisdiction, although
several insurers report that they routinely review all employer claims either upon establishment
of the claim or within the first 6 months to identify cases that may benefit from such a referral.
OR providers report lengthy delays in referral after injury, often well beyond 6 months.
Integrated, interdisciplinary treatment programmes that involve physiotherapy, vocational
counselling, and education components are not generally supported.19 Chronic pain
programmes, back education and evaluation services, and group work are not generally funded
although pilot programmes and specific arrangements have been funded in some cases.
Rehabilitation services for prescription-drug addiction, chronic pain syndrome, and post injury
self-image or vocational identity counselling are not specifically defined as occupational
rehabilitation services. Other services that are more "educational" and "counselling" oriented
are similarly undefined by the legislation but are, apparently, offered to some individuals
within the system. Physiotherapists, for example, sometimes offer "counsel" and "education"
incidental to or in combination with "treatment."
For some workers, the iatrogenic, non-compensable and combined psycho-social impact
of injury and other life issues form effective barriers to occupational rehabilitation and return
to work. Whether covered by the scheme or not, the sequelae to workplace injury have played
pivotal roles hi the course of many lives. If medical treatment, physical rehabilitation and
occupational rehabilitation form the primary and secondary interventions, then community
resources play an important tertiary role.

19A project is now underway to determine opportunities for more wide-spread recognition of integrated
programmes.
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Through discretionary grant programmes, community-based "rehabilitation"
programmes are also funded by the Authority. These programmes, often offered through social
and community health centres, provide both specified return-to-work preparation programmes
and, more importantly, the supportive milieu that may prevent further deterioration,
consolidate and stabilize the worker's current situation, and encourage the re-establishment of
a positive self-image and an appropriate disability identity that may eventually lead to
successful vocational or avocational outcomes.
Some cases require re-education as part of rehabilitation. Educational institutions
provide services that are paid for as "rehabilitation" expenses. These cases are not always
easily identified in the database, but tuition, books, equipment and like expenses are provided
under the scheme. Workers engaged hi training programmes are identified in the ACCtion
system as "not incapable" and are not differentiated from others in receipt of benefits. It is not
possible, without detailed file review, to determine in which specific programmes workers
have been directed for re-training most often.
Over and above these directly funded services are services provided by other aspects of
the social safety net. Commonwealth Rehabilitation Services (CRS), for example, provide
rehabilitation to the broader community on a national basis. While some VWA cases are
referred directly to CRS programmes and services, a number of cases that have a work-related
injury (often involving a significant or protracted dispute but occasionally involving stoic or
passive individuals) find their way to CRS for rehabilitation services. These cases and the
services provided are not funded by the VWA.
The WISE Programme
The WorkCover Incentive Scheme for Employers (WISE) programme is aimed at
workers who are unable to return to their accident employer. An employer receives an up-front
grant of up to $2,000 and a wage subsidy payable at weeks 12 and 24 of a placement. The
subsidy is equal to 50 percent of the gross weekly earnings to a maximum of $390 per week. A
further $2000 may be sought in weeks 45 and 52 as work stability payments.
The VWA has promoted the programme in various media and has produced booklets
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encouraging potential employers to register vacancies for specific jobs. The central registry is
housed with the Victorian Employers Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI) and the
programme is funded by the insurers in proportion to their market share. VECCI provides a
coordinator, computer service and telephone support. Job opportunities are faxed daily to
registered providers with summaries provided weekly. Providers receive a placement fee of
$500 in week one and a durability fee of $500 in week 12 if the placement is successful.
Additional funds for workplace modification and the fees paid to providers to assess and
implement these may also be covered.
According to VWA, 226 registrations were made during 1995-96, with 73 of these
resulting from job opportunities actually nominated through the Central Job Register. It is
reported that many employers have discontinued use of the register because the system is
unable to provide suitable candidates. Organised labour claims that the average referral to the
WISE programme occurs some 20 months after injury. Assuming these workers are partially
incapacitated, that means that their benefits will likely be terminated hi only 4 months. Under
these circumstances, it is difficult to motivate insurers to invest in workplace modification, or
other supportive services. It is cheaper to just let the benefits expire.
However, the VWA reviewed the average cost of WISE placements against estimated
weekly benefits that would have been payable if the worker had not been placed using WISE.
They estimated that nearly $2 million in weekly benefits had been saved. For the 32 percent of
cases that received weekly benefits after WISE placement, i.e., another disability spell, the
average weekly benefit amount was reduced by 70 percent.
Other Internal Services
For the long-term, seriously injured workers, there may be little attachment to an
insurer or an employer. These cases, many totally incapacitated for one reason or another,
have very special needs. For this population, there are also unique issues that require longterm monitoring and periodic intervention. Determining the appropriate level of personal care,
assessing drug use, and maintaining these injured workers in the highest enabling environment
are challenging issues. For these workers, there likely will be a continuing need for assessment
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and re-assessment. Unfortunately, even with a falling claims rate, the numbers of individuals
in this category will continue to grow over time due to extremely long durations. They may
also pose an additional moral and fiscal challenge to the VWA since it is unlikely many of
them will be able to return to their former employment.
The Authority has one manager devoted to the task of overseeing these special cases.
As a facilitator and coordinator of services, this manager consults and advises on the services
provided to these cases. Services may include independence and home maintenance services
such as vehicle modifications and housing renovations, even painting. Unlike some
jurisdictions which provide an on-going allowance for independence and home maintenance
issues, each case hi Victoria is decided on an individual basis as the need arises. The Authority
also provides an information line that may be a point of contact for a despondent worker or
family member. A sessional contract psychologist is available for consultation but, for the most
part, cases are directed back to the authorised insurers. The most complex cases are referred to
the internal VWA manager to address.
The Authority is currently developing pilot coordinated care programmes for the most
complex cases in the system in an effort to provide the worker and medical practitioner with
the appropriate means, mechanisms, and support to ensure that these cases receive quality
effective care.
Other External Services

Authorised Insurers make a variety of resources and services available to claims
officers, employers and others. Some insurers have in-house rehabilitation staff while others
use contracted or wholly owned subsidiaries to provide rehabilitation services or claims
management advice. Those that have internalised rehabilitation resources into their own
administration provide these services as part of the claims process and not as a billed service.
Counselling, basic assessment and, in some cases, the direct contracting of services may be
approved and provided within an authorised insurers' operation. Since there are no separately
billed expenditures, the quantity and nature of services actually provided cannot be determined.
Some employers and authorised self-insurers also use the services of employee
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assistance plans (EAPs) to augment the services covered by the scheme. These plans are
generally staffed by professional counsellors who can address the full range of counselling
services including vocational and occupational issues. Again, there is no formal recording of
these services with respect to the VWA. Similarly, any service contracted by an employer for
the benefit of his or her employees generally is not reported to the VWA. While the policy
requires use of registered OR providers for VWA purposes, there are no restrictions on the use
of non-registered personnel for services not charged against the scheme.
Rehabilitation-Oriented Research
Various research initiatives funded by VWA have taken a broader view of the system
and the impact of current policies on rehabilitation issues. In cooperation with the Victorian
Trades Hall Council (VTHC), the VWA sponsored a review of the barriers to effective
rehabilitation.20 In addition, a detailed analysis of the occupational rehabilitation services
industry in Victoria was completed by Gadiel and Ridoutt.21 This review applies standard
market analysis to the industry and raises issues of accreditation, market concentration and data
sufficiency. The willingness of the VWA to participate in such examinations is indicative of a
sincerity of purpose in furthering the understanding of rehabilitation issues.
Several groups, however, complained that the research produced by the organisation
was not readily available or widely published. Many professionals expressed the opinion that
the VWA should be more pro-active in doing internal research and sponsoring appropriate
academic research that would be authoritative, reproducible, and publishable. Such research,
particularly if designed in cooperation with key professional groups, would command a greater
degree of credibility amongst these groups. This may be of particular importance to the

^Jeanette Sdrinis, VTHC/VWA Rehabilitation and Return to Work Project Identifying the Barriers to
Effective Rehabilitation and Return to Work of Injured Workers, Final Report and Recommendations, Melbourne,
Victoria, May 1995.
2'David Gadiel and Lee Ridoutt, "A Review of the Occupational Rehabilitation Services Industry in
Victoria, Health Care Intelligence, December 1995.
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development of clinical practice guidelines for physiotherapy, chiropractic and occupational
medicine, for example.
As pointed out earlier, much analysis is currently based on the ACCtion database. The
utility of this data system for detailed research is currently being explored through work at the
University of Melbourne.22 The VWA has funded nearly $500,000 in rehabilitation research
over the past 3 years and has a continuing commitment to this programme. This interest in
academic research, prospective studies and empirical research that contributes to the
development of knowledge beyond any immediate business gain has the potential to be an
important contribution to the rehabilitation professions in Australia and elsewhere.
Service Delivery Personnel
Rehabilitation services are provided by a variety of professional, semi-professional and
designated staff. The following section parallels the rehabilitation process from the employer,
through the authorised insurers, health care professionals and authorised providers. This is not
intended to describe all possible individuals involved in the delivery of rehabilitation services
but, rather, to illustrate the range of personnel involved in the process. This section also
highlights some of the key procedures and tools employed and records some of the key issues
and views presented by representatives of these service delivery personnel.
Return-to-work Coordinators
More than any other position, the Return-to-work Coordinator is key to the access to
occupational rehabilitation in Victoria. The Act requires the employer to nominate a return-towork coordinator. This person is not necessarily a professional in rehabilitation or related
discipline, nor is there a requirement for such individuals to have specific training. There are,
however, mandatory functions assigned to this individual. Section 161 of the Act prescribes the
folio whig functions for the RTW coordinator:

22Dr. Peter Disler.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

assist injured workers, where prudent and practicable, to remain at or return to
work as soon as possible after injury;
liaise with any parties involved in the occupational rehabilitation of, or
provision of medical or hospital services to, an injured worker;
monitor the progress of an injured worker's capacity to return to work;
ensure that, where reasonably necessary, an injured worker is given assess to
occupational rehabilitation services;
take steps to as far as practicable prevent recurrence or aggravation of the
relevant injury upon the worker's return to work.

Of necessity, terms such as "prudent" and "reasonably necessary" involve judgments
based on knowledge and experience. In practice, the role of RTW Coordinator is carried out
by a variety of personnel. In many smaller firms, the task falls to a pay clerk. In some larger
organisations, a human resources or safety officer is delegated this responsibility. While it was
acknowledged that most RTW Coordinators were well meaning, there were general concerns
among those we interviewed over the confidentiality, knowledge, and skill demands placed on
these individuals. There were also concerns that, in an effort to hasten early return to
employment, well-meaning but uninformed personnel may adversely affect recovery in some
cases. Similarly, the wide variability in experience, skill and knowledge could result in late
involvement or referral to OR providers. Again, these concerns are likely more valid among
smaller employers or those where the RTW Coordinator position is subject to rotation or
turnover.
Since this position has been made pivotal to the occupational rehabilitation of injured
workers hi Victoria, there is an implicit requirement for a knowledge base and an
understanding of the requirements for confidentiality as well as appropriate support. The VWA
produces a variety of publications that outline how the functions should be carried out but no
formal training is required for those taking on this position.23 For employers with few injuries,
regardless of payroll size, there may be insufficient incentive to develop effective RTW
Coordinators. Even if the investment is made in training those assigned the task, skills may not

23The TAPE system offers a 5-day training programme for RTW Coordinators, and VECCI offers
formally structured training programmes of shorter duration. Such training although developed with the VWA
remains voluntary.
7-31

be used for many months or even years, diminishing both the effectiveness and utility of the
advanced training. For those employers with relatively frequent injuries or with well
established disability management programmes, the appointment of an appropriate and
knowledgeable individual is less of an issue. These firms generally will have selected an
individual to deal with disability issues regardless of the requirement.
Tools employed by RTW Coordinators include graduated return-to-work programmes
and alternate duty programmes. These can be particularly useful hi assisting a full return to
work, maintaining the employer-worker relationship, and mitigating the costs of disability both
to the worker and the employer. Many labour representatives supported the general concept of
both programmes. They pointed out, however; that these programmes only work well with
specific employers in specific industries, usually where the utilisation of such programmes is
part of complete rehabilitation process and disability management plan. Employers'
representatives, too, voiced some concerns regarding the RTW coordinator skills and the
difficulties in providing alternate employment for injured workers.24
General Practitioners / Family Physicians
For the majority of injured workers, the family physician will be the prune medical
contact during recovery. The VWA has aggressively sought to inform the general public of the
physician's role hi rehabilitation and return to work. Mass media campaigns, for example,
have been based on the theme, "What kind of doctor sends an injured worker back to
work? .... A doctor who cares." The VWA has backed up this message with a
physician-developed guide booklet outlining the role of the general practitioner in WorkCover
cases.25
As described earlier, the physician is the person normally charged with the
responsibility of completing medical certificates. These are critical to receiving weekly benefits
24VWA-approved training programmes are offered through TAPE and VECCI. The availability of the
training was less of an issue than the difficulties from an employer point of view in determining who to train and
when. The difficulties noted in the previous paragraph are not diminished by the fact that training is available.
^Dr. Ray Moore, The Role of General Practitioners in WorkCover, VWA: November 1995.
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and tend to maintain the contact with the GP. Physicians are encouraged to emphasise what the
worker can do and to draw comparisons with sports injuries. Although encouraged to maintain
contact with the worker and facilitate positive dialogue amongst the various players in the
system, some physicians complained that the phone call demands of insurance adjudicators,
RTW Coordinators, and others were an interruption to their normal practices. While some
acknowledge that the fee structure provided by the VWA schedule offsets some of these costs,
there was a general complaint that any fee premium was more than offset by additional cost.
Physicians are the main source of referral to other rehabilitation personnel. Referrals to
physiotherapists and others that provide physical rehabilitation treatment are consistent with
typical professional practice. This is not the case, however, when it comes to referral to
occupational rehabilitation providers. The following is the advice provided to physicians
regarding occupational rehabilitation:
GPs and employers may refer the worker to a provider but the referral has to be
approved by the employer. Funding is often only granted for a specific amount and for
specific services. Unreasonable refusal to attend could result in cessation of benefits for
the worker. Employers now have nominated preferred rehabilitation providers.
You should expect to be kept informed about the rehabilitation provider's
recommendations and an opportunity for the worker to discuss matters with you should
be offered before rehabilitation starts.26
One specific concern raised by physicians in the course of our interviews was the
practice of employer or insurer substitution of provider. In some cases, a physician will
specifically name an occupational rehabilitation provider in his/her referral. This
named-referral may be based on the physician's previous experience, specific knowledge of the
provider's success in dealing with certain injury types, or other reason based on professional
judgment. At some point, however, the referral is re-directed to the employer's or insurer's
preferred provider or other registered provider. This substitution was called "unethical" by
some and ill-advised by others.

26Ibid., p. 15. Note also that the rehabilitation provider no longer has to be approved by the employer.
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Physiotherapists
In Victoria, continuing certification of incapacity is under the control of physio
therapists as well as physicians. In fact, workers are free to seek treatment directly with the
therapist of their choice without referral from a physician. However, the initial certification of
incapacity must be provided by a physician. Physiotherapists provide manual therapy
techniques, including mobilisation and manipulation, therapeutic exercise, physical agents and
mechanical modalities, electro therapeutic modalities, microwave and diathermy, hydrotherapy, and massage. They often are involved in assisting injured workers in adjustment to
disability. The rather arbitrary line between "treatment" and "counselling," with the latter
being assigned to OR providers, is often crossed hi clinical practice. While this may
compromise statistical analysis, such encroachments are likely to be a positive rather than
negative influence on the worker's recovery.
The Australian Physiotherapy Association (APA) represents some 2000 physio
therapists in professional practice hi Victoria. About 80 percent of registered physiotherapists
are covered as members of this association. The high degree of membership provides a strong
collegial and professional body which represents the interests of physiotherapists to the VWA.
There is also a separate registration board and organisation for massage practitioners.
As a professional body, the APA has worked closely with the VWA and they
participate in the peer review process for physiotherapists described above. The APA endorses
a full programme of peer review rather than just directing attention to high-end utilisation.
They also expressed concern over the development of treatment protocols for back injuries,
recommending adherence to clinical practice guidelines produced by the National Health and
Medical Research Council. They believe that the VWA should be more pro-active in doing
clinical research and sponsoring appropriate academic research hi conjunction with
professional bodies like the APA. Such research would then give a greater degree of credibility
to such things as practice guidelines and would be more readily adopted by their membership
as well as injured workers.
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Occupational Medicine Providers
There are relatively few physicians with occupational medicine specialty designation in
Victoria. These specialists offer services to workers and employers and are occasionally
aligned with a registered occupational rehabilitation provider, physiotherapy provider or
integrated treatment programme. While they have very specific skill and knowledge, they are
faced with similar problems to those of the general practitioners and the additional challenges
of OR providers. Substitution of referrals, the lack of rehabilitation and occupational medicine
knowledge amongst insurers, and a general lack of autonomy were often mentioned as
concerns by these professionals. The "second guessing" by employers and insurers of what
should be routine decisions to refer a case for rehabilitation services was said to be an
unnecessary step that actually delayed interventions and could prolong patient recovery and
return to work.
Some occupational medicine specialists also act as Independent Medical Advisers.
These physicians perform medical examinations at the request of insurers in order to assist in
decision-making on individual cases. The medical reports of these physicians, however, are not
routinely shared with the treating physicians. This imbalance or asymmetry in information is
often based on a concern for confidentiality yet, for the treating physician, these reports may
be extremely useful in determining the appropriate rehabilitation activities that may be required
in individual cases.
Occupational medicine has much to offer both the injured workers and other medical
and rehabilitation personnel in the WorkCover system. VWA is currently developing a training
cycle for physicians. This may take some time to implement but is believed to be an important
initiative. There was a common call for greater consultation and involvement of professionals
from occupational medicine and rehabilitation on training, education, ethics, confidentiality
and treatment topics. The VWA Advisory Committee, if more actively utilised, was cited as an
appropriate forum for such consultation.
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Occupational Rehabilitation Providers
The term "Occupational Rehabilitation" in Victoria describes a set of services, not a
profession. While those engaged in delivering the services defined under the Act are
Occupational Rehabilitation providers, the personnel are drawn from a number of disciplines:
Physiotherapists (15 percent), Vocational and Rehabilitation Counsellors (19 percent), and
Occupational Therapists (42 percent) to name a few. Figure 7.3 shows the distribution
graphically. Between 700 and 800 occupational health professionals are associated with the 100
or so approved OR providers; however, the full time equivalents are somewhat lower than
that—around 650.27 There are several large registered occupational rehabilitation providers,
with the top five producing about 60 percent of the aggregate billings. Three registered
providers are owned and operated by insurance companies while the remainder are either
private (for profit) operations or not for profit (and public) agencies.
The Victorian Council of Occupational Rehabilitation Providers (VCORP) represents
some but not all of the providers. Some providers are active in the Australian Society of
Rehabilitation Counsellors or other professional groups, but membership or accreditation is not
a requirement of registration. Providers are registered by the VWA. This registration involves
review of credentials and is tantamount to an "approval" system. Unlike some states or
provinces in North America that require rehabilitation personnel to be certified by an
professional association or licenced by a governing college or body, there is no analogous
system in Victoria.
This does not mean that the professionals providing service are in any way inferior to
their counterparts in other jurisdictions. Many are, in fact, members of such professional
bodies and are subject to periodic accreditation and continuing education programmes to
maintain professional standing. The Australian Society of Rehabilitation Counsellors, for
example, has developed core competencies and a code of ethics similar in content to the
Commission on Rehabilitation Counsellor Certification (CRCC) in North America. The

7Gadiel and Ridoutt, op. cit., p. 23.
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absence of an outside independent body with the responsibility to accredit providers, however,
makes VWA the de facto accreditation body in the jurisdiction.
In the absence of a universally accepted accrediting body, there is no objective or
professional assessment of the quality of services provided to VWA clients. Some providers
have services that extend beyond occupational rehabilitation towards the closely allied areas of
physiotherapy treatment or occupational health and safety (or both), while others augment their
service repertoire to include geriatric assessment, pre-employment screening and rehabilitation
of non-VWA clients.
Effective assessment is another key determinant of successful rehabilitation. Providers
use the typical range of professional tools and methods to assist in rehabilitation. Some
facilities are equipped with work sampling stations, psychometric testing facilities and even
an ERGOS28 computerized assessment installation. The technical counselling ability and
competencies in vocational assessment, training and job placement, and rehabilitation
philosophy are well represented within the provider community.
Community-Based RTW Projects and Services
The VWA offers grants for specific projects sponsored by community-based
organisations. These grants are targeted at workers who have or had an accepted claim and
who have exhausted all other avenues of support under the VWA scheme. Eligible workers are
those without an employer or current employment and 18 months without regular employment.
Generally, other barriers to employment must also exist. The VWA lists the following
"disadvantages": age, occupation, employer, language, literacy or geographic location, and a
risk of long-term detachment form the labour force.29 The grants support programmes to assist
in placement or self-placement, facilitate access to vocational training, and provide relevant
information on worker rights. Projects are run by non-profit, community-based organisations,
28ERGOS work simulators are free-standing, computer-monitored, task sampling units used for
standardized evaluation and assessment.
29VWA, "Community Based Return-to-work Projects: Policy Guidelines—Return-to-work Services," a
companion document to the "Guidelines for Applicants 1995/96 Funding."
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often specialising in support and health programmes for a geographic or cultural community.
These organisations operate in centres that are close to the people they serve and are
often less imposing than the formal clinical and office settings in which most other service
delivery personnel operate. The range of services offered are generally more holistic and
reflective of the community. For example, VWA clients may be in support groups with
individuals recovering from car accidents and sports injuries. Family members are often
included in such programmes at the community level.
While appreciative of the grants they receive, community-based resources seek a
greater recognition of the contribution they make to mitigating the collateral consequences of
injury. Even cases that result hi a failure from a return-to-work point of view may be
successful in raising the potential of the individual to eventually succeed, preventing a further
deterioration of functioning, or fostering adjustment to the permanent effects of a disability.
Authorised Insurers
The 14 authorised insurers have varying arrangements with respect to rehabilitation
services. As authorised insurers, they are responsible for ensuring the compliance of those
policy holders they underwrite with the requirements of the legislation, including the creation
of rehabilitation policies. Most offer some assistance to their employers in such compliance,
and in working with the RTW coordinators on developing rehabilitation and return-to-work
plans. As the "claims" managers, they are responsible for the adjudication and on-going
management of claims. This includes referral to OR providers.
One of the challenges for the insurers is the identification of cases that will benefit from
an OR referral. In a reactive mode, those insurers can wait for the identification to be made by
the treating medical practitioner, the employer, the union, or the worker. Physiotherapists and
others involved in medical treatment may also suggest that such a referral may be in order. In a
more pro-active mode, the claims agent will identify cases that would benefit from a referral.
The mechanism for this latter process varies amongst authorised insurers.
Some insurers have dedicated rehabilitation professionals (rehabilitation counsellors,
occupational health nurses, counselling psychologists, occupational therapists and the like) on
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staff. These are often called upon or are involved in routine file review to monitor the need for
occupational rehabilitation services. In some cases, initial assessments are conducted by these
personnel. In others, these in-house specialists may be empowered to make referrals directly to
an OR provider. More commonly, however, it is the claims officer or manager who has the
decision-making authority with respect to such referrals.
The number of these insurer in-house occupational rehabilitation resources is growing.
Interviews reveal three main reasons for this: increased recognition of the value of earlier
rehabilitation interventions, growing monitoring and audits by the VWA, and a greater
understanding of the complexity of rehabilitation issues, both hi terms of long-term cost drivers
and worker outcomes. It is important to note that the time and activities provided in-house by
insurers are not captured by the ACCtion system. These services form part of the overhead
costs of authorised insurers. Only external expenditures are coded by the insurer on an item,
case and provider basis.
Several insurers have allied themselves with specific providers. Several stakeholders
raised ethical issues around these arrangements. Unlike the "managed care" models in private
insurance where there are complete referral networks or health management organisations that
provide integrated care programmes as part of the policy offering, the Victorian system
involves a higher degree of choice. The practice of employer or insurer substitution of one
particular provider for the named referral of a physician or occupational medicine specialist
was raised as a significant issue by a number of those interviewed.
The issue of "self-referral,*' that is, referral by an authorised insurer to its own OR
provider, raises some ethical and principal-agent problems as well. Absent specific regulations
to the contrary, it is possible for an insurer to direct more cases to its own subsidiary than to
any other provider. The fear is that such referrals could be made for profitability reasons as
much as for professional requirements. The VWA is aware of this potential problem. Although
pattern analysis by the VWA has determined little difference hi either the referral rates or
actual service provision, one study claimed that the main referral source for insurer-linked OR
providers was insurers (52 percent of referrals). This is nearly four tunes the insurer-referral
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rate overall (at 13.1 percent).30 Later data from VWA indicates that the three insurers with
organisational links to OR providers in 1995-96 accounted for between 26 and 60 percent of all
OR services to their claimants.
Self-Insurers
Typically, self-insured employers have an administrative unit responsible for claims. In
some organisations, this unit reports through a human resources structure, but in others the
function is combined with risk management, occupational safety and health, or operations. The
administrative unit may have a manager or staff familiar with rehabilitation, but it is not
required. Many have rehabilitation policies that extend beyond the mandated measures of the
VWA and are more reflective of the full disability management philosophy emerging
internationally. Employee assistance programmes, graduated return-to-work plans and
ergonomic adaptations and modifications may be applied equally as well to those injured in the
workplace and those whose injury or disease is of non-workplace origins.
Several interviews revealed that self-insurers are relatively pleased with the autonomy
offered by the self-insurance scheme. In particular, the ability to use all the employer's benefits
programmes and policies to assist a disabled worker was highlighted. However, some critics
reported that this same flexibility can be used to "buy-out" a worker in such a way as to
relieve the employer of potential costs. Although such options would also exist among some
non-self-insured firms, insured firms are subject to a higher degree of outside monitoring and
reporting through their insurers and, by way of insurer audits, the VWA.
Integrated Programmes
Most workers' compensation jurisdictions have providers that offer integrated
rehabilitation programmes. These are often associated with pain clinics, back programmes or
general rehabilitation facilities. Victoria has several facilities in this category that offer

iel and Ridoutt, op. cit., p. 24. The analysis draws upon data from a provider self-assessment
survey.
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consolidated services that may include programmes from post-surgical convalescence through
pain management, occupational therapy, rehabilitation workshops, speech pathology, to
complementary therapy programmes in stress release, physical and remedial exercise, and
group support sessions. These facilities may also offer general counselling, functional capacity
assessment, worksite assessments and modifications. Technology including Kin Com, B200
and other assessment/diagnostic/treatment tools are often integrated into the programmes. In
general, the programmes offered by these facilities are hi accord with the rehabilitation
programmes accredited through CARF in North America.
These facilities illustrate most acutely the artificial line between "medical" and
"occupational" rehabilitation programmes. Holistic programmes are established by the
facilities, which are interdisciplinary by nature and not easily segmented for approval on a
"coded line item basis," as required by the VWA. This creates barriers to admission with some
such facilities requiring detailed approval before admission. Prior approvals, restricted
provider status and lengthy payment procedures are seen as the major hurdles to more effective
use of these facilities. One administrator suggested that development of "programme-based" as
opposed to "service-based" codes could facilitate more appropriate use of these facilities.
Outcomes
For the majority of workers and employers, "outcomes" in rehabilitation mean
successful, cost-effective and durable return to work. Measurement of these outcomes,
however, is never easy. Each of these terms—"successful," "cost-effective" and "durable"—
are subjective and highly dependent on the question asked, the tune-frames considered and the
definitions used. The VWA has invested in a series of evaluations and studies that attempt to
quantify outcomes. Many of these studies have been reflected in the preceding discussion or
directly cited elsewhere in this report.
Occupational Rehabilitation Outcomes
The following discussion carries with it an important caveat. There is no statistic that
will indicate whether a system is working optimally. Any measure may be disputed and any
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number discredited if the assumptions that underlie it are not accepted. The following
discussion of outcomes, therefore, includes the perceptions of the stakeholders as well as the
statistics and percentages associated with outcome analysis.
The "Return-to-work rate" for the VWA is reported at about 86 percent—a figure that
compares well with other jurisdictions including South Australia (at 82 percent)?1 and New
South Wales32 and is a startling improvement over the 54 percent RTW rate reported under the
WorkCare system in 1992.33 Further, the quality of these RTW rates are relatively high, with
same employer/same duties continuity at 66 percent.34 However, there are still a significant
number of persons who, by definition were workers at the time of injury, but have not
succeeded in a full return to work. Therefore, it seems worth pushing beyond the numbers to
report the perceptions of system participants.
Surveys and Interview Findings
In more than 60 interviews we conducted, stakeholders were asked the following
question: "What has the VWA got right?" Almost without exception, employers, worker
representatives, academics and providers stated that the VWA has correctly emphasised the
connection between worker and employer as the fundamental relationship. Taken hi the
historical context of workers' compensation in Victoria, this agreement constitutes a significant
positive outcome. Current disability management theory professes this relationship as a
fundamental tenet, (see Akabas, Gates and Galvin 1992) Through the reshaping of its
compensation and rehabilitation programmes in 1992 and its aggressive advertising since, this
message is clearly getting through to employers, workers, physicians, occupational
rehabilitation providers and others.
3lCampbell Research & Consulting, "Return to Work: A Benchmark Comparison of South Australian and
Victorian return-to-work Rates," July 1996, p. 8.
32The Boston Consulting Group, "Workers' Compensation in Victoria: Case Study of a Major
Turnaround," February 1996, p. 12.
33Ibid.
^Campbell, op. cit., p. 13.
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Part of the message presented by the VWA is the connection between injury and costs.
The experience rating system, 10-day employer "excess," and the required prior approval for
occupational rehabilitation expenditures reinforce this message. Employers connect the
expenditures and system costs with their own premium rates. The message, however, may not
be perfectly understood. Many employers believe that a rehabilitation expenditure paid through
the system will have a three-fold impact on total costs, because of the experience rating
calculation. One employer representative said that, before a decision was taken regarding a
certain occupational rehabilitation expenditure, consultants were called in to consider the dollar
impact on the firm's rate and to weigh the rate consequences of turning down the plan.
There is also a dichotomy in outcomes when it comes to assessing the success of the
mandated Occupational Rehabilitation programmes, RTW plans, and the RTW Coordinator
function. Survey data indicate a high degree of compliance, "ownership" and, indeed,
successful return to work.35 There were, however, significant criticisms of performance from
both workers and employers. On rehabilitation outcomes, workers supported early return-towork initiatives but indicated that, where alternate duties are meaningless or unavailable, the
RTW policy can actually have a negative effect on self-esteem. Employers, too, generally
approved of the early RTW policy but found its success to be highly dependent on the
individual worker and his/her characteristics. They also reaffirmed the difficulty many
employers have in finding suitable alternate employment for their injured workers.
While the VWA has been very successful in communicating the idea of early RTW,
commissioned survey results and the interviews conducted as part of this study indicate that
Occupational Rehabilitation Services are not highly valued by employers. Expenditures were
seen as "costs" rather than as investments that could result in positive, cost-saving outcomes.
On the other hand, workers who had been exposed to OR services were, according to survey

35Two "waves" of participant survey data were prepared for the VWA by Klein & Associates hi 1994 and
1995. These showed a higher degree of compliance in larger employers. A subsequent survey (Study No. 1669,
July 1996) by the same market research group investigated employer and worker attitudes toward return to work
in the Melbourne small business sector. This study and another (Study No. 1608, June 1996, which focused on a
similar population hi Ararat) found highly consistent attitudes among all stakeholders.
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results, highly complimentary and suggested that these services played a key role in both their
rehabilitation and early return to work.
Another recurring theme among employers, physicians and OR providers was a concern
about the lack of rehabilitation knowledge amongst insurance claims staff. Some insurers admit
this limitation but point to their creation or expansion of internal professional rehabilitation
resources to augment their claims management. They also have made efforts to develop greater
claims officer knowledge to ensure that workers receive appropriate occupational rehabilitation
services.
The VWA has made significant efforts to ensure that workers are returned to work as
soon as practicable. The key role of the RTW Coordinator and the necessity to have an
occupational rehabilitation plan in place as mandated by the legislation have been identified as
strengths. It appears, however, that there is wide disparity in compliance among smaller
employers. There is evidence that more than a third of small employers are not in compliance
with the requirements of the Act.36 The corollary is also documented; larger firms generally do
comply with the requirements of the legislation.
The WISE programme is the one operationally based initiative fostered by the VWA to
address those workers who cannot return to their accident employment. While the concept is
laudable and the investment to support the programme extensive, it has fallen far short of
expectations and potential. There are varying explanations offered for this. Some suggest that
competition by other agencies for scarce job opportunities coupled with relatively conservative
incentives place VWA clients at a disadvantage. The lack of transferable skill analysis and the
paucity of skill matching within the programme may further contribute to the low level of
success of this programme. An examination of the design or operation of this programme may
be in order.
The use of retraining is an appropriate rehabilitation measure. There are clear examples
of "success stories" as a result of retraining. Little data, however, is available to indicate the
^Ibid., p. 4. A summary of the two survey "waves," ("Assessment of Employer Compliance to
Occupational Rehabilitation Program Requirements," VWA, October 10, 1995, p. 4), notes that non-compliance
among small work places (1-10 workers) was 35%.
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degree to which this intervention is utilised and to what success. There was a general
perception that retraining is no longer taking place despite some media ads produced by the
VWA that might indicate otherwise. This perception may be addressed through research.
Concluding Observations
There is general agreement in Victoria that early identification and intervention can be
effective in reducing duration of disability and improving return-to-work outcomes. Providers
indicate strong support for the return-to-work focus and the efforts of the VWA to maintain the
connection between worker and employer in the workplace. These initiatives are seen as
supportive of a general disability management philosophy and consistent with a more
integrated model of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the value of the approach is seen as
compromised by the length of time it typically takes for cases to be referred to occupational
rehabilitation. Anecdotal accounts indicate that "early" referrals for occupational rehabilitation
assistance are virtually non-existent. As is all too common in worker's compensation systems,
time elapsed between injury and referral for an initial vocational assessment typically is in
excess of 6 months. One retrospective study using VWA data found that the mean time
between accident and referral was 1.42 years.37 More recent analysis by the VWA indicates
that the median elapsed time between claim report date and first referral to OR services has
been 152 days for the 12,169 OR referrals to date under WorkCover.
Another important technique for improving worker outcomes in rehabilitation is case
management. This worker-focused approach provides a clear responsibility for the case
manager and is characterised by a consistent, progressive series of interactions that lead to
optimal case resolution. The current structure of the Victorian system prevents most providers
from becoming "case managers." Providers are often used on strictly time-limited
interventions with no promise of continuity. An assessment or individualized rehabilitation
plan may be completed, but unless the insurer or the employer approves the plan, no further
37Ibid., (1994), p. 29. This figure applies to December 1994 Quarter. A footnote on the same page
compares this to December 1994 statistics from NSW WorkCover Authority which estimated the average period
from injury to referral to an occupational rehabilitation provider as 6.6 months.
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action can be taken. Some providers report it is typical to see a rise in activity on an earlier
rehabilitation plan as a case nears conciliation or settlement. However, in the absence of a
complete case management model, these activities are often not well integrated into a
continuing, individualized rehabilitation plan.
For a few seriously injured workers, employment outcomes will be limited at best. For
others, avocational outcomes may be the only realistic option. However, these individuals have
little ongoing contact with an occupational rehabilitation provider. Generally, the insurer or the
VWA itself becomes the claims manager for prolonged, permanent total or near-total disability
claims. Services of an occupational rehabilitation provider may be engaged by either the VWA
or the insurer, particularly for assessment or specific project management. A case management
approach could be beneficial to workers hi this category. Various jurisdictions have initiated
"late intervention" projects in order to meet the needs of injured workers whose claims are of
extended duration. The goals of such projects may not be full return to work, but such
initiatives can provide improvements in quality of care and potential for protected or
productive employment. Some OR providers are assisting in isolated projects of this type. A
similar approach may prove beneficial for individuals with a higher than expected frequency of
claims.
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Table 7.1 Summary of WorkCare Rehabilitation Activity: 1985/86 to 1991/92
1985/86'

1986/87

1987/88

1988/89

1989/90

1990/91

1991/92

ACC Claims
Reported2

61,531

93,261

86,979

87,493

80,159

75,438

68,442

Referrals to
Rehabilitation

4,806

12,257

25,179

14,735

10,354

10,987

10,251

Cases Entering
Rehabilitation3

4,274

9,707

14,044

11,455

9,327

9,426

9,667

Rehabilitation Cases
as % of ACC Claims

6.9

10.4

16.1

13.1

11.6

12.5

14.1

Rehabilitation Plans
Approved

n/a4

5,832

11,341

11,968

10,898

10,054

10,540

Case Closures

384

4,558

10,301

12,949

13,535

12,280

12,044

Open Cases

n/a

n/a

9,317

10,807

8,885

8,601

9,032

Source: Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council, Annual Reports
'10 months only, from 1 September 1985
2Actual claims reported. These figures differ from those for estimated incurred claims in Table 3.1 in that the
latter contains an estimate of incurred, but not yet reported claims (IBNRs).
3The difference between these figures and those for referrals to rehabilitation are accounted for by factors such as
not being able to contact the worker, the worker having returned to work, the worker having declined
rehabilitation, and the sufficiency of existing treatments.
4Plan approvals data introduced in October 1986.
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Table 7.2 Source of Referral to Rehabilitation
Under WorkCare
Source of Referral

1988/89 (%)

1989/90 (%)

1990/91 (%)

1991/92 (%)

Employer

40.8

42

41.4

33.8

Doctor

20.3

19.6

19.7

17.7

Insurer

--

—

4.3

7.7

Worker

15.1

16.3

13.7

14.1

VARC

15.4

11

7.7

5.6

Other

8.4

11.1

13.3

21.1

Source: VARC Annual Reports
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Table 7.3 Rehabilitation Services Covered by the VWA
Nature of Service

Payment for

Provided by

Medical Services

attendance, examination or
treatment of any kind;
medicines or curative
apparatus, appliances or
materials; repairs, adjustments
or replacement of crutches,
etc.; certificates or reports
required or authorised

medical practitioner, registered
dentist, registered optometrist,
registered physiotherapist,
registered chiropractor and
osteopath or registered
chiropodist, registered
pharmacist

Health Services

acupuncture, dietary analysis,
hydrotherapy, massage - tactile
therapy, naturopathy,
occupational therapy,
psychology, remedial
gymnasium, social work,
speech therapy

professional eligible for
membership with the relevant
professional body

Hospital Services

maintenance, attendance and
treatment including medical
attendance and treatment,
nursing attendance, medicines,
medically related materials,
appliances and apparatus

any public, denominational, or
private hospital or day
procedure centre, psychiatric
in-patient service including outof-state hospitals approved by
the VWA

In-Patient Charges

public or private hospitals with
special agreements

Out-Patient Charges

public or private hospitals

7-49

Table 7.3 Rehabilitation Services Covered by the VWA
Personal and
Household Services

attendant care, counselling,
modifications to a home or car,
household help, transportation
costs, aid, assistant or other
medical service

subject to an arms-length, 38
non-vocational assessment from
someone other than the
proposed service provider,
persons approved by the Health
and Rehabilitation Branch,
normally approved in advance.
No payment is made to a
spouse or family member for
services provided. These are
considered part of their familial
responsibilities.

Nursing Services

nursing outside a hospital
setting

registered nurses

Ambulance Service

any (return) transportation
required for the purposes of
receiving medical or hospital
services

any public, private or other
transportation service provided
it is the most economical and
practical given the worker's
condition. Where by private
vehicle, no parking expenses
accepted.

Occupational
Rehabilitation
Services

as set out in Section 5 of the
Act

approved providers who are
either Restricted (RR) or
Unrestricted (UR)

Hearing Aids

aids, batteries, cleaning kits

subject to prior approval, any
provider.

Source: summarized from Claims Manual: Chapter 5

38The "arms-length non-vocational assessment" is usually defined as a serious injury assessment for
certain workers. This is an administrative arrangement, not a legislative requirement. Not §Ji personal and
household services are provided subject to such an assessment.
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Table 7.4 Summary of Occupational Rehabilitation Codes and
Descriptions with Recent Volumes*
Code

Service Type

Description

RC100

Initial
Occupational
Rehabilitation
Assessment

An examination of the
current medical situation
and employment status to
determine specific
occupational and
rehabilitation needs to
maximise functional
recovery and achieve
maintenance at or return to
suitable employment.

RC105

N/A

RC113

Functional
Assessment

RC119

RC125

Service
paid on
hourly
rate(H)
or actual
cost (A)

Number
of indivi
duals who
received
services

Total
number
of units
of
service
paid

Value of
Services

A

3,254

12,455

$921,325

The objective measurement
of the injured workers'
physiological functioning to
identify work capabilities.
This code is only to be used
for objective and verifiable
tests.

H

885

1,806

$288,146

Advice or
Assistance to a
Worker in
Obtaining
Vocational
Re-education

Assistance to the worker in
obtaining appropriate
vocational re-education
relevant to the identified
employment goal.

H

322

1,300

$ 78,289

Advice or
Assistance in
Job-seeking

Teaching job-seeking skills,
such as job application
practice, interview role plan
and personal presentation.

H

1,446

14,034

$683,540
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Table 7.4 Summary of Occupational Rehabilitation Codes and
Descriptions with Recent Volumes*
Code

Service Type

Description

RC199

Work
Conditioning

Individually prescribed,
work-oriented process
involving the worker in
simulated or actual work
tasks and activities that are
structured and graded to
progressively increase
physical capacity, tolerance,
stamina, endurance, and
productivity with the goal of
remaining at work or
returning to suitable
employment.

RC220

N/A

RC225

Occupational
Rehabilitation
Counselling

RC245

RC295

Service
paid on
hourly
rate(H)
or actual
cost (A)

Number
of indivi
duals who
received
services

Total
number
of units
of
service
paid

Value of
Services

H

202

1,033

$ 77,885

Counselling service to the
worker throughout the
course of Occupational
Rehabilitation, focusing on
the totality of the worker's
needs.

H

2,418

18,296

$843,260

Functional
Education

Educating the injured
worker to maintain good
physical habits to strengthen
the body and/or mind to
avoid re-injury.

H

357

1,326

$110,039

Job/Workplace
Analysis and/or
Assessment

Visit to the workplace to
meet the employer, worker,
return-to-work coordinator
or supervisor to identify
suitable duties to facilitate
maintenance at or return to
work following injury. This
may also include advice
regarding workstation or
equipment modification or
the provision of aids,
appliances, apparatus or
other materials.

H

2,171

12,228

$783,026
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Table 7.4 Summary of Occupational Rehabilitation Codes and
Descriptions with Recent Volumes*
Code

Service Type

Description

RC300

Workplace
Modification

Actual cost of modifying
workstation or equipment to
be used by the worker
including the cost of aide,
appliances, apparatus or
other materials to facilitate
maintenance at or return to
work following injury.

RC310

N/A

RC315

Vocational
Assessment

RC330

Vocational ReEducation

Service
paid on
hourly
rate (H)
or actual
cost (A)

Number
of indivi
duals who
received
services

Total
number
of units
of
service
paid

Value of
Services

A

136

269

$ 53,237

Objective assess of the
worker's transferable
vocational skills to
determine appropriate
employment goals.

H

2,023

4,626

$662,578

Actual cost of vocational
re-education or training
course(s) approved by the
Authority including text
books or other course needs
which are part of the course
or payable to the worker.

A

210

614

$162,873

Source: VWA
*For 12 months ending 30 June 1996. A worker may, of course, receive more than one service hi any category
and services in more than one category may be provided to a single individual. Services to workers are also likely
to be provided over time so any 1-year snapshot will record services being provided for cases having arisen hi
both the current year and previous years. For the 12 months ending 30 June 1996, 7,042 individuals received
services under the above codes.
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Table 7.5 Distribution of 1995-96 Occupational Rehabilitation (OR) Expenditures
by Year of Injury
Year of Injury

Number of
Claims Receiving
OR Services

OR
Expenditures

Percent of Total
OR Expenditure
in 1995-96

Average Cost
$

1995-96

1,213

$ 792,152.11

17.03

$ 637.29

1994-95

2,162

$1,604,313.55

34.50

$ 742.05

1993-94

1,236

$ 813,876.62

17.50

$ 658.48

1992-93

674

$414,833.34

8.92

$ 615.48

1991-92

574

$ 345,793.80

7.44

$ 602.43

1990-91

340

$ 209,676.72

4.51

$ 616.40

1989-90

237

$139,983.18

3.01

$ 590.65

1988-89

171

$ 101,501.54

2.18

$ 593.58

1987-88

138

$ 82,105.90

1.77

$ 594.97

1986-87

159

$ 89,994.47

1.94

$ 566.00

1985-86

107

$ 56,187.94

1.21

$ 525.12

Source: VWA
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Figure 7.1

Rehabilitation Reporting Relationships Map

Victorian WorkCover Authority
Authorised Insurer
•vj

I

Ln
Ln

Approved
Occupational Rehabilitation
Provider

Health & Safety

Medical & Like Practitioners
Formal channels of report or responsibility following a workplace injury. Note the central role of the RTW Coordinator.
Main client/ or patient/practitioner relationships.

Source: Adapted from Gadiel and Ridoutt (1995)

Figure 7.2
Generalized Model of Injury and Recovery with Rehabilitation Process

management

Medical management/Certificates

Medical and like (PT, OT, etc)
Return to Work Coordinator
Insurer manages Claim
; Occupational Rehabilitation Services
j

Community-based Health and Social Services

Point A:

A worker suffers a work related injury.

hr

But for the injury, the worker's health or functioning would have remained constant over time.
With the injury, the worker's health takes a sudden drop. Medical practitioners manage the acute phase of the
recovery and, generally, refer the worker to physical rehabilitation.
First two weeks following injury; the employer is responsible for the worker's wages and accident costs up to a
statutory limit. Beyond this time or financial limit, an authorised insurer manages the claim. Services and liaison
between the employer and the worker are coordinated by the RTW coordinator.
Where a worker's injury is such that the former level of health/function cannot be attained, the worker is
permanently impaired and occupational rehabilitation services may be enlisted to assess capacity and transferable
skills, provide counselling and direction for vocational purposes or to arrange retraining or placement.
Dotted boxes indicate discontinuous activity or involvement.
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Figure 7.3

Distribution by Qualification of Occupational Rehabilitation Personnel in Victoria

MedicalJ iErgonomist
Practitioner
jo/0
1%
Source: Adapted from Gadiel and Ridoutt, (1995)

Chapter 8
THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY DIVISION

Chapter 8 THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY DIVISION
Introduction
This chapter addresses issues of importance to the delivery of occupational health and
safety (OSH) and public safety in Victoria, Australia. Among the questions to be answered are
the folio whig:

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What are the historical antecedents of the system?

What is the legal basis for occupational health and safety and public safety?
How is the system presently organised?
How are regulations and codes of practice established and updated?
How is compliance with regulations accomplished?
What activities compliment the occupational health and safety and public safety
mandate of the Health and Safety Division (HSD)?
What information is available to guide and monitor the effect of OSH activities?
How are the major stakeholders involved, and what are their concerns?

We will begin with a brief history of workplace safety in Victoria. This will provide an
understanding of the institutional framework and background for prevention activities. Then,
we proceed to the legal authority and the structure of the Health and Safety Division (HSD) of
the Victorian WorkCover Authority. 1 We will review the policies and strategies for promoting
occupational health and safety, including both enforcement activities and education and
consultation activities. Last, we will report the concerns of external stakeholders, and internal
staff as expressed to the research team in the course of our interviews. The chapter concludes
with some final observations.

1Throughout this chapter we will refer to the VWA Health and Safety Division (HSD), even though this
is only the latest configuration of the administrative entity under discussion, dating to 2 July 1996. The reason for
this will become apparent hi the first section of the chapter, "Historical Antecedents."
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Historical Antecedents
The earliest Australian initiatives in relation to workplace safety occurred in Victoria
In large part this was due to the fact that, until very late into the nineteenth century, Victoria
was the only colony with significant manufacturing activity; but it was also due to a radical
tinge in Victorian politics. This latter feature was reflected in such efforts as the colony being
the first jurisdiction in the world to achieve the eight-hour day and later the adoption of wages
boards.2 The very first occupational health and safety measure, the Supervision of Workrooms
and Factories Statute 1873, was a limited enactment of six sections restricting the hours of
work by females and enabling the use of regulations in respect of warmth, ventilation,
cleanliness and sanitation. It was largely a response to revelations in a regional newspaper, the
Ballarat Courier, of conditions in local clothing factories with "sewing girls" working up to 18
hours a day in deplorable conditions for extremely low wages.3
However, the general foundations of occupational health and safety practice in Victoria
for most of the last hundred years stem from the Factories and Shops Act 1885. This
enactment, which was drafted by Alfred Deakin, the Victorian Solicitor-General and later to
become Prime Minister of Australia, resulted from a number of pressures including a
prominent tailoresses strike and reformist agitation aided by a strong campaign by The Age
newspaper. 4 It was a measure which was highly derivative of the English Factory and
Workshop Act 1878, with 40 of its 61 sections being taken from that statute. Among its
provisions were an absolute prohibition on employment of children in factories, the
requirement that persons hi charge of boilers hold a certificate of competency, and for the
fencing of certain machinery. Of particular importance was the appointment of inspectors to
administer the legislation, thus effectively creating an enforcement mechanism for the first

2See Geoffrey Searle, The Rush to be Rich: A History of the Colony of Victoria 1883-1889. Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press (1971), especially chapter 3.
3 See James Hagan, "Employers, Trade Unions and the First Victorian Factory Acts, " Labour History,
7: 3-10 (1964).
4 Tasman George Parsons, "Alfred Deakin and the Victorian Factory Act of 1885: A Note," Journal of
Industrial Relations, 14: 206-208 (1972).
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time. The general structure of this legislation provided the framework for subsequent
legislative measures and governed the approach to occupational health and safety which was to
hold sway until the 1980s, not just in Victoria but in Australia generally.
This approach was characterised by a plethora of individual measures and by a strong
attachment to the English tradition of factory legislation.5 The legacy of the fragmented nature
of legislative and other regulatory initiatives in this area, and their voluminous extent, was
highlighted by the 1995 Industry Commission report into occupational health and safety, which
found over 150 statutes which regulate heath and safety at work in Australia and an even
greater number of regulations and codes of practice. All together there are some 200
Australian Standards which are referred to in the occupational health and safety legislation or
hi the codes of practice.6 In relation to fealty to the English model of law and practice, the
record of occupational health and safety measures was even more striking than that concerning
workers' compensation arrangements, some of the history of which is traced in Chapter 2 of
this report. This similarity of form and approach helps explain the relatively rapid adoption by
the various Australian jurisdictions of the new approach to occupational health and safety
represented by the Report of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work (the Robens Report)
hi the United Kingdom and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) which followed that
Report.
What is equally significant is the almost total historical division between workers'
compensation and workplace safety arrangements. While the legislation governing the two
spheres of activity was often administered by the same Government department, there was
virtually no interaction between these operations. It has only been since the 1970's that
workers' compensation systems have included more than a slight regard for rehabilitation
among their operational activities. Meaningful interaction between the agencies charged with

5 The classic account of this tradition is B. L. Hutchins and A. Harrison, A History of Factory
Legislation. London: Frank Cass (1926); reissued 1966. Also M. W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation.
Leigh on Sea: Thomas Bank Publishing (1948).
6 Industry Commission, Work, Health and Safety. Inquiry into Occupational Health and Safety. Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service (1995), vol. 1, p. 44.
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occupational health and safety and occupational disability compensation has been an even more
recent phenomenon.
The Robens Approach
The traditional approach to workplace safety revolved around prescribed minimum
standards of safety practice outlined in legislation or regulations, the breach of which
constituted a criminal offence. The enforcement of these standards was vested in an
independent public inspectorate with a right to enter and inspect workplaces and to initiate
prosecutions following detection of a failure to conform to the prescribed requirements.7
Concerns about the relevance and effectiveness of this approach led the British
Government in 1970 to set up a Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Robens.
The Committee submitted its Report in June 1972. This report proved to be a catalyst for
change in Britain, Australia and elsewhere in the world. In a central paragraph of the Report it
was argued that among the problems of the then current system was "too much law of the
wrong type" and that "there are severe practical limits on the extent to which progressively
better standards of safety and health at work can be brought about through negative regulation
by external agencies."8 The Committee argued that there was need for "a more effective selfregulating system" with "the acceptance and exercise of appropriate responsibilities at all
levels within industry and commerce."9
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) provided the legislative response which
picked up the principal recommendations of the Robens Committee and provided for
a series of general duties on employers, occupiers, manufacturers, suppliers and
employees;
7Breen Creighton and Peter Rozen, Occupational Health and Safety Law in Victoria, 2nd edition.
Sydney: Federation Press (1997) p. 2. The following discussion of the implementation of the Robens approach in
the United Kingdom and Australia draws heavily upon this work.
8 Committee on Health and Safety at Work, Health and Safety at Work Report of the Committee 1970-72.
London: HMSO (1972), para. 41.
'Ibid.
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•

the making of regulations and codes of practice to support these broad duties;
safety representatives and safety committees; and
the establishment of two new statutory bodies, the Health and Safety
Commission and a Health and Safety Executive to administer and enforce the
new scheme.

Victoria was the third Australian jurisdiction to attempt Robens-type legislation with the
Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare Act 1981. This legislation
. . . more closely resembled the Robens model than either the original South
Australian or Tasmanian Acts. It is true that it did not make any serious attempt to
unify or integrate existing legislative or administrative arrangements, or to adopt more
responsive and effective enforcement techniques: rather it reenacted, with only slight
amendments, the principal safety provisions of the Labour and Industry Act 1958 (Vie).
On the other hand, it did provide for the establishment of a tripartite Industrial Safety,
Health and Welfare Advisory Council (ss 5-10); and included a series of "general duty"
provisions (ss ll(l)-(2), 13 and 14) together with a very broad regulation-making
power (s 33). It also provided for the preparation of health and safety policy statements
by employers (s 11(3)), and envisaged that employees should be given the right to elect
health and safety representatives who would, in turn, have the right to require their
employers to set up a health and safety committee (s 12). For a variety of reasons, the
only parts of the Act which were ever activated were those which reproduced the 1958
provisions, and those which dealt with the so-called "general duties." These latter
appear to have been very little used in practice. In other words, in terms of giving
effect to the Robens philosophy, the Victorian Act appears not to have had significantly
more practical impact than its forerunners in South Australia and Tasmania, even
though it undoubtedly had greater potential than either of these measures. 10
As with the earlier South Australian and Tasmanian enactments, the Industrial Safety,
Health and Welfare Act 1981 would be repealed and replaced with a more thoroughgoing
measure, in this case the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985.
The Enactment of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
As was discussed hi Chapter 2, Victorian voters hi April 1982 elected a Labor
Government for the first time in almost 3 decades. This Government, under the leadership of
John Cain, was committed, particularly in its earliest years, to a vigorous reform agenda. Part
°Creighton and Rozen, op. cit. at p. 9.
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of this agenda was the overhaul of the system of workplace safety in the state. Prior to the
assumption of Government, however, the Victorian branch of the Labor Party had, in October
1981, endorsed a comprehensive occupational health and safety programme. This programme
included the establishment of an Occupational Health and Safety Commission; the bringing
together into one administrative unit of the various disparate inspectorates and allied personnel
dealing with occupational health and safety; giving statutory recognition to worker involvement
in workplace safety decisions at the enterprise and workplace level; increasing the powers of
inspectors and the penalties for workplace safety breaches and providing for a comprehensive
licencing system embracing all workplaces and work processes and all substances used in
them.
The unveiling of this policy brought about a fiery public debate, particularly over the
powers of health and safety representatives and the proposal for comprehensive workplace
licencing. The then Minister for Labour and Industry, Mr. Ramsay, attacked the proposed role
of health and safety representatives as something which "would amount to a reign of terror on
employers by trade union organisers with almost unlimited powers in the name of industrial
safety." 11 The debate continued into the election campaign in early 1982 and occupational
health and safety policy was specifically included in John Cain's opening campaign speech.
The initial responsibility for occupational health and safety policy in the new Labor
Government was with the Minister for Labour and Industry12 as was previous practice.
However, in September 1982, in a transfer of ministerial functions, this responsibility was
HThe Sun, 30 September 1981; cited in Jennifer Doran, "Implementing the Victorian Government's
Policy on Occupational Health and Safety - 1982-1984" in Breen Creighton & Neil Gunningham (eds) The
Industrial Relations of Occupational Health & Safety. Sydney: Groom Helm Australia (1985) at p. 138. The
following account of the developments concerning the original attempt to enact new occupational health and safety
legislation between 1982 and 1984 draws heavily on this excellent insider account. Jennifer Doran was a
ministerial adviser on occupational health and safety to the Minister for Employment and Training.
12Whereas most other Australian jurisdictions had one Department dealing with "labour" issues, Victoria,
prior to the election of the Labor Government and for some years following had at one stage three such
departmental bodies, namely the Department of Labour and Industry, the Ministry of Employment and Training
and the Ministry of Industrial Affairs. As well, over time and even after a rationalising of the number of bodies,
there was a confusing change of departmental nomenclature from the Department of Employment and Industrial
Affairs to the Department of Labour. When the new Liberal coalition Government assumed power in October
1992 there was a further change to the Department of Business and Employment.
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given to the Minister for Employment and Training, the portfolio held by Jim Simmonds, who
had been closely involved in the development of the occupational health and safety policy when
Labor was in Opposition. Almost immediately the Minister determined upon a public
consultation policy and, in late March 1983, the Government released a public discussion
document. This document set out in detail the Government proposals in this area and invited
comment prior to the final development of legislation envisaged for the 1983 Spring Session of
Parliament.
Occupational Health and Safety Bill 1983
Some 211 submissions were received including 28 from trade unions, 30 from
employer associations and 73 from individual employers. The Minister undertook a busy
schedule of addressing meetings and seminars on the proposals. Meetings were held in all
major metropolitan and provincial centres. A special sub-committee of the Victorian
Employment Committee (including representatives from the Victorian Trades Hall Council,
Metal Trades Industry Association, Master Builders Association and the Department of Labour
and Industry) considered the various submissions and identified the major areas of agreement
and disagreement. Following this report, the Minister issued, in late September 1983, a
"Response to the Submissions on the Government's Public Discussion Paper on Occupational
Health and Safety" which included significant modification of the Government's original
proposals.
This was followed, in early October 1983, with the circulation of a draft Occupational
Health and Safety Bill to major stakeholders for comment which again resulted in significant
modifications. Then, on 17 November 1983, the Occupational Health and Safety Bill was
introduced into the Legislative Assembly and given its Second Reading, although there were
still matters of concern unresolved with some employer groups. Debate was then adjourned
until March 1984 to allow further consultation with the major interest groups. When
Parliamentary debate resumed in March 1984 the Government had agreed to move amendments
which would clarify the duties of employers under the legislation and provide further limitation
upon the powers of health and safety representatives, together with further rights of appeal.
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The Bill passed the Legislative Assembly, where the Government had a majority, and was
introduced into the Legislative Council, where it was in a minority, near the end of the
Parliamentary session. Given the entrenched resistance of the Opposition parties, the
Government decided not to proceed with the legislation in the Legislative Council. On
9 October 1984, the Minister announced that "Without tripartite support for the Bill and faced
with the inevitable action by the Opposition to use its numbers in the Upper House to mutilate
the legislation, we have had no choice. This is regrettable in view of the Government's
willingness to substantially amend the legislation in order to get that tripartite support." 13
The Industrial Route and the Legislative Window of Opportunity
It had become apparent to the trade union movement that the prospect of achieving
substantial statutory overhaul of workplace safety arrangements was unlikely even before the
Government surrender in October 1984. Accordingly, trade unions had prepared the way to
secure equivalent processes to those outlined in the proposed legislation, particularly in respect
to health and safety representatives and committees and the powers and functions of such
persons and bodies, through negotiated health and safety agreements between individual unions
and employers. A model for such activity was the agreement signed between unions and
management at the Williamstown Naval Dockyard in 1982.
Significant early agreements were concluded by relevant unions with the State
Electricity Commission of Victoria (then the state monopoly electricity utility), the Gas and
Fuel Corporation (which occupied a similar position to the SECV in the gas industry), the
Government Aircraft Factories and Comeng Pty Ltd (a large metal manufacturing enterprise).
The Victorian Trades Hall Council, in May 1984, circulated a "Negotiating Exhibit on
Occupational Health and Safety Agreements" to its affiliates and the move to industrially
bargained agreements gained added impetus following the collapse of the 1983 Bill. By July

13 Simmonds, Jim, the Minister for Employment and Training, Press release dated 9 October 1984; cited
by Doran, op. cit., p. 160.
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1985 there were 17 health and safety agreements formalised in Victoria and many more under
negotiation. 14
Then, as the result of a conjunction of political circumstances, the Labor Government
achieved a majority in the Legislative Council for a brief period in mid-1985. During this
window of opportunity the Government was able to secure passage of the Accident
Compensation Act 7955, giving force to its workers' compensation proposals, and the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 and the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, effecting its
workplace safety agenda. These latter two statutes were assented to on 30 July 1985 and
entered into force on 1 October 1985.
WorkCare Responsibilities and Linkages
Prior to the enactment of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, the Government
had administratively moved in the direction of implementing its policy of centralising the
activities of the various inspectorates within one body. From 1 July 1984, the Ministry of
Employment and Training assumed control of the health and safety responsibilities of the
Department of Labour and Industry, as well as those of the Occupational Health Division of
the Health Commission and part of those carried out in the Department of Minerals and
Energy. In turn, these responsibilities were vested in the Department of Employment and
Industrial Affairs from October 1985. Thus, with the coming into effect of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act, the operational aspects of workplace safety in Victoria were largely
centred upon the Department of Employment and Industrial Affairs, which housed the
inspectorate, while the policy-related aspects of the scheme were largely the function of the
Occupational Health and Safety Commission.
As indicated in Chapter 2, the WorkCare system was intended to provide a coherent
approach to all aspects of workplace safety and occupational disability in terms of injury and
illness prevention, rehabilitation and compensation. While there were three agencies created to
14 Department of Employment and Industrial Affairs, Working Environment and Policy Division, Review
of Occupational Health and Safety Agreements (July 1985).
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advance these aims and provide regulatory oversight—namely the Occupational Health and
Safety Commission, the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council and the Accident
Compensation Commission—it was intended that there would be a greater degree of scheme
synergy than in fact occurred. However, one of the objects of the Accident Compensation Act
was "to reduce the incidence of accidents and diseases in the workplace"15 and pursuant to this
mandate the workers' compensation component of WorkCare became the major underwriter of
the costs of the new workplace safety arrangements. This funding rose from $4.4 million in
1988-89 (around 44 percent of budget) to $17.6 million in 1992-93 (about 70 percent of
budget). The remaining funding, mainly in later years to fund dangerous goods activities, was
derived from the Government's central consolidated revenue.
As well as sustaining the occupational health and safety organisational infrastructure,
these funds also supported a range of workplace safety initiatives. Prominent among these was
the provision of seed funding to the Victorian Trades Hall Council and individual trade unions,
as well as employer associations, to establish or extend training for health and safety
representatives and managers/supervisors, respectively, in occupational health and safety
matters. Some ancillary workplace safety initiatives by external bodies were also funded. This
element of funding reached $4 million in 1988-89 but declined to $2.1 million in 1990-91, a
move which largely reflected the phasing out of the seed funding initiatives.
Personnel and Organisational Arrangements
During the period of WorkCare prevention there was a dramatic change in the size and
composition of the inspectorate. In October 1985 there were some 55 inspectors; over the next
5 years the number of inspectors had almost tripled to 150 in 1991. This increase continued
into the WorkCover period with the inspectorate reaching 170 by 1994.16 As well, there was a
conscious effort to widen the background of the inspectorate from its traditional male,
15 Accident Compensation Act 1985, Section 3(a).
16 Industry Commission, op. cit., vol. 2, Table M17.
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Anglo-Celtic, trade-based origins with the recruitment of some new inspectors among women,
persons from non-English speaking backgrounds, and persons with tertiary qualifications. Also
technical staff such as ergonomists, hygienists, and risk management experts were recruited in
greater numbers.
There was also a range of other organisational and structural changes ostensibly
designed to enable more effective delivery of services. Most prominent among these was the
institution of a central OHS division responsible for policy development, standard setting,
programmes and targets and a Regional Services Division charged with service delivery. Thus,
in 1986-87, workplace inspection and advice services were decentralised to 10 regional centres
around the state. The perceived special circumstances relating to the building and construction
industry also determined that this area of activity should be dealt with separately, with its own
inspectorate and policy development unit.
A more dramatic reorganisation took place hi 1991 when the occupational health and
safety responsibilities of the Department were separated from its industrial relations and other
functions in a separate body, the Occupational Health and Safety Authority (OHSA). In an
effort to provide better co-ordination of WorkCover prevention activities, the Victorian
Occupational Health and Safety Commission (VOHSC) assumed the role of board of
management of OHS A along with its other roles. Structurally, the new body was organised
around three major divisions. The major workplace inspection and advice services were to be
delivered through the Workplace Management Division with a consolidation of the previous
regionalised structure into three geographic zones. The Plant and Chemical Safety Division
provided specialist technical services directly to external clients as well as to and through
OHS A field staff. The Planning and Communications Division provided strategic planning,
performance monitoring, marketing, and certification/licencing functions for the organisation.
Role of the Inspectorate
Despite these series of organisational and other changes, it appears that it took time for
them to have an appreciable effect upon organisational performance. At least over the period
1985-1990, there was little general change in the nature of the operations of the inspectorate.
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There was a continuation of its traditional concerns and enforcement approach which focussed
upon breaches of particular safety regulations, especially the failure to guard dangerous
machinery. The vast bulk of prosecution activity revolved around amputation injuries sustained
through the use of such machinery, particularly power presses and circular saws. It was
uncommon for prosecutions to be brought for breaches of the Act which did not result in either
injury or death. Also, it was almost unknown for prosecutions to be launched against
employees, managers, or manufacturers and suppliers of plant and substances.17
From 1990 there was a noticeable change in this situation with a much greater recourse
to the employer's "general duty" (in Section 21 of the Act) as the basis for prosecution. By
1995 almost all prosecutions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act were founded upon
such general duty breaches. It appears that much of this change relates to the establishment
within the Department in 1989 of a Central Investigation Unit to co-ordinate the investigation
of workplace fatalities and serious accidents and incidents, develop special programmes to
ensure compliance and prevention and develop an overall prosecutions strategy. It is quite
striking that while in Victoria around 60 to 80 prosecutions a year were instituted, in New
South Wales, between 1990-91 and 1993-94 an average of 422 prosecutions a year were
undertaken. 18
WorkCover Changes
The background to the WorkCover changes as they affected the workers' compensation
aspects of WorkCare have been sketched in Chapter 2. In October 1992 the Liberal and
National Parties came to power in Victoria. The new government amended the Occupational
Health and Safety Act to disband VOHSC, discontinue seed funding to non-government bodies
and vested the administration of the legislation in the new Department of Business and
Employment (DBE). OHSA was retained as a trading name, but government OHS and
17 Creighton and Rozen, op cit., p. 118, drawing on the unpublished 1994 Ph.D. thesis of Richard
Johnstone, The Court and the Factory: The Legal Construction of Occupational Health and Safety Offences in
Victoria (University of Melbourne).
I8lbid., citing Industry Commission figures.
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dangerous goods services were delivered through two divisions within DBE. The Health and
Safety Division and the Chemicals and Plant Safety Division reported to the Minister for
Industry Services. An OHS Advisory Committee (consisting of representatives of employers,
workers and the Minister) was established to advise the Deputy Secretary for Industry Services
on health and safety matters.
In 1994 the Minister for Industry Services commissioned Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to
conduct a review of OHSA and to recommend changes to its structure.19 As a consequence of
the consultant's report, a new structure was implemented in May 1995; the trading name was
changed to the Health and Safety Organisation, Victoria (HSO).20 The need to maintain a
health and safety function separate from the VWA was increasingly coming under scrutiny.
The consultant's report on OHSA suggested that in time amalgamation might be viable and
beneficial. Similar comments had been made by the Auditor-General in his portfolio review of
DBE in 1994.21 In November 1995 the Industry Commission's report on OHS arrangements in
Australia recommended integration of OHS and workers' compensation policy making.22
Following the return of the Liberal/National Coalition Government in March 1996, the health
and safety functions of DBE were merged with the VWA on 2 July 1996. The Health and
Safety Division of the VWA retained the structure and functions of the former HSO.
Legal Authority

The Health and Safety Division derives its authority from several pieces of legislationincluding the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, Equipment ( Public Safety) Act 1994,
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, and the Road Transport (Dangerous Goods) Act 1995.
"Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu: Report to the Minister for Industry Services—Review of the Occupational
Health and Safety Authority (Melbourne, July 1994).
20A new Equipment (Public Safety) Act was also enacted in 1994. In addition, there is a significant public
safety aspect to the Dangerous Goods Act, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act imposes duties on
employers, self-employed persons and occupiers of workplaces in relation to the health and safety of non-workers.
2lVictorian Auditor-General's Office: Report on Ministerial Portfolios (May 1994), p. 85.
"Industry Commission Report: Work, Health and Safety (Canberra, 1995), Volume I, p. 270.
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Collectively, the principal Acts impose general duties on employers, manufacturers and
suppliers of plant and chemicals and occupiers to achieve and maintain general health and
safety standards. The Acts provide a broad framework for the imposition of specific regulatory
controls.
The mining industry is within the mandate of the Department of Natural Resources and
the Environment under the Mineral Resources Development Act 1990', certain hygiene issues
(e.g., legionella) are the responsibility of the Public Health Department under the Health Act.
Federal enterprises within the state are the responsibility of Comcare, and the Environmental
Protection Authority also has some responsibilities for dangerous goods. While overlaps or
gaps of jurisdiction are possible, agreements and understandings between the HSD and these
other jurisdictions seem to have adequately defined the roles.
Principal Legislation
OHS Act
As indicated earlier, the Victorian OHS Act is based in large part on the United
Kingdom's Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The style of the Act is performance-based,
i.e., it sets out broad duty of care provisions and requires the achievement of performance
outcomes without specifying how these outcomes should be achieved thus establishing a
framework which allows employers and workers to be flexible in their approach to achieving
the standards set out in legislation. In addition, it provides the machinery to establish standards
and enforcement. Details of issues covered by the Act are provided in Regulations and Codes
of Practice.
General duties. The Act imposes duties on employers and workers; the self-employed;
occupiers of workplaces; and designers, manufacturers, importers and suppliers of plant,
equipment and substances used in the workplace. This is to ensure that those with authority or
control over particular aspects of the working environment exercise that authority hi a manner
that is not harmful to the health and safety of any person.
Worker participation. The participation of workers in decisions concerning their health
and safety is central to the Act's strategy for prevention. This is achieved through the election
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of health and safety representatives (HSRs) and the establishment of health and safety
committees in individual workplaces. Through negotiation between employers and their
workers, designated work groups (DWGs) may be established in workplaces from which health
and safety representatives are elected by the workers.
The Act provides representatives the right to inspect any part of the workplace at which
members of the relevant DWG work, to receive relevant information, and be consulted on
proposed changes to the workplace that may affect health and safety. HSRs may issue a
provisional improvement notice to the employer if s/he believes that the Act or regulations are
being contravened. This requires the employer to rectify the breach within a specified time
frame. The employer has the right of appeal to an HSD inspector.
The Act also provides for HSRs to be involved hi the resolution of health and safety
issues in the workplace. It envisages employers and workers agreeing on procedures for the
resolution of issues; if there are no agreed procedures, the OHS (Issue Resolution) Regulations
1989 provide a procedure. Where there is an immediate threat to the health and safety of any
person, the HSR may stop the work following consultation with the employer's representative.
Health and safety committees may be established at the request of the HSR. The composition,
role, and function of these committees is flexible in the Act, which sets out only minimum
requirements. It is for the parties in the workplace to agree on what is most appropriate for
their circumstances.
Inspectors. The Act assigns a number of roles to V"WA inspectors. They have powers
to:
•
•

enter the workplace at any reasonable time;
make any necessary examination and inquiry in the workplace to determine
whether the Act or regulations have been complied with;
remove any equipment or materials or take copies of any document that may be
required;
direct that the workplace or a part of it be left undisturbed;
issue an Improvement Notice where he or she believes that the Act or
regulations are being contravened—this requires the breach to be rectified within
a stipulated tune;
issue a Prohibition Notice where he or she believes that an immediate risk exists
in a workplace—this prohibits the relevant activity until the matters that give
rise to the risk are remedied;
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bring a prosecution for an offence against the Act, on the authority of the
Minister.
Penalties. The Act provides penalties for contravention of the Act or regulations. These
penalties are currently set for most offences at a maximum of $40,000 for bodies corporate and
$10,000 for individuals. For certain offences the maximum is set at $250,000 for bodies
corporate and $50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 5 years for individuals. Additional
penalties, with these same maximums for indictable offences and maximums applying to most
summary offences, may be imposed for repeat offences. The Act also has a provision for
infringement notices (on-the-spot fines). However, regulations to give effect to this provision
have not been brought into effect.
Codes of Practice. The Minister may approve Codes of Practice to give practical
guidance to parties with duties under the Act. Where a Code is relevant and has not been
observed, a court, during a prosecution, will find the offence proved unless the alleged
offender can demonstrate that the duties are being carried out by some other means.
Since its enactment, the OHS Act was amended in 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1996. The
principal amendments were:
1990 - increased penalties for offences against the Act;
1993 - strengthened the requirement for workers to co-operate with their employers in
relation to health and safety, and removed the specific role of unions hi the
establishment of DWGs and the election of health and safety representatives;
1996 - transferred the health and safety functions of the Department of Business and
Employment to the Victorian WorkCover Authority.
Dangerous Goods Act
A separate Act covering dangerous goods covers the special nature of risks arising from
\^

dangerous goods (e.g., explosives, flammable materials, and corrosive substances). The Act's
maui objectives are to minimise the possibility of serious incidents involving dangerous goods,
and to mitigate the impact of any such incidents which occur. It applies generally both to the
workplace and non-workplace situations. The Act consolidates legislation covering dangerous
goods and activities associated with them, viz. manufacture, storage, handling, transport,
transfer, use and sale.
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The Act's objectives are achieved by:

•

imposing responsibilities on certain identified parties;
establishing legal procedures to support prosecutions (offence, penalty and
evidentiary provisions);
creating the framework for a licencing regime;
establishing an inspectorate with comprehensive powers of inspection and
enforcement;
providing for the power to make regulations and other orders to stipulate the
detail of the legislative scheme.

Inspectors have powers to enter and inspect premises, make inquiries and remove
items. Inspectors may issue Written Directions to require any action which the inspector
believes on reasonable grounds is necessary to ensure the safety of people or property. In
addition, inspectors may require or arrange the safe disposal of dangerous goods. The Act
permits the delegation of certain inspector powers to officers of the State road safety agency,
the police force, the fire authorities and local government.
Penalties for breaches of the DG Act are generally in line with those under the OHS
Act. In addition, in relation to certain duties, there are daily penalties for continuing offences.
There is a provision for infringement notices here also which has not been brought into effect.
The DG Act was amended in 1987, 1989, 1990 and 1995. The principal effects of the 1995
amendments were to provide:

•

an extensive definition of dangerous goods, broadly in line with the Australian
Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail;
powers to exempt specific dangerous goods from the operation of the Act or
regulations, and to declare substances or articles to be dangerous goods in
public interest situations;
inspectors with authorisation to issue an additional type of Written Direction
(similar to Improvement Notices under the OHS Act);
power for the Minister to approve codes of practice.

Most VWA inspectors are concurrently appointed under both the OHS and DG Acts.
The DG Act is currently under review since the rather prescriptive style of the
legislation (i.e., specifying the actions to be taken, rather than referring to the desired
performance outcome) makes it inconsistent with the OHS Act. There has been considerable
effort during the last decade to change from prescriptive/restrictive legislation and regulation to
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a performance or outcome based approach. Further, the DG Act covers a number of issues
which are now addressed by draft National Standards developed by the National Occupational
Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC).
Equipment (Public Safety) Act
The E(PS) Act mirrors the provisions of the OHS Act in relation to prescribed
equipment operated in non-workplace situations. It places duties on proprietors, manufacturers,
designers, importers, suppliers and persons in charge of prescribed equipment. Proprietors'
duties are similar to those of employers under the OHS Act in relation to prescribed
equipment, while the duties of persons in charge of prescribed equipment are similar to those
of workers.
Inspectors appointed under the E(PS) Act have identical powers to those appointed
under the OHS Act. There are provisions for regulations and codes of practice. Penalties are
identical to those under the OHS Act. There is also a provision for infringement notices which
has not been brought into effect.
Regulations
There is an ongoing programme to move from a prescriptive to a performance-based
regulatory environment in Victoria. The advantages of the performance-based approach are
seen to be that it provides

•

simplicity: the general duties are much less complex than the technical specifics
required to be included in prescriptive legislation, and need to be amended much
less often;
flexibility in meeting health and safety outcomes: the particular circumstances of
each workplace can be taken into account;
encouragement for the development of innovative technologies for risk
management;
a focus on health and safety outcomes rather than on the methodology for
achieving them; and
encouragement for a systematic approach to the management of risk.

In 1996, the Department of State's Office of Regulation Reform issued a document
entitled Principles of Good Regulation, in which it stated "Much of the recent reform work in
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Victoria has been directed to developing more effective and lower cost policy instruments
compatible with economic realities. This has resulted in a move towards performance-based
regulation in key areas such as occupational health and safety and environmental protection."
In 1995, a new set of performance-based regulations covering plant replaced three
prescriptive Acts and 11 prescriptive principal regulations. The new regulations abolished the
requirement for VWA inspectors to carry out regular inspections of certain types of plant, thus
freeing resources for programmed inspections in targeted industries and reactive workplace
visits.
While the flexibility provided by a performance-based approach is welcomed by many
employers, some (particularly small business) express a preference for the prescriptive
approach, where government tells them what they have to do. The VWA has sought to deal
with the tension between the two approaches by issuing codes of practice as well as an
extensive range of publications.
The VWA's decisions about the suitability of health and safety issues for regulation are
primarily guided by decisions taken through the National Occupational Health and Safety
Commission (NOHSC). In 1991 a meeting of Australian heads of government identified OHS
as an area in which all jurisdictions should seek to work towards national uniformity. NOHSC,
which comprises representatives of the Commonwealth, State, and Territory governments, the
employer associations and trade unions, is the vehicle for facilitating the achievement of
national uniformity in OHS. NOHSC develops National Standards which are then implemented
by the various jurisdictions in the way that is most appropriate within their own legislative
frameworks.
In 1992 NOHSC identified six priority issues for the development of National
Standards: manual handling, noise, plant, certification of users and operators of plant,
hazardous substances and major hazard facilities. National Standards have been declared hi all
these areas, and Victoria has implemented four and commenced work to implement the
remaining two. In Victoria, the objective of national consistency is supported, however, there
is a great deal of criticism of the end product. The view is that the national standards are far
too prescriptive and detailed. Currently, there is a lack of agreement by state governments, and
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little co-ordination of the implementation process. Thus, significant differences in OHS law
exist between jurisdictions.
Victorians would like to see some reforms to NOHSC processes. In particular, they
have concerns that National Standards are developed as model regulations which the States and
Territories are expected to translate directly into their own regulations. The VWA would
prefer that National Standards be statements of understandings that the jurisdictions would
translate into Acts, regulations and Codes of Practice within their own legislative frameworks.
The Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 stipulates that all Victorian regulations sunset
after 10 years. At that point a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the revoked
regulations is carried out. The VWA is currently reviewing and replacing the OHS (General
Safety) Regulations 1986. The OHS (Manual Handling) Regulations 1988 are being evaluated
as part of a national process. The OHS (Lead Control) Regulations will be reviewed prior to its
sunset date in 1998. (see Table 8.1)
The Industry Commission in their Report No. 47 states that the true costs of workplace
injury and disease are much greater than that represented by worker's compensation payments.
The report suggests that the costs are borne in the following approximate proportions: 30
percent by injured workers and their families; 40 percent by employers through the
compensation system, lost productivity and overtime; and 30 percent by the community. Other
studies have estimated the true cost at from 2 times to 11 times the compensation cost
depending on the industry and size of the enterprise.
The Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 also requires that a Regulatory Impact Statement
(RIS) be prepared and circulated to accompany any proposed changes in the regulations. The
Division invests considerable resources in the development of RIS's. The goal of such an
exercise, to calculate the costs and benefits of the proposed regulations, is important in
justifying the need for their imposition. This practice is carried out in other health and safety
jurisdictions around the world, such as OSHA in the United States.
It is the position of HSD that the required RIS analysis has improved the policy
development process for occupational health and safety. For example, during the preparation
of the OHS (Plant) Regulations 1994, the cost-benefit analysis demonstrated that inclusion of
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manually powered and hand held plant could not be justified on cost benefit grounds. Other
non-regulatory alternatives were considered more appropriate for addressing these hazards.
This analysis resulted in the scope of the Regulations being restricted to exclude this type of
plant. Current examples where the RIS review has influenced policy development include the
pending proposal for Incident Notification Regulations, and the development of proposals
covering the scope of health surveillance requirements and employer duties under hazardous
substances regulations.
In all regulatory impact statements prepared by the Division, assumptions are defined
and sensitivity analysis is undertaken where information gaps are identified. As a result of
external review processes, the Division prepares cost projections using worst-case assumptions
and highest expected cost of compliance predictions. Because of the risk of bias when
undertaking RIS analysis, the Division acquires information from a range of sources, including
those who will be directly affected by the proposed regulation outcome.
The draft RIS is submitted to a rigorous public review and comment process. In
addition to a 60- or 90-day public comment period, the Division obtains independent advice as
to the adequacy of the RIS and of the assessment included in the RIS. There is also a
Parliamentary Committee which scrutinises proposed Regulations and their accompanying RIS
before implementation. This committee places significant weight on the RIS and also receives
copies of all public comments and submissions received by the Division.
Codes of Practice
There are 17 Codes of Practice established under the Occupational Health and Safety
Act for the purpose of providing practical guidance for compliance with the duties and
obligations outlined in the Act, as listed in Table 8.2. The legal status of approved codes is that
provisions in a code of practice may constitute compliance with the provision of the Act or
regulation to which the code is addressed. However, the provisions do not give these
instruments mandatory status. Indeed, the status of approved codes of practice enables persons
with obligations to have flexibility regarding their method of complying with
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performance-based duties under the Act or regulations. All codes approved by the Minister
include in the preface an explanation regarding their advisory legal status.
Where appropriate, some employers are choosing to follow associated industry codes or
guidelines. Use of Australian Standards or other technical standards is also commonly relied
upon to supplement or substitute for the advice contained in approved codes to achieve
compliance with the relevant obligation. Alternatively, employers can and do rely on aspects of
j
it to develop their own comprehensive risk assessment and control
from
vary
but
code
the
systems which may be more relevant to their workplace. A further possibility, allowable under
the current legislative framework, is reliance on relevant documentation developed by NOHSC
or other Australian jurisdictions, or perhaps an overseas OHS agency. Recent VWA cost-of
compliance employer surveys have indicated this approach is being adopted by some firms.
Policy and Procedure
The Division invests in development and documentation of policies and procedures that
are presented in a series of manuals. The most important HSD manuals are:
Quality Manual - This sets out management responsibilities in relation to quality, and
standards and procedures for the operation of the quality system.
HSO Manual - This sets out standards and procedures common to all staff, such as in
relation to policy and planning, human resource management, OHS and business
administration.
Operations Manual - This sets out standards and procedures for field staff activities,
such as hi relation to emergency services, operational activities, and approaches to risk
control. During 1996 an external audit was conducted of the Division's manuals against the
requirements of Australian Standard 3904 (ISO 9004), parts 1 and 2 (Quality management and
quality system elements). The audit demonstrated total compliance with the requirements of
this Standard.
The manuals are available on-line via the HSD intranet and in printed format. The
Operations Manual is very complete and constitutes an effective mechanism to provide staff
with timely and up-to-date advice and directives on sensitive and complex issues and priorities.
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It forms the basis of consistent service delivery. An Orientation Manual has also been
developed to assist newly hired staff to acquaint themselves with the organisational and service
accountabilities of the various sections within the Division. Each section within the Division
produces an annual business plan.
The thoroughness of the documentation suggests a significant resource investment
within each of the sections and the Division to develop and maintain these manuals. The
substantive volume of these documents speaks to a highly process driven organisation that is
committed to quality service delivery. This does however raise questions about the appropriate
balance of the resources necessary to deliver the documentation and the front line staff
deployed to carry out the plans hi accordance with the policy and procedure.
Structure of HSD
Figure 8.1 shows the organisation of HSD as at 2 July 1996. The Director, HSD has
overall responsibility for the Division and with six reporting senior managers forms the
Division Executive Committee. Three Operations Sections under senior managers provide
inspection and informational services through a series of regional offices. In addition, each of
these managers has responsibility for two or more Statewide Coordinating Units to ensure
consistent service delivery through a matrix management process.
Strategy Group
The Strategy Group consists of the Planning and Review Unit, Standards Development
and Co-ordination Unit, Legislation Policy Branch, Marketing Branch, the Central
Investigations Unit, Organisational Development Unit and the Information Systems Division.
The principal functions of the Strategy Group are to provide strategic planning services,
implement the VWA's legislative reform programme, develop and review policy, drive the
Division's enforcement strategy and programme, provide marketing services, represent the
Division in external forums, and provide support services to the Division.
Key programmes for the Strategy Group in 1996-97 are
•

assisting with the full implementation of the Site Assessment and Targeting
System in the Operations Groups;
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conducting a compliance/OHS performance survey, the results of which will
guide a public information programme;
completing the regulatory package for hazardous substances;
conducting a policy review of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 and implementing
legislative changes resulting from the review of the Act;
completing the Incident Notification Regulations for implementation;
completing the Infringement Notices Regulations for implementation;
completing any associated regulatory impact statement, public comment and
code of practice products;
completing a code of practice for plant not covered by the already-approved
Code of Practice for Plant;
developing policy to give effect to the National Standard for major hazard
facilities;
providing policy advice on the Regulatory Efficiency Bill, national competition
policy and other significant legislative reform processes;
reviewing the investigations/prosecutions programme and implementing
changes;
increasing the level of prosecution with a reduction in the turnaround times of
prosecution files;
introducing simpler prosecutions options;
completing the investigations training programme;
providing authoritative advice to other Divisions on OHS legislation;
developing and overseeing the implementation strategy for the revised
Enforcement Policy;
implementing a marketing plan;
implementing a new publications production system;
undertaking the VWA Awards and Health and Safety Week programmes;
maintaining VWA and Ministerial publications, promotional and media
campaigns; coordinating the briefing of representatives on major national and
State bodies;
coordinating VWA submissions on other agencies' legislative proposals;
providing training and organisational development services;
coordinating the HSD's corporate quality programme.
Technology Group
The Technology Group consists of the Chemical Technology Unit, Ergonomics Unit,
Hygiene Unit, Occupational Medicine Unit and Mechanical Engineering Unit. Technology
Group's role is to provide engineering, scientific and other technical advice to assist the
Strategy and Operations Groups of the Division to achieve their programme goals. The Group
is staffed by chemical, mechanical and electrical engineers, chemists, occupational hygienists,
8-24

ergonomists, and an occupational medical practitioner. The Group's expertise covers plant
design and operational safety, all aspects of the storage, handling, transport and use of
dangerous goods, hazardous substances, lead and asbestos, work environment hazards such as
heat and noise, manual handling and other ergonomic issues and biological hazards.
Key Technology Group activities are

•
•

assisting inspectors with workplace visits;
carrying out research on emerging health and safety issues;
carrying out risk assessments, e.g., in association with applications for licences
or approvals, or with plant designs notified to the VWA;
responding to telephone inquiries;
representing the Authority on external committees, e.g., in relation to the
development of technical standards;
supply ing expert witnesses for prosecutions and cases in the Coroner's Court;
providing technical input into training programmes for VWA staff;
providing technical advice on documents developed by the VWA or external
bodies.
Operations Groups

There are three Operations Groups. Each of these groups includes a number of
statewide co-ordination units and regional offices. The inclusion of statewide co-ordination
units was part of the restructure of the HSD in 1995. These units co-ordinate programmes in
their specialist areas across the three Operations Groups, and provide information to internal
and external clients. Resources for implementation of statewide projects come from the field
operations areas of the three Operations Groups and are secured through negotiation between
the managers of statewide co-ordination units and the regional office managers.
Regional offices under the authority of regional managers are located in 12 locations
across Victoria. VWA inspectors, information officers and staff to process licencing and
certification applications are based at each regional office. The Operations Groups have
established the following key priorities and activities for 1996-97:
programmes to assist workplaces to manage health and safety better: audits,
provision of information/advice, provision of training, marketing;
compliance programmes: inspection, prosecution, investigation, OHS legislative
dispute resolution, statutory approvals;
public safety programmes: activities to promote public safety in the areas within
the VWA's jurisdiction, emergency response;
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quality programmes: training, audit activity, performance management,
implementation of new procedures and services, focusing on clients and
obtaining feedback from them;
resource management programmes: reducing costs and working within budget
strengthening the budget components in planning;
people management programmes: communicating effectively, establishing clear
roles and accountabilities, establishing training and development opportunities.
The following information describes the structure and function of each Operations Group,
including its statewide role.
Operations Central (Plant) Group consists of
three statewide co-ordination units (the Plant Co-ordination Unit, the Building
and Construction Industry Co-ordination Unit and the Information Network);
the Design Notification Unit;
regional operations at Metro Central and Preston in Melbourne, and Bendigo,
Mildura, Shepparton, and Wangaratta in central Victoria.
Plant Co-ordination Unit. The roles of this unit are to reduce the risk to health and
safety arising from plant and equipment through the co-ordination of statewide projects;
develop and review guidance material for VWA operational policies, national and industry
standards; provide specialist advice to both internal and external clients; and manage specified
programmes. The Unit is responsible for authorising assessors of applicants for certificates of
competency to operate specified types of plant, and for auditing assessments. It conducts about
100 audits each year. The Unit also assists field staff in the conduct of about 2,500 inspections
annually.
The Information Network. The work of this unit will be described later in the section on
Injury and Disease Reduction through Consultation, Education and Technical Assistance.
The Building and Construction Industry Co-ordination Unit. This specialist unit aims to
reduce the incidence of work-related illness, injury and death on building sites through the
delivery of an integrated range of services. The building and construction industry is seen as
sufficiently different from other industries to justify a specialist inspectorate resource.
Decisions about which building and construction sites to visit are made in accordance with
criteria set out in the Building and Construction Industry Manual. Resources allowing, most
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large commercial sites in metropolitan Melbourne are visited. The Unit carries out about 5,000
inspections a year and responds to about 2,000 requests for information and advice.
The Design Notification Unit. This technical unit receives notifications of plant designs,
answers inquiries relating to plant design notification, and arranges for audits of plant
requiring design notification. About 600 plant notifications are received each year.
Operations Eastern (Work Environment Group consists of
•
•

three statewide co-ordination units (the Work Environment Co-ordination Unit,
the Management Systems Unit and the Licencing Unit);
regional operations at Mulgrave in Melbourne, and Traralgon and Sale in
eastern Victoria.

Work Environment Co-ordination Unit. This co-ordinating group brings together a
number of scattered functions relating to hazards in the work environment. The unit is
responsible for identifying work environment issues that need a VWA response as well as
planning, monitoring, and reporting on all Divisional activities relating to work environment
hazards. Some important current programmes relate to asbestos removal, manual handling,
noise, confined spaces, hazardous substances and heat-induced illness. The Unit conducts
about 100 audits of approved asbestos removalists and assists field staff with about 3,500
inspections each year.
The Management Systems Unit (MSU). The MSU has evolved over time towards
facilitating clients' capability to manage their own health and safety responsibility. A key part
of MSU's role is the promotion of SafeyMAP, the Safety Management Achievement System.
SafeyMAP is described in the section on Injury and Disease Reduction through Consultation,
Education and Technical Assistance. The Unit carries out approximately 300 audits of
workplace health and safety systems, including those at self-insurers and prospective selfinsurers, each year. The SafeyMAP audit criteria are used as the basis for carrying out these
functions.
The Licencing Unit. The function of this group is to co-ordinate the Division's licencing
activities, and ensure the effective administration of all licencing, registration, certification and
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approval processes. Most of the Unit's staff are centrally located, but there are also staff
members at the major regional offices.
The principal types of licences and certificates dealt with by the Unit are
•

certificates of competency for operators of cranes, hoists and forklift trucks,
scaffolders and riggers; and operators of pressure equipment (23,093 in 199596);
registration of items of high-risk plant (28,393 in 1995-96);
dangerous goods licences (8,410 in 1995-96);
asbestos removalist's licences (about 40 per year).

Operations Western (Dangerous Goods^ Group consists of:
•
•

two statewide co-ordination units (the Dangerous Goods Co-ordination Unit and
the Enforcement and Public Safety Unit);
regional operations in the Metro West region of Melbourne, and Geelong,
Ballarat and Warrnanibool in western Victoria.

The Dangerous Goods Co-ordination Unit. This group identifies and co-ordinates
appropriate VWA activities in relation to dangerous goods. The Unit aims to co-ordinate 12
projects in 1996-97. Prominent among them are the conduct of emergency preparedness audits
in premises not previously audited, the inspection of licenced premises which had not been
inspected in the previous 12 months, and joint inspections with the Environment Protection
Authority (EPA) and fire authorities of high-risk premises.
The Enforcement and Public Safety Unit. This unit provides quality assurance in
relation to the VWA's compliance and enforcement activities and places a great focus on the
organisation's public safety role. It is responsible for promoting, reviewing, and advising on
the VWA's enforcement profile and activity, and for identifying public safety issues and
developing strategies to address these issues. It establishes and audits service standards for the
delivery of the VWA's field services.
The EPSU also co-ordinates the VWA's 24-hour emergency response service for both
OHS and dangerous goods incidents, Including where a fatality or serious incident is involved.
The service aims to respond to emergencies within 1 hour in the Melbourne metropolitan area
and 2 hours in other areas.
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Development Taskforce
The role of the Development Taskforce is described in the section on Injury and
Disease Reduction through Consultation, Education, and Technical Assistance.
Other VWA Divisions with a Health and Safety Role
Apart from the Health and Safety Division, two other VWA Divisions conduct
activities in the area of health and safety. The Corporate Affairs Division carries out highprofile marketing activities. These are described in the section on Injury and Disease Reduction
through Consultation, Education, and Technical Assistance.
The Scheme Development Division carries out research which is used to find practical
ways of improving workplace safety. Major recent projects conducted by the Division are
•

Operation Safety - Launched as a pilot project at Ballarat in rural Victoria in
August 1995, Operation Safety was based on extensive research. Road transport
and nursing were identified as the industries hi Ballarat with the highest claims
costs per million dollars of remuneration. Both industries had a high proportion
of back injuries resulting from lifting, loading and unloading. Operation Safety
combined a number of interventions including worksite visits, telephone
surveys, a mobile display of lifting devices, a promotional safety bus, ongoing
publicity in the Ballarat media and an intense advertising campaign.
Engineering, design and work practice solutions were recommended at
individual worksites and through media publicity. The preliminary results of the
research suggest there has been a remarkable reduction of injuries and their
costs hi the Ballarat region during the period Operation Safety was conducted.

•

TruckSafe - A Joint initiative between WorkCover and the Road Transport
Forum,TruckSafe aims to reduce injuries and improve workers' compensation
management throughout the road transport industry. Best practice safety and
claims management strategies in the road transport industry are identified and
promoted through publications and videos.

Role of other Organisations in Prevention
There are a number of important roles played by organisations other than the VWA in
prevention and analysis of workplace injuries and illnesses.
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The State Ombudsman
The State Ombudsman receives and investigates complaints from individuals when all
other avenues of complaint have been exhausted. The Ombudsman has broad powers to obtain
information and conduct hearings. The Ombudsman can make recommendations and request
that the agency provide notification of its plans to implement the recommendation.
The State Coroner
The State Coroner has the responsibility to examine all reportable deaths23 and
determine, generally at inquest, the causes and circumstances of death and the identity of any
person found to contribute to the death. In addition the Coroner has jurisdiction to deal with
fire. The Coroner has the power to comment and make recommendations on public health and
safety or the administration of justice which relates to the death or fire. The Coroner's Act
1985 gives a statutory basis for coronial findings and recommendations to be used for
prevention of future deaths or fires. VWA investigators and inspectors are frequently called
upon to assist the Coroner in the investigation of work-related deaths. In recent years the State
Coroner's Office has taken an increasing interest in the prevention of work-related deaths.
Employer Associations
The major employer associations—the Victorian Employers' Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (VECCI), the Australian Chamber of Manufactures (ACM), the Metal Trades
Industry Association (MTIA) and others—employ health and safety professionals to provide
OHS services to their members. These services include information, advice, health and safety
audits, training and representation in consultative forums. The information and advice services
cover the legislative requirements, OHS management systems, and risk control. Training is
provided for managers, supervisors, safety professionals, health and safety representatives and
members of health and safety committees. Courses run by VECCI are approved by the VWA.

In general terms, violent and unnatural deaths.
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Trade Unions
The Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) has an OHS Services unit which provides
training, health and safety audits, and assessments of compliance with legislation, plus
information and advice to assist with the implementation of health and safety systems and risk
control. These services are available to affiliated unions and to workplaces. The VTHC also
represents unions and workers in consultative forums. The VTHC's training courses are
tailored primarily for health and safety representatives and members of health and safety
committees, but courses are also offered for workers and supervisors. Approximately 2,000
people are trained annually.
Most of the larger unions also provide health and safety services to their members,
particularly information and advice. Some have dedicated OHS officers and/or run training
courses for health and safety representatives and workers. Courses run by the VTHC and three
other unions are approved by the VWA.
Tertiary Education Institutions
Victoria's Technical and Further Education (TAPE) system provides relatively easy
access to OHS diploma programmes, training for safe operation of plant and equipment
(including training for certificates of competency to operate specified types of plant), and
training for health and safety representatives. These functions are in addition to the TAPE
colleges' central role of delivering training to new entrants into the trades sector. The
competencies for trade training courses delivered by the TAPE sector are identified by industry
training boards, and include OHS competencies specific to the individual trades. The industry
training boards include representatives of employers, workers and the TAPE sector.
Victoria's universities run undergraduate and post-graduate courses in OHS, as well as
professional and short courses (e.g., in ergonomics, hygiene); conduct research; and provide
opportunities for continuing education through seminars and conferences. The Victorian
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health at the University of Ballarat is an important centre
of training and research. A number of academics publish articles, reports, and books dealing
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with health and safety. These are based on their academic research and increase the overall
information pool on health and safety issues in Australia.
Interest Groups
A number of groups representing particular business or community sectors run
programmes in the area of health and safety. The Victorian Farmers' Federation (VFF) has
taken an active role in advising fanners and motivating them to improve their health and safety
performance. In conjunction with the VWA and its predecessors, the VFF has run three
subsidy programmes for farmers who fit roll-over protection devices to their tractors. The VFF
has sponsored the establishment of FarmSafe action groups in rural centres across the State to
promote awareness of farm health and safety. The Plastics and Chemical Industry Association
(PACIA) runs a Responsible Care programme which seeks to raise the level of health and
safety awareness and capability of PACIA members and to assist them to improve their
performance by providing training, information and advice. Other interest groups which have
provided information and advocacy services for their members include the Property Council of
Australia and the Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce. Safety Groups in various parts
of the State bring together safety professionals and employers to discuss topics of common
interest.
Certificate Assessors
The VWA authorises persons to assess applicants for certificates of competency to
operate certain types of plant and equipment. The VWA issues the certificate if the applicant
has been assessed as competent in the relevant areas. There are approximately 180 certificate
assessors who work for TAPE colleges, large employers, and private consultants.
Consultants
Consultants provide services to the workplace parties in areas such as management
systems, occupational hygiene, risk engineering, OHS recording and reporting systems,
training, ergonomics, health monitoring, stress management, and organisational development.
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In a performance based regulatory environment, consultants' services are critically important
to assist persons with duties under the legislation to meet the standards required. Section
21(4)(c) of the OHS Act requires employers to employ or engage suitably qualified persons to
advise the employers in relation to the health and safety of his or her workers. The VWA
maintains an electronic directory currently listing 390 consultants. However, consultants
nominate themselves for inclusion in the directory. The VWA does not vouch for the accuracy
of information provided by consultants.
Professional Associations
Professional societies also have an important role in the continuing development of
OHS professionals. These societies include the Ergonomics Society of Australia, the Australian
Institute of Occupational Hygiene, the Safety Institute of Australia, the Australian
Physiotherapy Association, the Australian College of Occupational Medicine, and the
Australian Occupational Nurses' Association.
Collection and Use of Data
The HSD has an extensive database for the period from 1985 which it uses to target its
prevention activities. The principal elements of the database are as follows.
The VWA claims database described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report. This
contains basic identity information and claims data on the approximately
200,000 Victorian workplaces which are part of the workers' compensation
scheme. Self-employed persons and self-insurers are not included in this
database.
Information available from the HSD's INSPIRE database (e.g., visits to
workplaces, reasons for visits, results of visits such as Notices and Written
Directions issued). This includes data on all workplaces and sites visited by
VWA field staff, including the workplaces of self-employed persons and selfinsurers, dangerous goods sites and non-workplaces visited pursuant to the
Equipment (Public Safety) Act.
Data on serious incidents, prosecutions, dangerous goods licences, certificates
of competency to operate plant and equipment and registered plant and plant
designs.
HSD field staff access the database to obtain workplace profiles prior to visiting a
workplace. However, in practice there are difficulties in linking data in the claims database and
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other data gathered by VWA. The address or name of the establishment as described in the
claims database does not always match with its actual location or name when the establishment
is visited by an inspector. Inspectors can create new records of workplaces in INSPIRE and as
such some firms have several files under different names. It is estimated that INSPIRE records
and the WorkCover claims database cannot be matched in relation to 20 percent of workplaces.
Work is underway to resolve this problem.
INSPIRE has been in place since 1988 and is based on outdated technology. While
enhancements have been made to it from time to time, it is recognised that INSPIRE should be
integrated with other parts of the VWA's overall database. A new system for tracking incidents
reported to the VWA and investigations was implemented in 1996 as a forerunner to the
redevelopment of INSPIRE.
A statistical section within the Planning and Review Unit (PRU) provides data to
internal and external clients. Some 400 requests for information are dealt with annually. The
section also produces an annual Statistical Profile analysing WorkCover claims, fatalities
investigated by the VWA, and the VWA's compliance and enforcement activity. In 1996 this
publication was merged with the VWA's statistical supplement to its annual report.
As in many federated nations, Australia does not have consistent national injury and
disease statistics, and thus comparison of injury rates and the success of interventions is
difficult within the country. The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission
publishes annual estimates of national OHS statistics based largely on workers' compensation
data. Victorian data is generally excluded from this publication as Victoria's employer excess
coverage threshold (greater than 10 days off work) is not in accordance with the National Data
Set (NDS). The NDS is currently being reviewed, with VWA participation, and inclusion of
Victorian data may resume in the future.
It is unlikely that any of the reporting systems capture all of the workplace injuries or
diseases. The HSD database contains approximately 200,000 workplaces; however, it is
estimated that up to 100,000 additional may exist that are not captured. The WorkCover
database does not contain statistical information on injury and disease incidence at self-insured
employer worksites, nor for injuries that have durations below the 10-day excess. The VWA
8-34

database has also been criticized as lacking a decision support system to facilitate valid and
reliable causality research.
HSD uses the data to develop the top 20 injury-producing industries each year to assist
in targeting both high-risk industries and specific high-incidence injuries within these. The
Division recognises that this system is not easily capable of providing targeting data by
enterprise or workplace. To correct this shortcoming, a new system called SATS (Site
Assessment Targeting System) has been developed to record inspector assessments of a
workplace's risk elements (hygiene, plant, manual handling, dangerous goods, location), health
and safety management system, compliance performance, and risk control measures. The
objective is to develop a profile or scorecard for each site and to use this as a guide to target
future interventions.
Incident Notification Regulations are proposed as a means of capturing all of the data
on dangerous occurrences and injuries from accidents. Approaches used in other jurisdictions
to solve this information deficiency include the development of a menu-driven PC-based
system that is provided to employers so that pre-coded data are transmitted electronically to the
system. This approach avoids expending what might be a great deal of resources in data entry
and coding. For large employers who are already capturing the data, interchange specifications
are provided and the system can be made available on the internet.
The Licencing Co-ordination Unit has a significant database that tracks all of the
licences, permits, approvals, certificates and registration required under the various pieces of
legislation. This unit has responsibility for all licence and registration processes, except for
2,500 approvals for asbestos removalists, lead and carcinogen medical surveillance
programmes and audiometrists that are the responsibility of the Work Environment
Coordinating Unit.
Under the Dangerous Goods Act there are 23 different licences issued, including 3 for
transport, 12 for explosives and fireworks, and 8 for storage. Approximately 7,100 such
licences were issued in 1995. Twenty-eight different certificates of competency are issued to
equipment and plant operators; these are nationally accepted certificates. A common database

8-35

for all Australia facilitates verification. Approximately 23,000 of these are issued each year, of
which 19,300 are for forklift operators.
A registration system to track the location of plant and equipment contains five different
registration groups and registered approximately 70,000 items when the new plant regulations
came into effect in 1995. Current registrations run about 4,000 per month. The various
registrations, certificates and licences are issued on a fee for service basis and the unit collects
about $7 million annually.
Securing Compliance Through Inspection and Enforcement
In enforcing health and safety legislation, the VWA's goal is to achieve consistency,
transparency and predictability. The enforcement policy emphasizes that

•

the tools used to enforce compliance should be appropriate to the circumstances
and actions required proportionate to the risk;
there should be consistency in response—a similar approach is taken hi similar
circumstances to achieve similar ends;
a targeted approach should be taken to ensure that the greatest attention is given
to the highest risk situations and to those duty holders who are responsible for
the risk and are best placed to control it;
transparency in process should be maintained so that duty holders understand
what is expected of them and what they should expect of the VWA—this also
relates to clear avenues to appeal actions of the enforcing authority;
the primary purpose of enforcement action is to prevent injury, illness and
disease and to make non-compliers accountable to act as a deterrent to others.
Resource Utilisation

The three Operations Divisions provide a full range of services including inspection,
investigation, information, advisory, licencing, and training. They are resourced with 304
people, of which 170 are field inspectors and 15 are information officers. These 185 positions
deliver the front-line service. Field activity is recorded on the INSPIRE database. During the
two-year period July 1993 to June 1995 a total of 123,899 inspections were recorded for an
average of 5,162 per month or 28 per inspector and information officer each month. Forty-five
percent (2,323 per month) of the inspections involved traming/information/advice and
observation reports. In the period March 1995 through February 1996 inspections totalled
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46,141 and consumed 64,039 inspection hours. This averages 350 hours per inspector
assuming all of the 185 positions were field active, and 1.4 hours for each inspection.
Licencing/Certification/Registration accounted for about 20 percent of the inspections
(1,032 per month). Inspection activity involving improvement notices, prohibition notices and
dangerous goods directions averaging 170, 103, and 150 per month, respectively. It is
somewhat surprising that less than 10 percent of the workplace activity results in the creation
of an inspector's direction to improve or prohibit use. A 20 June 1996 policy directive on
enforcement requires that inspectors issue the improvement and prohibition notices whenever
they observe non-compliance. Apparently this is in response to the low number of enforcement
notices cited above.
Since the September 1995 reorganisation it is reported that the deployment of regional
inspection staff is totally consumed by responding to the targets set by the various coordinating
units and in the investigation of serious accidents and complaints. Furthermore, the regional
teams report they have little if any time for locally planned inspection activity.
The Inspection Process
WorkCover inspectors have the power to visit any place in Victoria covered by the
three health and safety Acts. The legislation provides inspectors with broad and far-reaching
legislative powers. They have the right of entry, without the need for a search warrant, to
workplaces and to sites where there is high-risk equipment or dangerous goods. They can
exercise this right at all reasonable times both by day and by night. It is an offence for anyone
to refuse access to an inspector, or to obstruct, hinder or oppose an inspector. In conducting a
visit, an inspector can be assisted by other people, including technical or scientific experts,
interpreters or police officers.
Inspectors also have statutory powers to

•
•

conduct interviews and inquiries;
take photographs, recordings and measurements;
seize property;
take samples;
examine and copy documents; and
issue whatever directions are necessary for them to carry out their functions.
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When inspectors come to a workplace or site, wherever possible they will notify the employer
person in charge, or site manager and any health and safety representative of their entry, and
show their identification card before acting or proceeding under the law.
If inspectors see a dangerous situation or a potential dangerous situation, or a breach of
the law or a potential breach, they may issue one or more of the following:
•
•
•

Improvement Notices
Prohibition Notices
Written Directions.

Improvement Notices and Prohibition Notices may be issued under the Occupational Health
and Safety Act and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act. An Improvement Notice is a written
direction requiring a person or organisation to fix a breach or likely breach of the law. A time
limit for the required improvement is included on the notice. A Prohibition Notice is a written
direction prohibiting an activity that the inspector believes involves or will involve an
immediate risk to the health and safety of any person. The activity cannot be started again until
an inspector certifies that the risk has been removed. A dangerous goods Written Direction
may be issued for a breach of the Dangerous Goods Act or its regulations, or where the
inspector believes that action is needed to ensure the safety of people or property. The Written
Direction may be for immediate compliance or compliance within a stipulated time as the
inspector considers appropriate.
Inspectors may include directions in Notices and Written Directions saying how the
breach of the law or the threat to health and safety may be fixed. These hand-written
documents are the Inspection record—providing the detail for all of the pertinent employer and
site location data and the inspectors' observations. The Infringement Notice—more commonly
referred to as on-the-spot-fines—is not applicable at this time, as regulations for these have not
been promulgated.
When the inspector returns to the office, s/he may enter the data into the INSPIRE
database, and information to create a profile of the firm is also recorded in SATS (Site
Assessment and Targeting System). As a general rule, however, inspectors do not enter the
data themselves. The inspector will conduct a follow-up visit where improvement and
prohibition notices have been issued. Inspectors appear to have a predetermined
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inspection/follow-up schedule for the day. In the case of a complaint they attend to the narrow
issue being addressed, provide some overall guidance for the employer and move on to the
next programmed visit. The sense is that they are pushing to obtain a quota of activities and
this detracts from being able to do a quality, in-depth inspection of the site or adjacent sites.
The VWA Enforcement Policy sets out the circumstances in which Notices and Written
Directions are used. This policy was reviewed in 1996, arid the review found areas where the
existing policy was not being followed or needed clarification. In particular, inspectors were
often using their powers to issue written requirements under general statutory powers instead
of issuing Notices and Written Directions. Following the review a revised Enforcement Policy
was issued which was essentially a restatement of the existing policy with more emphasis on
ensuring that it be consistently and effectively applied in workplaces.
The revised Enforcement Policy states that Notices and Written Directions must be
issued where a breach of the legislation or an immediate risk is identified, whether or not any
other enforcement tool is also to be used. The exceptions to this rule are
where compliance is achieved immediately while the inspector is at the premises
or on site, and the record of the observed non-compliance, the requirement and
the compliance with the requirement are included in the inspection record form;
where a Notice or Direction cannot, for a technical reason, be used to achieve
compliance, and requirements issued under the inspector powers provision in
the legislation are more appropriate (e.g., for taking of samples or seizure of
property);
where WorkCover has issued a licence, approval, certificate or authorisation
(e.g., in relation to asbestos removal, or operating a crane or forklift), an
inspector who sees a person or organisation not complying with the law or with
any of the conditions that are relevant to the licence, etc., may initiate action to
suspend or cancel it.
Inspectors also respond to requests to arbitrate

•

disputed Provisional Improvement Notices (PINS) issued by workers' health and
safety representatives;
disputed work stoppages due to alleged immediate threats to health and safety;
and
disputed Provisional Directions related to dangerous goods matters issued by
delegated officers such as fire services officers.
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The follow-up workplace visit to a comprehensive audit is focused on specific, agreedto improvements and consultation. Some inspectors advise that the new enforcement policy will
eliminate this approach since they believe they are now required to issue notices in each case.
On follow-up where compliance has not been achieved or recurring non-compliance exists,
they must issue a compliance notice or proceed to prepare the file for prosecution.
Prohibition and Improvement Notices steadily increased during the late 1980s to reach
their highest levels in 1990 to 1991. Table 8.3 shows they gradually fell off from 1991 to
1994, approximately back to the levels of the late 1980s. This trend may reflect the movement
through different Departments and the related reorganisation of HSD and its predecessor
entities over this period. Changing inspection focus and reductions in the inspection resource
may also explain the declining trend. However, the number of Improvement and Prohibition
Notices has risen substantially in the past 2 years.
Investigations and Prosecutions
Each of the three principal health and safety Acts requires the Minister to issue general
guidelines to inspectors about the prosecution of offences. The guidelines identify the
following matters for consideration for prosecution, and prosecution proceedings will generally
be instituted if investigations identify breach of legislation hi respect of them:
fatalities;
incidents resulting in serious injury or ill-health;
incidents with potential for fatality, serious injury or health effects;
repeat offenders (e.g., previous prosecution, including where Notices and
Written Directions have been issued);
obstruction or other offences in relation to inspectors;
non-complied Provisional Improvement Notices or Provisional Directions, or
inspectors' Notices or Written Directions;
Discrimination against persons in respect to OHS issues (under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act only);
where other tools such as Notices and Written Directions are not considered
appropriate for ensuring compliance or where there are repeated offences.
Prosecution proceedings may be instituted for breaches of Governor-in-Council Orders, under
the Dangerous Goods Act and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act. Prosecution for
manslaughter or offences under the Crimes Act 1958 is considered (in conjunction with the
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Director of Public Prosecutions) where, in the case of a work-related death or serious injury,
there is evidence of gross negligence by a body corporate or persons in the workplace.
The trend for prosecutions follows the same general pattern as in the prohibition and
improvement notice data as shown in Table 8.4. The number of successful prosecutions
increased each year to a peak in the 1991/92 fiscal year and, after falling off dramatically for 2
years, appears to be on the rise again. A recent policy directive on enforcement (issued on 20
June 1996) requires inspectors to investigate and prepare a file for potential prosecution for
circumstances listed in the policy. A record of the numbeir of files investigated for prosecution
each year is not available; however an estimate of between 200 and 300 was given.
Investigations are co-ordinated by the Central Investigation Unit (CIU). They may be
carried out by the CIU's five senior investigators, or by the ten dedicated regional
investigators, or by inspectors. As with all field work, investigation time is logged on
INSPIRE. The prosecution process consumes a considerable amount of the resource of the
Division. A survey was recently conducted by an independent consultant, which resulted in the
estimate that about 15 percent of HSD's resources went to investigation and prosecution
activities. The same study estimated the average cost of investigation at $30,000 against an
average fine of $10,000. A very high success rate is achieved, indicating a very thorough and
exhaustive investigative and selection process. The average time from accident/incident to
issue of charges is 15 months and to decision about 21 months.
All offences against the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Equipment (Public
Safety) Act and some against the Dangerous Goods Act are indictable offences, i.e., the
organisation or person charged with an offence has the right to a trial before a judge and jury
in the County Court. However, with the agreement of the organisation or person charged and
the Court, offences can be heard summarily in the Magistrates' Court. Most Dangerous Goods
Act offences are summary offences dealt with in the Magistrates' Court. Except for 25 cases
heard by a judge and jury in the last 10 years, all were actually heard by the Magistrates'
Court.
Where there has been a previous conviction under the relevant Act, the Court has the
power to impose another penalty in addition to the penalty for the second or further offence.
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The Dangerous Goods Act also has penalties on a daily basis for continuing offences. The
VWA has increasingly sought to pursue charges of manslaughter in appropriate cases. In 1994
a company was successfully prosecuted on a charge of manslaughter, and a director of the
company of two charges, under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.
There are several evident weaknesses in such a large investment in prosecution. First,
the fines are typically at a relatively low level, in the range of $10,000 to $20,000 and as such
cannot be seen as a significant deterrent. Magistrates are not sure that such prosecutions rank
as serious criminal offences and are therefore reluctant to levy higher fines or use good
behaviour bonds. Second, the prosecutions are event-focused. Prosecutions are initiated when a
serious injury or death or a "near miss" occurs and almost exclusively focus on the corporate
employer and not the individual directors, managers or supervisors. Thirdly, the lengthy tune
between the event and the application of the penalty serves to delink the event from the
consequence.
The Industry Commission Report calculated the probability of a penalty being applied
in Victoria at 2 percent and, even though the average fine is higher than other jurisdictions,
this results in a calculated expected penalty of only $29. It is difficult to assess the argument
that publication of the successful prosecutions will create the deterrent effect desired for other
similar employers, but at the level of penalty currently being levied, this is a dubious
proposition.
Appeal Process
An employer who has been issued with a Notice under the Occupational Health and
Safety Act may appeal to the Employee Relations Commission of Victoria (ERCV).24 The
ERCV may affirm, modify or cancel the Notice. In 1995/96, 12 Notices were appealed (fewer
than 1 percent of Notices issued). A person who has been issued a Written Direction under the
Dangerous Goods Act or a Notice under the Equipment (Public Safety) Act may appeal to the

24

At the beginning of 1997 this jurisdiction was transferred to the Industrial Division of the Magistrates'

Court.
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Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Such appeals are very rare. There have only been two
appeals under the Dangerous Goods Act in the last 3 years.
Employers who have been issued with a Provisional Improvement Notice (PIN) by a
health and safety representative under the OSH Act may appeal to an inspector. In 1995/96
there were 94 such appeals.25 In 58 of these cases the PIN was cancelled by the inspector. A
person who has been issued a Provisional Direction by a delegated officer under the Dangerous
Goods Act may appeal to an inspector. No such appeals have been recorded. The VWA is
preparing to release a booklet on the powers of inspectors and the appeal rights of employers
and others. This booklet aims to encourage a more open process to the benefit both of the
parties who come in contact with inspectors and the agency itself.
Injury and Disease Reduction through Consultation, Education, and Technical Assistance
The VWA supplements its inspection and enforcement programme with a number of
other activities designed to provide workers, unions, employers, equipment manufacturers, and
others with the knowledge and information they need to maintain safe, healthy working
conditions. This section of the report will give a brief description of these efforts.
Information Network Unit (INU)
The INU was established in 1989 to augment field resources by providing information
officers whose sole task is to provide information and advice to workplaces. Information
officers do not have the statutory enforcement powers of inspectors. The Information
Network's services are directed to the key parties who can influence decision-making in the
workplace: employers, managers, health and safety representatives, safety officers, and
supervisors. The Information Network undertakes targeted prevention projects (e.g., assisting
with the application of manual handling legislation); conducts industry briefings; provides
assistance hi workplaces; conducts seminars, displays and rural field days; distributes VWA

"Neither health and safety representatives nor employers are required to advise the VWA when a PIN
has been used.
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publications; responds to telephone and over-the-counter inquiries; maintains a central library
and regional resource centres; and carries out media activity.
The INU has a head office component and teams of regionally based information
officers whose activities are overseen by a zone co-ordinator. The co-ordinator liaises with
area managers to ensure consistency. INU responds to about 35,000 inquiries and conducts
about 700 industry briefings each year. Since 1992 the Unit has run a shopfront at the HSDs
headquarters building which responds to visitor and telephone inquiries and sends out written
information.
The INU is also responsible for approving courses in health and safety which are
conducted by external providers. The OSH Act permits health and safety representatives to
take time off work with pay to attend approved courses. The following categories of courses
are approved at present:
•

•

five-day basic courses for health and safety representatives and
managers/supervisors/others. Eighteen providers have been approved,
a one-day post-introductory course (Everyone's Business) for managers/
supervisors and health and safety representatives/committee members. Three
providers have been approved.
a training package (SafePlant) which provides an overview of the Plant and
Certification Regulations and the responsibilities of all the parties. Five
providers have been approved.

The SHARE Programme collects solutions for dealing with health and safety hazards
and makes them more widely available to workplaces via a loose-leaf manual. Solutions are
usually identified by inspectors and information officers, though workplaces are encouraged to
nominate their own solutions for incorporation in the programme. The SHARE manual costs
$75, and there are about 900 subscribers.
The Bilingual Information Programme (BIP) was established in 1985 within the
Department of Labour. In 1991 the BIP was integrated into INU. The objective was to make it
part of the mainstream programme while maintaining its special services to workplaces. BIPs
current activities include providing information to workplaces on the Codes of Practice and the
provision of OHS information in languages other than English, providing information to
various communities via ethnic radio broadcasts and networks, assisting inspectors in
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investigating incidents involving persons of non-English speaking background, conducting
sessions on cross-cultural communication in external courses for health and safety
representatives, and distributing publications in languages other than English. In recent years
activity in this area has fallen off, due mainly to difficulties in coordinating the BIP's work
through regional offices as well as a focus on other projects.
Development Taskforce
The Division set up the Taskforce in October 1995 with a defined 18-month life. Its
objectives are to develop sustainable partnerships focused on achieving improved health and
safety performance, provide an enhanced advisory infrastructure and drive increased
community awareness of OHS issues. Seven projects are currently underway and a long list of
potential additional projects has been identified. The Development Taskforce's current
activities include the following projects.
Community relations: do-it-yourself/home safety, off-the-job (24-hour) safety,
promotion of community safety, safety at school;
Farm safety: training days, promotion of farm safety action groups, tractor roll
over protection rebate scheme, increasing farmers' OHS skills and awareness;
Local government: improved CEO/senior management accountability, safety
management systems, development and expansion of OHS professional networks,
contractor safety;
Small business: collaboration with trade and professional associations to produce
appropriate OHS tools, use of a panel of accountants, solicitors and financial advisers
to increase small business commitment;
Partnering: establishment of one-on-one partnering sets between companies to
promote best practice in OHS (pilots are underway in the plastics and chemicals
industry and in some regional centres);
Healthshare: establishment of a SHARE-style programme within the
health/hospital industry;
Building Construction: co-operation with industry associations to improve work
practices; and
Mechanical integrity: transfer of best practice in predictive and preventive
industrial maintenance to a wider range of workplaces.
The Taskforce strives to create opportunities that will mobilize and leverage local
resources in partnerships for specific project initiatives. For example, a community relations
project will promote off-the-job safety and health through the school system to enhance student
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hazard awareness and enlist worker ambassadors to promote health and safety. The Taskforce
presents an opportunity to develop greatly enhanced hazard awareness for workers and their
families and in the long term cause a culture shift where the belief is that all workplace injury
and disease is preventable.
SafetyMap
Safety Map is an audit tool developed by HSD and launched in 1993. The audit was
specifically designed to evaluate safety management systems at enterprises. The tool does not
audit compliance for site specific health and safety issues. The product has been marketed
extremely well and has enjoyed a good reception. Staff estimate that 2,000 copies have been
sold throughout Australia and to other countries. Accreditation under SafetyMap is a
requirement for all self-insured employers under WorkCover. Many large employers also are
now requiring that the contractors they hire be accredited under SafetyMap as a form of due
diligence.
While the number of units that have been marketed is high, there are less than 200
firms that are actually accredited under SafetyMap. The coordinating unit expects to increase
the number of accredited firms significantly. The tool is aligned with quality assurance
principles and therefore the expectation is that most medium and large firms will be able to
achieve at least the entry level certification. The coordinating unit is somewhat apprehensive
about their marketing success, since they feel they may not have sufficient auditors available to
meet the demand.
Marketing Unit
HSD has a Marketing Unit that provides a communication function. The focus of the
material is driven by emerging technical issues and legislative amendments. These are in the
form of brochures and pamphlets that are given away. The rights to distribute the Acts,
Regulations and Codes of Practice are owned by other agencies and are marketed by them.
This unit produces a publication called WorkWords and distributes 24,000 copies each quarter.
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This publication keeps the readers informed on upcoming amendments to regulation, emerging
issues in health and safety, and general news about HSD.
The planning and co-ordination of Health and Safety Week is also a responsibility of
this unit. The programme for 1996 consisted of a wide range of events organised across
Victoria by the VWA and individual workplaces and unions. These events included debates,
workshops, seminars, displays, roadside tea breaks for truck drivers, a forklift derby, a moot
court and an art display.
The annual Health and Safety Awards programme that has been operating for 8 years is
also co-ordinated by this unit. The awards are given for achieving innovation or excellence in
health and safety. Approximately 150 applicants are judged each year in seven categories of
industry. The unit also carries out some media programmes when there are new regulations or
standards and seeks regional media assistance to publicize successful prosecutions to achieve a
deterrent effect.
The VWA's Corporate Affairs Division has become increasingly active in marketing
health and safety in recent years. It has run a series of high-profile advertising campaigns
aimed at promoting a pervasive culture of safety within Victorian workplaces. The campaigns
are grounded hi comprehensive research and market testing. Their effectiveness is tested by
market awareness surveys and changes hi recorded claims numbers. Market awareness recently
was found to be 80 percent, and a continued decrease in claims reported is attributed partly to
this marketing effort.
Campaigns include television and radio commercials, posters, displays, and outdoor
advertising. Recent campaigns are
WorkCover's working to stop injuries - promoted better communication between
management and workers, improved workplace environments, job rotation,
training, workers' exercise programmes and safety responsibility at the supervisor
level;
Quiet Tragedy - highlighted the number of deaths and severe injuries in Victorian
workplaces;
Safety: think it, talk it, work it - targeted the "black spots" of workplace injuries:
working at heights, mixed pedestrian and vehicle traffic, manual handling, and
insufficient management commitment.
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Major safety promotion displays are held at shows, exhibitions and field days throughout
Victoria, including the Royal Melbourne Show and the "Victoria on Show" exhibition. Safety
videos are produced, and there has also been a range of activities to promote safety in the
farming community.
Stakeholder Feedback
In this section of the report, feedback from employers and labour on the VWA health
and safety efforts is provided. Since we talked to a significant number of such stakeholders in
the course of carrying out this study, it seems appropriate to record their reactions to the
system as they experience it. Of necessity, these comments are more subjective, and are also
subject to less cross-referencing than other material in the report. Nevertheless, they are an
important part of our review and analysis. Ultimately, the stakeholders will get the system they
want, and their perceptions are an important part of an evaluation of the performance of the
VWA.
Employer Comment
Employers complain that the Division has an excessively intense interest hi prosecution.
They believe the preoccupation with putting the legal case together hinders the true preventive
value of the accident investigation. Small- to medium-sized enterprises express concern that
fines resulting from prosecution may in fact reduce their financial capacity to improve health
and safety standards at the workplace. They argue for a system that would require the penalty
to be invested in improvements to standards at the workplace.
Employers believe that the targeting system and the lack of field inspector capacity
results in an uneven playing field. They argue that sporadic and arbitrary enforcement fuels a
low expectation of detection of non-compliance and subsequent action. They believe this could
result in good operators being driven out of business, especially in the building and
construction industry where competition is stiff in the tendering process. Employers are
reluctant to seek advice and assistance from the inspectorate. In spite of the establishment of an
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Information and Advisory Network to deliver service in a non-threatening way, many
employers still perceive a threat because the officers are part of the enforcement organisation.
Self-insured employers believe SafetyMap is an effective tool that will result in the
development of a higher level of hazard awareness and drive behavioural change at the
workplace. There is support for the Management System Coordinating Unit's belief that there
is room for improvement to the audit process.
Some employer representatives were very critical of the knowledge and skills of the
inspectorate. Low pay levels and lack of recognition for those with ability were blamed for
many of the good inspectors leaving the Division. In addition, the cyclical variations caused by
changes in government was seen to reward those who were politically astute as opposed to
those with good skills in health and safety issues.
One employer association was extremely critical of the process they had been through
to get approval of a course developed to train health and safety representatives. After 7 months
of process, during which the goal posts were constantly moved, the impression was that the
HSD did not wish to approve any courses, even though the legislation requires it. This
frustration led to the comment that everything HSD did seemed to be very bureaucratic,
convoluted and designed with the specific purpose of maintaining or increasing staffing levels.
One association stated the SATS system was another useless paper exercise hi that it
was too subjective and lacks consistency. They recommended the energy be applied to assisting
small businesses who do not have access to health and safety professional assistance and also to
providing these enterprises with best practices information.
In common with complaints from labour, employers found a lack of opportunity to
communicate with HSD and believed some form of consultative process was needed. One
regional office was said to be a problem because the staff were rude, not interested in being
helpful and the inspectors were also found to be threatening to employers. Employers found
inspectors often reluctant to provide advice, and that they would only point to the regulations
or codes to indicate what was expected. Employers sensed that the problem might be systemic
since they believe HSD really does not understand what employers need.

8-49

The Division provides a lot of information developed by specialists, however employers
complain that they have difficulty getting a yes or no answer to a question. It appears to the
employer as a fear of being held accountable for the advice given. The Division is not viewed
as proactive or responsive to emerging health and safety issues. In a recent discussion paper,
an employer association has called for major reform to the OHS legislation and further
regulatory changes. They strongly recommend greater involvement by employers in OHS
j
regulation and code of practice development.
Of course, this sentiment is echoed by the labour representatives and would mean
reconstructing a tripartite committee that was only recently disbanded. Involvement of the
community as advisors is critical to the regulation making process. However, recent experience
in another jurisdiction in North America (British Columbia) where a consensus approach was
tried led to a process that has taken many years, cost millions, and produced purposely vague
regulatory language that had to be bargained over at every step. Each workplace party
interprets the requirements differently and policy had to be developed to establish the intent.
Achieving a balanced approach that has meaningful consultation and yet achieves timely and
clear regulatory amendment must be the goal.
Employer associations complain that there is a lack of consistency in service delivery
by inspectors. It should be noted this is a common concern of employers world-wide in dealing
with OHS regulators. On the other hand, employers often point out that each workplace is
unique and inspectors should be more flexible in determining the level of non-compliance.
Regulators can ensure consistency through training and strong policy direction; however, the
natural result is no exceptions in following policy and thus no flexibility.
The reorganisation of the Division was touted to provide a one-stop service to
employers. Some employer's view is that the strategy is not working, since they find
interaction with different parts of the Division still produces inconsistent advice and direction.
The performance-based regulations are an area of concern because of the manner of application
by the inspectors. Compliance with them is reduced to the individual inspector's view of what
is required. To overcome many of the issues a suggestion was the formation of regular forums
with employer representatives to discuss emerging issues.
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Consultant Comments
Independent health and safety consultants believe that the Division is suffering from a
long history of political influence, and there is a carryover of policy and behaviour from that
history. They expressed concern that the integration with VWA might drive inappropriate
prevention strategies that were exclusively founded on the costly claims. They believe the
Division's efforts are hampered by a poor database, in that all workplaces are not captured and
only the excess claims are reported. Further, they have a grave concern that the information on
workplace hygiene issues is either non-existent or very poor.
The consultants also did not give high marks to the VWA prevention media campaigns.
They acknowledge the effort achieved high audience awareness, however, the feeling is that
they are not targeting the real hazards in the workplace. Another concern consultants have is
that employers do not understand the new performance-based approach and still view HSD as
an agency that provides the historic inspection and enforcement service. In addition, they are
highly critical of industry associations. They are sceptical that these organisations have much
interest in a proactive agenda for health and safety issues, unless the effort is funded by grants
or awards. On a positive note, these consultants believe improved targeting of the inspection
resource could make a significant difference to the reduction of injury and disease.
SafetyMap is a leading edge approach to fostering the development of safety
management systems that drive employer and worker responsibility for workplace safety. At
the same time the approach ensures the regulator is monitoring the effectiveness of this strategy
at each firm that is accredited. Victoria is years ahead of other jurisdictions around the world
that are developing similar approaches. However, at the moment Australian critics seem to be
sceptical about the long-term effectiveness of the safety management strategy in reducing
injury and disease, even at large, well-resourced enterprises.
Consultants view HSD as being over-organised, highly inefficient, and very politicized.
The strong emphasis on prosecutions is viewed as an ineffective use of resources. Critics
believe that corporations approach a prosecution with a heavy emphasis on making the good
corporate citizen argument and also shifting the blame and responsibility. Furthermore, they
believe enforcement by HSD must move more rapidly to a decision to penalize in order to
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achieve corrective behaviour. The concern is that too much time and energy are expended in
coaxing an enterprise into compliance.
Labour Comments
Worker representatives express a great deal of concern that they cannot get a speedy
response from HSD inspectors when they have complaints at the workplace. They believe that
there are too few unannounced inspections conducted. This observation was actually supported
by HSD staff and managers. When an inspector does arrive at the workplace, they frequently
do not invite participation of the health and safety representative hi the inspection or seek out
their views on workplace issues. When combined with a reduction in labour's influence with
employers, this means that workers are losing their opportunity for meaningful participation.
They also point out that inspectors continue to be focused on their area of specialization
and often walk right past other hazards and serious safety issues during an inspection. They
observe that inspectors arrive promptly to the scene of an accident where there is loss of life or
limb but may take up to 6 weeks to investigate injuries such as crushing, falls or broken bones.
Labour views the advisory, training and information role of inspectors as something
that reduces their core function of inspection and enforcement. They assert that less than 30
percent of available inspector time is spent actually undertaking workplace visits. This leads to
their conclusion that most employers in Victoria have no expectation that they will ever be
visited by an inspector. Thus the minimal risk of violations being detected has for all practical
purposes left Victorian industry to self-regulate.
The high level of inspection resource invested in the prosecution of employers is not
supported by labour. They argue that the monetary fine levels are so low and the elapsed tune
so lengthy that there is little deterrent effect. They would support a speedy, less resource
consuming process, provided the freed-up inspection time was deployed on increased
inspections. Labour also questions the value of the resources invested in tracking the
movement and installation of plant and equipment compared to the prevention of injury and
disease. Labour is concerned that the Infringement Notice proposal (on-the-spot fines) will not
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have fines that are high enough to reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. Furthermore, they
do not want any fines applied to workers.
The tripartite structure that gave the labour community the opportunity to provide
advice and exert influence on HSD has been abandoned and lack of access is of great concern.
However, labour concedes that the previous Health and Safety Commission was too
consultative and that change was required. Reduced access and a perceived fortress mentality
on the part of HSD results in their observation that opportunity for participation has virtually
disappeared.
Labour points out that the budget of the Division is only 25 to 50 percent of that in
other states of Australia. Plus, the resources are deployed in a reactive strategy of accident and
incident investigation as opposed to a proactive random compliance strategy. They point out
that Victoria has the highest number of workplaces per inspector of any of the states and even
at one inspection per workplace the re-inspection cycle would take 8 to 10 years. They believe
that compliance is only driven by the probability of being inspected and an expectation that
severe punishment will follow. This is based on the understanding that employers face difficult
competitive pressures and this drives the reluctance to invest in health and safety.
Those unions representing workers in federally regulated industries, as well as those
representing workers in the education system, complain that the arrangement for HSD to
provide services is not working. There is no inspection or enforcement activity. The primary
concern is that education system employers are not taking responsibility for OHS. Under
reporting of injuries, coercion of workers not to report, and a lack of expertise about violence
in the workplace and environmental issues are key areas where improvement is needed. In
addition, the reorganisation of the Division has resulted in the ergonomists and the hygienists
no longer being available to assist them in identification and assessment of risks.
High marks are given to a noise measurement programme called Operation Decibel and
the manual handling training programme carried out by the Division. Labour would like to see
more preventive programmes of this nature. However, labour perceives a withdrawal of HSD
inspections in this sector and believes this to be a significant contributing factor.

8-53

Unions recommend that training for safety and health representatives be prescribed in
regulation and, further, that the value of worker participation in workplace OHS be the focus
of media campaigns. They point out that at present, training falls mostly to trade unions and
that those who have been trained require upgrading as regulations are amended. They feel
strongly that the qualifications for inspectors needs upgrading such that the minimum
requirement would include the 3-year OSH diploma programme.
The publications prepared by HSD are important to labour; however, they criticize
them as being too glossy and difficult to decipher. They would trade the high production
quality for a greater numbers of documents that are more available and user friendly. Many of
the documents they need to meaningfully participate, they find too expensive and believe they
should be provided free or at a subsidized price.
They point to the fact that the fatal injury toll at workplaces has not been reduced and
recommend the focus should be on hazard reduction and awareness campaigns. More emphasis
on research into working environment issues is also recommended.
Finally, labour is concerned that the merger of HSD with VWA might mean an
emphasis on privatisation of the health and safety function and point to the VWA privatisation
of the compensation scheme as evidence for their position.
Health and Safety Division Concerns
Senior staff in HSD expressed significant concern at the criticism they receive both
from the employer and worker communities. They are at a loss to explain this. In addition, a
concern exists that the Division and its mandate are one that no department of government
wants. Over the years this has resulted in constant movement from Ministry to Ministry, to a
stand-alone agency and now to WorkCover. This all leads to a pervasive morale and identity
problem. Those who have been around awhile point to 15 changes of title for the organisation
over 20 years! The impression left is that "this too will pass" and not much will change. Since
HSD also has the responsibility for both public safety aspects and occupational health and
safety, this Division should be viewed as the champion of health and safety and should be
highly respected for their knowledge and professional and technical expertise.
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The Technology Section is too reactive in its service to the Division. Some units, such
as the chemical engineers, are fully utilised in support of the licencing and approval process for
dangerous goods. The engineers are not able to undertake proactive prevention initiatives to
achieve improvements in occupational health and safety. There is also a concern that they are
"out gunned" in the licencing and approval process by the client's experts, largely because the
Division has not promoted technical currency through attendance at international symposia,
etc. The manager has been proactive in arranging secondment exchanges with the chemical
industry to offset these concerns; however, this is not viewed as sufficient.
The occupational medicine unit has only one physician position. That is currently
vacant, and there is some doubt whether this position will be staffed in future. The hygienists
and ergonomists act as in-house consultants to the field inspectors. As part of the unit's
business plan under the reorganised structure, these professionals spend time at the field offices
on a rotational basis. This strategy is expected to make the inspectors more aware of their
expertise and result in increased utilisation of their skills. However, these professionals do not
make their own field visits to enterprises. When they are called upon by the inspector, their
advice or findings are relayed through the inspector to the workplace. The individual
professionals are concerned that the inspector may decide not to utilise the information, or may
have difficulty hi its application or explanation. Moreover, the expert is screened from the
client.
Hygienists expressed a keen interest hi secondment exchanges with other OHS agencies
to maintain currency and experience other approaches. These professionals also no longer see
themselves as part of the strategic planning process. They see their unit as a group still
struggling with the reorganisation and trying to sort out how they fit, and how best to utilise
their specialty skills. This is a common theme also expressed by some regional office staff.
Hygienists are particularly concerned that the government laboratory will be closed and they
will be left without one that has the credentials to do the analyses they require to carry out
monitoring. One possibility suggested was the establishment of this analytical capability at the
University of Melbourne. Moreover, the staff believe such a lab may require financial
assistance and see this as an opportunity for consideration by VWA.
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The current matrix organisational structure was initiated on 25 September 1995 upon
the recommendation of management consultants Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. Senior
management's view is that the state-wide co-ordination in the areas of Plant, Dangerous
Goods, Working Environment, Enforcement and Public Safety, Building and Construction,
Information Programme, Standards Development, Management Systems, and Licencing and
Certification is working well. However, regional managers and their staff say that they are
being asked to provide the resources to meet targets for service that are not reasonable. The
total inspector time needed for the targets in a region have been estimated at between 110
percent and 200 percent of the available resource. Regional managers believe they will be held
responsible when the targets set by the statewide co-ordinators are not met. The planning
sessions held to sort out the difficulties were viewed as a failure and, in the end, the state co
ordinators prescribed the targets. Adding to this dilemma for regional managers is the time
required for their staff to attend training sessions mandated by the co-ordinators that are often
scheduled on short notice. All of this leaves them with reduced control over the resources they
manage.
Both inside and outside HSD the sense is that inspection of workplaces has the lowest
priority. The minimum worksite time available per inspector has been set at 500 hours per year
(about 25 percent) as a guide in allocating scarce field inspector resources. Investigation and
preparation for prosecutions are estimated by some managers to consume 60 percent of some
inspectors' time, and the balance is scheduled to projects assigned by the co-ordinators. Senior
management indicate this is a gross exaggeration. However, it is agreed that workplace
complaints have the lowest priority. The result is they may not be followed up for weeks or
until there is sufficient heat generated to cause the complaint to rise to the top as a Ministerial
Directive.
Staff are generally concerned about the high level of resources invested in the licencing
of the manufacture, transport, storage and use of dangerous goods. It is widely believed that
very little of this activity leads to prevention of injury and disease, or any added value to health
and safety. The dangerous goods coordinating unit has six inspectors, currently being increased
to 11 to deal with the transfer of the added responsibility for the Port of Victoria. The chemical
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technical group estimates 70 percent of the 12 chemical engineers and chemist's time is
devoted to this process. The manager of the co-ordination unit is concerned that the number of
inspectors with dangerous goods skills has diminished, and as a result only 40 percent of the
targets set by this unit are being met by the regions. Everyone agrees that the revision of the
regulations in this area to a performance-based approach will alleviate some of the problems.
Dangerous goods are seen as an area of apparent political interest and sensitivity.
Service delivery has been criticized by the Auditor General, since, in spite of the activity, there
is no understanding of the level of compliance with the existing legislation. Other agencies
(Infrastructure and Planning and Environmental Protection) also have responsibilities for
licencing and approval of dangerous goods, however, there is a lack of co-ordinated service
delivery by the agencies. There is significant animosity within the organisation directed at the
dangerous goods coordinating unit. The unit is viewed as a clearing house that orchestrates the
hand-off of tasks to other areas and adds little value.
It appears that the reorganisation has not been well communicated throughout the
organisation. The coordinating units are misunderstood and barriers have been erected between
the regional front-line staff and the coordinating and technical units. The difficulty is described
by some as a failure to define and document the roles of the various managers. Others attribute
the problems to either poorly skilled resources in the field or their inability to adapt to changed
responsibilities. The multiplicity of tasks and demands from the coordinating units is seen by
many as inhibiting quality service delivery. The reorganisation has created an unhealthy
competition by the coordinating units and technical unit staff for inspector's time, either to
carry out projects or to participate with them in workplace interventions.
The coordinating units apparently have higher staff pay levels. This concerns regional
managers from an equity perspective, and also because vacancies in the units are sought after
by skilled inspection staff from the regions. This results in a drain of resource from the field.
The lowest paid positions in the coordinating units are at the same level as regional managers,
who believe they have a greater workload and responsibility without appropriate compensation.
Regional managers assert that if a position contains policy or co-ordination functions it pays far
better and that this drives the proliferation of policy development functions in many units. Both
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internal and external critics of the recent reorganisation believe the coordinating units are
unnecessary.
Insufficient vehicles provided for field inspection is a significant complaint heard from
all levels within the organisation. In the worst case there are three vehicles allocated for five
inspectors. The result is a rotation where each inspector can only spend 3 days per week on
field activity. This also means that the inspectors carry a minimum of supplies with them since
i

they must carry the materials fairly long distances to and from the vehicles, especially in the
central office. Inspector time is significantly under-utilised because of this serious under
complement of vehicles.
While in the office, inspectors answer phones, input data into the database, and no
doubt have some non-productive time. Failure to provide a dedicated vehicle for each inspector
also means that they have to fight traffic travelling to the office in their own vehicle, park their
vehicle, attend at the office to gather materials, fight traffic travelling to the first inspection,
and repeat this in reverse after the last inspection. This seems to be a very inefficient
application of scarce inspector time.
HSD also has a remarkable "starship" arrangement of one computer to four desks, i.e.,
one computer shared by four inspectors. Inspectors complain that this arrangement leads to
great inefficiency since they often find there are more inspectors in the office than available
computer terminals.
Some inspectors are also having a great deal of difficulty adapting to change. They are
not comfortable with their revised roles as a result of the performance-based legislation. Many
are accustomed to being "the expert" and providing the detailed inspection and audit functions
associated with prescriptive regulation. Employers also have not fully realized or adapted to
their new responsibilities under the revised regulations. This results in an expectation on their
part for the old style of service from inspectors.
Many inspectors are not at all comfortable with the new (June 1996) get-tough
enforcement policy. Senior management claims that this was merely a restatement of the
existing guidelines, with more emphasis on ensuring that they are consistently and effectively
applied in the workplace. In spite of this, some inspectors see this as a significant culture
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change for them. They interpret the policy as giving them no flexibility in dealing with the
employers. They must write improvement and/or prohibition notices whenever they observe
non-compliance. When inspectors determine there has been a failure to comply or observe
repeated non-compliance, they must proceed to recommend prosecution. They see this as
detrimental to the maintenance of good employer relationships and the significant degree of co
operation achieved in the past. But when one observes that there are approximately 50,000
inspections each year and only a small fraction of these have generated improvement or
prohibition notices, it is understandable that the executive has had to resort to this tough policy
direction.
There is a great deal of energy expended in paperwork and entering data to track
activity. Both inspector and technical staff raise significant concerns about the value of this
exercise. The Job Tracker system is similar to that which would be used by a consulting firm
to track billable hours. It apparently is not flexible enough to allow full tracking of
multitasking. One professional complained that a 12-hour day had been worked and the system
would only credit 8 hours of activity. The INSPIRE system is designed to track inspector
activity by workplace, however there is skepticism that the data reflect what is actually
happening in a region. Criticism is particularly levelled at Inspire's inability to flag exceptions.
A new system to track incident/accident investigation was criticized for not being user friendly.
In addition to Job Tracker and INSPIRE the technical staff also use Microsoft Scheduler
and a correspondence tracking system. The output from Job Tracker is seen by some simply as
great stacks of paper listing the tasks performed, and of little real value. Inspectors find they
spend a great deal of time handwriting the paper work that is left after an inspection. If they
were to observe 100 infractions they would produce 100 improvement notices and spend
perhaps a day to complete the paperwork. This onerous burden may drive a practice of only
recording the very serious infractions or even reducing the scope of the inspection so as not to
observe too many infractions.
Inspectors and regional managers maintain that the inspector positions are underpaid by
up to 25 percent when compared to equivalent private sector positions. Several have seen peers
leave the organisation to set up shop as assessors or consultants. Outside inspection service is
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in great demand by employers as they begin to understand their new responsibilities under the
performance based regulations. Regional managers report an inability to attract appropriately
experienced and trained replacements as a result of low pay levels. Given the difficulty some
inspectors are experiencing in adapting to their revised roles under the new regulations, it may
be that their skills need upgrading coincident with the development of a revised job
classification and re-evaluation of compensation levels.
Most managers were sceptical that safety and health interventions could be linked to
outcomes. One manager cited a conference where safety and heath professionals presented
papers to show how their programmes had led to measurable outcomes. However, all of the
professionals were claiming responsibility for the same outcomes. The lack of a research
capability or the funds to support a significant Grants and Awards scheme to foster
fundamental research by the academic community into emerging health and safety issues was
also seen as a significant concern.
Regional staff expressed concern that the organisation does not have sufficient data to
provide an effective targeting system. The top-20 worst industry list is not seen as a
particularly useful tool. Head office provides the list of industries and the regions are left to
figure out which workplaces within the region to inspect. Some inspectors said this strategy
resulted in them often inspecting the same workplaces over and over and preaching to the
converted.
Some staff raised what they termed the workplace culture and industrial relations
issues. They believe that these issues are detrimental to improvement of health and safety hi
some industries. In such instances they view strict enforcement of compliance with the
regulations and codes as the only effective approach. These views when compared to earlier
stated views of some inspectors that the enforcement policy is inflexible points to the
inconsistency of approaches by individual inspectors. This is not uncommon and is found in
most inspecting agencies.
Staff expressed concern that VWA and HSD were sending mixed or conflicting
messages to the community about prevention of workplace death, injury and disease and the
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responsibilities of employers and workers. Discussions held to co-ordinate strategies and
integrate messages in the past apparently did not alleviate the problems.
A significant opportunity is seen by most staff to develop synergy between HSD and
VWA to drive prevention initiatives. However, a concern was expressed that HSD was
internally process-driven and that difficulties had arisen in previous collaborative attempts to
develop and deliver important strategies in a timely manner. On the other hand it was
recognised that HSD's process strengths and activity focus would compliment what is seen as a
lack of process strength in WorkCover.
There is a general feeling of apprehension at the integration of VWA and HSD. There
is a common belief that VWA does not understand or appreciate the importance of the mandate
and responsibility flowing from the legislation, nor HSD's function as a service delivery
organisation. In addition, the staff have a specific fear of further integration, even where they
see the positive opportunities of consolidation. Staff point to an earlier amalgamation of some
HSD/VWA departments as an example of their concern. They indicate this reorganisation was
not handled very well and that most of the HSD staff were declared redundant.
Conclusions
Over the last decade, the Health and Safety Division (HSD) of the VWA has
experienced constant change. In the past 15 years, the Division has been a part of six different
Ministries or Authorities. In 1982 it reported to the Minister of Labour and Industry and this
seems to be where most in the general public still identify the prevention field staff, referring
to them as DLI inspectors. However, in 1982, the new Labor Government moved the agency
to the Minister for Employment and Training. With the passage of the Occupational Health
and Safety Act 1985, the agency moved to the Department of Employment and Industrial
Affairs. In 1991 an administratively autonomous Occupational Health and Safety Authority
(OHSA) was set up to oversee and consolidate the delivery of health and safety in Victoria.
With the change in government hi 1992, the functions were delivered by two divisions within
the Department of Business and Employment. In May 1995, the organisation was renamed the
Health and Safety Organisation (HSO), and on 2 July 1996 the responsibility was once again
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moved to become the Health and Safety Division of the Victorian WorkCover Authority. The
Division actually may be suffering an identity crisis resulting from the numerous name
changes.
In addition to the movement through various Departments and Authorities, the
organisational structure has been constantly evolving. This current study is among several the
organisation has been subjected to over the last 5 years. All of this change is reflected in a high
level of frustration and cynicism among the staff of the Division. There is a feeling that the
mandate for health and safety is difficult and politically charged, and for these reasons the
responsibility is constantly shifted. Each new reorganisation is seen as "the flavour of the
month," and the staff have developed a fortress mentality that to some degree deflects or
resists the change. Lack of "buy in" is partly a result of the constant change, but also because
it is driven from the top, providing little opportunity for involvement of those who are required
to implement change.
Since the Division is still in the process of adjusting to the reorganisation as a result of
the Deloitte Touch Tohmatsu report in 1994, any further reorganisation must be carried out
carefully and skilfully. It should be inclusive of staff representatives from most levels in the
division during the planning and transition process. The importance of the mandate for health
and safety dictates the critical need for a period of stability for the division. Since "Prevention
of Injury" is the primary challenge stated in the mission of the Victorian WorkCover
Authority, there is now a golden opportunity to achieve a strong identity and stable service
delivery performance.
The HSD has a very broad mandate that includes occupational health and safety at
almost all places of work in Victoria. In addition, HSD's responsibility extends to public health
and safety with respect to dangerous goods and plant and equipment. Given this significant
scope, HSD needs to utilise resources in a way that maximizes their effect. The efforts of the
Information Network Unit, the Development Taskforce, SafetyMap, SHARE, and the
Marketing Unit are being successfully deployed to leverage resources in the community. These
are successful and valuable strategies, however more effective co-ordination and service
delivery efficiencies could be obtained.
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The inspection resource is probably sufficient in numbers, but the staff are severely
constrained in maximising their effectiveness by such things as the lack of vehicles, excessive
paper and data entry work, the heavy focus on prosecutions, insufficient computer resources,
and ineffective software. HSD strategies should ensure inspectors are field active for most of
their day and almost every day of the month.
In addition, improved targeting strategies need to be developed. The SATS programme
will assist in targeting; however, a significant improvement in the collection of causality and
source data, other than that needed to adjudicate an injury claim, would assist targeting
strategies. The knowledge, skills and ability of the inspection resource needs to be refined to
match the performance based regulatory focus. This should be followed with an evaluation of
the existing resource base and means developed to upgrade and replace as necessary.
Remuneration levels should also be evaluated, so as to attract and maintain appropriately
skilled staff.
HSD's management structure has many layers and as such is seen to be very top heavy.
The plethora of coordinating units sets up an internal competition for resources, and will likely
result in blame shifting as aggressively planned objectives are not achieved. The skills of
technical specialists, especially the hygienists and ergonomists, could be deployed more
effectively to achieve preventive measures. At the moment they are not empowered or
stimulated to aggressively utilise their skills to drive results-oriented approaches.
The significant investment in investigation with a view to prosecution is not supported
by any of the stakeholders. This is primarily due to the belief that the deterrent effect of the
existing strategy is minimal. This does not mean that the enforcement effort should be
abandoned. However, a new strategy is needed that does not focus solely on events that have
serious injury attached; rather one that has significantly greater fines for the occasions when
prosecution is attempted and supplemented by a process linked to the premium system. The
existing prosecution focus is reactive to an injury event as opposed to proactive/preventive
where a serious risk or imminent hazard is observed.
Some services provided by HSD could be as effectively carried out by the private sector
and some need further refinement. Legislative amendment may be required to achieve the
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desired result in some instances. The community suggested there were mechanisms that should
be either enhanced or established, included funding research into emerging occupational health
and safety issues and the development of a meaningful consultative mechanism. Both employer
and labour communities agree the previous tripartite mechanism was not working, however
they now feel isolated from participation with HSD.
HSD has many cutting edge-strategies, and for the most part, a highly educated and
skilled staff that knows its mandate and is dedicated to reducing workplace injury and disease.
All of this positions the Division, in partnership with employers and workers, to achieve order
of magnitude improvements to safety and health in Victoria.
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Table 8.1 Regulations under the Principal Health and Safety Acts
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
OHS (Asbestos) Regulations 1992
Provide for control of risks of asbestosrelated disease among workers working in
process which use asbestos and among
workers likely to be exposed to airborne
asbestos
OHS (Certification of Plant Users
Establish minimum standards of competency
and Operators) Regulations 1994
for people working with cranes, forklift
trucks, hoists and other mechanical
loadshifttng equipment, pressure equipment
and scaffolding, and implement a certifi
cation system to ensure that those standards
are observed, hi order to minimise the
incidence and severity of serious incidents
involving these types of plant________
OHS (General Safety) Regulations 1986 (to be Prescribe criteria for the notification of
replaced with the OHS [Incident Notification] accidents;
Prescribe criteria for the keeping of accident
Regulations 1997)
records;
Prescribe age prohibition for the
employment of young persons________
Prescribe a procedure for the effective
OHS (Issue Resolution) Regulations 1989
resolution at workplaces of health and safety
issues as they arise, where there is no
agreed process for resolution________
Provide measures to protect people at work
OHS (Lead Control) Regulations 1988
against risks to health or safety arising from
exposure to lead
_____
Provide measures to reduce the number and
severity of injuries resulting from manual
OHS (Manual Handling) Regulations 1988
handling tasks in workplaces;
Require employers to assess and control
risks arising from manual handling activities
in workplaces_________________
Provide measures to protect people at work
OHS (Noise) Regulations 1992
against risks to health or safety arising from
noise
___
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Provide measures to protect people at work
against risks to health or safety arising from
plant and systems of work associated with
plant___________________
Dangerous Goods Act 1985
Provide for safety in the manufacture,
DG (Explosives) Regulations 1988
transport, storage, sale, import and use of
explosives;
Provide for safety in the making of
explosives mixtures other than at a factory;
Provide for safety in the filling of safety
cartridges other than at a factory;
Provide for the safe location of ships
containing explosives while in port;
Prescribe matters for the purposes of the Act
DG (Liquefied Gases Transfer) Regulations Specify various matters relating to liquefied
gas containers and cylinders;
1987
Set requirements for maintenance,
alteration, and repair at liquefied gas storage
installations
DG (Storage and Handling) Regulations 1989 Provide measures to promote the health and
safety of people and the safety of property in
relation to the storage, handling, transfer,
use, manufacture and sale of dangerous
goods at premises;
Prescribe matters for the purposes of the
DGAct
Provide for the licencing of vehicles used to
transport dangerous goods hi bulk;
DG (Transport) Regulations) 1987
Provide for the registration of persons who
drive vehicles used to transport dangerous
goods in bulk;
Adopt the Transport Code;
Specify requirements that must be observed
to enhance safety in the transport of
dangerous goods_______________

OHS (Plant) Regulations 1995
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Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994
E(PS) (General) Regulations 1995
Declare certain equipment to be prescribed
equipment for the purposes of these
Regulations and the E(PS) Act
Provide for the health and safety of people
in relation to prescribed equipment
Source: VWA
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Table 8.2 Approved Codes of Practice under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
Code of Practice

Date of Operation

Tilt-Up Construction

1 October 1987

Foundries

30 June 1988

Workplaces

30 June 1988

Lead Control

1 July 1988

Temporary Electrical Installations on Building
and Construction Sites

1 August 1988

Manual Handling

1 February 1989

Safety Precautions in Trenching Operations

1 September 1988

Safe Work on Roofs (excluding villa
construction)

1 July 1989

Safe Use of Cranes in the Building and
Construction Industry

1 March 1990

Safety in Forest Operations

1 March 1990

Building and Construction Workplaces

1 October 1990

Demolition

1 October 1991

Manual Handling (Occupational Overuse
Syndrome)

1 January 1992

Provision of Occupational Health and Safety
Information in Languages other than English

1 October 1992

Noise

1 October 1992

First Aid in the Workplace

1 June 1995

Plant

1 July 1995

Source: VWA
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Table 8.3 Inspections, Notices, and Written Directions, 1990-1996
Year

Inspections

Improvement
Notices

Prohibition
Notices

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

44,834
48,146
48,429
78,913*
55,904
48,261
43,678

2,639
4,062
3,428
2,382
1,393
1,787
2,889

1,714
1,659
1,159
1,024
814
841
1,285

Written
Directions
(requirements)
73
2,099
3,655
7,092
4,008
6,286
7,288

* The high number of inspections in 1993 was related to a programme to identify unregistered boilers
and pressure vessels.
Source: VWA
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Table 8.4 Prosecutions with Average Fines Imposed

1990-91

1991-92

1992-93

1993-94

1994-95

1995-96

5rosecutions

<\verage fine

76

119

68

64

79

86

$6,449

$5,374

$7,509

$12,682

$8,918

$11,333

Source: VWA
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Figure 8.1
HEALTH AND SAFETY DIVISION, VICTORIAN WORKCOVER AUTHORITY
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Chapter 9 ATTENTION POINTS
As in other comparable studies of workers' compensation systems in North America,
we have taken the liberty to record in this chapter our summary observations about the
workers' compensation system of Victoria in the form of "attention points." These attention
points are identified as such because they represent special strengths of the system or because
they warrant, at least in our opinion, additional attention by those who seek to improve the
system.
We have depended very heavily on the available data, and on what people intimately
familiar with the VWA have told us. It would not be possible to perform such system reviews
without the wholehearted support of these people. Our reactions to what we have heard and the
judgments that result are, of course, solely our responsibility. We hope that the issues we
identify for attention here will resonate with decision makers in Victoria. However, we
purposely do not prescribe cures for problems identified; we believe this is the responsibility of
the stakeholders in the system. We simply offer what we hope is a well informed outside
perspective on the workers' compensation system hi Victoria.
It is also important to emphasize that we were unable to stay current with very recent
policy developments hi Victoria. It was necessary to keep our focus on the "official"
observation date of July 1996. While this means that some of our attention points may already
have been addressed with amending legislation, it was simply not possible for us to keep up
with the latest alterations in an environment as dynamic as that in Victoria.
For purposes of exposition, we have grouped our observations into the broad categories
of (1) general issues; (2) insurer regulation issues; (3) compensation issues; (4) rehabilitation
issues; and (5) prevention issues. Within each of these categories, our attention points are
numbered for convenient reference. However, the points are not presented in priority order.
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General (G)
We begin with a set of observations that relate to the general approach and the
accomplishments of the VWA over the period from late 1992 to the present.
G-l. Amazing Transformation
In just a few short years, the VWA has transformed a workers' compensation system
characterised by a "compo" philosophy, uncontrolled claims incidence, excessive durations of
disability, and runaway costs. The picture that emerges from our review is of a system that is
aiming to attain equilibrium and stability at a level of performance that would have been
unimaginable 5 years ago. Claims are down more than 50 percent, durations have been
significantly reduced, the incidence of long-term claims has been cut by nearly 40 percent, and
system costs are at the lowest level in Australia at 1.8 percent of payroll. The system is fully
funded (actually with a small surplus) compared to a 42 percent unfunded liability under the
last full year of WorkCare. The leadership of the VWA and the Ministry deserve much of the
credit for this turnaround. Their vision and consistency of purpose have been remarkable.
While the system has its critics, no one disagrees that this has been an amazing transformation.
G-2. Historical Opportunity
While much has been accomplished, this is not the time for the VWA to rest on its
laurels. After 5 years, it is apparent that the time is now ripe to rebalance the system and
carefully adjust the various facets so that they reinforce each other to accomplish both strategic
and tactical objectives. The merger of the former Health and Safety Organisation and the VWA
in 1996 creates a historical opportunity for a thorough and careful rethinking of system
parameters. Bringing the mission and operations of HSD into the VWA will prove challenging,
but if it can be done with the kind of creative thinking that has characterised the past 5 years, it
can move the entire organisation to new heights of achievement.
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G-3. Cultural Change through Media
We are not aware of any other workers' compensation system in the world that has used
media more aggressively or more effectively than has the VWA. Their fundamental faith in the
power of the media to effect a change in the "compo" culture that characterised Victoria's
workers' compensation system previously has paid off in a major way. From injured workers
and their employers to the doctors and other medical practitioners that treat them, the VWA
has changed the expectations that participants have about the system. The media strategy of the
VWA has been a leading element of this change. The merger with HSD creates the opportunity
to carry the media message into new areas. This promises additional returns in the fight to
prevent workplace injury and disease and to minimise its disabling consequences.
G-4. Stakeholder Input
Our interviews revealed that labour and management, as well as other stakeholders,
have perceived a problem over consultation with the VWA and policy makers. The complaint
has been that the "consultation" resembles a "briefing" on what the VWA or the government
has already decided to do. We believe the system in Victoria has matured sufficiently that
further improvements will depend upon participation and ownership by stakeholders. Thus, it
seems that it is time to move to a more open, consultative policy development process. This
does not mean that VWA management abdicates its decision making responsibility, but rather
that they recognise the legitimate self-interest of stakeholders and allow for the input of those
viewpoints before critically important decisions are made. While it may take a little longer,
this will lead to more durable decisions and sounder policy judgments in the long run.

Insurer Regulation (I)
There are a number of issues which emerged from our review of the insurer regulation
procedures at the VWA. It is difficult to forecast how future policy changes may impact the
role of the VWA, given the uncertainties about possible changes in regulatory policies and
mechanisms and further privatisation of the provision of insurance services. We have tried to
formulate attention points that address these uncertainties, as well as the eventual operational
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issues that will emerge from the political decisions about the relative roles of the insurers and
the VWA.
1-1. Improvements in Scheme Performance
The regulatory scheme appears to have been successful in managing the transition from
the limited insurer functions under WorkCare to the insurers' expanded role under
WorkCover. This has been a learning process for both regulators and insurers, and the success
of the WorkCover scheme is at least partly attributable to more sophisticated regulatory
mechanisms, as well as the development of insurers' capabilities. Improvements in reserve
analysis, pricing, and detailed scheme information are among the most notable
accomplishments of this system. The VWA has continued to refine its regulatory mechanisms
as problems are identified and insurers' capabilities have evolved. Because of these efforts, we
believe insurers will be in a better position to assume expanded functions and exercise greater
authority if measures are implemented to effect such changes.
At the same time, these improvements have not occurred without significant
government interference with insurers' activities and tension between regulators and authorised
insurers. Victoria may be approaching the limits of what can be achieved from the current
principle-agent framework. In looking towards the future, policy makers will need to assess the
potential further gains from this type of arrangement against those offered by alternative
models, including those that return greater responsibility and choice to the private sector.
1-2. Role and Expectations for Authorised Insurers
VWA staff expressed concerns that insurers are not being sufficiently proactive in
helping employers identify and address problems. VWA staff also are critical of insurers'
performance in managing long-term claims and returning these injured workers to productive
employment. Of course, VWA's view of the role of insurers and what their objectives should
be may be very different than insurers' views.
VWA documents, such as the licensing agreement, are intended to inform insurers as to
what they are expected to do, but these documents cannot be specific enough in this regard. It
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is not feasible for regulatory documents to prescribe every aspect of insurers' functions nor
address every contingency that may arise. There are likely to be expectations on the part of the
VWA that are not fully articulated in the documents.
A certain degree of ambiguity is inherent in a system where the government and
insurers share responsibility for providing workers' compensation insurance. However, this
ambiguity has been exacerbated by communication problems, political uncertainty about the
future role of insurers, and economic incentives that are sometimes inconsistent with the
expressed goals of the system.
Within the last 2 decades in Victoria, insurers' levels of responsibility and discretion
have varied considerably. Further, when WorkCover was implemented in 1992, it was
expected that the system would ultimately move to full privatisation. However, today it is
uncertain how far Victoria will go in increasing insurers' responsibilities. In fact, our
interviews suggest that insurers themselves have very different preferences and expectations
regarding "privatisation" which are affecting their current behaviour. This uncertainty about
further changes to the system complicates insurers' planning efforts and may cause them to
defer investments that would improve their current efficiency and performance. It would be
very helpful if these uncertainties could be resolved and all insurers understood the shape of
the future hi Victoria's workers' compensation market.
1-3. Relations Between the VWA and Insurers
The VWA and insurers are partners in providing workers' compensation insurance, but
they do not always behave strictly like partners. The VWA acts towards insurers as both a
regulator and a partner, and insurers respond accordingly., The VWA obviously cannot
abrogate its regulatory role, but the way it performs this role may contribute to confusion on
the part of insurers.
Some insurers believe that they are unfairly treated by the VWA, and that VWA actions
towards them are unnecessarily heavy handed and arbitrary. Insurers generally believe that the
VWA is not sufficiently open with them and does not consider their views when addressing
mutual concerns and proposed remedies. On the other hand, many VWA staff believe that
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insurers have not demonstrated behaviour that would warrant easing regulatory pressure. Also
VWA staff do not acknowledge the communication problems that insurers experience. Clearly,
there is a certain lack of mutual trust and respect.
We believe the relationship between the VWA and insurers is more adversarial than
appropriate for their shared responsibilities. The development of institutional mechanics that
would facilitate better communication and joint problem resolution could improve VWAinsurer relations and contribute significantly to improved scheme performance. However, this
will have to wait until the privatisation issue is settled one way or the other, since this policy
decision will fundamentally determine the nature of the future relationships.
1-4. Economic Incentives
Structuring economic incentives to promote scheme goals is complicated by the sharing
of responsibilities between the VWA and insurers. One senior VWA executive asserts that they
have brought economic incentives to "an art form." The combination of experience rating and
competition among insurers for employers' business is intended to encourage insurers to
provide high-quality service, and to work with employers to contain costs.
However, service is only one parameter on which insurers compete and the use of
"kickbacks," in the form of special services or allowances, is alleged to be rampant in the
industry. This implies that some insurers find it more economical to acquire business through
in-kind price discounts (e.g., computer equipment) rather than through better service outcomes
(e.g., loss prevention and claims management services). The audit programme and best
practice incentives are intended to contribute to proper economic incentives but insurers
complain that these programmes are not structured properly and the best practice incentives are
insufficient to compensate for the deficiencies of the remuneration scheme.
Also, it is not clear that the incentives contained in VWA's pricing, remuneration, and
regulatory schemes encourage the return-to-work goal which the VWA espouses. The VWA is
contemplating new initiatives which may help to enhance proper economic incentives
generally, but the management of long-term claims and severely injured workers will continue
to be a problem without incentives specifically focused to address these objectives.
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1-5. Insurer Quality of Service and Performance
VWA statistics indicate significant variation among insurers in several important
service measures, including timeliness, case reserve accuracy, dispute rates, and medical panel
delays. Some of the variation might be explained by differences in insurers' risk and claim
portfolios, but sub-par performance by some insurers also could contribute to this variation.
Multivariate analysis of available data should help to untangle these influences.
These issues, combined with the VWA's concern about loss prevention and long-term
case management, require continued attention. New initiatives to improve economic incentives
and employer information, as well as the new audit programme, are likely to improve the
performance of below average insurers. If not, further measures will need to be considered.
However, we would urge the adoption of a continuous improvement model for all insurers, in
addition to the implicit bench marking and relatively crude financial incentives currently
underlying the regulatory regime.
If better service performance (considering an insurer's specific risk and claim portfolio)
can be adequately compensated, then insurers would have a greater incentive to pursue the
performance goals of the system. With this strategy, regulatory pressure can be more
effectively targeted, and the performance of the entire scheme can be improved.
1-6. Insurer Audits
The VWA's audit programme has been a major concern to insurers, and the VWA has
recognised the need for its improvement. Although some insurers are not fully satisfied with
the design of the new audit programme, it may be prudent: to defer judgment until its
performance can be evaluated. However, fully engaging insurers in a continuing collective
evaluation of the programme could help to ease their concerns and further support partnering
with VWA. One critical element which the VWA can influence in the implementation of the
new programme is the experience and training of the auditors, which has been a matter of
concern for insurers. Of course, the VWA and insurers need to be willing to pay to recruit and
retain better qualified auditors, and to commit to longer-term contracts which would support
additional capacity development by vendors of auditing services.
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1-7. Pricing and System Costs
The government has placed a high priority on maintaining a low overall workers'
compensation insurance rate, which is considered to be a critical benchmark of scheme
performance as well as an important policy objective. It is also a legislatively expressed system
objective that the scheme be fully funded. It is critical to the perceived fairness of the system
that scheme parameters are not manipulated to maintain the price objective if system costs
begin to rise. While the goal of maintaining a low premium rate is laudable, it needs to be
balanced against other scheme goals and the costs which may be externalised to employers,
workers, or others in the community.
We fear that the promotion of a low rate increases the pressure on the government to
sacrifice other objectives to maintain that rate. For example, the significant investments
required to return severely injured workers to employment may not be compatible with
minimising costs in the short run. However, they may represent the best long-term strategy for
minimising the social costs of work-related injury and illness and maximising injured workers'
continued participation in an active lifestyle. Also, efforts to keep rates low should not be
allowed to mask trends with respect to system costs or other emerging problems, which might
delay recognition and implementation of remedial measures. It would be beneficial to direct
public attention to other measures of scheme performance in addition to the premium rate.
1-8. Scheme Information
Insurers' ability to compete and provide high-quality service is heavily dependent on
their access to information. However, many insurers complain that VWA information systems
are not designed to allow them to easily extract and analyse data. Thus, insurers are forced to
expend considerable resources to extract information from the VWA database or even develop
their own systems. Smaller insurers are at a greater disadvantage than large insurers hi this
regard, which tends to increase market concentration and lessen competition. Strains on the
ACCtion system have also prompted the VWA to pressure insurers to decrease their usage. On
the whole, this tends to discourage the kind of analysis that insurers should be performing (and
presenting to employers) to enhance loss prevention and effective claims management. Further,
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insurers' ability to calculate accurate reserves, one of the VWA's concerns, is clearly affected
by their ability to access and analyse claims information.
If privatisation were to delegate greater responsibility to insurers for pricing, reserving,
and bearing risk, a summarised industry database might prove to be inadequate to meet
insurers' needs. Generally, insurers' data on their own claims experience is not sufficiently
credible for accurate pricing. This is recognised in "competitive rating" states in North
America that maintain a pooled database with access by all insurers. It is not clear to us that a
summarized database would provide sufficient detail to enable insurers to supplement their own
data to develop a proper rate structure, nor allow the VWA sufficient insight into insurer
performance to support their regulatory functions.
The opportunities for "database synergy" with HSD should also not be overlooked. The
potential contribution of analysing claims information jointly with occupational health and
safety information would seem to argue for retaining an establishment level database under
VWA control. Thus, we urge the VWA to carefully consider the strategic and tactical
implications of the regulatory database proposals.
1-9. Consumer Information
Good consumer information (i.e., to employers who purchase workers' compensation
insurance) is important hi promoting effective competition and efficient market performance.
Buyers need reliable, user-friendly information on the performance dimensions within which
insurers compete. Lack of access to this information in the past has probably contributed to the
inertia in employers' movement to better performing insurers. The VWA's plan to publicize
insurer performance data should help to address this deficiency and, thereby, enhance
competition and scheme performance.
Some insurers are understandably nervous about this development and the potential for
misleading performance indicators. However, the VWA should not shrink from this initiative
and efforts should be directed toward refining the accuracy of the information that is provided
to employers as experience is acquired, rather than suppressing this information. Good
consumer information will become even more important if insurers are encouraged to increase
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their competition through service differentiation. Using data to enable employers to evaluate
their own claims experience relative to industry averages, and to feed their potential interest in
cost reductions are other areas which the VWA may wish to evaluate if it wants to encourage
more effective use of these mechanisms.
I-10. Self-Insurance and Self-Administration
It is reasonable to consider ways to enhance employers' incentives to contain costs by
allowing them to bear greater risk and/or be more actively involved in managing their claims.
There are an array of options to consider: expanding access to individual self-insurance and
self-administration; extending group self-insurance; permitting retrospective rating; increasing
retention limits; or introducing large deductible policies. Enabling such options could help
medium and smaller employers as well by increasing insurer competition for their business.
There must be safeguards to ensure that only economically-viable employers are allowed to
self-insure and avoid unfunded obligations to the scheme. Other systems around the world have
developed self-insured security funds to prevent transferring any cost burden to the general
population of insured employers. This experience should be reviewed by the VWA before
offering significantly wider access to self-insurance.
Greater use of self-insurance will also inevitably result hi some "adverse selection"
(i.e., low-risk employers should find this option more attractive than high-risk employers).
This could increase the average premium rate for the scheme even though, if it improves cost
containment among self-insureds, it could lower overall social costs of occupational injury and
illness. The expansion of self-insurance will also exacerbate the "missing data" problem. Selfinsured employer's experiences should be part of the system database for analytical and
comparative purposes. In addition, as the VWA recognises, it will need to rnuiimise cross
subsidies to avoid unnecessary erosion of the pool of employers insured by the scheme. Thus,
expanding access to self-insurance will highlight any existing flaws in the premium pricing
system.
Group self-insurance will undoubtedly become more of an issue following the initial
extension of this concept to the municipal sector. Certain group self-insurance arrangements
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can offer legitimate economic efficiencies. However, this is a philosophical issue for the VWA
and policy makers to resolve, because it raises numerous regulatory issues as well. The VWA
would benefit by informing itself regarding other jurisdictions' experience with group selfinsurance before venturing into these relatively uncharted waters.
1-11. Coordination of Federal and State Regulatory Responsibilities
Victoria's authorised insurers appear to fall into a gray area with respect to financial
regulation. The VWA relies on the federal regulator's oversight of the solvency of authorised
insurers. However, the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC) gives diminished
attention to these insurers because they are formed solely to service WorkCover policies and
cede all of their risk to the VWA. This is not a problem under the current framework, since
these insurers do not bear any underwriting risk and generally have parent companies that
could infuse capital, if necessary, to keep their subsidiaries solvent. However, if changes are
made that would permit authorised insurers to bear more risk, the VWA and the ISC would
need to reconcile their respective oversight functions to ensure that solvency issues would not
slip between jurisdictions and place the VWA or policy holders at risk.
1-12. Other Issues With Respect to Privatisation
The prospects for privatisation initiatives are uncertain, but the VWA will likely
implement several measures to improve economic incentives and increase insurers'
responsibilities even if full privatisation is not achieved. Uncertainty about the future may be
the most significant challenge facing insurers. Resolving this issue and developing a shared
vision of the future structure of the scheme among all the stakeholders would facilitate better
planning, investment, and other changes necessary to achieve scheme goals.
If there is a move to transfer greater risk and responsibility to insurers, then a host of
questions will arise as to the appropriate regulatory structure, as well as the transition strategy
to support this move. Entry barriers, market concentration, price regulation, information
needs, and solvency concerns would become much more significant issues under a privatised
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scheme. Developing an appropriate balance between regulation and private choice would be
critical to the success of such an effort.
Compensation Issues (C)
We take the basic structure of compensation as a "given"; that is, we assume that the
political leaders in Victoria have structured the benefits to accord with current Australian
realities. Of course, a careful study of the equity of the benefit structure has not yet been
undertaken. However, there are still a multitude of issues which arise, and we have a number
of observations in the area of compensation.
C-l. WorkCover Goals Have Been Met
Many workers' compensation schemes are vague about the goals of their public agency.
Certainly, the same cannot be said about the Victorian WorkCover Authority and its architects.
The legislation that created this new scheme sought to remedy certain perceived problems.
Among the objectives were to reduce the number of claims for compensation, to reduce the
average period of time for which a worker would collect weekly benefits and especially to pare
back the number of long-term beneficiaries. The WorkCover system has accomplished each of
these goals.
Many compensation agencies worldwide have sought to restrain various excesses that
resulted in the growth of costs in their programmes. Some have not succeeded in doing so at
all, and some have done so only by making their laws overly harsh. Critics of the government
and/or the Authority argue that their goals were accomplished at the expense of injured
workers. That controversy certainly cannot be resolved here. However, we did not find that
the Authority or the underlying law sought to accomplish system goals by disregarding or
trammelling the needs of injured workers.
C-2. The Erosion of the "Serious Injury" Threshold
The concept of "serious injury" was a central feature in two main areas of the
WorkCover reform legislation. First, it was introduced as an additional benefit category,
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alongside "total incapacity" and "partial incapacity" with respect to statutory benefits. Second,
it served as a screening device to limit access to the common law remedy to those instances
where a work injury or illness had left the worker with a level of impairment equal to at least
30 percent, as measured by the AMA Guides, 2nd edition. However, parallel to the Transport
Accident Act, a narrative threshold of serious injury was also permitted, so that the 30 percent
threshold was not an absolute precondition to access the common law remedy.
In fact, a number of gaps have emerged that substantially open up access to the courts,
One source of this has been the ability of claimants to achieve or surpass the 30-percent
threshold through the aoverlay" of a psychiatric impairment on a physiological one. Clearly,
psychiatric conditions and the associated impairment ratings tend to be more subjective than
those for physical injuries. 1
A second source of widening access to actions at law has been interpretation by the
courts. A critical decision, Petkovski v. Galetti. essentially would permit damages to be sought
where a claimant has suffered a "serious consequence" of an injury, without regard to the 30percent threshold. Similar issues have arisen under the Transport Accident Act, and the law is
not yet settled here. This potential expansion of the concept of serious injury is a considerable
threat to the current cost levels of the system. Leaving this decision in the hands of the court
system also may not be the most effective way of dealing with the social equity and efficiency
issues involved.
C-3. Consistency and Comprehensiveness of the Table of Maims
In several respects, some attention to the Table of Maims may be warranted. At least
three anomalies in the table are apparent. First, the basis for rating most maims are different
from those applicable to the back, neck, and pelvis. Thus, the very formula for setting a rating
is substantially different for these different classes of injury. (It should be noted that Victoria is
hardly unique in this regard.) A consistent approach has the virtue, at least, of being

! We offer no judgment on the adequacy or equity of the December 1996 amendments seeking to end this
practice.
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understandable to persons with little familiarity with workers' compensation benefits, e.g., an
injured worker.
A second difference occurs because uniform standards have been imposed in the rating
of impairments of the back, neck, and pelvis through the requirement that the AMA Guides be
utilised. No such uniformity is imposed where a worker suffers, for example, the partial loss
of use of an arm. Third, the Table of Maims does not include impairments to most internal
organs. For example, respiratory impairments are not found in the Table and, therefore,
benefits for permanent impairment are less likely to be provided. Combined with an update to
a later edition of the AMA Guides, it would be appropriate to reexamine the equity aspects of
the current benefit structure for maims.
C-4. Terminating Weekly Benefits
The process of terminating weekly benefits is frequently problematic for a workers'
compensation agency. If it is simple for an insurer to unilaterally terminate benefits, it can do
serious harm to an injured worker, and places the worker in a very vulnerable position relative
to the insurer. By contrast, if terminating benefits is a slow and contentious process for the
insurer, it can increase system costs and induce some workers to delay their return to work.
Both are common in North American workers' compensation systems.
A key to finding a fair balance is to assure both sides that the system can respond
promptly. Thus far, it appears that the Conciliation Service has managed to arrange and
conduct conferences very promptly, thereby minimising the difficulties that either side might
have to endure from the termination process. The significance of maintaining this access
should not be minimised. Most jurisdictions cannot approach the Conciliation Service's record
of scheduling and conducting its conferences. While not all disputes are actually resolved, the
contribution made to dispute resolution overall is very valuable.
C-5. The Injured Workers' Wage Level May Need Consideration
Weekly benefits under workers' compensation programmes aim to replace a large
proportion of the lost earnings of an injured employee. The weekly benefit is based on the
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employee's pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). A feature of Victoria's law is that
the calculation of the PIAWE takes no account of an employee's pay for overtime, shift
differential, hazard duty allowance or dirt money. For some workers that are accustomed to
earning such payments, their true wage replacement rate when they are injured is lower than
that of a fellow employee who does not regularly receive such earnings.
This situation is mitigated, however, by the existence of industrial awards in many
occupations and industries which provide for the operation of "make-up" pay to the actual preinjury level inclusive of allowances. However, these provisions (particularly in relation to their
duration) vary considerably between industries, and they do not operate at all in some sectors
of the economy. In addition, with the deregulation of the labour market, many awards are
being superseded by enterprise bargained agreements. Consequently, it is impossible to tell
how significant this issue may be. However, it seems difficult to justify this disparate
treatment, even though it might lead to some administrative savings through simplifying the
weekly benefit determination process.
C-6. Payments for Maims Have Been Growing
Though many elements of the WorkCover system have been successful and have curbed
the growth in costs of workers' compensation, there are certain areas that warrant scrutiny.
Payments for maims have been growing under the new system. A variety of explanations can
be given for this. The effort to limit lump sum payments may be the major driver behind this
development. The role of solicitors is obviously important here as well. The maim benefit,
including any benefit for pain and suffering (Section 98A), is flexible enough to be used as the
basis for resolving other disputes between the parties. The pain and suffering benefit is
especially subjective in character. Further, a larger maim benefit can be used to reduce the
incentive to seek common law damages, subject to the potential offset of the lump sum.
The WorkCover law has been able to limit the availability of lump sum payments.
However, it has not been able entirely to eliminate lump sum settlements. Other jurisdictions
have found that where the practice of lump sum settlements has existed, it becomes a familiar
and convenient tool for the parties to use, and is extremely difficult to eradicate. Clearly these
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issues need to be reexamined in the current, successful workers' compensation environment.
C-7. Problems in the Setting of Reasonable Medical and Like Fees
A variety of issues exist in the setting of reasonable fees for medical and like services.
While some providers believe that the fee schedule that applies to them is too low, the VWA
believes that fees have been overly generous in recent years. The Authority also contends that
complaints by health care providers about delays in making payments are overblown and no
longer justified. Negotiations over fee schedules have been contentious. The process of
rationalizing and negotiating these fees needs examination.
Managed care has not yet arrived in Victoria, but its spread elsewhere has raised the
interest of those seeking to curb health care cost growth in workers' compensation.2 All told,
the current period appears to be one of transition; that is, where important system changes are
imminent, but their exact configuration is not clear. All parties will benefit if these changes
were to materialize as part of a carefully considered package of change, with extensive public
consultation, rather than emerging on a piecemeal basis.
C-8. The Medical Panels Have Been Overburdened
The medical panel scheme has been well designed and could be a highly useful source
of dispute management. However, the extraordinary bulge in the workload of panels because
of their use in maims disputes has exacted a price. Delays and backlogs have resulted, both in
arriving at determinations by panels and in resolving disputes. It remains to be seen how these
maims disputes will be resolved in the future, with or without the use of medical panels. What
seems clear at this point is that the panels, as now constructed, cannot be counted on to deliver
decisions in thousands of disputes yearly. That level of need inevitably raises questions about
the costs and the quality of decisions, and the impact that delays have on other programme
elements. It would seem more appropriate to confine the Medical Panels to areas where their
expertise could really make a difference.
2The December 1996 reforms include authorisation of a managed care scheme by the VWA.
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Rehabilitation Issues (R)
Occupational rehabilitation in Victoria has a narrower arid more constrained focus than
in some other jurisdictions. This results in large part from the perceived excesses under the
WorkCare regime from 1985-92. Accepting this reality, we find there are also a number of
issues in the occupational rehabilitation area that need scrutiny.
R-l. Focus on Return to Work
Since WorkCover took over responsibility from WorkCare, some of the greatest
changes to the scheme have occurred within the rehabilitation area. The VWA's success in
changing expectations of both workers and employers towards early return to work is
remarkable. As well, physicians and occupational rehabilitation providers now appreciate the
importance of a timely return to work. The VWA has been remarkably effective in getting this
key message across in its policies, its media campaigns, and in its dealings with stakeholders.
They have achieved a return-to-work focus second to none.
R-2. Rehabilitation as an Employer Responsibility
More than any other factor, the commitment between the employer and the worker will
determine the success of rehabilitation. Employers in Victoria generally accept that they are
responsible for returning workers to their employment. Many medium- and large-sized
employers have very effective early intervention, case management, and return to work
programmes. Insurers, large and small, are developing rehabilitation expertise to advise and
consult on rehabilitation matters. In many ways, the policies of the VWA have operationalised
the ideals of the disability management movement.
The effectiveness of such policies, however, are constrained hi certain circumstances.
Small enterprises, hi particular, have struggled with rehabilitation issues and mandatory
reinstatement laws. The size of an enterprise will inherently limit its flexibility to accommodate
workers with disabilities. The relative infrequency of injury and disease for smaller employers
(simply because of their size) also limits the opportunity of smaller enterprises to become
familiar with occupational rehabilitation concepts and their use hi coordinating an effective and
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in Victoria. The measurement of expenditures, when reduced to some form of contact hours
between client and occupational rehabilitation provider, also reflects lower than expected
levels.
In addition, there is little in the way of analysis of the factors that might signal an
earlier intervention. For example, the fact that a worker has had several previous back claims
may be an important factor in determining the type of rehabilitation intervention necessary. Yet
there is no formal mechanism to flag such a case for early intervention, nor to bring forward
information regarding medical or rehabilitation interventions on previous cases that might be
indicative of either successful approaches or blind alleys.
The record of the VWA in funding research on rehabilitation demonstrates a long-term
commitment to improving measurement and outcomes. The VWA is uniquely placed to
provide a rich source of data that can contribute to both prevention and rehabilitation goals.
The design and integrity of the database and data-capture systems are critical investments that
can assist in answering fundamental questions for Victoria.
R-7. Rehabilitation Provider Issues
The VWA plays a pivotal role in the rehabilitation professions in Victoria. The
standards it sets for services will have an impact on the community at large. The existing
dedicated internal rehabilitation administrative staff, the advisory and peer review committees,
and the meetings with provider groups could form the institutional structure for a continuous
improvement model. The VWA has a vested interest hi fostering the professional development
of the medical and rehabilitation community.
The hybrid public-private system that exists in Victoria poses particular policy and
monitoring problems in medical and occupational rehabilitation. While occupational medicine
has recently gained acceptance as a medical specialty, the expertise of occupational medicine
and occupational providers is still treated more like a commodity than a professional service.
The practice of service-provider substitution (where the referral of a physician to a particular
treatment programme or occupational rehabilitation provider is diverted to another provider by
the insurer) was widely reported. It is not documented that this practice has been detrimental to
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any individual worker, but the practice is an affront to professional values. The vertical
integration of some insurance carriers with wholly-owned rehabilitation subsidiaries and the
ownership of rehabilitation facilities by medical practitioners may exacerbate the problem. This
raises an important policy question for the VWA; what guidelines or restrictions, if any,
should exist for the referral of VWA cases to enterprises or facilities where the referral agent
has a pecuniary interest in the referral?

Prevention (P)
The mandate of the VWA to prevent workplace injury and disease and in some cases
provide for the safety of the general public is a daunting one, even if the resources to deliver
such services were fully sufficient. Many of these attention points are targeted towards
improving the utilisation of Health and Safety Division (HSD) resources, dealing particularly
with the efficiency and effectiveness of providing field services. The logic is that the
organisation must be able to demonstrate maximum effect from the existing resource and
strategies before it can be determined whether the resource level is appropriate.
P-l. Potential Synergies
We commend the HSD on its programmes, several of which represent cutting-edge
strategies hi this field. The management of the division is visionary, energetic, highly
educated, and experienced in occupational safety and health (OSH) matters, and firmly
committed to the challenge of reducing workplace injury and disease in Victoria. The merger
of HSD with VWA provides a historical opportunity for the division to develop new synergies
within the organisation and leverage the resource potential. As experienced OSH professionals,
the division management exhibit a strong belief that the workplace sources of personal pain and
suffering experienced by workers are preventable.
VWA is to be further commended on its investment in extremely aggressive and
successful outreach programmes based on sound research; highlighted by initiatives such as the
"Operation Safety" pilot in the Ballarat Region, the TruckSafe programme, the dissemination
of best practices and practical solutions through the SHARE programme and the SafePlant
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training package. Both employers and labour expressed support of these initiatives and
provided suggestions for future efforts.
P-2. Management Structure
The Divisional management count is over 40, or about 10 percent of the total staff.
Within the sub-sections and area offices there also exist further management levels with titles
of manager, assistant manager, supervisor, senior consultant, technical consultant, and team
leader; although it is true that many of these maintain an active field role. Any future
reorganisation should seek to reduce the number of managers and re-deploy resources at the
field inspection or service delivery level.
P-3. Human Resource Skill Adjustments
The adjustment of the Division's human resources to the 1985 change from a standards
enforcement approach to a performance-based approach is not yet complete. We heard this
story from employers, from inspectors and their managers, and from informed outsiders. The
division needs to evaluate whether each individual inspector's skills match a performancebased regulatory approach that promotes the use of best practices and a systems approach to
managing safety. Retraining or replacement may be necessary to effect a change in service
delivery that matches the requirements of the legislation. There is far more tertiary-level
education available in health and safety matters than there was a decade ago in Victoria, so
HSD has the potential to retrofit the human resource skills needed. However, compensation
levels may need to be re-evaluated in light of the specific skill sets required.
P-4. Resource Allocation
The Division might benefit from reevaluating the need for the significant resources
invested in the development of the various procedure manuals. The volume and detail of these
appear excessive and incompatible with a performance-based regulatory approach. This may
also be true of the time reporting system used by inspectors. When field resources are spread
so thinly, any such allocation of valuable inspector time seems wasteful.
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P-5. Community Collaboration
The Development Taskforce has an opportunity to drive significant and durable
improvement in the prevention of injury and disease in both the workplace and communities.
Serious consideration should be given to continuing this effort, with a rigorous impact
evaluation plan set for a date certain. Consideration might also be given to assist with
provision of basic OHS information, training, auditing, and inspection services by external
organisations. Victoria is developing a wealth of private and public resources that can be
enlisted to help with the prevention mission on a cost-effective basis.
VWA and HSD also might build more collaborative relationships with the State
Coroner's Office which possesses a wealth of information on occupational disease and injury
causality that may help drive the development of targeted interventions and research efforts.
P-6. Service Quality Assurance
Service quality needs to be monitored regularly through surveys of employer and
worker communities. It is particularly important in a regulatory environment that customers
feel free to give their unfettered opinion. Thus, a random, anonymous survey conducted by an
independent entity is the most reliable way of gathering information on service quality.
P-7. Specialist Skill Deployment
Given the proliferation of new chemicals introduced into the workplace each year and
the unknown long-term effects of exposures to combinations of them, the HSD requires an
active worksite presence of trained industrial hygienists. HSD should consider the field
deployment of hygienists as inspectors, and as vacancies arise in the field increase the number
of hygienists.
Manual handling injuries represent more than 50 percent of work related injuries in
most countries. This staggering number suggests a far greater proactive role for ergonomic
expertise to assist at the workplace in identification and assessment of hazards. HSD should
consider ways to enhance and deploy these resources as well, so that they can be more
effective in delivery of monitoring and assessment services in the field.
9-23

P-8. Inspector Support
Each inspector needs a dedicated vehicle. This would maximise field inspection time
and promote prompt, quality service to workplaces. The ability to begin their workday from
home and return directly home at the end of the day, as well as being field active for 9 of 10
working days (rather than 6 of 10 at present), could provide a 64 percent increase in field
active tune over current practice (add 1 hour per day =14 percent, move from 6 to 9 days in
every 10 = 50 percent). This is equivalent to adding 109 inspectors to the current stated
complement of 170.
An added bonus will be the ability of inspectors to carry brochures, pamphlets, posters,
and other information they now advise employers to obtain by calling the information officers.
At present, it is unlikely that the employer remembers what to ask for if they find the time to
call, and on receipt of the information they are less likely to find and fully understand the
relevant sections that simply could be highlighted by the inspector while he or she has the
employer's attention.
Each inspector might also be provided with a laptop computer and portable printer.
Appropriate software could be developed to provide for data entry right at the worksite to
produce professional-looking, readable, and consistently-worded documents. Added benefits
would include the ability to upload information to HSD's database, as well as refer to
standards, regulations, policies, and procedures on disk or via telecommunication. When
combined with a dedicated vehicle and cellular phone, the inspector essentially has a fully
mobile office. Some jurisdictions in North America have successfully utilised this concept to
make the inspector contact with workplaces more effective and to significantly extend the
inspector resource hi the field.
P-9. Other Resource Allocation Issues
A significant effort is involved with the monitoring and inspection requirements of the
prescriptive Dangerous Goods Regulations. The national uniformity process seems stalled hi
delivering a new model, although far enough along that the outcome may be approximated.
VWA may want to consider moving ahead with policy revisions to achieve performance-based
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regulation on its own, with a view to regularise with the national model when it becomes
available.
VWA should also review the significant resource deployed in prosecutions, particularly
in light of the generally held view that the deterrent effect is minimal. For example,
prosecutions might be scaled back to cover only wilful and blatant violations where workers
are injured or killed. A swifter and financially more punitive approach likely could be
developed in the form of an administrative penalty system.
P-10. Information Sources
A toll free OHS information call centre could be developed which would provide timely
advice and answers to questions from the public. A few well-trained staff with access to
computer information sources such as chemical safety data sheets, regulations, codes of
practice, standards, etc., should be able to handle up to 80 percent of the calls. Those requiring
special expertise or a field inspector could be routed to the appropriate person, perhaps via
electronic mail. In addition to supporting the performance-based regulatory approach, such a
facility creates good public relations for the agency when it is done effectively.
The division could also develop a series of industry specific, user-friendly guides to the
regulations and codes that are written hi plain language arid offer practical solutions. These
should be targeted to small business. For example, a guide to health and safety for an office
employer or a small retail or wholesale trade employer would sift out the key hazard
prevention sections from the stack of regulatory documents and provide practical examples of
how to deliver a safe and healthy workplace.
Conclusion
The VWA with its new responsibilities for occupational safety and health has
outstanding potential to exploit the synergies between prevention, compensation, and
rehabilitation. Further, the well-established VWA communication resource has the
demonstrated capability to bring this vital message to the general public. The start that has
been made in funding applied research also will generate new understanding of the integrated
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mission of the VWA. As champion of both prevention and rehabilitation, the VWA now
directs the two programmes with the largest potential to leverage financial and human cost
savings in workers' disability. We look forward to seeing how the VWA responds to this
challenge over the next several years.
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Appendix

Table A-l VWA Statistics, 1985-1996
_____________________1985-1986

1986-1987

1987-1988

1988-1989

1989-1990

1990-1991

1991-1992

1992-1993

1993-1994

1994-1995

1995-1996

Average Employment ('000 persons) 1

1,856

1,903

1,934

2,023

2,139

2,018

1,953

1,945

1,966

2,019

2,079

Unemployment Rate 1

6.4%

6.3%

9.6%

4.9%

4.9%

8.9%

11.0%

11.9%

11.5%

9.4%

8.4%

Total Wages excluding
Commonwealth 1

N/A

39,042

N/A

N/A

Consumer Price Index1

4.3%

1.9%

2.5%

5.1%

$

28,717

$

9.8%

32,727

$

7.1%

36,395

$

7.6%

40,256

$

7.8%

40,460

$

6.9%

39,197

$

1.5%

40,070

$

0.3%

Average Weekly Earnings'

$

374.80

$

394.20

$

414.90

$

442.20

$

476.20

$

485.90

$

504.40

$

519.80

$

534.50

$

558.50

$

557.00

Statutory Maximum Weekly Benefits2

$

400.00

$

430.00

$

457.00

$

481.00

$

506.00

$

550.00

$

575.00

$

603.00

$

603.00

$

621.00

$

650.00

Average Weekly Benefits'

$

257.00

$

270.00

$

287.00

$

297.00

$

305.00

$

311.00

$

318.00

$

318.00

$

326.00

$

354.00

$

374.00

Claimants in receipt of weekly benefits
during year
Statutory Maximum Table of Maim
Payment2
> Average Table Payment3

31,244

80,778

88,784

93,823

88,388

81,836

71,817

61,773

38,703

35,767

33,524

$61,750.00

$66,440.00

$70,620.00

$74,260.00

$78,100.00

$84,840.00

$88,750.00

$93,080.00

$93,080.00

$95,810.00

$100,300.00

$ 6,089.00

$ 4,626.00

$ 5,856.00

$ 7,128.00

$ 7,268.00

$ 7,857.00

$ 8,523.00

$ 7,324.00

$ 7,110.00

$10,774.00

$ 15,467.00

56

1,119

2,724

3,474

4,779

6,012

7,169

10,924

11,004

8,391

7,540

"* Claimants in receipt of Table of Maims
payment
Statutory Maximum WorkCover
Common Law-Pecuniary Loss2-4

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

$671,760.00

$671,960.00

$691,650.00

$724,070.00

Statutory Maximum Common LawNon-Pecuniary Loss2

N/A

N/A

$140,000.00

$147,210.00

$154,810.00

$168,390.00

$176,150.00

$298,640.00

$298,640.00

$311,770.00

$326,380.00

Average Common Law SettlementTotal Loss3

N/A

$7,796.00

$11,706.00

$13,738.00

$14,913.00

$15,935.00

$22,216.00

$22,832.00

$21,216.00

$26,484.00

$47,751.00

Number of Common Law SettlementsTotal Loss

N/A

46

295

714

1,770

3,471

4,941

10,529

5,270

4,444

1,720

$100,000.00

$108,640.00

$113,640.00

$119,180.00

$122,670.00

$128,420.00

$131,190.00

Statutory Maximum Settlement for
Death2
Average Settlement for Death3
Number of Settlements for Death

$62,079
10

$55,374.00

$47,506.00

$52,204.00

$57,859.00

$62,366.00

$72,417.00

$73,006.00

$87,755.00

$97,509.00

$93,669.00

97

147

248

246

222

227

144

90

72

95

'Source - Australian Bureau of Statistics - Employment Surveys
2Maximum payment available as compensation for heads of damages as specified and indexed annually in the Accident Compensation Act
3Total payments for head of compensation divided by number of claimants in receipt of compensation during whole or part of period
'Pecuniary loss entitlement existed only after 1/12/92

1985-1986

1986-1987

1987-1988

1988-1989

1989-1990

1990-1991

1991-1992

1992-1993

1993-1994

1994-1995

1995-1996

Claims Reported (all claims lodged in
period)

59,112

90,260

84,481

84,887

77,664

74,253

68,302

56,381

40,841

35,317

33,291

Weekly Benefit Claims (Claims lodged
in period that have received weekly
benefits)

49,384

68,111

59,191

62,036

56,497

51,983

45,510

31,947

16,547

16,549

14,305

Medical Only Claims

4,105

10,055

16,871

14,448

14,265

15,966

16,893

19,557

19,546

12,504

-

Hearing Loss Claims

1,287

2,788

1,887

2,210

2,162

3,304

5,048

8,628

10,094

3,251

2,807

14,887

25,135

24,013

24,223

22,314

17,081

12,818

8,244

2,547

2,336

1,973

134

248

288

334

293

239

249

183

134

120

127

Standard Claims Reported

43,981

64,768

60,229

60,437

55,103

56,917

55,247

47,966

38,334

32,981

31,318

Claims Incurred (latest estimate by
Actuaries 31 December 1996)

75,715

94,452

89,609

86,628

78,849

73,340

66,411

51,145

35,706

34,098

34,971

Claims

Journey Claims and Claims<10 days
Fatal Claims

1

NJ

Claims Payments (SM) made in
period
$

245.6

$

349.2

$

427.3

!B

416.5

$

417.0

$

423.4

$

377.9

$

229.6

$

226.5

$

258.4

$

0.4

$

3.5

$

9.8

!B

26.3

$

55.2

$

109.7

$

240.3

$

111.8

$

117.7

$

100.1

0.3

$

5.2

$

15.9

$

24.7

!B

34.7

$

47.2

$

61.1

$

80.0

$

78.2

$

89.0

$

104.0

$

0.6

$

5.3

$

7.0

$

12.9

:B

14.2

$

13.8

$

16.4

$

10.5

$

7.9

$

7.0

$

8.9

Medical and Like

$

10.0

$

57.9

$

103.4

$

140.1

:$

145.5

$

159.7

$

171.3

$

172.9

$

128.8

$

118.0

$

131.2

Legal Costs

$

0.1

$

2.9

$

15.4

$

42.8

!B

63.9

$

89.7

$

104.8

$

114.7

$

85.6

$

90.0

$

74.9

Other Payments

$

3.0

$

15.3

$

30.4

$

51.7

:S

58.0

$

75.8

$

109.6

$

76.1

$

36.8

$

33.6

$

35.8

Total Claim Payments

$

62.1

$

332.6

$

524.8

$

709.3

!S

759.1

$

858.4

$

996.3

$

1,072.4

$

678.7

$

681.8

$

713.3

Weekly Benefits

$

Common Law

$

Permanent Impairment (Table of
Maims)

$

Death

WorkCover Administration Costs
(SM)

48.1

15.1

17.5

35.0

55.4

60.3

63.8

55.2

70.4

73.0

67.1

73.7

Total Scheme Administration Costs
(SM) Include Agent & Authorised
insurer fees, certified payments & selfinsurer settlements

Total Payments

$

53.5

$

80.6

$

104.2

$

151.4

$

182.3

$

187.3

$

184.8

$

197.4

$

171.4

$

172.5

$

173.9

$

115.6

$

413.2

$

629.0

$

860.7

$

941.4

$

1,045.7

$

1,181.1

$

1,269.8

$

850.1

$

854.3

$

887.2

304

136

104

Permanent Commission Staff (includ
ing maternity, leave without pay)
WorkCare Compensation Services Staff
Total Staff

Number of Registered Employers

$

353

68

213

208

112

559

290

270

274

371

622

656

465

559

290

270

274

102,912

102,070

114,270

133,729

140,243

142,044

140,056

155,716

169,032

174,854

183,560

20,831

27,050

$

30,879

$

$

37,598

$

37,960

39,637

$

$

42,759

$

45,027
1.98%

2.25%

2.50%

3.00%

3.00%

3.30%

3.30%

3.30%

37,942

$

1,171

$

1,261

$

1,129

$

$1,128

$

839

$

889

CJ>

OOT
OOJ

734.6

$732.0

$

761.2

$

1,126.3

$

1,607.0

$

1,918.3

$

1,990.6

$

2,247.6

$

2,683.9

$

3,027.6

34.0%

-11.2%

Fund (Total Assets) ($M)

$

381.9

$

$

$

215.4

$

286.6

2,340.0

$ 2,340.0

$

2,520.0

$

2,901.0

$

1,466.1

$

114.7

$

353.3

$

(17.0)

$

1,858.3

$ 1,971.1

$

2,582.3

$

2,931.4

82.4%

87.5%

79.9

$

142.6

$

187.4

$

218.4

2,720.0

$ 4,865.0

$

3,532.0

$

3,347.0

$

3,680.0

$

$

(429.3)

$ (2,157.3)

$

1,706.7

$

656.7

$

(42.8)

$

694.9

682.5

$

1,056.2

$

1,528.0

$

1,721.2

13.2

$

145.4

$

(75.8)

Gross Outstanding Liabilities ($M)

$

534.7

$

2,300.0

$

Outcome for Year (Net profit/loss)($M)

$ (181.8)

$ (1,430.3)

Funding Position (Net assets)

$

704.2
30.6%

96.6

$

$

25.6%

$

$

14.0%

29.9%

45.7%

48.0%

10.17%

9.5%

5.38%

13.1%

12.5%

12.1%

11.6%

9.5%
56.1

Net Investment Income ($M)

69.0%

$

795

587

$

38,070

$

$

369.2

$

706

457

27.0%

34,830

$

2.40%

2.40%

$

Funding Ratio (WorkCover Fund)

448

304

Premium/Levy income ($M)

Rate of Return on Assets

409

136

2.40%

Average Premium Rate

303

104

1
u>
Assessable Payroll ($M)

1995-1996

1994-1995

1993-1994

1992-1993

1991-1992

1990-1991

1989-1990

1988-1989

1987-1988

1986-1987

1985-1986

$

102.9%

101.9%

Table A-2
Victorian WorkCover Authority

Andrew Lindberg, Chief Executive
Jane Barnett, Provider Liaison Officer, Insurance Branch
Alien Beacom, Industry Manager, Building and Construction Branch
Stephen Bourke, Manager, Personnel and Industrial Relations
Doug Campbell, Acting Manager, Health and Rehabilitation Branch
Sue Chambers, Actuarial and Statistical Services, Scheme Development
Brian Cook, Director, Scheme Development
Steve Cummins, Manager, Self-Insurance Regulation
Richard Fuller, Executive Officer
John Gillespie, Manager, Legislation Scheme Development Division
Ursula Hauser, Bus mess Analysis, Scheme Development
David Hopkins, Telephone Operator
Lorraine Johnson, Director, Information Services
Joe Maher, Corporate Planning, Scheme Development
Sue Masters, Manager, Provider Services
Eileen McMahon, Director, Corporate Affairs
Gerard Moylan, Manager, Regulation, Monitoring and Planning, Scheme Development
Tom Mullins, Manager, Actuarial and Statistical Services
Jay Peries, Acting Director, Finance and Corporate Services
Ray Perks, Medical Panels
Jane Renshaw, Manager, Serious Injury
Bronwyn Richardson, Manager, Research and Development
Marilla Rootsey, Manager, Occupational Rehabilitation, Health and Rehabilitation Branch
Marjorie Taylor, Manager, Training and Information
Teresa Testarotta, Health and Rehabilitation Branch
Peter Tibbits, Manager, Medical Panel
Paul Tipping, Senior Solicitor, WorkCover Authority
Greg Tweedly, Director, Scheme Regulation
Max Vickery, Acting Director, Scheme Development
Con Vidinopoulos, Manager, Insurance
Kerri Whitehead, Manager, Licence Management and Insurance Regulation
Dick Wright, Manager, Investigations and Compliance
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Health and Safety Division

Kaye Owen, Director
Halil Ahmet, Occupational Hygienist, Technology Division
Heather Baker-Goldsmith, Manager, Country West
Cliff Ball, Acting Manager, Mechanical Engineering Unit
Greg Bird, Inspector, Preston
Bryan Bottomley, Manager, Strategy
Rod Bray, Inspector, Metro West
Phil Court, Manager, Enforcement and Public Safety Unit
George Crick, Area Manager, Traralgon
Margaret Donnan, Manager, Operations East
Cath Duane, Manager, Legislation Policy and Implementation
David Ellis, Area Manager, Metro West
Mick Fallon, Manager, Information Services
Gerry Fitzpatrick, Senior Inspector, Preston
Clare Gallagher, Manager, Information Network Unit
Ken Gardner, Manager, Minerals with Energy
Jim Giddings, Administration Manager, Western Zone
Eric Glassford, Area Manager, Preston
Heather Hall, Inspector, Mulgrave
Derrick Harrison, Manager, Operations Central
John Hickey, Area Manager, Metro Central
Klaus Hoellfritsch, Area Manager, Mulgrave
Geoff Jones, Inspector, Brambles Tanker Division
Lou Kapeller, Manager, Licensing
Lance Kenningham, Ergonomist, Technology Division
Ros Kushinsky, Manager, Ergonomics Unit
Damien L'Huillier, Manager, Western Zone
Michael Little, Manager, Planning and Review
Graeme Maddiford, Inspector, Preston Office
Trevor Martin, Manager, Central Investigation Unit
Trevor McDevitt, Manager, Dangerous Goods Coordination Unit
Dennis Noonan, Inspector, Ballarat
Barbara Palmer, Manager, Systems Unit
Carry Radley, Manager, Standards Development and Coordination Unit
Peter Rankin, Manager, Management Systems Unit
Geoff Rivert, Inspector, Geelong
Glenn Sargent, Director, Technology Branch
Harold Scanlon, Manager, Work Environment Coordination Unit
Adrian Simonetta, Manager, Technology Unit
Irena Taylor, Assistant Manager, Licensing
Peter Vacouski, Information and Systems Management Group, Preston
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Sreeni Vasan, Mechanical Engineer, Technology Division
Peter Vitali, Chemist, Technology Division
Sue Ward-McGurty, Manager, Occupational Hygiene Unit
Neil Whitington, Manager, Development Taskforce
David Wong, Manager, Plant Coordination Unit
Colleen Young, Manager, Marketing
Insurers
Craig Bakker, Underwriting Manager, HIH
Bernie Bartels, Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Phil Bawden, Claims Manager, Workers' Compensation, MMI
Rodney Bond, Sales Manager, Workers' Compensation, MMI
Bruce Bowlby, General Manager, HIH
Trever Collette, Key Account Manager, GIO
Rayphe Collins, Manager, Risk and Rehabilitation, GIO
Peter Daly, Chief Executive, Insurance Council of Australia
Paul Eastman, Operations Officer, Mercantile Mutual
David Eggar, Chief Manager, QBE Workers' Compensation Ltd.
Barry Ellis, Managing Director, HIH
Donna Evans, Medical Case Coordinator, HIH
Linda Evans, Injury Management Team, FAI Workers' Compensation Victoria
Stephen Grant, General Manager, GIO
Ivan Handasyde, National Workers' Compensation Manager, NZI Insurance
Michael Heagerty, Operations Manager, GIO
Leonie Higginbotham, Rehabilitation Advisor, GIO
Hilary Kerrison, Client Services Manager, GIO
Paul Kitch, VACC
Greg Lackman, Marketing Manager, HIH
Barry Lindgren, Manager, Victorian WorkCover, MMI
Stephen Loomes, Acting Manager, Workers; Compensation, MMI
Victoria Martin, Manager, National Workers' Compensation, Catholic Church Insurances Ltd.
Glenda McCartney, Injury Management Team, FAI Workers' Compensation Victoria
Peter McDonald, GIO
John McGuinness, Marketing Development Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Gary McMullen, Claims Supervisor, HIH
Tony Newlands, General Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Shane O'Dea, Manager of Work Safety, VACC
Andrea Own, Technical Services Manager, GIO
Mike Papuga, Administration, Premium, Credit Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Steve Regester, Conciliation Manager, GIO
John Schultz, Rehabilitation Manager, NZI Insurance
Lorraine Stabey, Rehabilitation, NZI Insurance
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Cathy Thornee, Manager, Small Business Division, QBE
Dennis Trafford, National Manager, Workers' Compensation, Insurance Council of Australia
Alan Whitehead, Business Development Manager, VACC
Susan Wiegel, Senior Claims Officer, HIH
Bruce Willey, Manager, Key Clients Division, QBE
Susan Wischer, Manager, VACC
Employers and Representatives

Trevor Armstrong, Manager, Corporate Services, Manufacturing, Engineering, and
Construction Industry Association
Nan Austin, Safety Manager, University of Melbourne
Val Barry, Human Resources Officer, DuPont Fibres Bays water
Rosemary Bavaresco, Manager, WorkCover, Amcor, Ltd.
John Bridge, Manager, Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare, Phillip Morris Ltd.
Malcolm Brown, Manager, Health, Safety and Environment, Shell Australia
Vanessa Castle, Senior Consultant, Safety, Health and Environment, Victorian Employers'
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI)
Illona Charles, Safety Manager, Australia National Bank
Joanne Clancy, Group Manager, Qantus Airways Limited
Sandra Cowell, Australian Chamber of Manufactures
David Edwards, CEO, Victorian Employers Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI)
Sue Forsyth, Occupational Health and Safety Coordinator, Holeproof
Tony Graham, Unilever Corporation
Peter Greer, Director, Greer Industries Propriety Ltd.
Sandy Hamilton, DuPont Fibres Bayswater
Prue Hardiman, Health and Safety Coordinator, Royal Children's Hospital
Brian Hope, Manager, National Workers' Compensation and Risk Management Services,
Coles-My er Ltd.
Joe Jurisic, Manager, Human Resources, Nippondenso
Warwick Koochew, Manager, Workers' Compensation, Mayne Nickless, Ltd.
Sid Levett, Group Insurance and Risk Manager, Amcor, Ltd
Elizabeth McFail, Manager, Health and Safety, Royal Children's Hospital
Colin McLean, Senior Consultant on Safety, Health and Environment, Victorian Employers
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI)
Larry Meager, Manager, Safety, Employee and Environment, Transfield Tunnelling
Liz Menwood, Chairperson of Southeast WorkCover User Group, Southcorp
Richard Russell, Division Manager, Safety, Health and Environment, ICI Australia
Laura Sillitto, Manager, Claims Management, Coles-Myer Ltd.
Jim Smith, Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association,
John Smith, Senior Counsellor, Australian Chamber of Manufactures
Graeme Suckling, Risk Manager, University of Melbourne
lan Swann, Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association,
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Seyram Tawia, Manager, Safety, Health and Environment, Victorian Employers Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (VECCI)
Anne Taylor, Metal Trades Industry Association
Geoff Thomas, Manager, Human Resources, Thiess Contractors, P/L
David Trenerry, Director, Employee Relations, Shell Australia
Karen Wild, National Manager, Occupational Health and Safety, Australia National Bank
Ivan Wilson, Kemcor
Graeme Wishart, Manager, Occupational Health and Safety Projects, Coles-Myer Ltd.
Conciliation Service
Peter Jackson, Director, Conciliation Service
David Bryson, Conciliation Service
Richard Green, Senior Conciliation Officer, Conciliation Service
Fay Yule, Conciliation Officer
Unions
Mick Avent, Australian Education Union
Dr. Yossi Berger, Director, National Occupational Health and Safety, Australia Workers'
Union
Graham Burgess, Transport Workers Union
Gayle Burmeister, National Union of Workers
Thea Calzoni, Victorian Trades Hall Council
Gary Cameron, Trainer, Victorian Trades Hall Council, Occupational Health & Safety
Training Unit
Helen Casey, Divisional Branch Secretary, Australian Liquor, Hospitality, and Miscellaneous
Workers Union
Judith Edwards, Australian Nursing Federation Injured, Nurses Support Group
Gwynnyth Evans, WorkCover Project Officer, Victorian Trades Hall Council
Sue Fuller, Australia Manufacturing Workers' Union
Leigh Hubbard, Secretary, Victorian Trades Hall Council
Peter Kelly, President and Occupational Health and Safety Officer, National Union of Workers
Elina Koletsis-Dalziel, Finance Sector Union of Australia
Elizabeth Langford, Australian Nursing Federation, Victorian Branch
Geoff Lewin, State Public Services Federation/Community and Public Sector Union
Peter Livy, Plumbing Division, Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information,
Postal, Plumbing, & Allied Services Union of Australia
Claire McMurtry, Australian Liquor, Hospitality, and Hospitality Union
Mark Nelson, Industrial Officer, Finance Sector Union of Australia
Pat Preston, Construction, Forestry, Mining, Energy Union
Jeanette Sdrinis, Health Services Union of Australia
Kath Spence, Victorian Independent Education Union
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Mark Towler, Occupational Health and Safety Officer, Victorian Trades Hall Council,
Occupational Health & Safety Training Unit
Robyn Vale, Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union

Deborah Vallance, Health and Safety Officer, Australia Manufacturing Workers' Union
Tim Wall, Australian Education Union

Teresa Weiss, Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia
Margaret Williamson, Telecommunications & Services Branch, Communications, Electrical,
Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing, and Allied Services Union of
Australia
Other Government Agencies

Mike Bampfield, WorkCover Support Unit, Department of Treasury and Finance
Len Boehmn, Transport Accident Commission
Faye Burton, Director of WorkCover Support Unit, Department of Treasury and Finance
Eric Chalmers, Assistant Commissioner, General Insurance, Insurance and Superannuation
Commission
Jim Cox, Manager, Field Operations, WorkCover - New South Wales
Andrew Fronsko, Transport Accident Commission
Graeme Johnstone, State Coroner, Victoria
Judge Chester Keon-Cohen, County Court
Helen L'Orange, Acting CEO, WorkSafe Australia, Sydney
Alan Mahoney, Chief Executive Officer, Victorian Funds Management Corporation
Judge Brian McCarthy, Administrative Appeals Tribune
Lew Owens, CEO, WorkCover South Australia
Jeffrey Rae, Presiding Commissioner, Industry Commission
Consultants and Others

Neville Betts, General Secretary, Safety Institute of Australia, Victorian Division
Joe Buckley, Independent Actuary
John Catto-Smith, Community Skill Share
Jim Davidson, Deakin University
Martin Fry, Trowbridge Consulting
Nigel Hannam, Collins Hill
Richard Johnstone, Associate Professor of Law, University of Melbourne
Chris Knight, OSH Consultant, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Tore Larsson, Ballarat University
lan Phillips, Management Consultant, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Andrew Remenie, Director, Rehabilitation Studies, LaTrobe University
Stanley Rodski, Chairman, Rodski and Falls
Peter Rozen, Associate, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of
Melbourne
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Serge Sardo, Italian Community Assistance Organization (COASIT)
Chris Tipler, Collins Hill
Lawyers

Bryan Gurry, Corrs, Chambers, Westgarth
Paul Mulvaney, Slater & Gordon
Simon Parsons
John Price, Maurice Blackburn
Geoff Provis, Director, Law Institute of Victoria
David Tulloch, Purves Clarke Richards
E.R. Huan Walker, Dunhill, Madden, and Butler
Doctors and Representatives

Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.

Tony Buzzard
Peter Desmond, Rehabilitation Provider and Medical Practitioner, HDA Medical Group
Peter Disler, Rehabilitation Medicine, University of Melbourne
Robyn Horsley, Occupational Physician and Specialist in Occupational Medicine
Bruce Kinloch, Medical Director, Bethesda Hospital
Edwin Knight, Occupational Physician
Peter Lothian, Director, Medical Service and Spokesperson, Australian Medical
Association (AMA)
Dr. Ray Moore, General Practitioner
Paul Ryan, Australian Medical Association
Dr. Kevin Sleigh, Medical Director, Caterpillar
Dr. Mary Wyatt, General Practitioner, WorkCover Advisory Committee
Dr. David Kotzman, Medical Advisor, Medical Panels
Dr. Bill McCubbery, Convenor, Medical Panels
Rehabilitation Providers and Representatives

Craig Bosworth, Physiotherapist, Australian Physiotherapy Association
Martin Buekers, Executive Officer, Research and Policy Analysis, Commonwealth
Rehabilitation Services
Chris Foley, State Manager, Commonwealth Rehabilitation Services
Helena Gillies, Broad Meadows Community Occupational Rehabilitation Centre
Leslie Hagen, Health Services
Anne Hannebery, Occupational Therapist, Commonwealth Rehabilitation Services
Peter Harris, Manager, Internal Rehabilitation Supplier, Total Injury Management
Cathy Jordan, Occupational Therapist, Combrook Occupational Health, Safety, and
Rehabilitation
Vaughan Kieran, Managed Care
Jennifer Lake, Executive Director, Australian Physiotherapy Association
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Catherine Lindholm, Director, Work Solutions Group
Lino Magnano, State Manager, NatCover
Dr. Michael Nissen, CEO, Cedar Court Hospital
Rod Nissen, General Manager, Cedar Court Hospital
Peter Ruzyla, Maroondah Social and Community Health Centre
Pam Thompson, Maroondah Social and Community Health Centre
Anne Turner, Executive Director and Rehabilitation Consultant, Vocational Rehabilitation
Services
Mary Whelen, Physiotherapist, Australian Physiotherapy Association
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